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Since February 2008, the Kenyan government and society have been the focus of 
continued debate and sustained criticism from the global human rights and transitional 
justice community concerning the authenticity of the multiple transitional justice 
mechanisms that have been implemented in the country. Drawing from more than 
four years of fieldwork in Kenya and nearly 160 interviews with major Kenyan 
policymakers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), local and international NGOs, 
public intellectuals, retired judges, international legal commentators and human rights 
advocates in Addis Ababa, Cape Town, Geneva, London, Paris, and The Hague, this 
thesis identifies the political logic behind the justice-and reconciliation-seeking policy 
initiated by the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) policy.  
 
In its consideration of the complexity of defining and executing justice and 
reconciliation in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis in Kenya, this thesis attempts to 
explain how the continuing effort to increase democratisation and implement reforms 
following the post-election violence has inaugurated the use of a new language of 
transitional justice policy. It argues that such precarious trends present more 
instructive opportunities for–as well as obstructions to–international engagements in 
Kenya.  
 
Revisiting the reflections of Critical Peacebuilding Scholarship (CPS) and Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) on the administration of justice, this thesis suggests that the 
interaction between transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding exhibits a precarious 
condition for navigating law and politics in post-conflict reconstruction studies. 




the international society to understand that a liberal cosmopolitan conviction of 
justice, peace, reconciliation, accountability and mitigating impunity via the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the national Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) has not addressed the needs of the victims or succeeded in 
combating the infamous legacy of impunity in Kenyan politics. The utilitarian 
approach to understanding retributive and restorative theories of transitional justice is 
inimical and univariate, and excludes the local political contingency of Kenyan 
history. Consequently, it fails to provide a sound understanding of the power relations 
and ideological apparatus of the ICC and TJRC in the neo-patrimonial logic of 
Kenyan politics.  
 
Drawinng on Michel Foucault’s theory of power and Louis Althusser’s theory of 
ideology, this thesis suggests that the IDPs’ needs for justice and reconciliation are 
not satisfied by the solutions prescribed by international policymakers and the Kenyan 
ruling class. This thesis concludes that further attempts to empower the IDPs through 
transitional justice mechanisms have suffered from the overwhelming politicisation of 
justice in Kenya and the call for a greater recognition of the logic of neo-
patrimonialism in policing justice in Kenya. By recognising the transitional justice 
mechanisms’ inability to resolve ‘everything’, or to implement a one-size-fits-all 
policy of liberal peace in Kenya’s recent democratic crisis, this thesis illustrates how 
the IDPs used everyday acts of resistance as a mode of survival. It also shows how the 
ICC’s intervention and the release of the TJRC report have made the environments in 
which the IDPs live more hostile and difficult, which has hindered the process of 
normalising and reintegrating them back into society. Challenging the narrative of 




reconciliation that Kenya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) claims to have 
effected, this thesis reveals how the ICC and TJRC have become forms of disciplinary 
technology and ideological apparatus with which the ruling class disenfranchises and 
marginalises the IDPs, and keeps the “hidden transcript” regarding state, law and 
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Literally translated from Arabic as ‘The Youth’. A multiethnic 
and transnational terrorist group that currently based in the Horn 
of Africa and widely claimed by the Kenyan government to have 
a direct connection with Al-Qaeda (Muthoni, 2011: p.157). 
 
A neo-traditional or socio-legal mechanism that was adopted by 
the Rwandan government as employed as a form of transitional 
justice (Clark, 2011b: p.5). 
 
A form of identity document introduced by the Colonial Office in 
Kenya. The Native Registration Amendment Ordinance of 1920 
introduced by the British government made the card compulsory 
for African males above the age of 15, which restricted the 
people’s mobility (Anderson, 2005: p.15). 
 
A Swahili term that is widely associated with national debates on 
decentralization or devolution. The word became commonplace 
in the political arena around the time of independence and the 
first election (Anderson, 2010: p.23). 
 
A popular private mini bus or van in Kenya. The term is widely 
used in Swahili-speaking countries. The etymological root of the 
name is a Swahili colloquialism with many definitions. Popular 
among them referred to the actual cost of a ticket, which was 
matatu or 30 cents (Ogonda, 1992: p.17). 
 
The origin of the term is highly contested, as the first generation 
of Mau Mau fighters never referred themselves as such. Mau 
Mau uprising occurred during the emergency period (1952-1960), 
which saw the Kikuyu and other landless minorities against the 
colonial oppressive land polices and British military rule in East 
Africa. Besides failing to win the supports of other communities, 
they also suffered betrayal at the hand of rich Kikuyus. Their 
efforts were also undermined by the ruling elite of President 
Jomo Kenyatta’s regime, who inherited the immediate period of 
post-colonial state (Branch, 2009: p.10) 
 
A criminal group that was banned by the Kenyan government. It 
has become systematically organised by late 1980s. It claims 
tracing its roots to Mau Mau fighters though this claimed is 
highly contested. The group represents a modern symbol of the 
rejection of Westernization and anything that is perceived to be 
foreign. They operated as part of the ‘shadow world’ and perform 












A Latin termed, meaning ‘Never Again’ and used by the Argentinian 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons; later 
















































Swahili terms for ‘members of public’ or ‘ordinary people’. 
 
Literally translated as communal works or ‘let’s pull out together’, it 
also used as a figurative expression for collective rights, welfare and 
wealth distribution. Popularised during the reign of Kenyatta. It was 
used to refer to specific neo-patrimonial practices in Kenya, with 
which the ruling elite obtained grassroots supports from the local 
community by providing immediate financial support to citizens as a 
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Chapter 1: Thesis Framework and Research Methodology 
 
A – Introduction  
 
On the day after the Electoral Commission of Kenya’s announcement that Mwai 
Kibaki, from the Party of National Unity (PNU), had won the presidential seat, a-37-
year-old priest from the Luo community received information that there had been a 
sudden outbreak of violence in the town of Londiani. The frustration of the Orange 
Democratic Movement’s (ODM) supporters had exploded when it was confirmed that 
Kibaki would be re-elected as Kenya’s president. For them, the injustice of a stolen 
election had to be fought with arrows and machetes.  
 
As the priest was heading back to his house from a nearby shop, he stopped at a 
junction where a number of Luo and Kalenjin youths had gathered. One of them 
chanted: Sasa tunaenda kuchukua silaha tuanze kazi, (‘we are now going to collect 
weapons to start work’). As they were beginning to become out of control, the priest 
walked towards the nearby village, inhabited mostly by Kibaki voters. Here the priest 
tried to reason with Luo and Kalenjin youths, by calling for restraint. They simply 
answered that their votes had been stolen, and that the Kikuyus had long denied them 
the wealth that was due to them. He then asked one of the women present why she 
was encouraging her son and relatives to attack the Kikuyus’ village; she replied, 
‘Why are you stopping these young men of your own Luo blood, from attacking the 
Kikuyus, even though they have been denying us for a very long time?’. As the priest 
tried to call the police from his mobile phone, the woman started throwing stones at 
him and accused him of being a traitor to his own community. As he belonged to the 




stop them from slaughtering the Kikuyus, or should he allow them to seek vengeance 
following for their stolen votes? Despite his brief intervention, the entire Kikuyus 
village in Londiani was burned to the ground that night.  
 
The priest’s story1 is just one of thousands of personal narratives relating to the 
violence that occurred during the 2007 election in Kenya (see also Njogu, 2009). In 
the face of extreme social devastation, Kenyans faced many dilemmas similar to that 
of the priest in responding to the violence; between seeking justice for a community 
on the one hand, and peace for the other communities on the other hand (Makokha 
and Opondo, 2008: p.16). The above narratives recall the traumatic memory of the 
conflicting desire for both justice and peace among various ethnic communities 
during the period of post-election violence. This is the latest phase in a cycle of 
violence that has recurred throughout Kenya’s recent history (Adebanwi and Obadare, 
2011; Kossler, 2008; Schaller, 2008). The electoral violence significantly reversed the 
progress of Kenya and many other of Africa’s ‘new democracies’2, and the crisis 
nearly reached the same scale as that which resulted in genocide in Rwanda (Schaller, 
2008: p.341). While competitive elections have been par for the course in African 
politics for two decades, the spiral effect of the violence of this particular election 
radically undermined the democratic process (Mueller, 2011: p.100). It reversed much 
of the democratic progress hitherto made and threatened the on-going attempt to 
cultivate a peaceful political practice between the plural societies of African nations 
                                                        
1  The above is a depiction of the anecdote of one of the survivors of the post-election violence; 
he voluntarily shared his story during the author’s first visit to the IDP’ camps in 2009. However, the 
individual has been given a surrogate name by the author (interview with IDP no. 8, Rift Valley, 
February 24, 2009).   
2  The term ‘new democracies’ has been used to describe the electoral processes of the different 
African countries since the 1990s. Despite being based on a strong desire for greater democratisation 
and a rejection of authoritarian politics, the electoral practices were characterised by unreliable 
electoral management and disputes, which sometime became violent. This had a markedly detrimental 




(Opitz et al., 2013: p.715; Orji, 2013: p.394). While the literature concerning political 
violence asserts that there had been a significant decrease in instances of military rule, 
and armed insurgencies by the end of the Cold War (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; 
Gleditsch et al., 2002; Henderson and Singer, 2000; Karbo, 2008; Reno, 1999), the 
return of multiparty elections have contributed to a recent trend towards the outbreak 
of violence in Africa’s democracies (Abuya, 2010; Cowen, 2002; Laakso and Cowen, 
2002; Morse, 2012).  
 
In its contribution to these outbreaks of violence, the democratic crisis in Kenya 
underscores many wider concerns about the tendencies of international and regional 
actors to resolve election disputes by using the liberal peace model of power-sharing 
as a means of providing crisis management, humanitarian intervention and transitional 
justice (Kagwanja and Southall, 2010: p.7).  In this case, the liberal peace model of 
crisis management was used to address the similar dilemmas of Zimbabwe (Boone 
and Kriger, 2010), Nigeria (Larémont, 2010), Uganda (Conroy-Krutz and Logan, 
2012), Mali (Ahluwalia, 2013), Ivory Coast (Lokongo, 2012) and Libya (Çubukçu, 
2013).  
 
This liberal peace model of democratisation and its shortcomings are worthy of 
consideration for several reasons. Firstly, most of the recent instances of political 
violence in Kenya were democracy-related. Consequently, this has reinvigorated the 
long-running debate on the crisis of legitimacy, and has questioned the post-colonial 
state’s ability to resist threats (Herbst, 1989; 2000a; 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). 
Secondly, the power-sharing and transitional justice policies that have been 




practice of patronage politics (Bayart, 2009; Clapham, 1996; Hyden and Colin, 1972; 
2006). Thirdly, the adoption of this model of liberal peace and transitional justice is a 
repetition of the mistakes of implementing the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) 
template, which does not address one of the main causes of the crisis itself: neo-
patrimonialism (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Curtis, 2013; Samuelson and 
Musila, 2011; Vambe and Zegeye, 2012). Finally, the democratic process and the 
continuous circulation of power among various members of the African ruling elite 
provided the marginalised groups (and other opposition movements who had hitherto 
lived in the peripheral spaces of the state and suffered gross violations of human 
rights) to redefine their positions through a vocabulary of justice, accountability and 
sanction (Kiwuwa, 2013: p.263).  
 
Specifically, with the commentator’s concern about the increasingly hostile reception 
of the ICC in Africa, and the recent accounts of Al-Shabaab’s terror in Nairobi, the 
campaigning of opposition movements for victims’ access to justice has triggered the 
rise of legalist discourse and an increased application of the politics of justice in 
recent election disputes. In her observation of the ICC intervention in the Ivory Coast, 
Giulia Piccolino examines the relationship between a legalist discourse of rights and 
the politico-military crisis that arose after President Laurent Gbagbo seized power 
(2014: p.62). Gbagbo’s heavy reliance on a language of justice and the opposition-
driven, legalist discourse of democratisation is mainly owing to Alassane Ouattara’s 
failure to atone for decades of economic disparity, rights violations and political 
impunity (2011: p.21). Accordingly, the more violations that were perpetrated by 
those in power, the more the opposition and the agents of international intervention 





In the aftermath of the post-election violence in Kenya, the admission of the Kenyan 
case to the ICC served to catalyse international intervention through the use of the 
legalist discourses of transitional justice and the politics of reconciliation (Sriram. and 
Brown, 2012: p.240). In the literature of transitional justice, it is gradually being 
acknowledged that the limited success of attempts to utilise post-conflict justice 
mechanisms in South Africa, Sierra Leone and Rwanda has confirmed the need for a 
more flexible methodology in the theory and practice of international relations. These 
cases also call for a clearer understanding that the act of implementing transitional 
justice policy is more than simply a discreet legal process and requires a heightened 
degree of political analysis in order to be successful (Clark, 2012b; Clark, 2010; 
Kelsall, 2009).  
 
The shortcomings of the existing literature on transitional justice are owing to a lack 
of focus on the current interplay between politics and law; analytically, the role of this 
interplay in securing some forms of justice of reconciliation has not yet been fully 
grasped (Thomson and Nagy, 2011). With the ICC’s recent, simultaneous waging of 
judicial and political battles in many African countries, the growth of in-depth 
research publications and critical reflections on transitional justice has mushroomed. 
Although many of these publications are rich in empirical findings, few have 
succeeded in conducting clear theoretical investigations; rather, many have rephrased 
similar, pre-existing Critical Legal Studies (CLS) perspectives on the interplay 
between law and politics (Buckley-Zistel et al., 2014; Sriram et al., 2013). In 
particular, within the growing concerns of international thought and practice, what 




compares against the actual reality of administering international justice. A further 
unresolved issue is the question of how the fluidity of intersection between 
transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding affects to the existing positions of 
scholars of Critical Legal Studies on the interplay between politics and law.  
 
This thesis recognises the need to bridge such gaps in the literature of transitional 
justice, and uses the ongoing situation in Kenya as a framework within which to 
position the country’s transitional justice institution within the broader constellation 
of law and politics. In the process, this thesis provides some critical reflections on the 
Kenya situation in order to gain some new footholds in transitional justice theory. For 
example, the extent of the manipulation of the language of justice by the political elite 
is underestimated in the literature on Kenyan politics (Brown, 2013; Hansen, 2010a; 
2010b; 2011c; 2011d; 2013a; 2013b). The victims’ demands for justice and reparation 
were manipulated by the political elite, and the victims’ needs for justice remained 
unaddressed (interview with University of Nairobi’s lecturer no. 1, Nairobi, March 
18, 2009). This serves to create circumstances ripe for future outbreaks of violence 
rather than for the resolution of existing troubles (Greiner, 2013; Lynch and 
Anderson, 2013; LeBas, 2013; Mati, 2013). Hence, the detrimental effect of this 
electoral violence upon the development and refinement of transitional justice and the 
prevention of political violence deserves a lengthy investigation, since it is 
characterised by ‘continuous ambiguity’ (interview with US International University’s 
lecturer no. 3, Nairobi, March 23, 2009).  
 
‘Continuous ambiguity’ here refers to a prolonged state of confusion or contestation 




period became inextricably associated with what was perceived to be a regressive 
outcome, and continuously impeded the justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy that 
later came into play when both commentators and policymakers started to construct 
viable and legitimate claims of accountabilities for mass atrocities against certain 
parties (see Nicolli, 2008; Zartman and Kremenyuk, 2005).  
 
Equally important is the ambiguity concerning the violence itself, in that there is now 
a conflicting desire for both peace and justice in the wake of the electoral violence 
(interview with IDP no. 7, Rift Valley, February 23, 2009). Different communities’ 
attachments to collective (and constructed) primordial cleavages in Kenya reproduced 
a fictional divide between contested identity and group categorisation (Lynch, 2011c: 
p.400). If the fluidity of identity is a ‘modern invention’ (in which an individual 
claims himself to be a ‘son of the soils’) and results from what John Lonsdale terms as 
‘autochthony’ or ‘a political strategy rather than historical fact’, the post-election 
violence that revolved around politics of belonging could not have simply appeared 
uniquely as a result of global repercussions of the 1990s elections that swept through 
Africa; rather it is a consequence of the vulnerability imposed on these communities 
by the existing disparities, economic inequalities, negative ethnicities and ferocious 
patronage struggles between the favored barons in their attempts to tighten their grip 
on the state (Lonsdale, 2008: p.310). ‘It is not to guard against some existential global 
threat that African[s] expel stranger neighbors from their local community…rather, [it 
is] against, the daily inequalities…by which [the] states decide who is to gain…and 
who [to] bear [the] cost’ (pp.310-11). What remains pertinent is how autochthonous 




continuous sense of ambiguity that reversed democratic progress and perpetuated 
further injustices (Interview with IJR officer, Cape Town, July 15, 2011).  
 
Stories like that of the priest and his dilemma–whether to take the side of his 
community or of another group during the violent period–have not only confirmed 
Lonsdale’s critical assertion concerning the political function of primordial 
attachments in mobilising support, orchestrating violence and claiming human rights; 
more importantly, they have challenged the simple and criminal binary dichotomy 
between victim and perpetrator based on this notion of fluid identity. This dichotomy 
had a seriously obstructive effect on the justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy that 
was implemented following the power-sharing agreement between President Mwai 
Kibaki and Prime Minister Rahila Odinga in 2008 (see Table 1.1). After all, the 
debate on justice, accountability, peace and reconciliation after the intensified period 
of election violence and the model of crisis management in Kenya has been 
‘exported’ to similar hybrid democracies, such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Mali and the Ivory Coast (Straus, 2012: p.15). Kenya is one of the few 
hybrid democracies in which the electoral processes have been accompanied by 
recurring outbreaks of violence followed by intense but overly ambitious attempts to 
address these outbreaks with reform and justice (interview with CIC officer no. 1, 
Nairobi, February 7, 2012). For this reason and other outlined below Kenya has been 
selected as the main case study for this thesis.  
 
Table 1.1: Agreement on the Principle of Partnership (Power Sharing) 
Acting together for Kenya: Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition 
Government 
Preamble 
The crisis triggered by the 2007 disputed presidential election has brought to the surface 




these divisions threaten the very existence of Kenya as a unified country. The Kenyan 
people are now looking to their leaders to ensure that their country will not be lost. 
 
Given the current situation, neither side can realistically govern the country without the 
other. There must be real power-sharing to move the country forward and begin the 
healing and reconciliation processes. 
 
With this agreement, we are stepping forward together, as political leaders, to overcome 
the current crisis and to set the country on a new path. As partners in a coalition 
government, we commit ourselves to work together in good faith as true partners, 
through constant consultation and willingness to compromise. 
 
This agreement is designed to create an environment conducive to such a partnership 
and to build mutual trust and confidence. It is not about creating positions that reward 
individuals. It seeks to enable Kenya’s political leaders to look beyond partisan 
considerations with a view to promoting the greater interests of the nation as a whole. It 
provides the means to implement a coherent and far-reaching reform agenda, to address 
the fundamental rot causes of recurrent conflict, and to create a better, more secure, 
more prosperous Kenya for all. 
 
To resolve the political crisis, and in the spirit of coalition and partnership, we have 
agreed to enact the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008, whose provisions have 
been agreed upon their entirely by the parties hereto and a draft copy thereof is 
appended hereto. 
Its key points are: 
 There will be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya with authority to 
coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the 
Government of Kenya. 
 The Prime Minister will be an elected member of the National Assembly and the 
parliamentary leader of the largest party in the National Assembly, or of a 
coalition, if the largest party does not command majority. 
 Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the National 
Assembly to be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister. 
 The Cabinet will consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, 
the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the other Ministers. The removal off any 
Ministers of the coalition will be subject to consultation and concurrence in 
writing by the leaders. 
 The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister can only be removed if the 
National Assembly passes a motion of no confidence with a majority vote. 
 The composition of the coalition government will at all time take into account 
the principle of portfolio balance and will reflect their relative parliamentary 
strength. 
 The coalition will be dissolved if the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or if the 
parties agree in writing; or if one coalition partner withdraws from the coalition. 
 The National Accord and Reconciliation Act shall be entrenched in the 
Constitution. 
Having agreed on the critical issues above, we will now take this process to Parliament. 
It will be convened at the earliest moment to enact these agreements. This will be in the 
form of an Act of Parliament ad the necessary amendment to the constitution. 
 
We believe by this step we can together in the spirit of partnership bring peace and 
prosperity back to the people of Kenya who so richly deserve it. 
 






        Hon. Rahila Odinga                                          H.E. President Mwai Kibaki 
         Orange Democratic Movement                         Government/Party of National Unity 
 
Witnessed By: 
       H.E. Kofi Annan H.E.                                          President Jakaya Kikwete 
            Chairman of the Panel                     President of the United Republic of Tanzania 
Of Eminent African Personalities                         and the Chairman of the African Union 
Source: (KNDR Secretariat, Niarobi, 2008) 
  
B – Objective and Research Inquiries 
 
This thesis explores the nature of post-conflict attempts to administer transitional 
justice in Kenya. It focuses in particular on the role of the legal and political 
institutions that were established in the wake of the 2008 disputes over the 
presidential election, with specific attention paid to the role of the national Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). This thesis explores these institutional arrangements through a critical lens, 
drawing on Michel Foucault’s conception of power and Louis Althusser’s conception 
of ideology. The thesis’ central argument is that the attempts of these institutions to 
successfully implement some form of post-conflict justice in Kenya was flawed 
because they did not take into account how these institutional arrangements were 
being manipulated by Kenya’s political elite with the aim of reinforcing their power 
and promoting an ideology that connected them with the global ideological apparatus 
of post-conflict peacebuilding. The thesis substantiates this claim by focusing on how 
these institutions failed to address the problems of Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs), whose political subjectivity and agency were denied in the process of 





This thesis draws from an extensive bibliography that has been compiled using 
sources from legal and political theory, Kenyan politics, Transitional Justice and 
critical IR theory. This thesis also utilises material that has been mined from 157 
interviews with individuals from Kenya, including IDPs and members of the 
international civil service charged with carrying out the ICC’s arrest warrants. The 
central focus of this thesis is on transitional justice institutions, and measures that are 
later identified as forms of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy. Since it is nearly 
impossible to analyse all of the measures undertaken by the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) or those which emanated from KNDR’s ambitious scope (see Table 
1.2), the examination will be limited to two major instruments of justice- and 
reconciliation-seeking policy, which will later be identified in this thesis as being 
related to transitional justice mechanisms; the ICC and TJRC. Framing transitional 
justice in this thesis involves an examination of the Kenyan government's ambitious 
attempt to resolve the electoral crisis. This attempt later became an ambiguous and 
controversial case for justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya.  
Table 1.2: Agenda Item Three – How To Resolve the Political Crisis 
Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
Mediated by H.E. Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
14 February 2008 
I. Preamble: 
Reaffirming the Goal of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation. 
 
To ensure that the National Dialogue and Reconciliation is carried out in a continuous 
and sustained manner towards resolving the political crisis arising from the disputed 
presidential election results as well as the ensuing violence in Kenya, in line with the 
agreement between His Excellency Mwai Kibaki and Honorable Raila Odinga, as 
publicly announced on 24th January and reaffirmed on 29th January 2008 at Country 
Hall in Nairobi. 
 
The final goal of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation is to achieve sustainable 
peace, stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. 
 
Recognising under Agenda Item Three that, in large measure, the current crisis resolves 
around the issues of power and functioning of state institutions, and also recognising 
that its resolution may require adjustments to the current constitutional, legal and 




resolving the political crisis arising from the disputed presidential electoral results as 
well as the ensuing violence in Kenya. 
 
II. Regarding the disputed presidential electoral results, we examined the following 
options: 
 
(a) Complete Re-count of the Presidential Elections. 
 
We agreed that any re-count, to be considered credible in the eyes of the Kenyan 
people, would need to be nation-wide, involving a ballot by ballot scrutiny of all of the 
more than 11,000,000 ballots cast on December 27, 2007. We agreed that all ballots and 
electoral materials, would have be made available at counting centres across the 
country before announcing a re-count. A re-count would need to be conducted under 
the full scrutiny of trained observers and party agents, who would have the right to 
scrutinize the counting and verify each and every ballot. 
 
We agreed that a re-count would need to be overseen by a special appointed 
independent body that enjoys the trusts and broad support of all Kenyans. We 
considered the timeline for a possible re-count. We agreed that the preparatory work 
required to make a re-count credible in the eyes of the Kenyan people and in keeping 
with international best practices could take up to three months. 
 
We were concerned that a delay of several months could significantly increase existing 
tensions and delay resolution of the current crisis, and we recognize that the result of a 





We agreed that any re-tally, to be considered credible in the eyes of the Kenyan people, 
would need to be nation-wide, involving full scrutiny and re-tally of results sheets from 
all of the more than 27,500 polling station tally sheets and 210 constituency tally sheets. 
We agreed that all forms would have to be made available across the country before 
announcing the re-tally. A re-tally would need to be conducted under the full scrutiny 
of trained observers and party agents, who would have the right to scrutinize the 
conduct of the process and the validity of the each tally sheet, and would need to be 
overseen by a specially appointed independent body that enjoys the trusts and broad 
support of all Kenyans. 
 
While we agreed that a re-tally could successfully identify problems or irregularities in 
the tally sheets, a re-tally could not however identify the correct result in those stations 
or constituencies where problems or irregularities were identified. 
 
For these reasons, we decided to review other options. 
 
(c) Re-run of President Elections 
 
We were not in agreement on the need for a re-run of the Presidential elections. 
 
We agreed however that, to safeguard the trust and confidence of the Kenyans people 
in the democratic process, the next election should take place only after the electoral 
reforms, including but not limited to the reform of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, 
finalizations of the work of the Independent Review Committee, updating of the Voters’ 
List, establishment and improvement of dispute resolution mechanisms and effecting 






We considered the timeline for these reforms, which would be essential to make the 
process credible in the eyes of the Kenyans people, and in line with international best 
practices, would be substantial and would take at least one year. 
 
We recognized that Kenyans could not wait that long for a resolution of the crisis, and 
we therefore decided to review other options 
 
(d) Judicial Process 
 
We agreed that a judicial process was no longer an option as the legal time limit had 
expired, and we therefore decided to review other options. 
 
(e) Forensic Audit 
 
We considered a forensic audit of the electoral process. We agreed that an audit would 
have the advantage of investigating and making findings regarding the conduct of the 
2007 election. We agreed that an audit will not reduce tension and violence and will not 
result in solution to the crisis, and that the legal basis for such an audit was unclear. 
 
We further agreed that the functions of a forensic audit would be best undertaken by an 
Independent Review Committee 
 
(f) Independent Review Committee 
 
We agree to establish an Independent Review Committee that would be mandated to 
investigate all aspects of the 2007 Presidential Election and would make findings and 
recommendations to improve the electoral process. 
 
The committee will be a non-judicial body made up of Kenyan and non-Kenyan 
recognized electoral experts of the highest professional standing and personal integrity. 
 
The Committee will submit its report within 3-6 months and it should be published 
within 14 days of submission. The Committee should start its work not later than 15 
March 2008. 
 
The findings of the Independent Review Committee must be factored into the 
comprehensive electoral reforms that are envisaged. 
 
III. Regarding the need for a political settlement to resolve the current crisis, we agree 
on the following points: 
 
We recognize that there is a serious crisis in the country, we agree a political settlement 
is necessary to promote national reconciliation and unity. 
 
We also agree that such a political settlement must be one that reconciles and heals the 
nation and reflects the best interests of all Kenyans. A political settlement is necessary 
to manage a broad reform agenda and other mechanisms that will address the root 
causes of the crisis. 
 
Such reforms and mechanisms will comprise, but are not limited to, the following: 
 




 Comprehensive electoral reform – of the electoral laws, the electoral 
commission and dispute resolution mechanisms; 
 A truth justice and reconciliation commission; 
 Identification and prosecution of perpetrators of violence; 
 Parliamentary reform; 
 Police reform; 
 Legal and judicial reforms; 
 Commitment to a shared national agenda in Parliament for these reforms; 
 Other legislative, structural, political and economic reforms as needed. 
 
We have only outstanding issue under this Agenda Item, the governance structure, 
which is being actively discussed. Several options have emerged and the parties are 
going to consult their principals and leadership on these options and will revert to the 
chair shortly. 
 
We also agree that the issue in Agenda Item Four are fundamental to the root causes of 
the crisis, and are closely linked with Agenda Item Three. The implementation of the 
following reforms should commence urgently in concert with reforms of Agenda Item 
Three. However, these processes may continue beyond the timeline of the next election. 
 
 Consolidating national cohesion and unity; 
 Land reform; 
 Tackling poverty and inequity, as well as combating regional development 
imbalances, particularly promoting equal access to opportunity; 
 Tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth; 
 Reform public Service; 
 Strengthening of anti-corruption laws/public accountability mechanisms; 
 Addressing issues of accountability and transparency. 
 
We recognize that this settlement is not about sharing of political positions but about 
addressing the fundamental root causes of recurrent conflict, and we reaffirm our 
commitment to address the issues within Agenda Item Four expeditiously and 
comprehensively. 
 
Milestones and benchmarks for the implementation of the reform agenda will have to be 
defined. 
Source: (KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2008) 
When implemented in liberal peacebuilding paradigms, advocates of transitional 
justice argue that its mechanism facilitates a wider access to justice and promotes 
greater democratisation (Arenhovel, 2008; Elster, 2004; Teitel, 2000). Yet there is a 
need to investigate how transitional justice becomes part of the existing attempts to 
implement democratisation, rather than signfying democratic transition in Kenya 
(Brown, 2013; Hansen, 2012b). There is an overwhelming tendency in the literature 




environment in Latin America and Eastern European countries as similar to the 
current situation concerning the consolidation of democracy and post-conflict 
peacebuilding in African countries like Kenya. While integrating transitional justice 
with broader liberal peacebuilding concerns leads to broader institutional reforms 
projects (as are currently being witnessed in the country), it will later be argued that 
neither the ICC nor the TJRC’s proceedings are directly connected to the victims’ 
ordinary or everyday understanding of justice and reconciliation in Kenya (fieldwork 
note no. 1, Rift Valley, February 29, 2009).   
 
It is nearly impossible to frame uniform national narratives of justice and 
reconciliation (interview with IDP no. 3, Rift Valley, February 15, 2009). For 
example, the TJRC hearing sessions in one district differs from those of another 
district less than a kilometre away. Arguably, the process is evolving and may 
eventually contribute to a generic understanding of justice and reconciliation in 
Kenyan society but to date this is uncertain. In exploring the nature of the situation 
that arose from the KNDR agreement, the term ‘transitional justice mechanism(s) or 
institution(s)’ (as explored in Chapter 2) and the term ‘justice- and reconciliation-
seeking policy’ in Kenya (as illustrated in Chapter 3) will be used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. This is owing to the lack of a general agreement in transitional 
justice literature (Olsen et al., 2010a: p.9), and contemporary Kenyan politics (Lynch 
and Zgonec-Rozej, 2013: p.6) as to whether a specific policy undertaken after conflict 
can be legitimately identified as a case study for transitional justice.  
 
The pragmatic approach taken in this thesis has been selected on the basis of the fact 




specified in the wider literature in transitional justice. Additionally, the approach 
focuses on the increasing interaction between two sides of the same coin of 
international intervention: Transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding as part 
of the broader liberal cosmopolitan agenda that has endured since the end of the Cold 
War (see Lambourne, 2004; 2009; Lambourne and Herro, 2008; Paris, 2004; 
Richmond, 2012). The interaction between that two fields is of crucial concern here, 
and an examination of how the process of terminating post-election violence in Kenya 
is “becoming” increasingly relevant to a debate that is commonly associated with 
transitional justice: how to implement the transitional justice mechanism through 
peacebuilding practices (see Brown, 2013).  
 
‘Traditionally, peacebuilding and transitional justice literatures and practice either 
have not engaged one another or have been in tension, or even opposition’ (Garcia-
Godos and Sriram, 2013: p.1). ‘Much ink has been spilled on the purposes and 
content of both transitional justice and peacebuilding, and both concepts continue to 
evolve’ (p.12) In this context, this thesis draws from the author’s recent experiences 
in Kenya and is an attempt to critically advance an understanding of how two 
different fields collude or entwine. The following questions will be posed; in what 
way have the measures put forward by the KNDR agreement responded to the legacy 
of electoral violence and a long decade of historical violence in Kenya, and how did 
they later interact with the mechanisms commonly associated with transitional 
justice? How have the major actors responded to justice- and reconciliation-seeking 
policy, and in what ways has it been employed as a political and judicial tool? What 
political factors and considerations underlie the epistemic assumptions and 




justice into peacebuilding practices, and how has this enriched the debate on justice- 
and reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya? Finally: what is the realistic potential of 
transitional justice mechanisms to reduce future political violence, and what are the 
limitations? 
 
C – The Justification of the Case Study 
 
Having outlined the key research inquiries, it now remains to justify the 
aforementioned country and subject: Kenya and, justice- and reconciliation-seeking 
policies. Kenya is interesting because ‘renditions of the causes, debates about the 
outcome and prospects of the country’s worrying situation are both intense and 
polarising, reflecting diverse political shades and ideological predilections of analysts’ 
(Kagwanja and Southall, 2010: p.1). Unaspiringly, the post-election crisis has 
‘inspired a burst of academic productivity’ (Abrahamsen and Cheeseman, 2013: p.1) 
in numerous publications during the few years since the crises came to be regarded as 
the worst event to befall the country since independence. Moreover, when both 
principals–Kibaki and Odinga–agreed to end the electoral violence, they set out an 
agenda negotiated in the power-sharing agreement, which was to be included in the 
justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy (Chapter 3). Yet, there has been more 
disagreement than consensus among key partners of the GNU on the need to 
implement the justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy, owing mostly to the 
institutional constraints imposed on the state following the flawed and unstable 
power-sharing peace agreement (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Cheeseman, 2011; 





Among the core elements constituting this agreement was a general call for the 
criminal prosecution of perpetrators of electoral violence (accountability); and the 
formation of the TJRC. The implementation of a power-sharing settlement in Kenya 
not only ensured the institutionalisation of both the TJRC and ICC, but also the 
sequences that eventually led to further expeditious reforms by establishing a new 
constitution and implementing electoral management, democratic consolidation and 
peacebuilding practices. As such, compared to the many transitional justice 
institutions worldwide, Kenya’s hybrid processes and multiple mechanisms of justice- 
and reconciliation-seeking policy are ambitious. They are also controversial in their 
attempts to expand transitional justice into other fields of political reforms: the 
repairing of social contracts, peacebuilding, governance, greater democratisation and 
historical injustice.  
 
Kofi Annan has argued that the implementation of the agreement is ‘a unique 
opportunity for Kenya’ and offers the wananchi (citizen) ‘a constitutional moment’ 
with which to free Kenya from the post-independence scramble of civil war, uneven 
development, political impunity, corruption and systematic violations of human rights 
that are synonymous with the African politics (Annan, 2008: p.7). However, as will 
be explored later, many skeptics (particularly advocates of human rights) have 
criticized the ‘Kenyan way’ of transitional justice, decrying it as a ‘cosmetic sham’ 
and a politicisation of justice that complicates the legal process for addressing the 
mass atrocities (Amadi, 2009: p.151). 
 
The above gives a general outline of why there is a widespread concern that similar 




Ivory Coast, Mali and Libya in their attempts to deal with their crises. Following the 
election disputes in Kenya, there was a vague but overwhelming demand for justice 
and long overdue political reforms, which would be implemented at the expense of 
transitional justice mechanisms. Due to an increasing emphasis on the rule of law and 
peacebuilding practices within the majority of the aforementioned countries, power-
sharing peace agreements and broad democratic reforms through international-
regional interventions have come to be associated with a vague demand for criminal 
accountability at the expense of transitional justice (Jarstad, 2009: p.49; Mindzie, 
2010: p.115).  
 
One of the oddities of this post-conflict reconstruction model is the multiple, hybrid 
mechanisms of transitional justice; and the intersection of its mechanism with an 
international peacebuilding agenda (as in the UN's agenda in 2004). This has 
expanded the general understanding of justice, which now seems ideal in theory but 
elusive in practice (Binningsbø et al., 2012: p.738; McAdams, 2011: p.8; Sriram, 
2010: p.282). In the words of one the TJRC’s officers, ‘never before has a study of 
how to implement a peace agenda in the wake of disputed elections in Africa or 
anywhere else been associated with a transitional justice’ (interview with TJRC 
Officer no. 1, Nairobi, February 5, 2012).  
 
Yet, the anomalies that have arisen from Kenya’s situation have demystified 
transitional justice as a subject of law, and therefore separable from politics. This 
arguably is an indication of a recent development of transitional justice as having 




politically synonymous with “coming to terms with past wrongdoings”.3 Interestingly, 
it was the maxim of Nunca Mas (Never Again) used in relation to Argentina’s 
experience of coming to terms with its past atrocities that enriched the debate on 
transitional justice (see Crenzel, 2008; 2011).  
 
From specifically international criminal law (ICL) literatures and retrospective studies 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, transitional justice has evolved into a 
multidisciplinary field that has attracted various non-legal commentators, including 
political scientists, economists, psychologists and socio-anthropologists (Arthur, 
2009; Elster, 2004; Kritz, 1995; Minow, 1998). Chapter 2 describes the genealogical 
development of transitional justice, how the current transitional justice literature is 
relatively distinct and is becoming multidisciplinary and how it later came to interact 
with peacebuilding scholarship. Below, it will be shown how transitional justice’s 
deepening affinity with liberal peacebuilding projects makes a strong case for 
navigating law and politics in post-conflict studies.  
 
D – Navigating Law and Politics: Pursuing Transitional Justice through 
Peacebuilding Practices 
In the introduction to the four edited volumes of Law and Politics, Keith Whittington 
has argued that while modern political studies focus on the ‘scientific’ assessment of 
the state and how power is revolved, law focuses on the state’s legal façade; and how 
the state enforces its legislative regulations (2013: p.I). Hence, the intersection 
between politics and law continues to be an ‘important element’ of political studies, in 
                                                        
3  Since its interaction with other fields like peacebuilding, democratisation and development, 
transitional justice have moving increasingly towards an examination of how various societies come to 
terms with their past wrongdoings. Consequently, transitional justice has found its way into diplomatic 
mission to resolve crises that cannot be analytically categories as belonging to a clear regime change. 




which the legal procedures serve as both an instrument (realist) of the state, as well as 
a source of constraint (liberalist) with which to police the state (Widner, 2001: pp.66-
7). If a study of law tends to focus on the ‘administrative’ dimension of enacting 
power, political studies concerned with the ‘enforcement’ of justice by those in power 
provides us with a better understanding of state-society relations (Dowrkin, 1982: 
p.199). For example, a study of the impact of human rights and constitutional laws 
upon the consolidation of democracy in developing countries would fulfill this 
purpose (Falk et al., 2006: p.711-12).  
 
Such studies of constitutional law, judiciary and legislative relations were 
‘acknowledged’ to be essential to advancing researchers’ understanding of the state 
and its legal obligations (Laryezower et al., 2002: p.713). ‘It is true that politics are 
not law, but an adequate notion of a body of law cannot be gained without 
understanding the society in and for which it exists, …’ (Westlake, 1894: p.92). In 
today’s scholarship, there is widespread concern about the uneasy relationship 
between politics and law at the global level, which may only serve to confirm the 
longstanding antinomy between the social contract debates of Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan and John Locke’s Two Treatise of Governments (Lee, 2010: p.3).  
 
In examining the nature of authority in both classical works, Anthony Lang’s 
observation on the execution of punishment and justice in the post-Cold War period 
has revealed the extent of the tension between politics and law (see Lang, 2008: 
pp.28-38). The recognition of this tension is attributable to both writers and their 
experiences of living through the English Civil War. Living as a political exile with 




famous thesis on the importance of having a robust leviathan (sovereign) as an 
authority for maintaining peace4, but not for dispensing justice (p.30). Hobbes did not 
recognise the juridical authority that was wielded by foreign powers, or by those who 
did not belong to the political community about which he was writing (p.30). Such a 
“realist” understanding of sovereignty may help to explain the state’s reluctance to be 
subjected to universal jurisdiction (by means of the ICC and R2P), although mass 
atrocities have been legally recognised as constituting crimes against humanity, which 
removed the state’s exclusive entitlement to sovereignty and overrode its policy of 
refusing to be subjected to international intervention (Lee, 2010: p.20).  
 
In contrast to Hobbes, Locke (who also lived as an exile during the later stages of the 
same war, but against the monarch) based his understanding of punishment for 
violations perpetrated in a state of nature or emergency on assumptions that the 
subjects or ‘individuals have certain natural rights’ to defend themselves (Lang, 2008: 
p.33). This state of nature resembles the current anarchical features of the 
international system, which functions without a single governmental authority. It is 
also significant that the continuing mass atrocities in the state of anarchy required 
some form of criminal accountability to be imposed by supranational entity like the 
ICC (Francis and Francis, 2010: p.62). Arguably, Locke’s recognition of various 
individual rights, including that of the foreigner to exercise justice if they are not 
subjects of the sovereign (who committed crimes against humanity) served as a 
starting point for many international criminal debates on the justification for using 
international law to impose sanctions on the state in punishment for its wrongdoings 
(Drumbl, 2007: p.15).  
                                                        
4  What Hobbes understands as the maintenance of peace and order by the strong legitimate 
sovereign is recognized by transitional justice literature as negative peace, because it is synonymous 





As such an interdependent yet conflicting relationship between politics and law has 
‘reappeared’ in studies of how society comes to terms with its past wrongdoings 
through a war crime tribunal; or studies the state’s reluctance to surrender its 
sovereignty to ICL sanctions (Bassiouni, 2000: p.215; Bevernage, 2013: p.92; 
Morton, 1999: p.7). The international dynamics of the likely situation like Kenya are 
understood by some commentators to indicate the interdisciplinary attempts of 
political scientists to incorporate the idea of ‘legalism’ into their international political 
research agenda (Goldstein et al., 2000: p.385). For instance, the key source of 
confusion in the field of international thought and practice is the reason for why the 
state actors invested so much time and energy in pursuing supranational legal 
commitments–such as the ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC–when this 
pursuit compromises their opportunity to navigate interests of power. Accordingly, 
recognising the unsmooth or roughshod nature of the interaction between law and 
politics is the key to determining the degree to which international rules are 
obligatory. This recognition can also help us to gain a clearer understanding of the 
precision of such rules, and the true effect of delegating some juridical functions of 
interpreting or monitoring public international law to state and non-state actors 
(p.386).  
 
As such, when anomalies began to appear, scholars emphasised the importance of 
distinguishing ‘the rule of law’–as it is procedurally understood the administration of 
the treaties and customaries of international law–from the ‘order of the system’. This 
order of the system is predominantly understood by political studies commentators as 




state system ranks alongside that of the predominant features of neo-patrimonialism in 
priority in the agendas of comparative political research projects on democracy and 
human rights in developing countries.  
 
In short, the agendas of transitional justice research projects are largely underpinned 
by an increasing move towards a legalist approach to political science. Formerly, the 
subject of transitional justice was considered as an auxiliary subject of the broader 
disciplines of human rights, the rules of law and democratic transition in political 
science, as well as the study of tribunal and international jurisdiction in legal studies. 
In this respect, much post-conflict peacebuilding literature is normative and concerns 
itself with the ‘political question’ of rebuilding the state. Meanwhile, the ICL and 
transitional justice literatures are mostly concerned with not only the ‘legal question’ 
of how to strengthen the rules of law, security and order, but also the political 
implications of adopting legal and non-legal mechanisms in post-conflict 
reconstruction policies (Barakat and Waldman, 2013; Hannum, 2006; Sriram et al., 
2013; Teitel, 2005).  
 
With the development of the ad-hoc international tribunal in the Balkans and Rwanda, 
the UN promoted a theme of peacebuilding through law. The 2004 report on the Rules 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies has arguably 
“neologised” the international liberal peacebuilding agenda in terms of not only 
addressing the political complexities of the peace process, but also the legal 
complexity of war-torn societies. Hence, there is a valid justification for expecting a 
polemical debate between law and politics to resurface in literatures that recognise the 




peacebuilding enterprises (Picciotto, 2010; Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011; Sriram., 
2006b; 2007; Sriram and Pillay, 2009; Sriram et al., 2009).  
 
The mushrooming growth of such literatures has reinforced the general presumption 
of the conflicting relationship between international relations (IR) and international 
law (IL), especially when IL has shied away from admitting the “anarchical” features 
of IR (see Cox and O'Neil, 2008; Burley, 1993; Koskenniemi, 1990; Sriram., 2006a). 
This has also confirmed the assertions of those who subscribe to Hedley Bull’s 
understanding of politics, in which ‘men within each state are subject to common 
government, sovereign states in their mutual relations are not’ (2000: p.77). However, 
framing such a polemical debate between IL and IR has not only proved to be 
counterproductive, but ignores the development of the study of law in comparative 
societies that has been progressing since the 1990s (Slaughter et al., 1998: p.393). It 
has also ignored the progress towards more dialogical and interpretative approaches in 
social science despite the firmed features of the positivism in legal studies (Akande, 
2004; Chhang, 2007; Drumbl, 2007; Roach, 2005).  
 
Some of the approaches, especially those of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and pluralist 
readings of law in the late 1980s and early 1990s (which form part of the third major 
debate in the field of social sciences) have attracted the legal analysis of the American 
constitution and post-colonial legal orders in developing countries, including in Africa 
(see Anand, 1962; Balkin, 1994; Ward, 2004). These analyses adopt the various and 
plural strands from Positivist, Marxist, Constructivist and Poststructuralist thought in 
order to interpret the functions of state institutions, regional arrangements, human 




Balkin, 1987; 1992; Gow and Zverzhanovski, 2004; Orentlicher, 1999; Smith, 2002; 
Sands, 2003). In the case of CLS, the concern is not so much about the procedural 
dimension of legal functions but the substantive significance of legal impositions on 
the political community (Bryde, 1977; Nevins, 2003; Ruskola, 2003; Triamble, 1990; 
Ward, 2004).  
 
The expanding literatures of comparative politics, constitutional law, human rights, 
international sanction, truth commissions and post-conflict tribunals have enriched 
understanding on the interaction between law and politics (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 
2004; Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004), and allowed the debate concerning this 
interaction to move beyond the classical contest between positivist and natural law, 
which is essentially a legal-normative debate about ‘law as it should be and law as it 
is supposed to be’ (see Fuller, 1957; Hart, 1958; Holmes, 1897; Schwarz, 1985).  
 
One of the earliest attempts to navigate law and politics away from such a normative 
debate appeared in Ruti Teitel’s Transitional Justice (2000). Adopting a constructivist 
framework, she re-synthesised the study of transitional justice by examining the use 
of justice mechanisms in a period of political transition (anarchy), but excluded an 
infinitesimal segment of the political transition (p.25). Yet her refusal (p.26) to 
consider some of the CLS’ assumptions about the political component of law in post-
conflict reconstruction policy has not escaped criticism. The increasing call for a valid 
assessment of transitional justice in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Cambodia, Timor Leste; as well as the ICC’s proceedings 
in Libya, Kenya, Northern Uganda and the Ivory Coast has confirmed the 




conflict environment (see Gready, 2005; Hannum, 2006; Vinjamuri, 2010). In these 
studies, the role of politics in the execution of justice in post-conflict environments 
has been understood as a call for legal positivism to recognise the following: 
1. Transitional justice does not arise from an empty vacuum, but is a part of the 
political bargaining chip between the local elites and international 
policymakers in implementing justice mechanisms (see Çubukçu, 2013; 
Lokongo, 2012); 
2.   The political and legal complexities of criminalising atrocities committed by 
the state actors, or of identifying the subjects or objects of the state crime (see 
Clarke, 2009; Gow and Zverzhanovski, 2004); 
3. The disconnection of those identified as victims of heinous crimes resulting 
from the imposition of justice mechanisms from the everyday reality of the 
post-conflict societies. In this context, justice functions as a global enterprise 
or template of conflict resolution (see Allen, 2008; Clark, 2012c); 
4. The cultural relativist claim that the execution of justice is deeply affected in 
the way that justice is conceived by the society, and by the society’s call for 
cultural considerations (see Kelsall, 2009; Mamdani, 2009); 
5. Power struggles/relations and the ideological apparatus of justice mechanisms 
within an unclear transition being affected in the midst of ongoing conflict, 
and the issue of who is speaks for the victim and who speaks for the accused 
(see Moon, 2008; Thomson and Nagy, 2011). 
 
In this thesis, the author recognises the fact that - like many political or legal 
disciplines–CLS scholarship has not produced a single, monolithic body of corpus, 




one of five major themes (see Bauman, 1996). The primary CLS traditions from 
which this thesis draws fall can be said to align themselves with the second strand, 
‘law and politics’, as well as the third strand, which represents the idea that ‘law tends 
to serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful’ (Kelman, 1987: p.34).  
 
Pursuing the second strand of CLS allows this thesis to focus its critical reflections on 
transitional justice institutions in Kenya in a way that facilitates the substantiation of 
the assertion that legal decisions impact on political decisions. While legal and 
political decisions may differ in terms of notions of expediency, both are formulated 
around the construction and maintenance of a form of social space. While this thesis 
criticises the positivist idea that law and politics can remain wholly separate from one 
another, it also rejects the extreme reductionist view that ‘all law is politics’ (p.35). 
Largely, this thesis concurs with some of the more pragmatic CLS assumptions that 
law and politics are intertwined. Following this second strand of CLS allows this 
thesis to view transitional justice institutions as products of legal arrangements that 
are intersected with post-conflict peacebuilding bargains, which themselves are 
subject to political discussions. As such, transitional justice is not simply discreet 
legal process; crucially, its successful execution revolves around questions of power.  
 
The third strand of CLS is largely influenced by Marxist writings concerning 
jurisprudence (Unger, 1983: p.12). This strand also relates to legal arrangements or 
consensus implemented by the powerful ruling class against minority groups, 
including subaltern agencies like women, small ethnic groups, the gay community, 
refugees or IDPs. Interconnected with this strand is the legal realist argument that 




analysis within this third strands may view law simply as an instrument of social 
injustice wielded by the ruling elite, the aim here is to reveal the ‘invisibility’ of the 
subaltern agents who have been subjected to political manipulations. The achievement 
of this aim requires post-conflict society to undertake further legal or political 
reforms, and to accept that removing structural barriers to social inequality is of 
greater importance than simply embarking on a legal crusade in the form of war crime 
tribunals, or than the formal, administrative necessity of publishing the truth 
commission’s final report (see Thomson, 2013b). The pursuit of this third strand of 
CLS allows this thesis to characterise transitional justice institutions as ‘technologies 
of power’, in that they form part of the ideological apparatus of the global, post-
conflict peacebuilding template that has so far only produced a ‘virtual peace’ 
(Taylor, 2007: p.557) and ‘fiction of justice’ (Clarke, 2009: p.62).  
 
 
E – The State, and the Neo-patrimonial Mode of Politics: Power and Ideology 
In the task of examining the nature of transitional justice in Kenya, all the 
aforementioned key debates are either implicitly or explicitly connected to the search 
for sustainable justice- and reconciliation-seeking policies. This thesis, however, is 
primarily concerned with the issues of power and ideology. Chapter 2 advances a 
framework for examining the social process of implementing transitional justice in 
Kenya through the lens of Michel Foucault’s conception of power (1977; 1980b; 
1980a; 1984; 1997b; 1997a; 2002a; 2002b) and Louis Althusser’s notion of ideology 
(1971; 1976; 1977; 2001). As for the definition of power, this thesis aligns itself to 
some extent with Joseph Nye’s assumption that it is impossible to subscribe to a 
single monolithic of the definition, since the concept itself is highly contested (2011: 




this research inquiry. Indeed, in his article, ‘Why should We Care about the Definition 
of Power?’, Keith Dowding concluded that, while adopting a pluralist approach to 
defining power may seem beneficial, definitions of power are best applied to the 
specific contexts in which it is wielded; a particular definition should only be ‘judged’ 
as productive when it can be successfully applied to the case study (2012: p.133). It is 
impossible to arrive at a single definition of power when every researcher is 
considering different aspects of what constitutes it.  
 
As will later be discussed in Chapter 2, Foucault’s conception of power is ‘structural’. 
In this respect, it differs from mainstream 5  IR theories and other reductionist 
definitions of power, however, it is arguably the most suitable method for 
contextualising power relations and locating these relational positions in the politics 
of transitional justice in Kenya6 (see Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Macmillan, 2010). 
Furthermore, as Carl Death has argued, the study of the application of Foucault’s 
method to IR can be divided into two main bodies of literature. One concerns the 
Foucauldian critiques of neo-liberal practices as extensions of the development of 
liberalism in European history. The other addresses the use of Foucault in a general 
analysis of power in any form of government (2012: p.8). Arguably, the first strand 
allows for more of an acute analysis of the current liberal cosmopolitan projects in 
                                                        
5  ‘Mainstream’ here relates to the major theories that are commonly used to make observations 
about international phenomena. The major theories that can be considered as mainstream IR theories in 
the analysis of power are those of realism, liberalism and (arguably) constructivisism, see Buzan and 
Acharya, 2010.  
 
6   In localising the concept of power within the broader literature concerning this concept in IR, 
scholars have built up a matrix of specialised research on power. This research has shown that 
investigations of infra-politics are more suitably conducted by adopting the Foucauldian approach to 
power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Accordingly, the socio-legal analysis of transitional justice in the 
domestic politics of Kenya is conducted in this thesis through the lens of Foucault’s ideas on power. 
Indeed, such epistemological traditions are widely recognised by Foucaudian scholarship itself, in its 
attempts to explore the question of power and the location of agency in the structure of the social 





transitional justice and peacebuilding as extensions of the liberal projects of the 20th 
century, and the second strand can be used to analyse Kenya’s form of government.  
 
While the exploration of Foucault’s works thus helps us to contextualise transitional 
justice as representative of power relations, it is important not to neglect the element 
of ‘ideology’ is which discussed in Chapter 2 (Lecourt, 1975: p. 207). As such, the 
political reading of transitional justice is informed by these two separate elements of 
power and ideology. While the term ‘ideology’ is vaguely contested in political 
theories, it has unquestionably contributed to a substantive configuration of the 
political issues that are currently most pertinent in society (Elster and Landemore, 
2008: p. 284). Michael Freeden asserts that the ‘ubiquity of ideology’ is crucial to 
contextualising ‘the human interaction that involves power transactions’, as many of 
the most incisive works of political theory are embedded in a particular ideological 
contingency (2006: p.19).  
 
Hence, this thesis draws from what Freeden identifies–in his sketches of the four 
major developments in the way ideology had been conceived in modern history–as a 
fourth critical development, in which the understanding of ideology is based on 
Althusser’s reading of Karl Marx (p.15). Althusser recognised the difficulty for an 
agent (or actor) to arrive at its own social reality (since there is no objective reality), 
and therefore suggested that what the agent visualises as reality is informed by set of 
ideologies (Boer, 2007: p.484). Hence, Chapter 2’s hypothetical consideration of how 
to dispense justice without punishing the members of Kenya’s ruling class is unlikely 
to accord with the vision of retributive and restorative justice shared by the Internally 





Claire Moon’s Narrating Political Reconciliation in South Africa confirms the 
transitional justice suitability of Foucault’s methods by contextualising the 
experiment in South Africa as power; however, she also admitted that Foucault’s 
identification of power through ‘discourse’ and ‘genealogy’ is essentially an abstract 
exercise that must be connected to concrete, social realities to which transitional 
justice is applied (2008: p.55). As such, this thesis agreed with her assertion that 
Foucault’s conception of power is akin to Althusser’s understanding of ideology in his 
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) (p.56). As is discussed in Chapter 2, Althusser 
developed his innovative interpretation of ideology by identifying its material 
existence or mechanism (Wolff, 1998: p.90).  
 
In this thesis, transitional justice mechanism are presented as contested forms of 
ideology, defined by the two opposing ideas of accountability and impunity. They are 
represented by two major, specific transitional justice mechanisms currently operating 
in Kenya; the ICC and the TJRC. Although Foucault and Althusser emerged from two 
different intellectual traditions, it is arguable that Foucault’s description of power and 
of subjugation to the neoliberal domination can be connected to Althusser’s criticisms 
of capitalism’s exploitation of the people’s hopes by projecting a false, liberal 
ideology of freedom in the 20th century (see Goldstein, 2004; Resch, 1989). This 
thesis acknowledges that by applying the ideas of Foucault and Althusser in this way, 
its conclusions will neither satisfy those who believe their ideas should be used in 






Without Foucault and Althusser’s systematic work on locating the practices of power 
and ideology in modern society, I would not have been able to perceive that 
transitional justice can be viewed as power as well as ideology. Aligning itself with a 
similar study undertaken by Moon and Thomson, the innovative reading of 
transitional justice as politics in this thesis is explicitly concerned with an 
understanding of justice and reconciliation from the victim’s perspective; with how 
Foucault’s power and Althusser’s of ideology of justice were “played out” by specific 
transitional justice mechanisms in the wake of post-election violence; and with how 
this affected the everyday lives of Kenyan residents of the IDP camps (Interview with 
IDP no. 9, Rift Valley, February 25, 2009).  
 
The ICC’s and TJRC’s proceedings are the “disciplinary technology” of power, and 
the ideological apparatus with which the GNU officials (especially the ICC’s 
suspects) and the IDPs are trapped in relational positions. As such, the research 
undertaken here differs from the statist and system analysis approaches in 
‘conventional political science’ (Scott, 1998: p.27). In conventional political science, 
the state is an ‘a priori concept’ or main focus of analysis (Abrams, 1988; Jessop, 
1990; Mitchell, 1991). The perspective adopted in this thesis is similar to that of Scott 
(1986), Englund (2006) and Thomson (2013b) in their analyses, of the nature of the 
constitutive processes of legal instruments or other state policies in tapping into the 
everyday lives of citizens, and the impact of such instruments upon the ordinary 
populace. This approach inevitably revealed the different understandings of justice 
and reconciliation among the marginalised citizens in their opinions of those who 





Given its focus on how the ideas of the state are made and inescapable part of the 
everyday life of Kenyans, this thesis’ understanding of transitional justice through 
power and ideology may help the readers of African politics to broaden their 
understanding of the logic of neo-patrimonialism, and to determine its precise purpose 
in the increasingly popular application of transitional justice mechanisms as a means 
of resolving Africa’s election disputes. What has been imperfectly described as neo-
patrimonialism in Kenyan politics could be better understood by applying this concept 
to a more acute analysis of the political logic behind the justice- and reconciliation-
seeking policy in Kenya. Such an analysis could also help to gain a clearer 
understanding of the politics of accountability and the impunity that has further 
complicated the relations between African leaders and their foreign partners, and the 
potential prospect of reconciliation with victims who have directly or indirectly 
suffered at the hands of the criminally indicted local elite (interview with The 
American University’s Lecturer no. 4, Cairo, 23 July, 2011). There are many works 
that attempt to explain the logic of neo-patrimonialism in African politics, 
democratisation and development, (Bratton and Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Erdmann, 2002), as well as Kenya’s political economy (Berman and Lonsdale, 
1990b; Currie and Ray, 1984; Haugerud, 1997; Widner, 1992). However, only a few 
of these works have succeeded in providing an analytically explanation of this logic 
(see Berman et al., 2009).  
 
This thesis analyses the Kenyan leaders’ resistance to being held accountable for the 
post-election violence, and the strategic calculations made by the victims in rejecting 
their leaders and international agents. It is for this reason that I have suggested that the 




the position of transitional justice in the aftermath of the post-election violence, may 
best to be captured by a framework that uses concepts of power and ideology to 
identify the logic of neo-patrimonialism in the process of implementing justice- and 
reconciliation-seeking policies in Kenya.  
 
While Chapter 2 traces the neo-patrimonial logic through the longstanding culture of 
impunity in Kenyan politics, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an in-
depth investigation of the role of neo-patrimonial logic in the broader literature of 
African politics. Therefore, I considered this role in relation to Gero Erdman and Ulf 
Engel’s concerns about the ‘non-analytical’ usage of such Weberian inventions (2007: 
p.96). Both argue that the concept does not make sense when one attempts to 
distinguish patrimonial and neo-patrimonial power: 
[d]oes this mean that all political power is personal power? Are all public affairs 
privatised in Africa? The problem is that it overemphasises personal power and 
privatisation. If all political power is personal power and all public affairs are 
privatised, then we are back to patrimonialism, albeit in a ‘modern environment’ 
(whatever that means) merely to justify the prefix of ‘neo’. (: p.102)  
 
Hence, to avoid the mistake of a ‘catch-all concept’ of neo-patrimonialism, this thesis 
adopted Erdman and Ulf’s conception that the term is a ‘creative mix’ of two 
prototypes of ‘post-Weberian innovation’; (a) legal, rational bureaucracy; and (b), 
traditional patrimonial domination (p.103). This means that not all affairs that 
understood as official (in state-society relations) are necessarily privatised and, that 
the modus operandi for political institutions is to be ‘informal’ in involving 
themselves in the everyday lives of Kenyans. Official functions, such as the 
distribution of jobs, tax revenue, constitutional drafts, special tribunal bills through 
legal gazettes (parliament) and the process of rectifying the power-sharing peace 




and external actors) are conducted in the diplomatic and official domains. 
Simultaneously, however, this thesis does not deny that the ruling class allocates 
special jobs based on their ethnicity and within the patronage networks (power 
sharing cabinet portfolios); that the illegal meetings are held between political cartels 
to lobby for parliamentary votes against the ICC is based on the strategic calculation 
of those ruling elite. Analytically, the primary concern here is to determine to what 
extent the establishment of what is known as ‘informal personal rule’ invades the 
legal-rational bureaucracy, and impacts significantly upon the dynamics of justice- 
and reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya.  
 
I believe that the proposed framework of power and ideology (illustrated in Chapter 
2) for understanding the political process of ending the post-election violence and 
“cultivating” transitional justice in Kenya is capable of explaining the intersection of 
politics and law, as well as the specific features of neo-patrimonialism that appeared 
after the post-election violence in Kenya. In this respect, informal and patronage-
based modes of access constituted the predominant mode of governance, but such 
modes relied on the existing formal, legal, rational bureaucracy of the state (Berman 
et al., 2009: p.465). Without doing so within the official domain of the state, it is 
nearly impossible for the ruling class to continue with its neo-patrimonial politics. If 
the neo-patrimonial logic of governance equates to the maxim ‘the more things 
change, the more they remain the same’, claiming political legitimacy after the crisis 
required the ruling class to rely on the juridical statehood conferred by the 
international system (see Cheeseman, 2009; Mueller, 2011).  
 




the TJRC) have strained the political elite’s claim to legitimacy, resulting in the 
manipulation of transitional justice mechanisms as a means of ‘conveying the 
impression that the formal rules of democracy are followed, while the substance is 
violated’ (Piccolino, 2014: p.63). The international determination to export a 
‘functional state’ and a western notion of justice has transitional justice mechanisms 
more susceptible to manipulation by the elites; this leads to the decay of peace, rather 
than peacebuilding (p.64).  
 
Understanding transitional justice mechanisms as forms of ideological apparatus, and 
locating this apparatus within the constellation of power relations, reveals the 
constitutive relationship between law and politics. Rather than standing in 
contradiction to what were perceived as ‘unlawful’, ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘informal’ 
politics, the ruling class’ obsession with the official and legal discourses of 
transitional justice mechanisms perpetuates the practice of impunity, and renews the 
old rhetoric of ‘nothing changes, except business as usual’ (interview with a local 
businessman; Mombasa, February 20, 2012). Such an obsession with law (in debating 
the roles of the ICC and TJRC) constitutes a central part of the political culture in 
modern Kenya, where leaders hide their neo-patrimonial practices under the peculiar 
cloak of legalism and juridical statehood.  
 
By extolling the virtues of peace and reconciliation, they are able to impede the 
processes of prosecution and criminal justice. This helps to account for the politics of 
accountability that has been practiced since the return of multiparty elections in the 
1990s (see Chapter 2), as well as the dramatic policy of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ initiated 




the jurisdiction of the ICC (see Chapter 4) following the implementation of the 
KNDR agreement (see Chapter 3). Hence, rather than rejecting the predominant logic 
of neo-patrimonialism in the literature of African politics, this thesis embraces such 
logic by engaging in a reading of power and ideology in order to conceptualise the 
alteration of social dynamics and the key political processes that occurred between 
February 2008 and March 2013. However, it is important to specify some other 
reasons for why Foucault and Althusser’s respective conceptions of power and 
ideology have been chosen for this thesis.  
 
F – The Rationale for Using Foucault’s Power and Althusser’s Ideology 
 
The works by Harri Englund (2006), Claire Moon (2008), James Scott (1998) and 
Susan Thomson (2013) have succinctly demonstrated that the current understanding 
of the neo-patrimonial logic of African politics can be further explained by using both 
Foucault and Althusser’s studies of how the docile body of power and the political 
economy of violence were both embedded in the ruling class’ struggles to develop 
political authority. Although the writings of these Western thinkers are not essential to 
understanding how the eruption of “madness” or anarchy was caused by those who 
wielded power and wealth in Nairobi, such works have enabled this thesis to illustrate 
the logic behind the violence, oppression and political control involved in negating 
people’s rights and justice (interview with University of Nairobi’s Lecturer no. 5, 
Nairobi, February 7, 2012).  
 
One does not establish that a crime has been committed merely by examining the 
crime scene (as a result of the violence). In this case, however, it is possible to match 




upon the social structure within which the wananchi (citizen) were being dialectically 
subjugated (Ahluwalia, 2007: p.47). ‘Scientific’, is used to denote the production of 
knowledge here, or the way in which we base our understanding of violence and 
reconciliation in African societies on certain assumptions (Smthy, 2005: p.20). Even 
if the full extent of what actually occurred during the crisis may never be understood, 
does this necessitate that international agents should stop assisting African countries? 
‘Surely those who glorified our uniqueness are the true masters of evil!’ (interview 
with retired judge no. 2, Nairobi, March 15, 2012). 
 
Such an understanding provides a justification for using the ideas of Foucault and 
Althusser and other theorists, whose ideas are otherwise contested by post-colonialist 
positions by virtue of their not having originated from Africa (Grovogui, 2010: p247). 
Applying Western ideas to Kenya, as some scholars of post-colonialism argue, is 
problematic. But the IDPs’ experience of violence and desire for reconciliation and 
justice is not a novel phenomenon. Indeed, it is best captured through the existing 
scholarly works that are indebted to the aforementioned thinkers. Chapter 2 elucidates 
how the contemporary literatures of transitional justice in Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Rwanda and Kenya arrived at certain assumptions about the politics of justice, and 
uses the concepts of power and ideology advanced by Foucault and Althusser to 
determine the nature of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in the 
aforementioned countries. For time being, suffice to say that the use of both scholarly 
works does not imply that their works have intentionally described the nature of 
violence and justice in war-torn societies. It is probable that their experiences of 
having lived through major crises in Europe, as well as their interactions with 
historical events in Northern Africa (Foucault having lived in Tunisia and Althusser 




and ideology that forms the basis of our understanding about violence and justice in 
Africa (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003; 2009).  
 
Furthermore, Foucault suggests that the operation of the justice system is connected to 
the function of war, and serves the purpose of strengthening the position of the 
sovereign (1980b, p.75). This provides an avenue for us to conduct an in-depth 
investigation on the relationship between transitional justice (as a system of justice in 
the aftermath of the violence) (Reyna and Schiller, 1998: p.339); the way in which 
Kenya’s ruling class wields its power as a tool of subjugation (Ahluwalia, 2007: 
p.46); and the way which it manages its relations with IDPs, as well as with the 
international actors that are involved in the system (interview with retired judge no. 1, 
Mombasa, February 21, 2012).  
 
The impact of Foucault’s experiences on his writings about Africa has been discussed 
by one of the most renowned Kenyan writers, Paul Ahluwalia. Ahluwalia asserts that 
it is hard to imagine that the post-colonial intellectual movement would have been so 
inspired by post-structuralists like Foucault and Althusser, if the later had not been 
exposed to post-colonial struggles of Africa (2010: p.598). While the distinction 
between some critical strands of post-structuralism and post-colonial remain blurred 
(Hill, 2005: p.150), it is less important to concern ourselves with the ‘chicken and 
egg’ question of who came first and who inspired whom, than to highlight the fact 
that both Foucault and Althusser were not inward-looking theorists. During their 





An examination of the development of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in 
Kenya through a reading of Foucault and Althusser may give new perspectives on 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The debate surrounding transitional justice in Africa challenges 
the tacit assumption that the agent (the African leader) is a passive bystander, and is 
systematically victimised by the preordained structure of the post-colonial state 
system and the imposition of international order upon African society (see Brown and 
Harman, 2013; Taylor, 2004; Young, 2004b). Indeed, since the period of 
independence, the nature of the states has evolved. Their leaders are now capable of 
making strategic calculations; of exploiting certain liberal cosmopolitan agendas in 
foreign policy (such as those of the ICC and TJRC); of hiding under the peculiar 
cloak of post-colonialism by romanticising the uniqueness of African societies, and of 
rejecting a wider call for reforms and denying the IDPs’ rights.  
 
As is demonstrated later (in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5), the position taken by the Kenyan 
ruling class and the IDPs in pursuing justice exhibited a mixture of possible 
motivations, including the desire for reconciliation and to confront the past atrocities. 
Many members of the ruling class wished to strike a political bargain in exchange for 
justice in Kenya (Brown and Sriram, 2012: p.260). Hence, the cautionary tale of 
Kenya serves as a reminder to international policymakers to reconsider the political 
danger of integrating Africa’s democracies (such as Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali and Ivory 
Coast) into a global constitutional project of humanitarian intervention and 
implementing measures for dealing with mass atrocities.  
 
Those who have argued that transitional justice is a simple legal measure for dealing 




the limitations of transitional justice in achieving its desired objectives (Sriram et al., 
2011: p.357; Thomson and Nagy, 2011: p.27). Additionally they have received 
general criticisms for the fact that certain post-conflict resolution models (such as 
power sharing) applied in recent electoral violence cases interacted with various 
transitional justice mechanisms (ranging from prosecution to the establishment of a 
truth commission), which required further considerations of the political implication 
of these models which are not necessarily exogenous to the local process itself (An-
Na'im, 2013; Bell, 2009; Clark et al., 2009; Grodsky, 2009b; Mani, 2008; Miller, 
2008; Nagy, 2008; Raddatz, 2013).  
 
As will later be discussed in Chapter 5, evidence from the TJRC’s proceedings in 
Kenya has confirmed that while the ‘increased judicialisation’ of the means of dealing 
with mass atrocities has marked the imperative locations of global constitutional order 
as imposed by international policymakers, the corrective approach to the flaws of one-
size-for-all solutions has not only repeatedly failed to recognise the problem to 
maintaining peace by using a top-down approach, but that these flaws are also 
apparent in the form of legal pluralism (Vandeginste and Sriram., 2011: p.500).  
 
‘Pluralism’ is used here in the sense that various transitional justice mechanisms 
‘represent a diversification and localisation that moves away from international 
centralized modes of justice’, and that what is comprehended as rooted from Africa 
‘operates alongside formal institutions, whether national or international’ (Nagy, 
2013: p.81). In such instances, legal pluralist approached to transitional justice 





By demonstrating the political impediment and calculations behind the transitional 
justice experiment in Kenya, this thesis embraces the ‘call for a dialogue’ between the 
two great disciplines of IL and IR, so they may benefit each other (Sriram., 2006a: 
p.475). Navigating the conflict between law and politics in analysing transitional 
justice through the lens of peacebuilding may seem counterproductive. However, 
conflict itself is a form of “dialogue”, and recognising the tension between both 
disciplines may be the first step in moving towards a more pragmatic understanding, 
dispelling the false hopes created by undelivered and overpromised justice crusaders 
in post-conflict societies.  
 
G – Structure of the Thesis 
To continue our examination of the intersection between liberal peacebuilding and 
transitional justice, and to conduct an in-depth investigation of justice- and 
reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya, this study will be organised in the following 
way: Chapter 2 will revisit the conceptualisation and criticism of liberal 
peacebuilding, as well as the practical dilemma of adapting it to African politics. 
Having considered Critical Peace scholarship (CPS) suggestions about whether to 
prioritise peace or justice in post-conflict reconstruction. The analysis attempts to 
contextualise the use of the bottom-up approach, to demonstrate the focus placed on 
the victim in the entanglement of transitional justice with post-conflict peacebuilding. 
The aim of this chapter is firstly to highlight the growing intersection between liberal 
peacebuilding and transitional justice, as both concepts have traditionally been 
assumed to be isolated from one another. These epistemological discussions help to 
bridge the gap between liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice, and to 




was used to resolve the 2008 crisis in Kenya. Having responded to some of the major 
issues that dominate the existing bodies of literature on peacebuilding, transitional 
justice and power sharing, the process of analysis feeds into that of clarifying key 
concepts and terms used throughout this thesis. 
 
The second part of Chapter 2 begins with two major assumptions concerning the 
conceptual framework for the political reading of transitional justice in Kenya as 
politics through power and ideology. The first is that what is widely perceived as 
political accountability in the literature of Kenyan politics and post-election violence 
has not only renewed scholarly interest in political and criminal forms of 
accountability, but has also helped to unmask the political logic behind the major 
stakeholders’ behavior in pursuing transitional justice as an accountability measure, 
and implementing it as part of the politics of accountability. Secondly, the increasing 
demand for accountability after the post-election violence is visible in the ongoing 
struggle between accountability and impunity.  
 
The final part of this chapter justifies the departure from a theoretical, legal analysis 
in favour of a more political reading of transitional justice proceedings on a national 
level. This reading draws from recent transitional justice literature and its critical 
reflections upon the failure of legal positivism to recognise the political components 
of justice in post-conflict societies. This chapter’s method of adopting various theories 
rather than a single one draws from various critical strands; as such, the academic 
exercise carried out in this chapter should be treated as a conceptual rather than a 





Secondly, the major theories or intellectual strands that this thesis draws from cannot 
be lumped into a single, unified theory, since both Foucault and Althusser perceived 
their own works as perspectives for advancing the concepts that were pioneered by 
thinkers such as Frederick Nietzsche and Karl Marx respectively. Both Nietzsche and 
Marx drew their social observations from the works of Medieval, Greek and Roman 
philosophers. (see Lecourt, 1975).  
 
Finally, the conceptual framework utilised by this chapter has been adopted in similar, 
recent critical evaluations of transitional justice literature. As is discussed in Chapter 
2, the major works of Moon and Thomson, and their findings on post-conflict justice 
and -reconciliation policies in Africa were explicit and implicitly derived from the 
critical strands of Foucault and Althusser. The aim of this chapter is to provide a 
framework for a specific analysis in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the background of the case study and analyses the local political 
milieu that transformed the post-election violence agenda into a transitional justice 
policy. Adopting a political economy approach, the first part of the chapter revisits the 
causes of the crisis and the key debates surrounding it in order to identify the key 
issues to which those ruling elites responsible for the development of coherent 
transitional justice mechanisms must respond. This part also identifies the major 
political challenges facing the development of transitional justice mechanisms at the 
national level. Two transitional justice mechanisms–the ICC and TJRC–are focused 
on specifically. The aim is not to provide an in-depth analysis of both mechanisms, 
but simply to depict the situation of the country immediately after the 2008 elections 




recurring pattern of impunity and historical contingency in Kenya.  This establishes a 
launching pad for the next chapter’s focus on the ‘invisibility’ of the IDP as an agent, 
the purpose of which is to attempt to provide an understanding of the local political 
process and its complex role in establishing reconciliation, claiming justice and 
countering impunity.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with the everyday resistance of the IDPs to the hegemonic discourses 
of accountability and impunity exhibited by the ICC proceedings in Kenya, and 
Chapter 5 illuminates the ideological apparatus of the TJRC’s proceedings as 
perceived by those who testified at the proceedings. Chapter 6 will revisit the key 
findings, and re-summarise the main arguments that are explored in this thesis. 
 
H – Methodological Consideration and Limitation 
 
I) Exploring the Secondary Literature 
 
In conducting the research for this thesis, the methodology that was adopted can be 
divided into two main parts. The first involved a use of secondary literature, and an 
in-depth survey of the more widely-discussed themes in the study of transitional 
justice and the 2008 crisis in Kenya’s political economy. There is an expanding body 
of literature covering models of conflict resolution adopted in resolving election 
disputes, and its immediate and long-term impact on the sustainability of peace and 
reform polices in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Mali and the Ivory Coast. As such, the 
increasingly common pattern of attempting to resolve election disputes or other 
democratic crises by engaging in broad, sweeping debates about peacebuilding, law, 





The primary aims of Chapter 2 are twofold. First, it calls for the recognition of the 
growing intersection between liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice, as has 
been discussed by various scholars, whose works engage with the major themes 
relating to electoral violence, peace agreements, peace processes, human rights 
prospects, the rule of law and bottom-up approaches to peace and justice in Africa. 
Such works have become primary references in the revisiting and critiquing of liberal 
peacebuilding, power sharing and transitional justice in Africa.  
 
The contributions of CLS and CPS have inspired further criticisms of the 
shortcomings of the existing post-conflict literature, which traditionally perceives 
transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding to be isolated from each other. They are 
connected, however, through these two fields; both disciplines focus on the victim, 
the post-conflict zones and the effects of a protracted transitional period as their 
primary sources of debate.  
 
Secondly, the final part of Chapter 2 introduces the reader to key political and legal 
theories surrounding transitional justice, and engages in an in-depth discussion on 
applying Foucault and Althusser’s works in an attempt to construct a conceptual 
framework for transitional justice theory in Kenya. 
 
The second major components of the secondary literature detailed in Chapter 3 
focuses specifically on changes made to the continuity of Kenya’s political economy 
during and after the crisis, and the effect of the justice- and reconciliation-seeking 




of the political logic behind the spatial and temporal structure of the transitional 
justice mechanisms implemented in Kenya. As such, this thesis proposes an 
examination of the three main subjects of research; (a) African politics as related to 
specific predicaments in contemporary Kenya; (b) the locating of specific anomaly of 
the local processes that can be connected to the global literature of transitional justice 
and post-conflict peacebuilding; (c) and the analysis of the specific forms of power 
and ideological apparatus used in socio-legal attempts to address the post-election 
violence, which can be connected to existing critical approaches to political and legal 
theories. Nevertheless, the predominant critical approach used to evaluate the various 
secondary references used in this thesis allows it to advance a conceptual framework 
for evaluating Kenya’s justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy, and to identify the 
actual location of the subject and actors by means of primary data collection. 
 
II) Conducting Fieldwork: Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
In addition to drawing from existing works of secondary literature, this thesis 
recognises the recent critiques made by a contemporary Kenyan writer, Ngugi wa 
Thiong’o that: ‘there’s a tendency to assume that knowledge, education, 
jurisprudence, and especially philosophy came from the pen. This is because 
knowledge, the world over, reaches us through books’ (2013: p.158). Although text 
has existed for a relatively brief period in human history, there is a tendency in 
today’s society to assume that ‘a person who cannot write and read is ignorant, or that 
the knowledge they possess is not good enough for sharing with others or benefitting 
the nation’ (p.158). This was the case for the individuals who were identified as 
victims or displaced after the post-election violence. They were excluded not for 




violence challenged some of the major assumptions of secondary literatures 
(fieldwork note no. 2, Rift Valley, March 25, 2012).  
 
In this respect, the second part of the methodology adopted by this thesis is based on 
the qualitative process of how transitional justice came into being following the post-
election violence. It also explores the underlying logic behind implementing 
transitional justice within what are identified by the secondary literature as 
peacebuilding practices (Chapter 2), as a basis for which the Kenyan government 
manipulates justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy (Chapter 3). This section 
examines the power relations and ideological apparatus upon which this policy is 
grounded, and with which it interacts with the victims (Chapter 4 and 5). The 
evidence will be provided in the author’s personal observations of TJRC operations, 
and of public opinion of the ICC’s proceedings.  
 
III) The Fieldwork Periods and Locations 
 
This thesis constitutes the first in-depth analysis of the entire transitional justice 
process and the debates surrounding it in Kenya from the perspective of the displaced 
victims of post-election violence, especially the IDPs. I began my fieldwork in 
February 2009. The previous year, the KNDR agreement had been signed, and the 
ICC started its investigation following the rejection of a local tribunal bill by the 
Kenyan parliament. Additionally, the TRJC’s mandate for executing restorative and 
redistributive justice became effective. The second period of fieldwork began in 
January 2012. At this point in time, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the 
charges against four of the six post-election violence suspects (Chapter 4), and 





The second period of fieldwork ended in May 2012, when the TJRC’s reports were 
still pending. The final period of fieldwork ran from February 2013, a month before 
the election, to April 2013, when the ICC’s proceedings were still ongoing. The 
research draws from 157 interviews with individuals from all of the relevant 
categories of stakeholders in the constitutional implementation of the TJRC and the 
ICC’s proceedings. These individuals range from officials who were indirect and 
directly involved in implementing the aforementioned mechanisms, to academic 
commentators, NGO personnel and the ordinary citizens who were affected by these 
mechanisms. The interviews consisted of both formal and informal conversations 
(including multiple interviews with many of the same individuals, some of which 
span a period of more than four years) in order to provide a broader perspective of the 
initial intentions, modus operandi and outcomes of the transitional justice mechanisms 
implemented as a result of the KNDR agreement. This allows the thesis to construct 
popular narratives of justice and reconciliation in Kenya, conducted by the author 
during thirteen months of living and interacting with various Kenyans. Research took 
place while the author was stationed at the Young Women’s Christian Association’s 
(YWCA) hostel on Nyerere Road in Nairobi; the British Institute in Eastern Africa in 
the Kileleshawa district in Nairobi and a tea and flowers smallholding in the Central 
Province of Kenya. The interviewees came from various groups of stakeholders, such 
as Kenyan government officials, US embassy personnel, AU personnel, TJRC officers 
from the research division, the audience and participants in TJRC hearings from 
various regions, members of small business communities in Nairobi, academics from 
the University of Nairobi and the United States International University based in 





Finally the author travelled to The Hague, Netherlands to interview individuals who 
had been witnesses to the ICC’s proceedings, SCSL (Sierra Leone), ITL (Lebanon) 
and ECCC (Cambodia). These individuals were asked for their opinions on a wide 
range of issues influencing Kenyan criminal accountability and the workings of 
justice- and reconciliation-seeking policies under the KNDR agreement. The author 
also travelled to Geneva and Paris to interview former international policymakers and 
observers from various UN agencies and organizations related to transitional justice. 
Finally, the author travelled to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to 
gauge the views of the individuals residing in this region towards the precarious 
Kenyan approach to transitional justice.7  
 
IV) Epistemological Inquiry in locating the Research Subject: The Bottom-Up 
Approach and Everyday Resistance 
 
The number of interviews in which the respondents who considered the interview 
questions from the perspective of a victim was around 103 IDPs. In this section, I first 
clarify what does I means by bottom-up approach and everyday resistance, and 
secondly, how does this can be connected to the IDPs. 
i) The-Bottom Up Approach 
In the next Chapter 2, I elucidates in details on the problems with liberal 
peacebuilding approach to navigate post-conflict society in Africa. However, suffice 
to say for time being, that such problems and criticism with the liberal peacebuilding 
projects in Africa have lead to the growing and shifting preferences on the Critical 
                                                        
7  The foreign diplomatic, government and AU personnel shall not be identified, in accordance 
with the agreement made prior to the interview that their public positions would be protected and the 
confidentiality of their views respected. However, the information gathered from the interviews has 




Peacebuilding scholarship (CPS) 8  that lead by the recent publications of Oliver 
Richmond in order to probe the question of peace and justice at the local level. I 
believe the Richmond’s suggestions of probing the question of peace and justice 
beyond the surface of national and international elites leads to recent attempts and 
criticisms to consider the bottom-up approach in research methodology or evaluating 
the international template of peacebuilding and transitional justice agendas. As such, a 
detailed discussion below served as the epistemological entry point to theories about a 
bottom-up approach or a justification in investigating the victim perspective on the 
issue of peace, justice and reconciliation.     
 
In critiquing liberal peacebuilding projects in Africa and other conflict zones, recent 
studies have proposed a new direction of research inquiry; ‘a local turn in 
peacebuilding’ (McGinty and Richmond, 2013: p.763.) by using what termed as 
‘post-liberal peace’ (Richmond, 2011: p.10). Post-liberal peace should not be read as 
an ‘alternative’ trajectory, replacement or solution to the existing liberal 
peacebuilding deficiencies in the form of binary opposition, but as an epistemological 
means of ‘rescuing’ liberal peacebuilding from becoming ‘illiberal’ in the wake of its 
failure to genuinely engage with the various local actors, including subaltern agent 
and everyday/infra politics (p.11). 
 
In this thesis, I borrowed Richmond’s post-liberal peace as a key to understanding the 
position of the IDPs as subaltern agents, victims or survivors of post-election violence 
position themselves within the political elite’s game of brinkmanship. As such, this 
allows me to contextualise the IDPs perspective as victim in assessing or evaluating 
                                                        




the outcome of the liberal cosmopolitan templates of transitional justice institutions 
upon the everyday life or infra politic of the displaced victims in Kenya. 
 
Meanwhile, in a recent scholarship of transitional justice, there is a nuance call on 
integrating those various actors’ perspectives at the local level or under the surface of 
the national elites in order to provide more precise understanding on the livelihood of 
the victims after conflict or during the implementation of the transitional justice 
institutions itself. For instance, in Susan Thomson’s study (2011) of the livelihoods of 
peasants in post-genocide Rwanda, term like ‘subaltern agency’, and ‘everyday 
resistance’ provide an avenue of inquiry for validating any claims about peace and 
justice made exclusively by state policymakers or international actors, and allow 
further examination as to why and how the Rwandan state’s narrative of justice and 
reconciliation for victims contradicts the everyday understanding of justice among the 
ordinary populace (p.446). As later discussed in Chapter 4, Kenyan IDPs 
understanding of peace and justice consists of avoiding discussions of the ICC’s 
proceedings and employing non-cooperative means including “telling lies” as a 
strategic calculation to survive in a hostile camp environments. 
 
In this regards, I believe that a CPS’ call for the local turn in researching peace as well 
as identifying the location of human rights victims as the agents of the outside the 
surveillance of those who occupy the apex of the state in transitional justice research 
arguably could be considered as a bottom-up approach9. In the context of African 
conflict zones and weak projection of the nation state building, the idea of probing 
beyond the surface of nation elite has attracted the attention of many commentators 
                                                        
9  Similar themes of research has been encouraged and hinted by recent trends in peacebuilding 




since the growing call for ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Murithi, 2008: 
p.28), post-colonial perspective (An-Na'im, 2013: p.200), Ubuntu approach (Hoppers, 
2013: p.72), neo-traditional frameworks (Kwasi Theku, 2012: p.38) or other non-state 
initiatives (Taylor, 2013: p.455.) that are not necessarily appealed the deeper 
philosophical inquiry of indigenous. It has also been contributed to by the growing 
number of individuals who received their educations from Northern institutions but 
who originated from the South, in which they developed their innovative readings of 
western political theories and their application to non-western societies (McGinty and 
Richmond, 2013: p.776). While it will be beyond the scope of this thesis to 
investigate all that can be regarded as an alternative to the top-down approach to 
peacebuilding and transitional justice, my focus on the IDP as one of the many 
victims and survivors for human rights violation should served as a point to reminds 
us on the victim’s perspective, as well as the complexity of defining a success story of 
post-conflict reconstruction policy if we abandoned their perspectives.10  
 
Meanwhile, it is always problematic to easily grasp the positions of the IDPs as 
subaltern agents, or to simply describe them as ‘local’ because of the existence of 
various local agents within a plural society.11 Additionally, their contested identities 
and socioeconomic positions during and after conflict transitions are fluidly 
interchangeable and cannot be sociologically claimed as deeply rooted from Africa 
and predating the colonial period (Lynch, 2011c: p.391). However, what matters here, 
                                                        
10  In the recent literature of transitional justice, there is a growing call for recognising the 
important of the victim’s perspectives as one of the ways to value the legitimacy of its institutions in 
the midst of unclear regime change. For example, see (Hansen, 2014) 
11  While I recognise the shortcoming of relying on the one single group perspective of the IDPs 
and the existence of various groups at the local level, including the fluidity of their identities in 
projecting their existential claims to certain issues in rights and injustice, the adoption of the IDPs here 
should be affirmatively accepted in order to justify the existence of multiple perspectives below the 
radar of the national elites and some of these perspectives challenges the official narratives prescribed 




the vulnerable position of the IDPs as one of the human rights victims could and 
should be regarded as the subaltern agents12 in providing a different narrative about 
peace and justice in order to reveal the actual gap between what were commonly 
understood from top-down and bottom-up are always varied and need to be 
considered. Simultaneously however, the IDPs perspective here should not be viewed 
as simply non-liberal, nor should be suppressed by the ruling class or ignored by the 
international policymaker, but should be recognise and integrated to help mitigate and 
improvise the shortcoming of transitional justice institutions or national peacebuilding 
projects (Chandler, 2013: pp.22-25; Hellmüller, 2013: p.25; MacGinty, 2011: p.15). 
 
The term ‘local’ here to avoid any confusion between liberal and illiberal, or 
international-modern and local-traditional values (Richmond, 2011: p.42). ‘Local’ 
refers to the actions of a local agent on a national level (in relation to the political 
elite), and as a partner to international peacebuilding and transitional justice agents 
(p.42). Additionally, the term local-to-local’ (critical agent) is used to recognise the 
existence and unique positions, including individuals and communities (p.46). In this 
thesis the term subaltern agents, critical agents and local agents will be used 
interchangeably in order to refer the displaced victims of the postelections violence or 
the IDPs, which means while their exist at the peripheral level and process within the 
confinement of the transitional justice institutions and become a primary object of 
human rights violations, their views and livelihoods have not been fully considered by 
the international or national elites, or even be able to excise their fully individual 
agency capacities in describing the term peace, justice and reconciliation.13 
                                                        
12  Similar approach have be considered in other empirical research in transitional justice, see 
(Ingelaere, 2008)   
13  For a useful discussion on a research agenda of the transitional justice from below, see 





Given the importance of local or subaltern agent in CPS literatures, this thesis argues 
that the existence of such actors–the displaced victims or the IDPs–of the postelection 
violence are vital key actor in assessing the viability of justice- and reconciliation- 
seeking policy in Kenya. In such instances, post-conflict environments become a 
conflict zones for power contestation, in which the interaction between various actors 
(international, local elite, civil society, victims and survivors) and various post-
conflict justice institutions displays the hybrid features of the relations, processes and 
mechanisms involved. Conducting a bottom-up research and recognising the existence 
of the critical agent allows us to avoid falling into a trap of framing the relations in a 
simplistic context of international versus local (Belloni, 2012: p.25; Hensell and 
Gerdes, 2012: p.156). This brings my next discussion to position the location of the 
IDPs or subaltern agent here with the concept everyday resistance or infra politics.  
 
ii) The Everyday Resistance and the Placement of the IDPs 
 
In the scholarship on comparative politics, rural resistance to state authority has been 
one of the dominant analytical frameworks through which governance is assessed 
(Scott, 1998; 1990; 1985). Resistance to state power has been used as a means to 
explain social relations in both the colonial and post-colonial periods, highlighting 
how the policies of a strong centralised state have been ignored, subverted or altered 
when they are applied at the local level.14 As a consequence of calling for more 
flexible and innovative method in assessing the everyday living of the victims of 
human rights violations and political violence, there is a growing scholarship within 
                                                        
14  For a useful reading on the formation of identity and everyday form of resistance during the 




recent empirical research of transitional justice to focus on the ways in which post-
conflict communities operated in situations of severe social constraint, examining the 
exercise of state power on these communities through the application of James C. 
Scott’s account of ‘everyday resistance’. 15  In Scott’s account, peasants resist the 
imposition of centralised power through discursive practices and passive activities 
that oppose state policies. 
 
I believes that it is both possible and necessary to nuance this current use of the notion 
of resistance by introducing an ethnographic analysis, semi-structure interviews or 
informal conversation of several individual who resisted state-supported violence – in 
this instance of my research the interviewed IDPs who directly challenged the state 
policy of reconciliation and national unity at crucial points of political contestation in 
recent Kenyan 2008 crisis. Examining the ways in which their resistance was enacted 
allows us to understand better their subsequent engagements with the way transitional 
justice institutions corresponds to them. Such analysis provides both passive 
resistance like “telling lies” and an archetypal example of active resistance through 
voting for the ICC suspects during the 2013 election (Chapter 4). 
 
Scott’s notion of ‘everyday resistance’ has been drawn on extensively to examine 
opposition to state power in northern Malaysia. As a result his work provides a 
necessary starting point for a discussion on the place of the IDP in the current theories 
on political resistance and the value of understanding resistance in transitional justice 
research. In his account of everyday resistance, Scott focuses on a vertical power 
relationship with one set of actors in a clear subordinate relationship to another 
                                                        
15  For a recent scholarship that utilised the Scott’s theory of resistance in transitional justice 




dominant group. For Scott, hidden transcripts of resistance develop and emerge from 
within this subordinate group. At moments of revolt, this subtle and on-going 
resistance is replaced by open defiance with ‘the hidden transcript storming the stage.’ 
Active resistance manifests as a collective social product built through the ongoing 
experience of oppression, in which an individual or a group speaks for an entire 
underclass. 
 
Having developed these initial ideas through a detailed ethnography in the village of 
Sidaka in Malaysia, in his later work Scott generalises his findings to argue that the 
degree to which ‘structures of dominance can be demonstrated to operate in 
comparable ways, they will, other things being equal, elicit reactions and patterns of 
resistance that are broadly comparable’ (1986: pp.30-34). It is in this realm that 
Scott’s work has been understood to contribute to the broader theoretical notion of 
what it means to resist and has been used to interpret empirical data on social relations 
in recent scholarship of transitional justice research, in particular of post-genocide 
Rwanda.16 
 
In the specific discussions on resistance in the post-genocide period, the positioning 
of Scott’s notion of the dominant and subordinate is framed in terms of the state, in 
the position of power, and the rural community, in the position of subordination. The 
emphasis is on the structure of hierarchical power relations; however, this requires an 
unavoidable level of simplification that risks obscuring individual action. For 
example, from the outset such a reading of resistance by a rural group against a ruling 
elite assumes a level of homogeneity and equality inside of these two groups. While it 
                                                        
16  This approach is very much in line with current CLS in which one case can constructively be 




fails to account for the social reality that within the political orderings of the 
subordinate group there may be forms of exclusion that lead to other possible points 
of political contestation (Palmer, 2014: p.237.) However, this works allows us to 
disaggregate the ‘subordinate group’, making visible the individual experience of 
power relations in post-conflict environment, both as exercised in the past and as 
experienced today. It enables us to see how relationships of power are experienced, 
transmitted, and changed by individuals in their everyday practices (interview with 
IDP no. 102, Rift Valley, March 22, 2013). In doing so, the aim of my research is to 
focus in detail on how an individual is able to exercise power while being subject to 
state authority. 
 
Similar themes of everyday resistance among the peasants in the post-genocide 
Rwanda have recently expanded by Thomson latest works that identify the form of 
everyday resistance among the Kenyan Somalis women in Kenya (Thomson, 2013a: 
pp.589-609). To this date, this is the only work that brings the predominant theme of 
everyday resistance from the subject of comparative political research on peasant 
society in developing country to innovative reading of the refugees or victims of 
human rights violation, as well from the specific focus on Rwanda to Kenya. As such, 
I believe that these scholarships could served as an entry point to locate my research 
focus on the IDPs narratives from the post-election violence as the critical agents to 
the ICC’s and TJRC’s proceedings.17 As further hinted, 
The key to grasping the dynamic possibilities of human agency is to view it as 
composed of variable and changing orientations within the flow of time. Only then will 
it be clear how the structural environments of action are both dynamically sustained by 
and also altered through human agency – by actors capable of formulating projects for 
                                                        
17  For past three to four years, the IDPs that I have met provides me with similar ideas of 
rejections upon both transitional justice institutions in Kenya. Throughout my engagements with them, 
they expressed both active and passive resistances upon the official narratives of justice and 




the future and realising them, even if only in small part, and with unforeseen outcomes, 
in the present (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: p.964).   
 
For both scholars, individual action are crucial to understanding the vertical 
relationship between dominant and subordinate groups. In addition, the agency of a 
single person, acting within the structures of power, is more visible when viewed 
across an extended period. 
 
As noted above, Scott’s theoretical work on resistance draws crucial attention to 
power relations between groups. Theoretical writings that build on Scott’s initial 
insights reinsert individual choice into the discussion on resistance and highlight the 
importance of a temporal examination of these choices (Ortner, 1995: p.175.) 
 
While critiques may argues that reading the few individual narratives from the IDP 
camps do not established a generic pattern of the whole idea of resistance of rejection 
of the entire society upon the ruling class or international agencies, but it does 
complicate our understanding of IDPs resistance to state power.18 Firstly, it challenges 
the dominant focus on top-down power structures in understanding resistance to 
transitional justice policy in Kenya, and re-introduces the individual into the picture 
of the exercise of power in Kenya today. Secondly, it shows the importance of local 
power differentials within the IDP communities in understanding how resistance is 
enacted in practice. The subordinate group should not be viewed as automatically 
homogenous or unified, either within ethnic or socio-economic groups. Finally, as a 
personalised and deep life history, the IDPs that the author spoken too introduces a 
crucial focus on the normative dimensions that underpin resistance. This 
                                                        
18  If there is a sense of disagreements and rejections, and yet have not been considered or by 
worse, ‘silenced’ by those in power, it is a clear  case of ‘politics’ and perhaps explain why the 




understanding calls us to ask in a detailed and grounded manner, why and how a 
particular government policy is resisted. It is with this cautious approach in mind that 
we should analyse and describe the extent to which Kenyan ruling class’ politicisation 
of transitional justice institutions and the ICC’s limited focuses on retribution justice 
are being resisted, with the goal of providing a more nuanced explanation of popular 
motivations. 
 
Hence, what is identified in the previous section as the bottom-up approach, which 
entails using the perspectives of those who were directly subjected to violence namely 
the IDPs. Thomson argues that the key to uncovering the act of everyday resistance 
lies in the concept that the weak party (critical agent), in its resistance to the dominant 
power (the agency of the state and its power representations) are not truly weak, and 
that weakness and power occupy relational positions (2011: p.449). Thus, the act of 
everyday resistance uncovers the extent of the power relations between the strong 
(dominant) and the weak (dominated) and, because these power relations are not static 
but ever-shifting, the critical agent that is ‘deemed’ to be weak cannot be permanently 
subject to this definition (p.450).  
 
In contrast to open confrontation, everyday resistance is a form of non-direct 
confrontation that is sustainable in a highly structured environment. The critical agent 
can achieve its goal of confrontation when its motives are not easily identified as 
conforming to systematic patterns of opposition to government policy or transitional 
justice mechanisms.19 Indeed, Scott’s observations of farmers living in the state of 
Kedah, northern Malaysia in the 1970s, have confirmed that the expression of popular 
                                                        
19  The aims of everyday resistance are to keep those in power in a ‘blurred zone’, where the 
authority is in constrained to prosecute those who belong to the anti-establishment movement. Similar 




resistance on the part of victims or marginalised members of society reveals the extent 
of state institutional oppression. It is also relatively effective in attaining the particular 
goal of objection, so that the critical agent may capitalise on its position and challenge 
the state’s dominant narratives about prosperity, peace, justice and economic 
empowerment (1986: pp.30-5).  
 
V) Why Interviewing the IDPs?  
Having resolved the key concepts of bottom-up approach and everyday resistance, in 
this section I first briefly explores the term ‘IDP’ in order to highlight the legal and 
political shortcoming in recent attempts to safeguard the livelihood of the IDPs in 
Kenya, as well as a further explanation on why my research focuses on this displaced 
victims after the post-election violence. Secondly, I briefly discuss the types of the 
IDPs in Kenya, and the actual method in collecting data, in term of how I access or 
speak to those IDPs for the last three to four years. 
 
i) International, Regional and National Legal Frameworks on the IDPs: 
Displacement and transitional Justice 
 
The concept of the IDP emerged in the last decade of the 20th century to distinguish 
those displaced people that have similar humanitarian needs as refugees, yet remain 
within their national territory (Schrepfer, 2012: p.668). Until the beginning of the 
1990s, IDP were defined negatively: they were people who had fled their homes, but 
who were not refugees (having remained within their country) (Phuong, 2004: p.1). It 
is only recently that some efforts have been made to devise a comprehensive 




General proposed a working definition. That definition was revised in 1998 and the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement now define IDP as, 
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid 
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human 
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognised state border (U. N., 1998). 
 
Eventually, through the revised edition of the same document, they were given 
international legal recognition with the publication of the document in 2001 (Phuong, 
2004: p.2). This allowed for the international community to provide protection and 
humanitarian relief under the principle of neutrality, without undermining the 
sovereignty of states. In short, without the agreement of the warring factions, the state 
and armed groups, IDPs are vulnerable to attack and also to neglect in post-conflict 
reconstruction policy, depending on the success of the group to which they were 
perceived to be aligned (Souter, 2013: p.173). Either in general or specifically to 
Kenyan situation after the 2008 crisis, there are various reasons why this thesis have 
choose the IDPs as a primary source of data collection, which will be discussed in 
turn. 
 
Firstly, whereas the number of refugees assisted by the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had fallen to 10.6 million by the end of 
2002, the number of worldwide IDP was estimated to be about 20-25 million at the 
same date (see Table 1.1 inU.N.C.H.R., 2002). IDP not only outnumber, by far, 
refugees, they also raise some of the most urgent human rights and humanitarian 
problems20 of our time and present a serious challenge to prevailing conceptions of 
sovereignty and intervention. Meanwhile, while the displacement have been one of 
                                                        





the continued themes in Kenyan politics, intersected with ethnically charged of 
electoral violence and land clashed since the colonial era, the democratic crisis 
estimated the bigger number of IDPs and worsen the existing unresolved 
displacement populations (Klopp, 2006: p.72).  
 
While the actual number released by the Kenyan officials is disputed 21 , various 
agencies indicated a bigger number of displaced victims that originated from the 2008 
crisis. For instance, following the 2002 elections, the only international organisation 
based in Geneva that monitored the IDPs’ situations in Kenya, the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated around 350, 000 victims from the 
electoral violence of the 1992 and 1997 remained homeless and were forced to 
migrate in the illegal settlements or new slums closed by to Nairobi city (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2004). In regards to greater democratic and 
constitutional reforms that took place in 2005, the IDMC seek clarifications on the 
status of female and underage IDPs during the fifth and sixth periodic reports 
submitted by the Kenyan government to the UN Convection of the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW), but none of the responds made 
by the Kenyan government matched the actual reality of protection improvements 
among the IDPs that they promised (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
2007a). By December 2007 crisis, IDMC estimated 600, 000 IDPs produced by the 
new wave of electoral violence (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007b). By 
early 2008, despite the Kenyan official claimed of active resettlement of the IDPs 
camps, nearly 650, 000 remained homeless and living in the worse environment with 
                                                        
21  Various international agencies have disputed the actual numbers of the IDPs by the Kenyan 





few access to the medical facilities (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
2010b).  
 
While the IDMC, UNCHR with other local NGOs have constantly called for the 
government immediate attention of speedy reforms and durable solution 22  to the 
growing numbers of illegal settlements, many that were interviewed by the IDMC and 
Human Rights Watch remained homeless and subject to various risk of violence 
(Kamungi and Klopp, 2008: pp.52-53). In the 2010 IDMC General Report, the 
organisation indicated around 250, 000 IDPs in various parts of the country, 
especially in Rift Valley province, subjected to the risk of discrimination, absence of 
physical security, and limited access to medical, clean water and shortage of food 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2010a). Most of these IDPs are from the 
2008 crisis and while the immediate violence have ceased, their livelihood remained 
in fear and some of them that met with the author have either still waiting for the 
promised money to buy the land for resettlement, or have been forced to resettle in a 
new place without any security assurance of their political and socioeconomic 
livelihoods (interview with IDP no. 100, Rift Valley, March 22, 2013).  
 
In addition, to the existing IDPs from the 2008 crisis, Kenya is few of the African 
countries that witnessing a rapid urbanisation with poor legal framework for land 
entitlement and people resettlement schemes. In the study conducted by the 
collaboration of researchers from the IDMC, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
UK, and Berkeley University, California US (Metcalfe et al., 2011: pp.31-33), a 
                                                        
22  As stipulated by the UN Guiding Principles, ‘durable solution’ is a legal termed in the 
international regulations that referred to the widely and understandable concepts on how to resolve the 
IDPs’ situations. In this respect, it refers to, a voluntary resettlement, fully participation in making 
decision on resettlement scheme, fully consultations, no coercion including physical and sexual abuses 




report have been produced on the status of urban resettlement and city sanctuary for 
the city of Nairobi.  
 
In that report, what remained disturbing is that the Kenyan government official 
claimed that they have successfully resettle the IDPs from the 2008 crisis by 
demonstrating the number of camps that have been closed down. However, the study 
discovered that huge numbers of IDPs that previously occupied the camps around 
Nairobi and southern Rift Valley have been forcefully migrated to the slums nearby in 
Nairobi, triggering the huge number of illegal slums, coupled with the new wave of 
homeless individuals from other rural areas due to the urbanisation23 and a massive 
construction of foreign private projects in rural cities. The research also discovered 
that those previous IDPs that are now resettled in slums like in Mukuru24, Mathare, 
Dandora and Korogocho have difficulty to access to justice, security, job opportunity 
and medical needs, especially when they cannot legally be identified as IDPs which 
means their existing humanitarian needs have been compromised and subjected to 
civilian status as an illegal settler.  
 
By June 2014, the IDMC latest reports indicated that there is no official, 
comprehensive, up-to-date national data on IDPs in the country. Data gathering has 
focused on instances of fresh displacement caused by violence or rapid-onset disasters 
with little quantitative and qualitative data on displacement dynamics after IDPs’ 
                                                        
23  Recent study also have shown that due to the rapid urban developments, Kenya’s rural areas 
suffered from the unintended consequences of limited fertile lands for individual ownership, 
community farming and this pushed some to move to the nearby slums in Nairobi with uneven 
development facilities and infrastructures to equips such demanding needs of proper resettlements, see 
(Hope, 2013) 
24  Through the author’s first interaction with the residents of the Mukuru slum in 2009, some of 
them later informed that they are previously lived in the IDP camps before their camps was closed by 
the government, and eventually some of them introduced the author to their families and friends that 





initial flights. The most recent informed estimate–provided by UNHCR in January 
2013–of 412,000 IDPs does not include those displaced by natural disasters, 
development projects and pastoralist IDPs (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
2014). Nor does it include any of the estimated 300,000 people who fled post-election 
violence in 2007/2008 and who are usually described as “integrated” IDPs. 
 
Secondly, the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention, as 
modified by the 1967 Protocol, indicates that IDP not refugees because they are still 
within their country of origin (Phuong, 2004: pp.5-6). They have not crossed a 
frontier, which is a precondition of refugeehood. While not defined as refugees, IDP 
have been dealt with by refugee structures such as UNHCR which provides protection 
and assistance to them (mostly in returnee-linked programmes), when they are found 
in the same areas as refugees, and when it considers that this forms an integral part of 
a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem. However, some concern has been 
expressed over such arrangements. IDP is linked with the refugee problem, in so far 
as it often constitutes a preliminary step towards external displacement, but the 
phenomenon also has specific characteristics and can raise special problems which 
cannot be solved by traditional methods of protection used in the refugee context 
(Daley, 2013: p.894).  
 
Internal displacement constitutes a distinct problem which has to be dealt with not 
only in conjunction with the refugee problem, but also separately as it raises issues of 
a different nature. As a consequence of to the obscured legal status of the IDPs, the 
Kenyan government has not proven to be really effective in ensuring their safety 




between the status IDPs and homeless citizens provides the political opportunity for 
the government to closed down many IDP camps as a pretext to reduce the 
government responsibility in ensuring their legal and political commitments upon 
them.25 As such, the IDPs living in protracted displacement continue to identify as 
protection concerns inadequate access to land, basic services and livelihood 
opportunities. Many IDPs are displaced in areas of the country that are 
environmentally and economically vulnerable and thus enjoy fewer opportunities for 
integration and development. As such in this thesis, the IDPs that the author 
interviewed are those that either still living at the camps in different parts of the Rift 
valley (in particular the self-help camps), or have been force to migrate to illegal 
settlements or slums around Nairobi, and this bring to next reason why this thesis 
focused on such vulnerable people. 
 
Thirdly, Africa has been plagued by many problems throughout its modern history. 
The problems have ranged from conflicts, to bad governance, to violations of human 
rights, to natural disasters. One of the current problems that many Africans encounter 
is forced displacement, which remains one of the most daunting challenges facing the 
African continent (Birganie, 2010: p.183). Whereas the number of refugees has seen a 
sharp decline, due in large part to the diminution of inter-State conflicts, the number 
of IDPs in Africa has increased substantially and, with it, the plight and suffering of 
the peoples of the continent (p.182).  
 
The AU and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), have tried to 
                                                        
25  By closing the 2008 IDP camps, the government announced in June 2008, as well as in July 
2013 that all the IDPs related to the 2008 crisis were fully resolved, but research have shown that those 
IDPs mostly either refuse to return back when they came from or to be resettled at the slums, and as 
such cannot be legally identified as an IDP, which ceased their humanitarian needs as enshrined by the 




address this problem. As far back as 1969, the OAU adopted the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa, which is 
considered to be the most progressive international instrument on the phenomenon of 
refugees (p.182). In keeping with that spirit, the AU has now added another 
convention to its cache of instruments in an attempt to address the plight of IDPs in 
Africa. The growth in IDP numbers and their vulnerability may account for the 
Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to IDP, which was adopted on November 
30, 2006 by states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes. Africa-wide 
recognition came on December 6, 2012, when the African Union’s Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance for Internally Displaced Peoples in Africa, which was 
adopted in 2009, came into force (Daley, 2013: p.895). Yet like many regional legal 
arrangements, the existence of these legislations has not resulted in marked 
improvement of the situation of IDPs, and at the moment remains to be seen (p.896.). 
 
The Kenyan government has somehow exhibits ‘hesitancy’ in signing and rectifying 
the aforementioned international and regional treaties. Kenya is a member state to the 
2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region and its 
protocols but it has yet to sign and ratify the AU Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa – the Kampala Convention (KC) 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). Its ratification has been delayed by 
the fact that Kenya’s 2010 constitution marked a change in how international and 
Kenyan municipal law intersect, moving from a dualist to a monist legal system. This 
required Kenya to pass legislation on domestication of treaties (Kamungi, 2013).  
 




the Resettlement of IDPs, whose mandate included preparing a draft bill on forced 
displacement. The draft policy was therefore complemented by the 2012 Prevention, 
Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities 
Act (hereinafter IDP Act), which received presidential assent on December 31, 2012. 
The IDP Act was eventually adopted in December 2012, so the country is now in a 
position to ratify the above mentioned regional KC but has not yet done so (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). The IDP Act largely reflects key protection 
principles throughout the displacement process and establishes an institutional 
framework for IDPs’ protection and assistance. However, little progress has been 
made towards its implementation – in particular the establishment of its inclusive 
implementation committee, the National Consultative Coordination Committee 
(NCCC). There has been little awareness raising or publicity about the Act with 
responsible authorities, the general public or IDPs. 
 
Some now feel that the draft IDP policy has been overtaken by the Act and there 
would be fewer added values in adopting the draft policy (interview with CIC officer 
no. 2, Nairobi, February 7, 2012). However, an approved IDP policy would certainly 
help facilitate implementation of the IDP Act. Both instruments are essential to 
improve the Government’s response to the needs of IDPs and the affected 
communities. The fast-tracking of the implimentation of the IDP Act and policy and 
the ratification of the KC are some of the recommendations on forced displacement 
that the TJRC included in its final report (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 4, pp.15-17). Since 
2014, responsibility for matters of IDP lies with the Ministry of Devolution and 
Planning and no longer with the now dissolved Ministry of State for Special 




the Ministry of Interior (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). Though 
IDP issues are seen to be a national government responsibility, county and central 
authorities will have to continue working alongside them to ensure effective 
management and equitable allocation of national and local resources. Thorough 
implementation of these legal and policy frameworks is fundamental to ensure real 
protection of IDPs’ rights and prevent further displacement. Again this remains to be 
seen, and bring this thesis the last final reason in opting for the IDPs as main object of 
primary data collection. 
 
Finally, in light of the 2008 crisis that lead to greater displacements of various ethnic 
communities in Kenya, the socio-legal and political attempts that embarked under the 
KNDR framework provides more instructive opportunities for a greater focus on the 
IDPs as one of the major identified victims of human rights violation (Zwier, 2013: 
p.327).  In this regards, when the power sharing government were created in Kenya, 
the agenda item number two of the KNDR were primarily designed to address the 
immediate attention of humanitarian and resettlement needs of the post-election 
violence’s IDPs (p.328). Subsequently, In May 2008, the government launched 
Operation Rudi Nyumbani26 in an effort to close camps and facilitate the return or 
resettlement of around 350,000 IDPs (U.N.C.H.R., 2008b). A national humanitarian 
fund was set-up to fund transport home, (re)construction of houses, livelihoods (in 
particular farming) and reconciliation initiatives. The international community 
provided non-food items, shelter and food assistance, supported basic services such as 
schools and health facilities and strengthened policing capacity in areas targeted by 
the operation (interview with USAID officer, Nairobi, February 15, 2012). 
                                                        





Yet as detailed in the next Chapter 3, the ruling class were heavily concerned with 
politicising the transitional justice options, and this lead a slow pace of genuine 
resettlements. IDPs have complained that it did not arrive for months or even years 
after their displacement. They also expressed concern about protracted land 
acquisition procedures and discrepancies between central and local databases, which 
led to the exclusion of certain displaced groups from government resettlement efforts 
(fieldwork note no. 1, Rift Valley, February 29, 2009). 
 
The Rudi Nyumbani operation was also criticised for its bias towards land-owning 
rural IDPs. Pressure put on IDPs to move out of the camps raised concerns about the 
voluntary nature of the process (Humanitarian News and Analysis, 2011). As 
discussed above, a careful look to the nature of the operation revealed that it was 
intend to swiftly closed major IDP camps from the 2008 crisis in order to indicates’ 
government commitment to reconciliation and resettlement and yet, most of the IDPs 
were politically transformed into homeless individuals and few were involuntarily 
opted to resettle at the slums (fieldwork note no. 2, Rift Valley, March 15, 2012). 
More could have been done to secure IDPs’ substantive participation in the planning 
and implementation of the operation. Additionally, the government reportedly bought 
land for resettlement without consulting IDPs who were unable to see the sites in 
advance in order to assess their viability and security (interview with IDP no. 10, Rift 
Valley, February 7, 2012). There have been allegations that state officials embezzled 





In the absence of the actual transparency and adequate assistance, members of around 
7,000 households who had not owned land prior to their displacement organised self-
help groups, purchased plots of land and settled less in 20 tents (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). Some IDPs remain in transit camps, while 
others stayed behind in the camps where they had originally taken refuge. This is 
particularly the case for those who had not owned land and those who feared new 
attacks in the absence of meaningful reconciliation with those who had displaced 
them. Many lack the resources to rebuild their lives and are waiting for the 
government to provide them with necessary help.  
 
In September 2013, the government announced that it would compensate each of the 
8,298 IDP households still living in camps with KSH 400,000 (US$ 4,600), and close 
all camps by the end of the month (Kiplang'at, 2013). In October 2013, the newly 
elected of Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta made a vague announcement that all 
IDPs had been resettled, though the local human rights groups challenged his 
statement (Joselow, 2013). However, in March 2014, in a report to the Kenyan 
parliament the president acknowledged that a total of 777 households had received the 
cash payments and that the exercise was continuing although not fully (Kenya Today, 
2014). 
 
Meantime, despite on-going displacement, levels of service provision and donor 
attention continue to decline. Several civil society organisations that for years have 
played a major role in the protection and assistance of IDPs have been left with very 
limited funding for IDP work (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). For 




particularly negative impact on the activities of KNCHR and knock-on impacts on the 
activities of the PWGID and of those of some of its members. Moreover, there is a 
clear gap between short-term emergency measures and the comprehensive medium 
and long-term initiatives that IDPs need to end their displacement and restart their 
lives. Within such predicaments, the author have discovered that the IDPs, in 
particular from the aforementioned of the self-help and transit camps developed a 
political expression and behavior of frustration and disappointment with the 
government, especially the local politicians that promised them money or the NGO 
that represents the ICC’s interest for land and other benefits of resettlements. As 
further discussed in Chapter 4, these politicians used 27  the money for their 
resettlements in order to garner political supports and votes for the 2013 election, 
rather than resolving their pressuring needs of resettlements. As discussed as well in 
Chapter 5, eventually, some of the IDPs that have testified at the national’s TJRC, feel 
being betrayed and opted for the immediate ‘financial rewards’ from the 2013 election 
candidates since their expected of reparations and restitutions have not been legally 
and politically met, even since the truth commission ‘closing the book’ or finalising 
the specific recommendation for implementations.  
 
For that, this thesis utilises the 2008 political crisis that plunged the nation with the 
greater IDPs’ situations and their everyday expressions as a way to understand how 
the intersection between transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding in theory have 
been energised toward addressing the issues of displacement, since the locus standee 
                                                        
27  There is a continued allegations and systematic evidence to suggest that the Kenyan MPs 
used, delayed and only distributed the IDPs’ ‘promised money’ for resettlement during the election 
rallies and while some of the allocations were provided through the Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF), there is wider irregularities in the way this money were transferred from the central fund to the 
individual MPs’ CDF, which allows them to delay and, only distributes the money for garnering votes 




of the IDPs and displacement zones has become part of the liberal cosmopolitan focus 
on the individual instead of the state as the primary object of morality (Schabas, 2014: 
p.156). Consequently, the focus on those who were subjected to violence has ensured 
that: ‘victim’s rights has emerged as a body of norms within the field of international 
human rights law, international criminal law, determining the treatment and 
entitlement [of the] victims…’ (Garcia-Godos and Sriram, 2013: p.3).  
 
Nevertheless, the above have more or less indicated why the is a worthy reason to tap 
into a livelihood of the Kenyan post-election violence’s IDPs, in particular when such 
displacement issues intersected with the country’s road of building a robust and firm 
transitional justice institutions in order to coming to terms with the 2008 crisis. While 
a lot have been written about transitional justice, peacebuilding and IDPs, but few28 
actually have given a primary focus on the IDP as an object of victim testimonials 
within the transitional justice research. The IDP or a theme on ‘displacement has not 
as of yet figured prominently in the literature or practice of transitional justice’ 
(Duthie, 2012: p.11). As rhetorically asked by Harris-Rimmer, ‘when and under what 
likely condition should transitional justice responds to the IDPs?’ (2009: p.1)   
 
Some would answer this by theoretically suggest that the displacement linked to the 
systematic violations of human rights. Severe violation, systematic killings, rapes and 
forced migrations that triggers massive numbers of displacement, resulting crimes 
against humanity that could be accepted as an evidence for the ICC’s proceedings, as 
well as denied access to justice that could be admitted as a testimonial for the truth 
                                                        
28  Between 2011 and 2012, few workshops have been conducted between the Department of 
International Development, LSE, University of London with International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, and most commentators recognised that the theme of displacement remained insufficiently 




commission (Duthie, 2012: p.34). Indeed, several world known truth commissions 
like in South Africa, Timor Leste, Liberia and Sierra Leone have integrated the IDPs’ 
testimonials in their final reports (Megan, 2012: pp.201-222). Bridging the gap 
between displacement and transitional justice required recognition to synergies 
multiples actors of peacebuilding, development, security and transitional justice itself 
with the issues that affected the IDPs.  
 
Yet as this thesis demonstrated, the empirical findings from the Kenyan cases 
revealed the complexity of attempts to bridge the gap in practice. Through the 
author’s conversation with the IDPs 29 , not all transitional justice concepts and 
institutions that will be chartered in the next Chapter 1 have successfully provides 
space to rehabilitate or to resettle the IDPs as stipulated by the transitional justice 
institutions’ mandates in Kenya. Of course, this not to blame on the institutional 
limitation of the transitional justice alone in the country but to highlight the failure of 
the transitional justice actors in the country, as well as at the ICC level to recognise 
that their transitional justice institutions are conditioned by power relations. By 
recognising the brinkmanship games of the ruling class and what I have illustrated 
earlier as the logic of neo-patrimonialism, I would revealed how such logic hide under 
the peculiar cloak of legalism and transitional justice norms to implicate partial justice 
that have not met the actual needs of the IDPs which remained to be victimised.  
 
Through the everyday lens of the IDPs and what I have explained earlier as their 
everyday resistance, the informal conversations that I had with the IDPs not only 
                                                        
29  The author would like to personally express his sincere appreciations to the first group of self-
help IDPs that engaged with the author in stimulating academic debate on the philosophical nature of 
human needs and vulnerability. Without these, the author remained blinds to see the gap between 




revealed the shortcomings of legalistic language that emphasise the institutional 
building of transitional justice mechanisms in Kenya, but a power relations, and how 
these institutions become parts of the ideological apparatus of the local elite, as well 
the global template of post-conflict peacebuilding, invoked through the notion of 
sovereignty and national security to defy the already problems of the international 
justice or the ICC’s legitimacy at the eyes of African countries and other developing 
countries. While critiqued argued that transitional justice institutions are not fully 
molded by the ruling class per see, and concerted as parts of the civil society’s 
crusades in ‘taming the leviathan’, my immediate replied would be calling for a wake 
up call30 among the debaters31 of Kenyan politics in order to distinguish between 
efforts to build standard settings of the legal framework (procedurals) and the 
integration of these legal exercise with the interplay with agency and how various 
agencies corresponds with these legal instruments (substantives), understanding this is 
a key to realise the blind spot32 in analysing African Politics and IR. 
 
For that, this thesis has narrowed down its focus on one particular segment of human 
rights victims after the Kenya’s 2008 crisis, namely the IDPs. This thesis identifies 
the victim’s perspective as a subaltern agent, while the victim is characterised by 
Roger McGinty and Oliver Richmond (2013), Jim Scott (1986) and Susan Thomson 
(2011) as a critical agent of everyday resistance. As such, the selected victims’ voices, 
perspectives and acts of resistance that emerge from the IDPs’ narratives are 
                                                        
30  Similar reactions have been hinted in the literature of sociology and land in Kenya, see 
(Kantai, 2007) 
31  The author would like to express his deep appreciation for the enlightening debates that he had 
engaged with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gabrielle Lynch (Warwick, UK) during his PhD’s oral examination/viva 
on providing very insightful perspectives on a philosophy of intellectualism in Kenyan political 
scholarship. 





considered by what discussed earlier in the subsection of the everyday resistance as a 
‘hidden transcript’, which revealed the difference IDP’s voices about peace, justice 
and reconciliation. Below, it will be shown how those self-help IDP community from 
the 2008 crisis and their languages of resistance can be read as one of the way to 
understand the dynamic of transitional justice institutions in Kenya. 
 
ii) The Patterns of Displacement and Method in Accessing the IDPs  
As mentioned earlier, the issue of displacement has existed prior of the 2008 crisis. 
All forms of displacements, whether caused by violence, ecological factors or 
projects, play into the grand narratives of deprivation and vulnerability, while at the 
same time exposing the reality of weak legal frameworks of governance, opaque and 
unequal mechanisms for accessing natural resources and poor human rights protection 
regimes (Juma, 2013: p.17). 
 
The main and most devastating cause of internal displacement in Kenya is politically-
motivated ethnic violence, which tends to recur during general elections held every 
five years. Since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1991, ethnically-
heterogeneous regions of the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western and Coast provinces have 
experienced violence in which some members of ‘indigenous’ tribes are pitted against 
migrants who are constructed as ‘outsiders.’ Claims that migrants acquired other 
communities’ lands unjustly through patronage networks undermine respect for their 
land and property rights. These claims have been used by politicians to mobilise 
ethnic militia to forcibly displace ‘outsiders’ and dispossess them of their land and 
property (Chapter 3). In 1992, 1997 and 2002, the displacement occurred before 




election. Hundreds of thousands of households have been displaced around these 
elections: 300,000 in 1992; 150,000 in 1997; 20,000 in 2002; and over 660,000 in the 
2007 post-election violence (Kamungi, 2009: p.1). As such, displacement were 
described by some as the ‘permanent features’ of recent political violence in Kenya 
(Kamungi and Klopp, 2008: p.53). For that, the immediate concerns of resolving the 
2008 crisis that subsequently led to the development of the transitional justice 
institutions are revolved around the primary attentions on resolving the IDP’s 
humanitarian needs and further robust framework of ‘durable solution’. As results of 
the 2008 crisis, there are several types of the IDP camps that can be identified based 
on the patterns of displacements that occurred during the crisis. 
 
Firstly, those who lived at the camp and eventually success in being resettle either 
through government’s concerted efforts in compensation, closing the camps and 
restitution, especially through the allocated land plots, funds to buy new land or 
returning home to a place where the IDPs came from. As discussed earlier, not many 
IDPs received such opportunities and the estimated number of the IDPs fall within 
such category (as released by the government), are disputed by many international 
and local actors. 
 
Secondly, those who initially have decided to remain at the camps in various part of 
the country. However, the major camps that scattered around Rift Valley province and 
the city of Nairobi have been the major targets of the government’s forced operations 
in closing these camps without a proper consultation and resettlement schemes. In 
regards to the government’s operation, Shutzer describes, 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) were asking for two things – security and land – 




of land tenure that lay at the heart of the violence and displacement. Such a process 
would threaten the very foundations of wealth and power in Kenya, inherited directly 
from the colonial period’s settler population. That the fighting displaced over half a 
million people who continued to garner attention from the media was scarcely lost on 
Nairobi’s decision-makers, many of whom had much at stake in preserving the status 
quo. It was at this critical moment that the Kenyan government introduced Operation 
Rudi Nyumbani (Operation Return Home/ORN), a resettlement programme for 
Kenya’s IDPs. Citing legitimate concern about the deleteriousness of long-term 
encampment, the government closed down camps and proclaimed to an international 
audience that all IDPs had returned home. 
 
Such an amicable name, Operation Return Home, offered an ironic contrast to the 
government’s forceful closure of IDP camps. When the operation began, there had been 
little effort to reduce hostility outside the camps, and many IDPs refused to leave, in 
part because they did not have a home to which to return safely. In order to remove 
IDPs from the camps, the government used physical force, cut off food and medical 
supplies, and made promises of compensation. In several cases, the police raided camps 
at night, burning down tents and chasing people away (2012: pp.345-346). 
 
Those who were forced to move out can be divided into two major groups; the 
integrated camp and self-help. In the previous section, I have touched on the 7000 
self-help IDPs who have decided to collectively settle down in limited tents instead of 
returning home while pressuring the government through various avenues to fulfill 
their resettlement needs (interview with IDP no. 17, Rift Valley, February 14, 2012).  
In addition, the second group was known as the integrated IDP camps. The integrated 
IDP community made up around 47% of the 2008 IDPs and the termed used by the 
government to refer to those who have been integrated in the community and lived 
with their closed by relatives in urban and semi-urban areas. However, as mentioned 
by a local researcher,  
it is not at all clear that ‘integrated IDPs’ in Kenya no longer have needs related to 
their displacement. In fact, because they are much less visible than IDPs living in 
camps, it is difficult to get a clear picture of what those needs are. Moreover, those 
who are ‘integrated’ joined the old caseload of IDPs, including those who had not 
found a durable solution since their displacement in the 1990s. 
 
The multiple causes of displacement suggest that the number of IDPs in Kenya 
remains significant, yet solutions are elusive for many. Following the formal closure 
of camps in 2010 and widespread public perception that persons still claiming to be 
displaced are imposters or ‘fake IDPs,’ there are only a few officially-recognised IDP 





While the role of municipalities in managing internal displacement is peripheral due 
to government practice, it is municipalities that bear the brunt of the negative impacts 
of influxes of IDPs. It is also important to consider that the new constitution of Kenya 
has created a devolved government structure that envisages municipal authorities 
playing a more central role in the management of affairs at the local level (Kamungi, 
2013: p.2). 
 
The author largely agreed with Kamungi, and as such the term ‘IDP’ throughout this 
thesis referred to those who is still living at the self-help camp, or being considered in 
the integrated camp. The term ‘integrated’ here refers to those who have involuntarily 
moved to the slums or other urban or semi-urban populated residencies. While major 
camps are close, government through the local country or district office has not 
provided a clear plan for a durable solution (interview with ICTJ officer no. 1, 
Nairobi, February 26, 2012). 
 
For that, throughout the IDPs interactions that they have with those officers that 
represents the government, the local NGOs and representatives of the international 
actors, especially the ICC, allows this thesis to construct a social pattern of their 
everyday resistance. In this regards, their everyday perspectives of subaltern agents 
were gauged by an open-ended questionnaire, which allowed respondents to 
characterise transitional justice in their own words. The victims’ or subaltern agents’ 
narratives were provided by those IDPs and former individuals who lived in IDP 
camps; their narratives of justice and peace indicated a different perspective from that 
of state agents and international actors.  
 
The approach of eliciting these subaltern narratives regarding the popular 
understanding of justice and reconciliation is based on Jacob Rasmusen’s study of the 
narratives of ordinary Mungiki individuals, which has been suppressed by Mungiki 




Northern Ireland (1991), Rasmussen’s definition of a narrative as being a means with 
which the narrator (the critical agent) can construct his or her story when he or she has 
already been subjected to and suppressed by the powerful inscription (the narratives 
of the international actor and the Kenyan government). As is eloquently summarised 
by James Baldwin: 
]I]f one really wishes to know how justice is administered in a country, one does not 
question the policemen, the lawyers, the judges, or the protected members of the 
middle class. One goes to the unprotected - those, precisely, who need the law’s 
protection most! - and listen to their testimony (1985: p.42). 
 
 
In this thesis, the narrative of everyday resistance is constructed as a ‘way of freeing 
oneself from such [the ICC’s, the TJRC’s and Kenyan politicians’] inscriptions’ 
(Rasmussen, 2010: p.443). The narrative of everyday resistance is central to this 
thesis’s argument on highlighting the limitations of transitional justice in 
administering justice to the victim and advancing political accountability. This is 
because the narrative is directly connected to Foucault’s notion of power and 
Althusser’s notion of ideology, according to which the narrative of everyday justice 
and resistance challenges the authenticity of KNDR policy. This policy provides the 
same reconciliation narrative for every Kenyan, and provides a framework for 
unraveling the political motives of the ruling class in supporting such a policy 
(Chapter 3).  
 
The conceptions of everyday justice and reconciliation held by the victims who reside 
in IDP camps can be understood by first identifying the reasons for the IDPs’ 
resistance, and for their claims that the ICC and TJRC’s proceedings no longer 
represent them (fieldwork note no. 2, Rift Valley, March 25, 2012). With regard to the 
IDPs’ narratives, all individuals who participated in this research were well aware of 




them. Additionally, all interviewees had an up-to-date knowledge of the ICC’s 
proceedings as they were reported in local mainstream newspapers (fieldwork note 
no. 1, Rift Valley, February 29, 2012).  
 
VI) Research Ethics and Limitations: Dealing with Highly Sensitive Political 
Environments and Subjects 
In this section, I share the dilemmas that arose during fieldwork, dilemmas that 
emerged perhaps because the author is working in an environment new to myself, 
namely the IDP camps, as well new, to a semi-structured interview method in highly 
sensitive environments. Although the author had traveled to the country prior 
conducting his extensive fieldwork in 2012, he too was new to the study site, with 
prior knowledge based only on having learned about it through his reading in 
secondary literature and the media and acquaintances from the area. Prior embarking 
into his extensive fieldworks, the author had also lived and completed his 
postgraduate research training both in England and Scotland for 3 years, thus situated 
in various different cultures as home. Within the literature of qualitative research 
methodology, a non-western researcher based in Canada, describes this as being in a 
bind, ‘where one is a third-world researcher who lives and works in the first world 
(over here), yet whose field of research is a third world site (over there)’ (Khan, 2005: 
p.218). The non-western researcher mentioned here highlighted how she has been 
perceived as an outsider despite her ancestral linkages to Pakistan.  
 
Within such backdrops that this research was planned and carried out, and share my 
experiences not only under the mandate of reflexivity that comes with qualitative 
research, but also for other researchers aiming to work in new contexts. Other 




either working in the Global South or with marginalised communities. For example, 
Riessman (2005: p.478.) reported how her research participants (barren women) in 
South India resisted signing the informed consent form as they were suspicious, 
associating ‘signing’ with a formal government document (p.478). Three concerns 
inmate my next discussion on research ethics and limitations, and each will discuss in 
turn. 
 
i) Preparing for the Fieldworks at the IDP Camps 
Research in new contexts can be daunting, and in preparation I explored, as far as was 
possible, background literature about the peoples, history and politics of Kenya, as 
well as engaged in dialogue on the methods and ethical guidelines to be used. By 
2011, during my first year PhD review,33 I have been wisely advice by the Convener 
for research students at my School to seek an advice from my Principal Supervisor, 
Prof. Ian Taylor in regards to research ethics and risk assessment prior conducting my 
fieldwork. For that, as part of the requirements to upgrade my status from a general 
research student to a full-time PhD researcher, I agreed with my supervisor advices to 
audit and to attend the additional modules34 offered by the School of International 
Relations, as well the MPhil core modules35 in Social Sciences that conducted by the 
University of St Andrews as a pre-requirement for conducting my fieldwork in 
Kenya. On April 25, 2011, I received a writing notice from the Postgraduate 
Committee, the School of International Relations University of St Andrews to inform 
that I have been fully upgraded as a PhD researcher. Without the advice of my 
                                                        
33   See the sixth document enclosed at the front page of this thesis. 
34  The modules: IR3024 The Politics of Africa; IR3033 Post-Conflict Transition in Sub-Saharan 
Africa; IR4516: The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa; IR5702: Case Studies in Conflict 
and Fieldwork, and IR5723: Conflicts and Security in Africa. 




supervisors and flexibility of the University in offering these modules, I may not 
equip myself with the fundamental knowledge in research and writing. 
 
During my first year doctoral training, I have been informed by the Conveners of 
IR5601 Research in International Relations and SS5103 Qualitative Methods in 
Social Research on a prerequisite of any doctoral researcher that intend to conduct a 
fieldwork must apply and receive a writing consent from both School of International 
Relations (where the author registered as a PhD student), and the University on the 
matter of ethics in research and risk assessment. As stipulated by the School of 
International Relations Handbook for PhD students and the University Regulations for 
research students, any doctoral candidate that intend to conduct a fieldwork must 
submit two different applications to the School’s Research Ethics Committee, and this 
application will be submit by the School to the University Teaching and Research 
Ethic Committee (UTREC) for their considerations and approval before the student 
final submission of his/her thesis for the purpose of the oral examination/viva. 
 
Returning from my second trip of fieldworks and after gathered all the necessary 
information, I submit my Research Ethical Form36 for all the periods of fieldworks 
that I conducted, and the UTREC received and considered my application form from 
the School. On September 13, 2013, I received a three years period of approval for all 
my fieldworks within my doctorate years (Reference Number: IR11188), which 
insisted that I must follows all the guidelines in regards to conducting fieldwork that 
deal with a living human being37, as stipulated in UTREC’s guidelines.  
                                                        
36  See the third document enclosed at the front page of this thesis. 
37  While this regulation mainly governed the research conducts in the field of medicine and 
health sciences, UTREC’s applied these regulations to all research that deal with a living human being, 





In addition, I have submitted my Fieldwork Risk Assessment Form with wide 
consultations from my supervisors, and the Head of the School in regards of 
evaluating the potential hazards that may hinder my research and life. Having 
satisfied with all the foreseeable significant hazards associated with the fieldwork 
have been identified and adequately controlled, I received the writing consent for all 
my fieldworks on May 27, 2014.38 In short, I consulted the relevant bodies regarding 
ethical framework, drafting my ethical guidelines from it and editing it through input 
and critique from colleagues, and lessons learned from prior research engagements. 
Additionally, I received valuable advices from attending various workshops on 
conducting fieldwork and writing from various relevant institutions, including the 
University of St Andrews’ Library, the University of Oxford’s Bodleian Library, the 
Royal African Society, the British Association for International Studies Association, 
the International Political Science Association that all based in UK and the British 
Institute for Eastern Africa based in Kenya. 
 
ii) What Happened at the Fieldwork Site? 
 
Despite careful preparation, I experienced a range of dilemmas that I will discuss 
below. (Cloke et al., 2000: p.133) report similar experiences with their research 
among homeless people in England and state that this may be because theoretical 
information and preparation, sometimes becomes less clear and noticeably more 
personalised when imposed in a different context, removed from the one for which the 
ethical and methodological procedures were originally designed. Indeed, there has 
                                                        




been polarised debate39 on which ethics and research practice should prevail. There 
are those supporting a universal code of research practice (deontological) and those 
who believe it should be contextual (consequential).  
 
In short, in this thesis, I have decided to take a pragmatic approach that spurns the 
rigidity of doctrinal rules in favour of adjusting research practices according to 
different contexts and the likely consequences of research therein. For that, while my 
research may driven by a personal drive for social justice, a philosophical position 
concerned with empowerment, and facilitating agency, not only in individuals, but in 
the whole of society, I posits that the consequences of the research should be for the 
good of the participants and the people around them and having moral sensitivity and 
good intentions with a moral imagination to protect the IDPs that respond to my 
questions from any calculated political repercussions, and not to passing any biased 
theoretical judgment that may not reflects their social realities in my writings.  
 
For instance, Lucy (not a real name), one of the senior female IDP’s accounts of 
resistance was recorded through a series of six semi-structured interviews conducted 
as part of an extended set of discussions held every 2 weeks between March and April 
2012 (interview with IDP no. 19, Rift Valley, February 16, 2012). In the course of 
these interviews, each spanning approximately 4 hours, she provided an oral account 
of her vivid40 experiences between December 2007 and March 2008. The exchange 
was recorded and later transcribed in its original Kiswahili and translated into English 
                                                        
39  For a detailed debate on the universal versus local particularity in research ethics, see (Yan 
and Jament, 2008)  
40  Including her detailed descriptions of physical and sexual violence committed by the local 
thugs at the instruction of the local MPs. However, she later agreed to remove that part of the explicit 
details from my official personal records in order to safeguard her dignity as a victim of gendered 
based of violence and human rights. My thesis largely inspired by her moral strengths and stories on 




by my assistant, a retired professor of Kiswahili at private local university in Kenya. 
At the next meeting, the Kiswahili version was read back to her, normally by a close 
family member, for confirmation and amendment. These changes were then added to 
both the Kiswahili and the English versions that were checked by a second translator. 
 
Given the deeply personal nature of her narratives, I arranged to bring back the full 
typed transcript to Lucy, so that she could keep a written record of our discussions. It 
was two weeks until our next meeting and I arrived with the diligently typed opening 
chapter to her narratives. The goal was to check for any alterations and corrections 
that she wanted to make and to leave a copy for she and her family. Lucy’s elder 
daughter and two of her children were all at the camp to greet myself. She instructed 
her daughter to read the typed pages to her. The process was detailed and dynamic, 
with Lucy adding comments and amendments, as the reading continued. All her 
family members remained throughout the exchange, listening to her telling of a 
complex personal history. At the conclusion of the discussion, I explained that the 
typed pages were for the family to keep as a record. I had additional copies to which I 
would make the changes and would bring them back at the next interview. Lucy 
refused. Leaving papers behind after my visit would start rumours, she explained; 
therefore, I must leave with the papers in the noticeable brown envelope, just as I had 
arrived (interview with IDP no. 19, Rift Valley, February 16, 2012). This is one of the 
few examples on how I practiced my ethical consciousness during the fieldwork. To 
respect the IDP’s confidentiality and to ensure the safety of the Kenyan assistants, 
interviewees and translators from any possible political repercussions created by this 






Nevertheless, in the discussion of the actual method of interviewing the IDPs here, I 
largely agreed with Griffiths’ advices (1998), methodology provides a rationale for 
the way in which a researcher goes about getting knowledge; it is therefore more than 
a description of techniques or tools, as it provides reason for using such techniques in 
relation to the kind of knowledge that is being collected, developed or constructed. 
 
My interviewed with the IDPs was undertaken in various self-help camps, or slums 
that occupied by previous members of the IDPs that were subjected to involuntary 
resettlement scheme of the Operation Rudi Nyumbani in May 2008. Though multi-
cultural41, its predominantly “home” to the Kikuyu community. During the fieldwork, 
observation and informal conversations with the IDPs were very helpful in 
understanding both the physical and social environment of the camps and slums. One 
of the distinct features of those that lived at the self-help camps and slums is that basic 
infrastructures were incomplete and dilapidated, where some tents are occupied with 
more family members that it can provides. This lack of privacy meant people have to 
go to toilet in gendered based groups (except the underage children) in order to be 
able to watch out for each other. Due to lack of privacy, some of the IDPs having a 
discussion with the author in various groups, and some held a returned meet for 
further interviews at three different venues that the author were stationed42 during the 
fieldworks. Throughout multiple meetings with some of the IDPs or former IDPs that 
now occupied the slums, the author discovered that the IDPs expressed in more 
comfortable freely discussions without any hesitation or interruption in discreet 
                                                        
41  Other minority ethnic communities like Kalenjin, Luo or Kenyan Somalis are mostly female 
members and are related to the Kikuyu’s IDPs through wedding prior the 2008 crisis, or a ‘pretended’ 
marriage that was intents to protect their safeties during the outbreak of the violence from any harms.   





locations where the author based. In this regards some researchers would describe this 
as researchers taking the opportunity to use their ‘distinctive powers’ on behalf of 
‘disadvantaged groups’, an example of going beyond the principle of doing no harm, 
to one of doing good (Harding and Norberg, 2005). In other words, it was an instance 
of taking Werhane and Moriarty’s advice (2009), to ‘disengage from one’s primary 
framework or extend or adapt that framework in a meaningful way’. 
 
For that, in regards to the selection of participants, the IDPs involved in this study 
comprised of both male and female adults, all over 21 years of age. Those interviewed 
in this line of research mostly traveled daily from Rift Valley to Nairobi, and were 
engaged in informal discussions with the author on the themes of reconciliation, 
national unity, peace and justice. The interviewees consisted of victims of post-
election violence, including 30 Kikuyus, 30 Luos, 30 Kalenjins and 10 individuals 
from other ethnic communities. The interviewees were of varying professions.43 The 
author conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with 103 residents of IDP 
camps, some of whom still reside there, or have moved to the slums. The interviews 
were conducted over a thirteen-month period that was split over 2009, 2012 and 2013.  
 
However, their narratives have had to be taken with a pinch of salt, especially in 
relation to exaggerated, self-aggrandising and misleading statements. As such, the 
interpretive process of recording, translating and analysing IDPs’ narratives was a 
painstaking, delicate and imperfect process.44 It aimed to tackle some of issues of 
                                                        
43  Most of the residents of the IDP camps identified here are known through their networks with 
local NGOs. The author would like to express his deep gratitude to the Kenyan citizens who co-
operated with him throughout his research and who made the writing of this thesis possible. 
44  I have decided to remove the original name of the IDPs and anonymous them by using 




translating personal accounts across cultures and draws on the current approaches 
adopted by Krog, Mpolweni and Kopano (2009: pp.175-207) to understand transcripts 
of atrocity provided before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). These authors argue for the need to read and interpret written transcripts 
inside an understanding of the immediate social context from which the individual 
was speaking. As a result, they suggest that the process of translation, in and of itself, 
may aid the researcher in accessing a participant’s world-view as well as a given 
account of events. In line with this thinking, the recording of IDP’s testimony at their 
“home” was the first act of interpretation, followed by the process of transcription, 
translation and analysis. Additional research was undertaken in the form of 
contextualising the data from the interview transcripts by a triangulation process 
tracing the gathered information back to its original source in order to verify it.  
 
As such, the most accurate written reflection of IDPs’ narratives would be to include 
the full or partial transcript throughout this thesis. However, as established, even in 
the writing of it, interpretation is occurring and so this piece deploys a more overt 
heuristic device that of focusing on critical junctures to capture the IDPs’ sets of 
choices over time. In short, the focus on the residents of the IDP camps does not mean 
that they are deemed to represent the interests and identity of the wider public, but 
simply that they provide a sound articulation of the role of the critical agent within the 
various segments of Kenyan society. This helps to substantiate the claim that the 
official language of justice and reconciliation used by the international and national 
elites in relation to the ICC’s suspects is not recognised or understood by the ordinary 
populace. 
                                                                                                                                                              
done in the best of my individual capacity as a researcher in case their recorded narratives subjected 





iii) Reflections on the Limitation of Qualitative Research 
 
Some of the key limitations encountered discovered in this research will be discussed 
below. Like many qualitative, interview-based research, there were two major 
obstacles confronting the carrying out of the fieldwork: building trust with the 
respondents and framing an impartial perspective. While the country has enjoyed 
relative peace since February 2008, the IDPs who imparted their opinions to the 
author exhibited a heightened sense of vulnerability and distrust towards the state, 
especially when engaged in highly sensitive and political topics of conversation. This 
reluctance to give an opinion can be explained by the fact that the ICC and TJRC’s 
proceedings were still ongoing (at the time of the research), and that those questioned 
on these processes were subject to multiple political penalties for their opinions.  
 
Additionally, the attempts to build the trust with the IDPs revealed the ‘positionality 
and power’. The asymmetrical relations between my position as a researcher and the 
IDPs constitutes certain normative barriers and presumptions among the IDPs which 
resulting an initial awkward interaction where those that I interviewed were curious 
and suspicious, especially with many previous researchers before the author asked the 
relatively similar questions (interview with IDP no. 2, Rift Valley, February 10, 
2009).  Thus, our conversations were initially statured with conflicting expectations, 
including asking for financial helps to buy food and other basic needs. In this 
situation, I break the ice or the awkwardness by sharing some of the hardship 
livelihoods that I have suffered while grew up in a poor economic background family 




years, creating a shared temporal moment for the IDPs to ask more and eventually 
willing to freely discuss their thoughts on my questions.  
 
However, the most difficult challenge in engaging with the IDPs is a feeling of fear 
among the IDPs from being seen by other IDPs, or an outsider Kenyans including the 
local authority when conversed with the author (interview with IDP no. 4, Rift Valley, 
February 4, 2009).  This was mostly resolved through meeting at my place rather than 
me having a frequent visit to the camps or slums. In this instance, power relations 
manifestly evidently in the start differences of wealth and social relations between the 
author and the IDPs that conversed, requiring an act of empathy by sharing some of 
my foods or water bottles with those that agreed to have a separate individual meeting 
with the author for future discussion. This is one of the examples that were likely to 
have been uncomfortable and not necessarily anticipated, with the author unable to 
prepare for every eventuality.  
 
Through a moral imagination process, the authors deliberated on this issue in 
hindsight, deciding that on future occasions I would either leave my water bottles in 
the car, or take enough water to share with my participants. I did take some groceries 
to the schools, such as loaves of fresh bread and other foods like fruits which were 
very hard to come by in these hostiles camps/slums. This was also a cultural gesture 
since it is appreciated when a visitor brings ‘milk and bread’ (interview with IDP no. 
5, Rift Valley, February 21, 2009).  However, the gifts of ‘hard to come by foods’ 
may also have aggravated the power imbalance. Such instances go beyond a formal 





In order to minimise disparities of power, I did my best to behave in a way that was as 
culturally aware as possible. For example, I dressed very simply, in a similar style to 
that of the IDPs. I also adopted a friendly disposition and conversed in Kiswahili, only 
speaking in English if the other person appeared comfortable with that. By acquiring 
basic Kiswahili and relying on a reputable local translator to engage with various 
Kenyans (since the author is not a Kenyan nor spoke Kiswahili prior to undertaking 
the research) it was possible to reduce the occurrence of cultural and contextual 
misunderstandings. Though using the local language helped develop trust and to be 
seen as ‘one of them’ (Griffiths, 1998: 40) we were still seen as having ‘superior’ 
knowledge (Lynch, 1999). Lynch describes this as an ironical situation, in that, 
despite my efforts to fit in I still presented ‘dominance’ (p.45). Perhaps an 
ethnographic style of research method in the community would have helped better in 
overcoming power dynamics, but time45 and resource constraints did not allow this. 
 
Secondly, one of the major obstacles to conducting the research, the local authorities 
(whose presence only moderately affected the in-depth interviews, as on most 
occasions the author was able to explain and “escape” from local bureaucracies) 
rarely hindered its progress. Meanwhile, officials and those involved in collecting the 
testimonies of human rights violations through TJRC hearings refused to let the 
author see the primary sources of the collected testimonies. In response to this 
challenging fieldwork environment, the author conducted additional interviews with 
some of the IDPs and borrowed their everyday notes46 as data with which to construct 
a view of the rehabilitation and reconciliation processes.  
                                                        
45  The author was funded for his PhD research, and his bursary sponsorship requires him to 
finish his fieldwork and thesis writing within 36 months. 
46  Success in establishing a good relationship with 50 IDPs allowed the author to provide them 





In addition to the above challenge, I faced my biggest dilemma with issues 
surrounding confidentiality. During the interviews, I learned of situations that were 
obviously harmful, especially the explicit details of sexual and other types of physical 
violence committed at the camps/slums or previous encounters of such crimes but 
have escaped from the local authority or the police (interview with IDP no. 11, Rift 
Valley, February 8, 2012).  After hearing this, I were faced with an ethical dilemma 
because though I had promised the IDPs not to discuss their data with anyone, I felt 
that their safety was at risk and eventually spoke to some researchers and local NGOs 
without mentioning the IDPs’ names (interview with HRW officer no. 1, Nairobi, 
February 27, 2012).  Most of the local NGOs’ officers or activists had grown up in the 
area and were very much aware of the violations or crimes that have occurred during 
the 2008 crisis. They said that constant dialogue with community members would be 
needed in order for the IDPs from various communities to speak with each other and 
their stories will be compiled by the local NGOs for various civil attempts to seek 
criminal justice at the local and national courts.  
 
A lesson learned during this fieldwork on the issue of consent and permission. Prior 
embarking the fieldwork, I have been officially informed that I only need a social visa 
to enter the country for every two months, and no further permit applications is 
required for conducting fieldworks. However, the local authority that engaged with 
the author at the camps/slums do sometimes being hesitant and questioned the author 
position to be at the camps/slums.  In this regards, soft and informal norms took it 
                                                                                                                                                              
not meeting the author. Of course, they were voluntarily agreed to do so and have managed to hide 
these mini notepads away from being access by any individuals that they perceived as a ‘threat’ to their 
writings. Upon receiving their verbal consents, the author kept these anonymous notepads for getting 




place and followed a chain of command. To protect the safety of those involved, the 
authors both canceled his visits on that day and asked for more assurance from the 
IDPs involved, and eventually they are more willing to travel to the author’s location 
for in-depth discussions  (interview with IDP no. 18, Rift Valley, February 15, 2012). 
 
As such, I negotiated a process of informed consent with my research participants, 
informed consent in this IDP community was different from what might normally be 
regarded as consent in western contexts, in that it followed a chain of command. For 
example, after getting permission from the various and relevant ministerial 
departments in charged on the IDP and District Officer, I met the slum/camp leaders 
and local NGOs and it was through them that I came to meet the IDPs. This chain of 
negotiating entry varies across contexts and shows that gaining permission is not 
always a one off event. This bears methodological implications to researchers wanting 
to work in the Global South, although collaborating with local NGOs, as I did, helps 
to bridge these different methodological circumstances as they are obviously more 
aware of local protocol.  
 
In nutshell, all of the IDPs were very responsive and pleased that I had chosen to 
work with their camps/slums (interview with IDP no. 6, Rift Valley, February 26, 
2009).  I appreciated this warm welcome (interview with IDP no. 9, Rift Valley, 
February 25, 2009).  I have had experiences where even if IDPs have been open to a 
study, they have asked critical questions about my intentions and how they will 
benefit from the study (interview with IDP no. 12, Rift Valley, February 9, 2012).   
Here it was different, and at times I wondered whether their unquestioning acceptance 




without question. However, by continuing to engage in multiple social interactions 
with similar respondents over certain periods, it was possible to establish a reliable 
relationship with each interviewee and to provide a “comfort zone” in which the IDPs 
could speak freely about complicated issues surrounding the ICC and the TJRC, 
(building trust and network with the IDPs). 
 
Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to generate a comprehensive description of 
justice and reconciliation in Kenya due to the limited number of participants, 
geographical confusions, and the fact that the ICC’s proceedings were still ongoing. 
Situating the IDPs’ understanding of justice and reconciliation within a complex array 
of legal jargon also proved difficult. In the author’s interactions with the respondents, 
the key questions surrounding justice and reconciliation proved to be too large to be 
comprehensively summarised by one single research project.  
 
One such example is the question of who should be held accountable for political 
massacres connected to various middle- and top-profile officers of governments that 
existed prior to the 2008 crisis (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. I, pp.62-78). Due to the limited 
degree of connection that most Kenyans feel with the transitional justice proceedings 
as debated by politicians, it proved necessary for the author to engage in more 
unstructured and informal modes of interaction with members of public, not all of 
whom lived at the camps. Some of these had been eyewitnesses to the TJRC’s 
proceedings, as well as to the state’s legacy of violence, impunity and injustice 
(fieldwork note no. 2, Rift Valley, March 25, 2012). This provided a deeper 
understanding of the perspective of ordinary Kenyans, in particular from the 




wrongdoings with transitional justice mechanisms. These perspectives are embedded 
in a rich and broad field of state-society relations, and inherent social patterns. This 
approach constitutes a significant development in compiling a comprehensive account 
of what recently happened in Kenya since 2008. Through the above extended 
discussion on research methodology, let us now embark to the next chapter, on the 

































Chapter 2: Liberal Peacebuilding, Transitional Justice and Power Sharing: 
Power and Ideology in Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) – 
Justice without Punishment? 
 
 
‘Men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and unable to punish what turns out to be 
unforgivable’ (Arendt, 1999: p.241). 
 
A – Introduction 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the key debates 
surrounding liberal peacebuilding, transitional justice and power sharing literatures in 
order to highlight the critical approach undertaken by this thesis toward peacebuilding 
and transitional justice. This examination also serves to illuminate the deeper affinity 
between liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice. In the liberal cosmopolitan 
approach to post-Cold War International Relations (IR), these entities can be viewed 
as two sides of the same coin: peacebuilding as a political project concerned with 
rebuilding the state and establishing a state of sustainable peace, and transitional 
justice as a legal project that concerns itself with evaluating the modes of prosecution 
and other non-legal measures during the transitional phase. Hence, this first part maps 
the increasing international trend of implementing transitional justice through local 
power-sharing arrangements, and identifies this development as an entry point for 
explaining and understanding the local political milieu in which the attempts to deal 
with post-election violence transformed into transitional justice policy. 
 
Having clarified the key terms and concepts used throughout this thesis, the second 
part of this chapter asserts that the development of the local peace process of the 




integration of the transitional justice agenda into the power-sharing agreement. It also 
demonstrates how this peace process developed from local discourses concerning the 
removal of impunity through the idea of accountability. Hence, the discussion on 
removing impunity and developing political accountability through transitional justice 
appears to have been the predominant form of discourse being projected in the 
aftermath of post-election violence. The discussion turns to an examination of 
transitional justice mechanism in applying political, as well as criminal, 
accountability; and how the ruling class has obstructed this application.  
 
The argument is based on two main assumptions. The first is that a discourse on 
political reconciliation based on KNDR constitutes transitional justice as a form of 
accountability. This connects the specific transitional justice mechanism with the 
element of accountability, and its two main components: answerability and 
enforcement. In conjunction with these components, the specific transitional justice 
mechanism in Kenya can be theoretically connected to the idea of holding the Kenyan 
leaders accountable, and therefore subject to criminal sanctions. The second 
assumption is that, while a discourse on political reconciliation that arose from KNDR 
placed an emphasis on a higher level of accountability, the process of building a 
specific transitional justice mechanism was impeded by political impunity.  
 
On the final part, this chapter also presents a conceptual framework for how power 
and ideology can be used to plausibly map the transitional justice processes in Kenya. 




and accountability, and to situate this relationship within Kenya’s ruling class47 and 
its notions of power48 and ideology49. Drawing from Michael Foucault’s works on 
power (1977; 1980b; 1980a; 1984; 1997b; 1997a; 1998; 2002a; 2002b) and Luis 
Althusser’s writings on ideology (1971; 1976; 1977; 2001), the discussion in the final 
part of this chapter unfolds into three subsections.  
 
Firstly, by exploring the Foucauldian conception of power, the study defines 
transitional justice as being one of the dominant discourses of accountability that 
arose from the post-election violence; the political agent is able to evaluate himself 
and others based on this discourse of accountability. Secondly, the study shows how 
the political agent resists the dominant discourses of accountability by projecting 
alternative discourses. This action is known as political impunity. Hence, transitional 
justice processes embody what Foucault terms as knowledge (connaissance) of the 
ruling class’ resistance to justice, rather than knowledge (savoir) of accountability.50 
Thirdly, the study uses Althusser’s works on ideology to unmask the ideological 
apparatus of reconciliation in Kenya, in which TJ was implemented for the purposes 
of defending the entrenched culture of impunity, but not for addressing the demands 
for accountability. As such, this chapter provides a conceptual framework for 
                                                        
47  By the ‘ruling class’, the author means the GNU senior officials, the political elite, MPs, state 
bureaucrats, transnational actors (including AU and UN officials), the security forces (including non-
state militias hired by the state) and those directly involved or connected to the process of formulating 
KNDR as a blueprint for the political reconciliation project in Kenya, as well as those who decide on 
which transitional justice measure will be implemented. Kofi Annan’s personal narrative of leading the 
negotiation surrounding power-sharing and transitional justice helps the study to identify the major 
members of the political elite who were involved in the process. See Anna, 2008; Kanyinga, 2011.  
48  This notion of ‘power’ here should be seen as the process or constellation of power that 
surrounds the agent, rather than a ‘thing’ or property that is wielded by him or her. See Foucault, 
2002b. 
49  The notion of ‘ideology’ here is defined as the process of constructing the imaginary 
projection of our reality and, how it perceives and identifies real conditions. See Althusser, 2001; 
Zizek, 1994.   
50  The English word ‘knowledge’ has two distinct equivalents in French. Since Foucault wrote 
his original work of Discipline and Punish in French, we have to recognise this shortcoming in the 




identifying the “bigger picture” that connects the operation of two major transitional 
justice mechanisms in Kenya: the ICC and the TJRC. 
 
B – Revisiting the Literatures: Liberal Peacebuilding, Transitional Justice and 
Power Sharing 
 
I) Liberal Peacebuilding and Its Discontents  
The end of the Cold War marked an increased focus on intra-state conflicts. As a 
result, there was an increase in the international determination to resolve these 
conflicts through peacebuilding missions, rather than by adopting policies that might 
lead to territorial distribution (Paris, 2004: p.24). The demise of superpower conflicts 
contributed to a proliferation of international peacebuilding projects (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2009; Jeong, 1999; Ramsbotham, 2000). Although the concept itself was 
not novel, it received considerable attention from international policymakers and 
commentators (Höglund, 2011: p.224; Kriesberg, 2011: p.77) with the 1992 
publication of the UN’s Agenda for Peace, in which peacebuilding was defined as 
‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order not to relapse into conflict’ (Ghali, 1992). The concept was later 
enriched by various UN documents (see Table 2.1), which signified its importance in 
navigating international peace operations in various conflict zones scattered over four 
continents.  
Table 2.1: The Major International Documents on Peacebuilding and Transitional 
Justice 
 
Organisations Year of 
Publication 
Title of the Reports 
UN 1992 Agenda for Peace 




UN 2000 Brahimi Report 
UN 2004 The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Society 
UN 2005 In Large Freedom 
UN 2006 Uniting Our Strengths: Enhancing United Nations 
Supports for the Rules of Law 
UN 2010 Review of UN Peacebuilding Architecture 
World Bank 2011 World Development Report 
UNDP 2011 Governance for Peace: Securing the Social 
Contract 
Source: Compiled by the author from various UN websites 
Accordingly, what is termed as ‘liberal peacebuilding’ in Roland Paris’s (2004: p.9) 
analysis of the features of democratisation and marketisation that have been evident in 
peace operations since the 1990s is a call for international society to recognise the 
liberal agenda in various peace operations including (but not limited to) peacekeeping, 
the rules of law, human rights, humanitarian intervention, immediate election, open 
market economy, constitutional writing, power sharing and transitional justice.   
 
Yet, as the peace missions became entangled with more complex questions of politics 
and national security, they came under a sustained barrage of criticism from 
peacebuilding literature about the heavy involvement of external actors, the recurring 
cycles of violent conflicts and the overreaching goals of peacebuilding missions 
(Franke and Warnecke, 2009: p.430; Menkhaus, 2009: p.230). 
 
Perhaps, the works of Oliver Richmond shed some light on the various types of peace 
that have existed and been connected to the various aforementioned peace documents 
(2005: p.203). The overlooked analysis of liberal peacebuilding, and the convenient 




throughout European history, have overshadowed the crucial term of ‘peace’ itself 
(p.204). Consequently, according to Richmond, the ‘mainstream IR theorists’ defined 
peace as being opposite to war, and focused solely on state formation and institutional 
arrangements to secure legitimacy, thus discrediting the role of various agents that 
operated under the radar of the state at the local level (p.205). Hence, the 
aforementioned peace operations can be connected to the four strands of liberal peace: 
victor’s peace (as witnessed during the two World Wars), constitutional peace (as 
witnessed in international tribunals, transitional justice and human rights projects), 
institutional peace (as witnessed through R2P, UNSC, regional arrangements and 
power-sharing peace agreements) and civil peace (appearing at the national and sub-
national level of conflict zones, affecting civilian society and the ordinary population) 
(p.214).  
 
While the operations may vary according to the specific needs of the conflict zone, 
they are underpinned by a liberal peace understanding of managing conflict, and so 
reflect a constituent part of the process of constructing a ‘liberal post-Westphalian’ 
order in predominant conflict zones in non-Western societies (Newman, 2001; p.425). 
Though it is almost impossible to establish Westphalian order in a fortnight, and such 
a one-size-fits-all approach violates the classical tradition of non-interference with 
other sovereigns’ domestic affairs (through responsibility to protect), the approach is 
considered by liberal peace proponents to be the best course of action. This is most 
easily explained by the fact that their epistemological assumptions about liberal peace 
are derived from the larger tradition of democratic peace theory in IR literature 
(Cohen, 1994; Doyle, 1983; Gaddis, 1993; Layne, 1994; MacMillan, 1995; Mansfield 




Kappen, 1995).  
 
What remains problematic is the sustained level of criticism from proponents of 
critical peace scholarship (CPS)51, who assert that the understanding of peacebuilding 
must be distinguished from the predominant understanding of liberal peacebuilding, 
and institutional approaches that tended to focus on state-building. Indeed, in his 
thesis on post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, Patrick Tom confirms that the 
focus that has been placed on state-building in various peacebuilding projects in 
Africa since the events of 9/11 has redefined concerns about security and peace 
operations. This is particularly apparent in countries that are internationally and 
quantitatively ranked as weak states, and in stateless societies that are prone to 
terrorist activity, as witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa (2011: 
p.87). The CPS emphasize that the practice of peacebuilding encompasses more than 
simply the task of fixing the state (state-building), and involves a range of issues, such 
as ‘social justice, welfare provision, tradition, custom, culture, the grassroots, 
reconciliation, equity and humanistic agendas for peace rather technocratic 
institutional state-centric agendas for peace’ (p.94). As such, peacebuilding (including 
liberal peacebuilding) should be understood as a form of ‘vision of rights, 
development, and representation across societies, whereas statebuilding is the vehicle 
through which the neoliberal institutional and political framework in a particular 
version of this vision can be assured’ (Richmond, 2013: p.299).  
 
To propose that it is necessary to distinguish between state-building and 
peacebuilding is not to make the radical proposal that peacebuilding can be developed 
                                                        




without a state; rather, it is to highlight that besides the fact that peacebuilding 
concerns itself with the task of rebuilding a state based on a ‘Western historical 
model…, realist theoretical approaches (e.g. Morgenthau, Waltz, etc.), to sociology 
(Weber, Tilly), anthropology (Evans-Pritchard, Radcliffe Brown), history, and 
economics (Keynes, Marx, Friedman)’ (p.300), there is also an argument to be made 
that it is dependent on various agencies that appear at the national and sub-national 
levels, and which are endogenous to the peacebuilding processes itself. This type of 
peace seemingly functions at the surface level of the post-colonial state and is 
manifested by the ruling elite’s rhetorical commitment to peace, which does not 
actually benefit those who were subjected to violence (see Taylor, 2007). This brings 
the next discussion to the placement of liberal peacebuilding problems in Africa. 
 
II) Liberal Peacebuilding and Its Critics in Africa 
In African context, Devon Curtis was correct to assume that the recurring cycle of 
violent conflict in eastern DRC (2008) and similar features of protracted conflicts in 
Rwanda (1994) are visible in the recent crisis of South Sudan (2012), since the 
question of how to establish peace after violent conflict continues to preoccupy 
international policymakers, and there is continual disagreement as to what types of 
peacebuilding activities should be prioritised (2012: p.73; 2013: p.83).  
 
Given the call for a further critical review of liberal peacebuilding and an analysis that 
probes beyond the focus on state-building in most peace studies, there has been a 
marked dearth of studies on the impact of such peacebuilding processes in Africa 
(Tom, 2011: p.111). However, a growing line of study that criticises liberal 




tenaciously follow the argument that ‘development is dependent on democracy, and 
democracy supports peace and stability, further encouraging development’ 
(Abrahamsen, 2001: p.80). Ironically, what has come to be identified as ‘international 
determinism’ since the introduction of the SAPs has featured the imposition of 
procedural democracy (in the early 1990s) through aid sanctions, as well as recent 
peacebuilding missions and transitional justice experiments in civil wars. The results 
of these processes are elusive (see both introductions in Sriram and Pillay, 2009; 
Sriram et al., 2013), but the cost of securing order and security remained high 
throughout their implementation, and what has been established so far is a ‘virtual 
peace’ (Taylor, 2007: p.558) or a ‘technocratic peace’ (MacGinty and Richmond, 
2007: p.495).  
 
Liberal peacebuilding missions have continually failed to transform the neo-
patrimonial logic of the state in the post-conflict environments of Angola, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda and South Sudan, and have inevitably produced unintended 
consequences of renewed violence, unequal access to economic resources, illiberal 
power alternation and flawed elections. The twin pillars of liberal peace 
(democratisation and marketisation) have not only failed to reform the neo-
patrimonial system that caused the crisis, have continually relied on the existence of 
such a system (because of the lack of internal hegemony) in securing immediate peace 
and compromising with peace spoilers (Munive, 2013; Ottoway, 1998; Phiri, 2012; 
Stroh, 2010; Williams, 2004; Willett, 2005). This has had a further detrimental effect 
on the existing approach to state-building in liberal peacebuilding enterprises, since 
‘the state rather than society is the unit of analysis, even if society is deemed to be the 





The consequence is of course predictable, as the contextualisation of peacebuilding in 
a neoliberal sense ‘is conventionally understood as principally a product of force, 
patronage, and power, including external power (as in post-colonial Africa), rather 
than recognition or to achieve a range of core functions’ (p.302). As a result, the study 
of rebuilding a state in Robert Bates’ and Paul Collier’s quixotic terming of 
‘dangerous places like Africa’ (Bates, 2008: p.17; Collier, 2010: p.45) has not only 
ignored what Curtin and Dzinesa (2012: p.37)  identify as power relations, ideological 
apparatus and local ownership, but also resembles the deja vu evidence that the 
‘[p]ost-colonial processes of state formation are, in particular, assumed to imply an 
illiberal social contract where state resources are used in various ways to support 
elites and to buy off citizens, preserving local patterns of power responsible…’ 
(Richmond, 2013: p.301). In this case, the ‘patterns of power’ are responsible for the 
repressive state that existed before the eruption of the crisis.  
 
Given the considerably critical reflection on the major peacebuilding projects in 
Africa, this thesis believes that Richmond’s conceptualising peacebuilding is a key to 
highlight the existing limitation of top-down approach of peacebuilding, especially in 
African regions. This brings us to the Richmond’s four major generations of 
peacebuilding research: the first generation of realists who emerged from 
predominantly positivist traditions of negative peace, and who believed that conflict 
was inevitable but manageable; the second generation of scholars of liberal 
institutionalism in peace and conflict resolution; the third generation of liberal 
peacebuilding studies conducted from the policymaker’s perspective, incorporating 




generation of Critical Peacebuilding Scholarship (CPS), with its critics of ‘peace-as-
governance’ and their demands for a broader reconceptualisation of peacebuilding as 
the means by which conflict resolution is transformed into conflict transformation by 
using the bottom-up approach (2008: pp.97-107). In this thesis, the fourth generation 
of peacebuilding research has been chosen by the author to be the primary domain in 
which analyse and clarify the peacebuilding process in Kenya. This decision was 
made for the following reasons: 
 
  The recent growth in the literature of the fourth generation of CPS opens up 
further avenues for examining the various activities of peace at the local level, 
especially on the subject of political reconciliation, inter-ethnic national unity 
projects and the quest for post-conflict justice that is commonly addressed 
under the subject of transitional justice. This inevitably helps to bridge the 
epistemological and methodological gaps between liberal peacebuilding and 
transitional justice, in which the specific local politics of peace and justice 
processes in Kenya can be connected to the above-mentioned critical position 
on liberal peacebuilding in Africa. A particularly important research avenue 
has been opened up by CPS’ critical reflection on the lack of international 
commentators’ understanding of the complexity and hybridity of the ‘local’ 
politics of peace. 
 
   The location of the subaltern agents that have been identified in this thesis as 
the IDPs, whose narratives provide the reader with a clearer perspective on the 
responses of the various local agents to the national peace process that is 




subaltern agents has helped the research conducted in this thesis to specifically 
locate the data collected from the semi-structured interviews with the IDPs as 
primary sources. These sources confirm these individuals’ positions as 
subaltern agents in the bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, as well as 
confirming the importance of their testimonials regarding the violation of 
human rights to the delineation of the limits of the transitional justice 
mechanisms that have been employed in Kenya. 
 
Nevertheless, this fourth generation of peacebuilding research - better known as the 
CPS agenda–allows this thesis to position its research inquiry in relation to the local 
political process of reconciliation and transitional justice in Kenya. Yet, before 
embarking on an attempt to address our primary concern of how to bridge gap in the 
interaction between liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice in Kenya, we need to 
operationalise the historical development of transitional justice itself. 
 
III) The Genealogy of Transitional Justice and Its Polygonal Features 
The past twenty years have seen the emergence of a proliferation of transitional 
justice mechanisms, such as criminal tribunals and truth commissions, which promise 
accountability for perpetrators and compensation for victims in the wake of 
authoritarianism and civil war. Transitional justice efforts may include - but are not 
limited to - criminal tribunals, truth commissions (TRCs), lustration, institutional 
reforms, public memorials, reparations and amnesties. The major intellectual 
developments of transitional justice can be summarised through the prominent works 
of Ruti Teitel (2003). There are three major focal points of transitional justice, which 





The first period is that which covers the post-World War Two years, which prioritised 
retributive justice and punishment for genocide and the worst forms of human rights 
violations, as well as systematic and political violence (p.70). The beginning of the 
second period was marked by the third or ‘late’ wave of democratisation at the end of 
the 1980s, following the decline of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe and of 
authoritarian rule in Latin America (p.81). A third contemporary period of  
transitional justice was officially marked by the establishment of the ICC in 2003, 
which gave strong priorities to criminal accountability, instead of amnesty (p.89).  
 
All the types of international tribunals that have operated in former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone, reflect the increased demand for international legal norms 
to be integrated into peacebuilding missions (Teitel, 2005: p.845). In debating the 
actual administration of transitional justice mechanisms, there are three major 
approaches, currently subject to critical discussion. Firstly, the ‘maximalist’ approach 
emphasises the necessity of criminal prosecution, tribunals and punishment, through 
the philosophical function of retributive justice as a form of deterrence (the basic 
criminal justice function). Secondly, the ‘minimalist’ approach is concerned with the 
political environment of post-conflict justice, and calls for the incorporation of 
amnesty as a compromise in fulfilling the basic function of retributive justice with an 
alternative (restorative) form of justice, in which non-legal mechanisms like the truth 
commission are more relevant and effective in dealing with mass atrocities. Finally, 
the ‘pragmatic’ approach calls for a balance between and combination of both 
retributive and restorative justice (Olsen et al., 2010a: p.17). The current precedents of 




(Lynch, 2012/2013: p.33).  
 
The strong international demand for accountability instead of amnesty triggered the 
creation of the ICC, and marked a return to the predominant theme of the retributive 
justice measures adopted in the first period (Teitel, 2003: p.90). Scholars like Lutz 
Ellen and Kathryn Sikkink have coined the phrase ‘justice cascade’ for instances 
where advocates of the third genealogy, inaugurated by the inception of the ICC, 
harbor normative legal criticisms of the weaknesses of previous measures (2001: p.2). 
These include the inability of the post-conflict regime to cope with intra-state conflict 
and poor judicial capacity, and an increase in peacebuilding missions in Africa 
(Bosire, 2006; Clark et al., 2009; Clark, 2010; Huyse and Salter, 2008; Lambourne, 
2009; Laplante, 2008; Merwe et al., 2009; Pensky, 2008; Peterson, 2009).  
 
Recent research by Lauren Balasco also mapped transitional justice in three major 
periods of development (2013). In the first period, although the idea of transitional 
justice had existed before the 1945 war crime tribunal and the 1980 truth commission 
waves, the concept only entered common usage in the language of policy 
recommendation following the growing international concern over the systematic 
violation of human rights and the unstable democratic processes of developing 
countries (p.199). Hence, this period saw a ‘normative exploration’ of transitional 
justice as part of the currency of IR (p.200). The second wave was concerned with the 
growth of transitional justice enterprises and their functions as some of the transitional 
options afforded to African countries (p.201). Borrowing from Latin America’s 
experiments, South Africa’s TRC opted for amnesty and restorative justice (Good, 




of using a criminal, legal language of prosecution and sanction led to the installation 
of hybrid tribunals, and later the tribunal in Rwanda, Balkans and Sierra Leone. 
Simultaneously, there was a call for hybridity and more comprehensive approaches, 
which lead to a growth in comparative studies evaluating the nature and viability of 
justice tools in war-torn societies, especially the broader impact of such tools on 
development, democratisation and peace processes (Duthie, 2008; Fukuyama, 2009; 
Fletcher et al., 2009; Hansen, 2011b; Jeffrey, 2011; Miller, 2008; Tondini, 2008).  
 
As a consequence, this introduced more difficult research themes on the scope of 
transition, the types of mechanisms employed, cultural resonance, clashes between 
values and interests, the relevance of the case study being examined and the tools that 
could plausibly be used for international intervention and other purposes that are not 
related to transitional justice itself (see  Bell, 2009). The ambiguity of its goals, the 
external factors that limit the effectiveness of its tools, and the broader forms of 
justice that it encompasses (ranging from retributive and prosecution-based justice to 
restorative and amnesty-based justice) have challenged the relevance of the field of 
transitional justice (Arenhovel, 2008: p.580; David, 2006: p.360). The growing 
literatures of CPS, conflict, security and development have all explicitly and 
implicitly shaped the polygonal or multifaceted features of present transitional justice 
practices (Adhikari and Hansen, 2013; Hayner, 2011; McCarthy, 2009; Rage, 2010; 
Skaar, 2012; Quinn, 2009b). Finally, the current wave of transitional justice follows 
the relatively recent trend of incorporating methodological concerns about data 
collection, single or large case studies and the merits of quantitative or qualitative 
approaches to the field. Despite the growth in literature, evidence to this date has 




debate concerning the merits of positivist versus critical approaches at the 
epistemological and methodological levels (Aukerman, 2002; Backer, 2009; Call, 
2004; Coomans et al., 2009; Dancy, 2010; Grodsky, 2009b; Klinkner, 2008; Mani, 
2002; Nagy, 2008; Olsen et al., 2010a; Olsen et al., 2010b; Rajagopal., 2008).  
 
As a result of the above discussion on the genealogy of transitional justice, the field 
faces a disciplinary crisis in academic debate and a ‘paradox of success’ in actual 
practice: ‘[t]he less effective its mechanisms seem to be in their efforts to build 
democracy and peace, the more we are demanding from them’ (Balasco, 2013: p.198). 
As a result of the critical challenges it has received concerning the boundary 
limitations that it shares with older disciplines (such as democracy, human rights, 
peacebuilding and international development), transitional justice has come under 
pressure from policymakers, who demand that it expand its missions, and the 
‘increased claims’ of scholars of the aforementioned disciplines that it must identify 
itself with a particular field (p.199). At this juncture, it is appropriate to open the 
discussion on the thesis’ attempts to bridge the gap between liberal peacebuilding and 
transitional justice, and plot some of the possible interactions between these fields. 
 
IV) Bridging the Gap between Transitional Justice and Liberal Peacebuilding 
 
At the outset, it will seem reasonable for some readers to question the expediency of 
pursuing an academic exercise that supposedly bridges the gap between liberal 
peacebuilding and transitional justice. Rather than dismissing it as mere academic 
rumination removed from everyday practical concerns, I believe that the analytical 
discussion proposed here helps to improve the policymaker’s understanding of these 




between law and politics in post-conflict reconstruction policy. Such understandings 
allow the reader to visualise how the local peacebuilding process to address post-
election violence in Kenya came to be transformed into transitional justice discourses, 
and how these furthered the political discussion of transitional justice as power and 
ideology based on the situation in Kenya. 
 
In framing the relationship between peacebuilding and transitional justice, advocates 
of peacebuilding have argued that the objectives of transitional justice are compatible 
with the objectives of peacebuilding (Laplante, 2008: p.339-42). Arguably, both 
peacebuilding and transitional justice share a liberal cosmopolitan vision of IR. Being 
a product of the Western Enlightenment, the liberal institutionalist project of the 20th 
century priorities ‘political freedom, democracy and constitutionally guaranteed 
rights, and [advocates] the liberty of the individual and equality before the law’ 
(Burchill, 2005: p.55), whereas cosmopolitanism can be understood as being an 
ideology based on a ‘consciousness of being a citizen of the world, whatever other 
affiliations we may have’ (Fine, 2006: p.242). It is a projection of a ‘worldwide 
community of human beings’ (p.243), which ‘seeks to reframe human activity and 
entrench it in law, rights, and responsibilities’ (Beardsworth, 2011: p.15), therefore 
upholding the ‘irreducible moral status of each and every person’ (p.16). As a result, a 
combination of liberal cosmopolitanism’s emphasis upon individual human beings 
rather than the state’s agency promotes desirable universal tenets for constructing a 
better international system, and seeks to challenge the state’s exclusive position as the 
primary moral actor in IR (Freeden, 2010: p.8).  
 




provided international space for the liberal cosmopolitan conviction of the necessity 
of respecting the law in peacebuilding, humanitarian crisis management and 
transitional justice (Forsythe, 2009; Humphrey and Valverde, 2008; Turner, 2008). 
This ideology has inspired international attempts to pursue justice through 
peacebuilding missions; the general view is now that the quest for justice is part of the 
original vision of peacebuilding (Lidén, 2013: p.83). Indeed, the UN strongly 
emphasises that there is no peace without law and criminal prosecution (Sriram, 2008: 
p.3).  
 
The transition from the process of securing post-conflict power sharing to that of 
establishing a long-term peacebuilding project necessitates the administering of some 
forms of justice. Most important among these is criminal prosecution, since the causes 
of violence are often related to impunity (Lira, 2001; Ross and Sriram., 2012; Yusuf, 
2007). Impunity is inherent in the renewed cycle of violence, and addressing impunity 
with certain judicial measures is a precondition to deterring future conflict (Fiss, 
2009: p.65). In sentencing Charles Taylor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
acknowledged that the primary objectives of justice were retribution and deterrence 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2012: pp.3-4). Obviously, retribution was 
emphasised by the trial chambers in order to acknowledge international concerns 
about the serious violations of human rights (p.4). The consequence of the verdicts 
also indicates that the retributive energies of the SCSL need to be tempered by the 
restorative aims of the Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
(Oosterveld, 2012: p.10). This is so that any future violations can be deterred with the 
help of both the restorative and retributive elements of transitional justice 




liberal cosmopolitanism in their conviction that justice and peace must be pursued 
simultaneously. The pursuit of justice in the signing of the peace agreement in 
Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrates the above argument (see Cheeseman and Tendi, 
2010).  
 
While the traditional positions of transitional justice practitioners have always 
maintained the importance of the impartiality of justice in peacebuilding (as a product 
of the political process) (Booth, 2001; Linton, 2001; Teitel, 2000), the ICC’s 
prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, goes on to claim that ‘[p]eace and justice are two sides 
of the same coin’(2012b). In line with Bensouda’s claim, Kenyan human rights 
activists argue that justice could be a means of preventing future election violence 
(interview with KNHRC officer no. 2, Nairobi, March 2, 2012). However, the 
increasing appearance of ICC officers in nearly every contemporary crisis in Africa 
has marked a normative shift from the simple moral advocacy of justice towards a 
legal consequentialist approach. To a certain extent, this challenges the existential 
functionality or legitimacy of the ICC (Alston, 2010; Vinjamuri, 2012). Pursuing 
justice in the midst of conflict is usually a matter of political compromise, as almost 
every agent has a different conception of what constitutes a just society (Pankhurst, 
1999: p.241).  
 
The aims of recent Kenyan diplomatic missions to the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
may seem contradictory to the argument presented by Bensouda and the Kenyan 
human rights activist (BBC News, 2013b). The mission requests the UNSC to 
terminate the ICC’s intervention on the basis that the pursuit of justice is destabilizing 




more about shielding impunity than maintaining security (since the ICC’s chief 
suspect is currently sitting as Kenya’s head of the state), the request obviously 
espouses the view that the pursuit of justice is incompatible with establishing peace 
(interview with the ICC officer, The Hague, February 12, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, the debate about the relationship between peace and justice constitutes a 
paradigm shift in justifying the reasons for promoting transitional justice. The moral, 
liberal cosmopolitan argument that justice is simply a good project has developed into 
a legal consequentialist argument, which asserts that the pursuit of justice is a 
requirement for establishing peace (see Mallinder, 2007; McEvoy, 2007). 
Consequentialist arguments have therefore contributed to a broader understanding of 
transitional justice, in which the pursuit of justice (through the ICC) is not only about 
dealing with past atrocities, but is also a kind of bargaining chip that shapes the 
formulation of the power-sharing deal in Kenya and humanitarian intervention in 
Libya (Vinjamuri, 2010: p.204). 
 
V) A Not So Obvious Relation between Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice? 
While peacebuilding and transitional justice share similar liberal cosmopolitan 
traditions, not all commentators agree on the practicalities of the interaction between 
and implementation of these two disciplines. This is visible through the 
transformation from peacekeeping agenda to broadly defined of peacebuilding 
mission in Rwanda, in which its complicated further the direction of transitional 
justice in the country. Since the 1990s, it has had an increasingly profound effect on 
the development of transitional justice. One instance in which it has exerted its 




violent conflict concept that later influenced the international intervention. In 
particular of these peace research is a Galtung’s research on negative peace (1969; 
1975; 1977). Negative peace is a condition that is achieved in the absence of war or 
direct violence, while positive peace refers to the absence of structural conditions that 
may produce a protracted conflict (Laderach, 1997: p.5). In return, Galtung’s 
extended definition of violence and conflict leads to an extended definition of 
peacebuilding (2007: p.208).  
 
By connecting violence to the structure of society, peacebuilding is understood to 
constitute a wide range of activities, including a focus on justice. ‘[S]ome tools of 
transitional justice are explicitly linked to democratic processes. Peacebuilding tools 
such as judicial liberal reform, reform of the security forces and the inclusion of 
former rebels and vetted former members of security forces are also often explicitly 
tied to processes of transitional justice’ (Sriram, 2007: p.285). For instance, the UN’s 
missions in Rwanda have seen an increased application of international law in 
responding to the long-term objectives of peacebuilding vis-à-vis transitional justice 
mechanisms (Schabas, 2005: p.605).  
 
However, the expansion of peacebuilding to include transitional justice creates a 
further difficulty in evaluating its success (Mani, 2008: pp.254-60). In assessing the 
ineffectiveness of peacebuilding missions in Africa, William Zartman (1996), 
Kenneth Omeje (2008) and Donald Rotchild (2005) have observed that the chief 
problem lies in the way that peacebuilding has been promoted in the African region. 
These peacebuilding missions were made more complicated by the inclusion of 




Rwanda were complicated by the implementation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Gacaca courts (Ingelaere, 2008: pp.51-7). 
Initially, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was 
enforced in order to facilitate the Arusha agreements (Republic of Rwanda., 1995; 
The UN., 1993). However, through UN resolutions 1995, UNAMIR’s objectives were 
broadened to include assisting the Rwandan government with ‘justice and 
reconciliation’ (The UN, 1994). The integration of the ICTR into the peacebuilding 
missions has been criticised for getting the rhetoric right, but the strategy wrong 
(Schabas, 2006a: pp.452-5). Since its inception, the ICTR has cost nearly one billion 
pounds, but has only succeeded in putting forty-three people behind bars (Pflanz, 
2013). There have been twelve others indicted, but the court subsequently freed them 
after the judges dismissed their cases on the basis of legal technicality errors (Elvarez, 
1999: p.481). In short, there has been continued criticism of not only the increased 
expenditure of the court, but also of the slow implementation of justice measures for 
establishing peace and enabling reconciliation (interview with AU officer no. 1, Addis 
Ababa, April 14, 2012). Although immediate peace has been restored since then, the 
difficulty of achieving retributive justice in Rwanda strengthens the perception that 
peacebuilding is highly unlikely to restore peace in the long-term (see Waddell and 
Clark, 2008). This galvanises the issues of the existing debate between peace and 
justice in the post-conflict reconstruction agenda (Ford, 2009: p.67). The suggestion is 
that the integration of transitional justice makes peacebuilding missions more prone to 
failure.  
 
While the Gordian Knot of disagreements and tensions grows ever tighter in Kenya, 




transitional justice ensures that the fusing of these two concepts into an international 
vision of a hybrid solution to political crisis on a global scale remains credible. This is 
particularly true in relation to the specific kind of crisis that is required to address 
global concerns of human rights violations in the process of drafting local peace 
agreements. The question of how transitional justice can incorporate a human rights 
agenda into a peacebuilding programme will be discussed in the next section. 
 
VI) Incorporating Human Rights Agenda in Peacebuilding: A New Direction for 
Transitional Justice? 
The increase in the ratifications of international human rights documents has helped to 
facilitate the co-existence of human rights and humanitarian laws in peacebuilding 
missions (Bell, 2008: pp.78-104). The gradual infusion of a human rights agenda into 
the peacebuilding process helps to highlight that, at its core, the jurisprudence arising 
out of both treaty and customary international law not only lays out specific legal 
contours concerning the rights of the victims or the reparations due to them, but also 
serves as a critical strategy for achieving the central aims of the transitional justice 
mechanisms discussed above. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 
of 1948, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) documents have contributed to the 
development of a more sophisticated system for the defence of human rights (Hansen, 
2008: pp.131-51). In particular, this has been achieved through the integration of 
these human rights documents with the enforcement of the Rome Statute in 2003, and 
the operations of the ICC.  
 




peacebuilding missions across the globe (Bell, 2000: pp.193-5). As Paige Arthur has 
argued, human rights provides a type of language with which a post-conflict 
reconstruction agenda can contextualise transitional justice, violation and crimes 
against humanity (Arthur, 2009: pp.312-3). The implementation of peacebuilding, 
particularly through peace agreements, power sharing, electoral assistance and 
constitutional advice, marks the transition from conflict to immediate peace.  
 
However, the process of securing peace is unlikely to come to fruition without some 
form of amnesty for preventing the future investigation and prosecution of former 
combatants (Ross and Sriram., 2012: pp.46-58). By the 1990s, only a few of the 
peacebuilding missions that ended civil war had included amnesty bargains, such as 
the peace processes in Liberia (1993) and Sierra Leone (1999) (Mutwol, 2009: pp.24-
5). Unfortunately, the particular amnesty bargains within these peace processes were 
not recognised by international human rights and criminal law, and could not be 
isolated from the globalising norms of crimes against humanity (Stensrud, 2009: p.6). 
As a result, the SCSL did not recognise the amnesty bargain that was produced by the 
Lome Peace Accord (Kelsall, 2009: p.229).  
 
Learning from the pitfalls of the Sierra Leone peace process, all subsequent 
mediations of peace processes and power-sharing arrangements in Sudan, Uganda, 
Burundi, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Kenya have prescribed a notably limited 
amnesty (in some cases abandoned afterwards), calling for more criminal indictments, 
trials, institutional reforms and reconciliations on a national level (interview with AU 





By 2000, most peacebuilding missions under the banner of the United Nation (UN) 
and the African Union (AU) had begun to integrate various transitional justice 
measures as part of effecting the transition to peace (Dorina, 2008: pp.131-5). Around 
the time of Kenya’s attempt to deal with post-election violence, transitional justice 
appeared to be a predominant theme of peacebuilding (fieldwork note no. 2, Nairobi, 
March 25, 2012). Particularly, South Africa’s TRC and the ICC’s 18 cases mostly 
reinforced the UN, the AU and Kenyan civil society’s perceptions that a viable 
solution to post-election violence could only be found in the integration of 
ttransitional justice as part of the power sharing deal (interview with Kenyan 
Government official no. 1, Nairobi, March 17, 2012).  
 
In regards to the above discussion, what remains pertinent is the consideration of how 
a plausible transitional justice mechanism can be understood in the context of its 
application within the domain of peacebuilding. The answer to this question lies in the 
diplomatic attempt to resolve the political crisis, or to force the warring parties to 
comply with a human rights agenda within a specific agreement that acts as a conflict 
resolution mechanism in many cases of civil war. This agreement is commonly 
known as the power-sharing arrangement. The next discussion will provide a brief 
illustration of how this power-sharing model acted as the precise instrument or 
institutional arrangement that bridged the gap between transitional justice and liberal 
peacebuilding in the Kenya situation. 
 
VII) Enclosing Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding in a Compromise Power 
Sharing Bargains 




of enacting transitional justice through a power-sharing peace agreement, as 
witnessed in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Vandeginste and Sriram., 2011: p.489). First, this 
section gives an explanation of the primary factors that led to the recent power-
sharing arrangements in Africa; the power-sharing arrangement is then 
operationalised based on the conceptual framework developed by Nic Cheeseman. 
Finally, the concept of power-sharing is utilised to position Kenya’s power-sharing 
dynamic in relation to other examples, and to highlight the institutional hindrances it 
has placed on the country’s democratic reforms and attempts to administer justice. 
i) Why Power Sharing is Popular in Africa’s Recent Crisis? 
Adopting a liberal peace approach to resolving disputed elections, the idea of 
transitional justice as a broad legal measure for coming to terms with rulers’ past 
wrongdoings has found its way into the AU mediation processes, during the 
establishment of the power-sharing deal between President Kibaki and Prime Minister 
Odinga (interview with AU officer no. 1, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 14, 2012). 
There has been a vast number of scholarly publications examining the effects of 
power sharing in resolving most of the recent political violence in Africa (Jarstad, 
2009; Lemarchand, 2006; Levitt, 2006; Mehler, 2009a; 2009b; Spears, 2000; Sriram, 
2008). The consociational democratic practices taken from European models like 
those of Belgium and Switzerland have catalysed the policies and publications of 
various power sharing prototypes in countries that are deeply divided, as well as 
African countries that have emerged from civil wars, such as Angola, Burundi, 
Rwanda and Somalia (Bogaards, 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hoddie and 
Hartzell, 2003; Rotchild and Roader, 2005; Schneckener, 2002; Spears, 2002; Tull 





The relatively stable peace conditions of these African cases have perhaps inspired the 
adoption of looser models of power sharing in the disputed elections of Kenya and 
Zimbabwe (Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Cheeseman, 
2011; Horowitz, 2008; Sriram and Zahar, 2009; Svolik, 2009). While the literature 
recognises the anomaly 52 that the prototype of power-sharing in disputed election 
cases does not belong to the classical notion of the power-sharing formula, it is also 
important to recognise that there are three major factors that contribute to the adoption 
of power-sharing in such disputed election cases. Firstly, since the return of 
multiparty democracies has continually failed to subdue the outbreaks of violence that 
come with the alternation of power between one leader and another, the power-
sharing formula has been regarded as a popular alternative (Amadi, 2009; Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2009; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Roeder and Rotchild, 2005).  
 
Secondly, learning from the relative “success story” of ending the ‘classic’53 civil 
wars of Africa, and recognising “the play-safe” approach of not disrupting the local 
power interests for fear of inducing a spill-over effect in regional instability, the AU 
preferred to adopt the liberal peace mode54 of power sharing to “stabilise” the crisis, 
but without interfering in the domestic affairs of the country (Akonor, 2010; Jalloh et 
al., 2011; Kiwuwa, 2013; Lemarchand, 2006; Okumu, 2009; Rotchild and Roader, 
                                                        
52  Violence resulting from election disputes is broadly understood as being a low intensity level 
of conflict, compared with cases of more sporadic violence, such as the civil wars in Rwanda, DRC, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and Mozambique. See Cheeseman and Tandi, 2010; Sisk, 2006; Spears, 
2000. 
53  The adoption of the power-sharing formula is commonly proposed in civil war cases. Recent 
power-sharing peace agreements in disputed elections in Africa have improvised the practices, 
implementing them without clear key institutional arrangements. The practices have mostly been 
implemented subsequent to the disputed election, and simply serve the purpose of stopping further 
hostilities between conflicting parties that could destabilize the country. See Hartzell and Hoddie, 
2003; Mehler, 2009b; Norris, 2008; Vandeginste and Sriram., 2011. 
54  For a detailed discussion on the adoption of the power-sharing formula as part of liberal 





2005; Wolff, 2007). Finally, power sharing has been instrumentalised in order to 
guarantee that the incumbent will retain power, and the loser of the election will join 
in the power collusion that resembles the single-party period of the 1970s (Barkan and 
Matiangi, 2009; Brancati and Snyder, 2012; Chaisty et al., 2014; Doorenspleet, 2013; 
Dunning, 2011; Goeke and Hartmann, 2011; Joshi and Rosenfield, 2013; Reilly, 
2013). Nic Cheeseman’s study of the power-sharing dynamics (2011) provides some 
plausible explanations for the impact of such institutional arrangements upon justice- 
and reconciliation-seeking policy.  
 
ii) Defining Power Sharing Trends in Africa: The Variable Relations between 
Elite Cohesion and Distribution of Violence 
 
The literature on power-sharing often reveals two crucial variables that shape its 
dynamic: elite political cohesion and the distribution of violence (Cheeseman, 2011: 
pp.339-40). I believes that the interaction between political cohesion and the 
distribution of violence developed by Cheeseman provides a framework for 
explaining the potential influence of power sharing on transitional justice currently 
embarked in Kenya. The first variable refers to the elite’s political cohesion and 
depends on two sub-factors: the history of political coalitions and the history of 
political violence (p.341).  
 
The history of political coalitions refers to the duration of time in which the factional 
elite in divided societies have had a history of finding common political goal. The 
history of violence refers to a condition in which violence that has repeatedly 
occurred hardens or strengthens the inter-elite coalition (p.342). Cheeseman 




disputed elections is more successful than a longer period of civil war (p.340). 
 
The second variable is the distribution of violence, which refers to the capacity of 
warring parties to employ violent measures in retaliating towards their opponents 
(pp.342-3). Power-sharing often emerges when there is no clear victory, which poses 
questions about actors’ voluntary compliance in withdrawing from violence (Sisk, 
2006: pp.1-40). The degree of violence is higher if the warring parties that participate 
in the power-sharing agreement have committed equal atrocities during the period of 
violent conflict, which limits the future development of transitional justice 
(Cheeseman, 2011: p.344). By contrast, the degree of violence is lower if the 
atrocities committed during the violence period have not evenly distributed among all 
conflicting parties, or if only one factional group has committed heinous crimes 
(p.345). This produces likely conditions for the use of strong language of criminal 
accountability and an investigation into past wrongdoings and rights violations, as 
evidenced in South Africa (p.346). The government recognises that a volatile scenario 
may emerge if the quest for addressing impunity is highly influenced by a prosecution 
option that is biased towards a particular factional group, as transitional justice will 
inevitably be politicised by the elite.  
 
Chesseman later concluded his model for analysing the four most likely predictions 
for post-power-sharing developments in Africa, and selected seven. 55  African 
countries for the following model: 
 
                                                        
55  These countries had all made a power-sharing arrangement either before or after elections, 
with each country adopting a form of power-sharing that emerged from a peace agreement put forward 
by an interim unity government in the aftermath of disputed elections or civil wars. In these selected 
cases, there was a legal obligation to pursue broadly goals of political reconciliation and justice among 






Figure 2.1: Model of Power Sharing Dynamic (Cheeseman, 2011: p.343) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Model of Power Sharing Dynamic (Cheeseman, 2011: p.343) 
iii) The Impacts of Power Sharing upon Transitional Justice in Kenya 
 
In his analysis, Cheeseman suggests that Kenya belongs to the ‘politics of collusion’, 
in which the distribution of violence and elite cohesion are both high (p.344). All of 
the elite barons have one motive in common: to prevent any future demands for 
criminal accountability for the post-election violence. At the same time, they also 
recognise the importance of overriding any particular ethnic alliance in order to thwart 




2013; Rotchild, 1973).  
 
Meanwhile, the increase in violence has also contributed to a negative reconfiguration 
of ethnicity, without preventing future inter-ethnic coalitions. All major elite factions 
have been widely believed to share some form of responsibility for the atrocities that 
eventually led to an international (as well as national) pressure on the ICC to provide 
criminal accountability (interview with the ICC officer; The Hague, February 12, 
2012). These calls for justice invoked the language of crimes against humanity, since 
Kenya is a signatory of the Rome Statute (Sriram. and Brown, 2012: p.222).  
 
The combination of both a higher degree of elite cohesion and the distribution of 
violence has been characterised by anti-reforms alliances, since none of the local 
politicians are committed to transitional justice (interview with the ICC officer; The 
Hague, February 12, 2012). In such instances, Cheeseman’s model of the power 
sharing dynamic may reveal the difficulty of implementing transitional justice in 
Kenya, and signifies a broader antinomy between power sharing and transitional 
justice. This was especially the case in debates regarding land tenure reform and 
historical injustices, in which the specific issues of transitional justice and human 
rights became dangerously connected to this more general debate (Elhawary, 2009; 
Huggins, 2009a; Lynch, 2009; Vandeginste and Sriram., 2011).  
 
What injustice means, and how the explicit mechanisms of transitional justice can be 
connected to this debate, remain contested. Despite talks on addressing the systematic 
injustices having been acknowledged, the contested concept of transitional justice has 




2009a; Willis and Chome, 2013; Zwier, 2013). The local politicians are not keen 
enough to develop a practical strategy with which to identify the key agendas for 
transitional justice options in Kenya (interview with the ICC officer, The Hague, 
February 12, 2012). As a result, the impoverished debate on the options for 
transitional justice among Kenyan MPs is more concerned with protecting the 
interests of power holders rather than addressing the actual grievances of victims 
(Annan, 2010: p.2).  
 
C – Responding to the Literature Reviews: Clarifying the Key Ideas and the 
Position of this Thesis 
In this section, some key debates in the literature of peacebuilding, transitional justice, 
and power-sharing have been revisited in order to formulate some general 
assumptions about justice- and reconciliation-seeking policies that are deeply 
embedded in the interaction between the literatures of peacebuilding and transitional 
justice. In order to contextualise the relationship between transitional justice and 
peacebuilding, this thesis assesses how both fields colluded with each other. 
Additionally, it attempts to explain how peacebuilding broadened or enriched the 
conventional projection of transitional justice beyond its legal personality. I believe 
that this trend should not be neglected in future research. As such, several major focal 
points should be clarified before we move to the proposed conceptual framework for 
power and ideology in Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). 
 
I) Bridging Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding through Power Sharing 
It is obvious that most peacebuilding literature is normative and concerns itself with 




meanwhile, is mostly concerned with not only the ‘legal question’ of how to 
strengthen the rules of law, security and order, but also the political implication of 
adopting legal and non-legal mechanisms in post-conflict reconstruction policy. 
Traditionally, peacebuilding and transitional justice literatures and practice either 
have not engaged with one another or have been in tension, or even opposition.  Yet, 
this thesis posits the ideas, its domains, institutions and mechanisms explicitly and 
implicitly intersect with each other, either in the form of the external imposition of 
top-down processes, or they are ‘invited’ by the local conflicting parties in order to 
regulate local crises or to detract immediate public attention from the crimes and 
atrocities perpetrated during the violent conflict. 
In surveying both literatures, this thesis discovered that, in terms of theory and 
practice, both peacebuilding and transitional justice have been isolated from each 
other in the past but now share certain common assumptions about rescuing victims or 
members of the population who live in the conflict zone. Therefore, it can be argued 
that transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding have become entangled, and share a 
deeper affinity with the liberal cosmopolitan ideas of post-Cold War IR. The growth 
in critical literatures and post-conflict evaluations has highlighted and provided 
further suggestions for the increased interaction between peacebuilding and 
transitional justice. It has also indicated the fundamental interaction between law and 
politics in post-conflict reconstruction studies. The peacebuilding objective of 
addressing impunity, strengthening the rule of law and drafting constitutions provides 
a plausible explanation of the present and future direction of contextualising 
transitional justice through peacebuilding practices. 




the specific device of power-sharing as an institutional arrangement is the actual 
instrument that allows the transmission and intertwinement of ideas between 
peacebuilding and transitional justice. This entanglement of ideas created a precarious 
predicament, in which national attempts to address electoral violence initiated a chain 
of consequences that facilitated the development and application of transitional justice 
mechanisms (see Figure 2.3). This kind of predicament is aptly described as 
‘precarious’, as the entire peacebuilding project of mediating electoral violence and 
promoting national reconciliation not only intersected with the transitional justice 
institutions’ attempts prosecute the perpetrators of criminal atrocities, but also shaped 
some of the country’s subsequent political concerns and sustained tensions. These 
tensions continue to hinder the development of transitional justice, in particular by 
affecting the debate concerning whether to pursue justice or peace. A detailed analysis 
of the specific aspects of Kenya’s power-sharing arrangement that produced the 
Justice- and Reconciliation-Seeking Policy will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
Figure 2.3: Mapping the Relationship between Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 







II) The Implication of Power Sharing upon the Uncertain Direction of 
Transitional Justice Agenda in Kenya 
This chapter has drawn its analysis from selected CPS literatures that emphasise the 
increasing clashes between transitional justice and peacebuilding, especially in 
regards to power-sharing arrangements. The debate about the most suitable 
mechanism with which to deal with the past as part of the power-sharing formula has 
ventured into dangerous terrain, in which transitional justice is recognised as a 
permissible form of justice despite being indeterminate in forming a realistic strategy 
for post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
The presiding international dynamics of the power-sharing formula in resolving the 
disputes surrounding local elections provides transitional justice with a difficult task; 
one that is based on reaching political compromise rather than on punishing 
perpetrators. Power-sharing has arguably left human rights violations and criminal 
accountability isolated from each other. The national power-sharing deals are 
dissociated from criminal accountability, and have become a type of rhetorical 
discourse that motivates political legitimacy with talk of national unity and 
reconciliation.  
 
Nevertheless, in discussing the anomalous and hybrid features of transitional justice in 
peacebuilding practices, several limitations should be recognised here. The adoption 
of power-sharing provides a unique view of justice during the transitional period as an 




transitional justice in this way lies in the agents’ tendency to manipulate human rights 
and ICL. Once it has been deemed to be ‘transitional’, justice- and reconciliation-
seeking policy can be characterised as being beyond the straightforward 
understanding of justice. The deep, normative commitment to human rights language 
reduces transitional justice to a strategic toolkit, or a mechanism that is up for grabs 
for any powerful actor or peace-spoiler that wishes to wage war, prosecute enemies, 
or manipulate victims, including MNCs and NGOs.  
 
III) Positioning the Low-Intensity of Post-Election violence within the Spectrum 
of the CPS Approach to Peacebuilding 
This thesis adopts a CPS perspective on liberal peacebuilding in relation to 
international attempts to put an end to the ubiquitous outbreaks of violent conflict in 
Africa. In this respect, the focus of the research inquiry is concentrated on a bottom-
up approach to peacebuilding, and includes a critical assessment of how 
predominantly local peacebuilding processes in Kenya can be valued and connected 
to the broader CPS position on liberal peacebuilding operations. Consequently, the 
ensuing discussion in Chapter 3 that specifically deals with Kenya’s infrapolitics and 
local peacebuilding processes allows this thesis to highlight the political dimension 
that structured the transitional justice industry.  
Given the continued peacebuilding discontents in Africa, there remains the 
problematic but legitimate question, however, of whether or not to bring a debate 
about peacebuilding and transitional justice into the case study of Kenya in analysing 
the measures undertaken by the GNU to address the post-election violence. In the 
peacebuilding literature itself, Daniel Lambach has warned about this conceptual 




into a ‘mainstream reading of peace and conflict analysis’ of inter-state conflict, such 
as that generated by the allied forces invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (2007: p.5). 
‘The prefix ‘post-’ is a temporal signifier attached to a noun (conflict) that has no 
fixed temporal content’ (p.9) with the consequent word of ‘conflict’, which is usually 
associated with war studies. Meanwhile, the term ‘post-conflict’ (usually referring to 
reconstruction) is rooted in peace studies. In many post-conflict scenarios, such as 
those of Rwanda (Reyntjens, 2004), Uganda (Shaw and Mbabazi, 2007) and Sierra 
Leone (Millar, 2013), although violence can be successfully halted, the desirable 
condition of peace remains elusive. This creates a precarious predicament, identified 
by MacGinty (2010) as a ‘no war, no peace’ situation.  
 
Evidence collected so far accounts for three types of post-conflict situations: firstly, 
when the actual period of war has been ended by a peace agreement; secondly, when 
the conflicting parties have signed the peace accord; finally, in the event that one side 
is clearly victorious, which forces the opposing faction to surrender unconditionally 
(Lambach, 2007: p.11). While the first and second types of situation have definitely 
arisen in Kenya (Chapter 2), the third has rarely occurred in recent post-conflict 
situations generally. In this thesis, the best approach is to adopt Lambach’s pragmatic 
definition of ‘post conflict’: a state in which open violence has ceased and is no 
longer a predominant issue, while the temporal and spatial dynamics of the post-
conflict zone are generated by the social experiences of the victims’ and survivors’ 
desire for peace or reconciliation, even if these desires are manipulated by the power 
relations and ideological apparatus of the national elite (p.11). In such instances, this 
thesis agrees with Chandra Lekha Sriram’s readings of the Kenya’s situation, and her 




did not experience a violent conflict akin to civil war, but rather brief and severe 
election-related violence, albeit with an internationally mediated agreement akin to 
the power-sharing peace agreement. It has not experienced an international 
peacebuilding presence, nor have militias involved in the violence been demobilized. 
It is difficult to argue that it has undergone a political or post-conflict transition. Yet 
it has had national debate about a range of transitional justice measures and the 
subject of four ICC prosecutions. (2013: p. 265) 
 
What matters here is the significant impact of pursuing transitional justice ‘in the 
absence of transition...’ (p.265) and ‘in the wake of conflict’ (p.266), which makes it 
nearly impossible to map the processes of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policies 
in Kenya without entangling transitional justice research within peacebuilding 
domains. While some anomalies in the study of types of conflict (such as post-
election violence) or justice- and reconciliation-seeking policies hardly make a case 
for a typical case study of peacebuilding and transitional justice, policymakers’ and 
commentators’ adoption and discussion of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy 
through a liberal peace mode of power-sharing has facilitated a move towards a line 
of research that is commonly associated with both the fields of peacebuilding and 
transitional justice. This kind of interdisciplinary interaction constitutes a case study 
for both peacebuilding and transitional justice, especially when several (hybrid) 
characteristics, elements, time-sequences and instruments related to both fields can be 
identified during and after the electoral violence period. 
 
Hence, this thesis has adopted a pragmatic position by positioning the GNU’s attempts 
to put a stop to Kenya’s low-intensity electoral violence as part of the liberal 
peacebuilding understanding. Its central assessment of the ICC’s and TJRCs relations 
with the IDPs is used as a primary means of uncovering the political complexity 
behind the process. This discussion in Chapter 3 conduct a brief exploration of the 




agreement that gave birth to transitional justice discourses in Kenya. 
 
IV) Exploring the Scope and Key Concepts of the Thesis: Reconciliation, Peace 
and Justice 
 
It is important to emphasise that the study of transitional justice in Kenya that is 
conducted in this thesis is influenced by the author’s academic background in political 
studies rather than in the legal aspects of the field. The author is most intrigued by the 
popular views of ‘transitional justice as a political process’ in Kenya (interview with 
TJRC Officer no. 1, Nairobi, February 5, 2012). In this section, I will place 
conceptual boundaries upon some of the keywords of my thesis. Unless specified 
otherwise, the following explanation shall be generally applied referred to the 
majority of the keywords used throughout the thesis: 
 
i) Reconciliation 
Surprisingly, although reconciliation is one of the most thoroughly researched 
subjects in post-conflict studies, very little substantive material is available on it 
(Laderach, 1997: p.15). Perhaps, the problem is neither with Kenya nor any other 
specific case study, but with the manner in which reconciliation studies (as a part of 
peacebuilding literature) and transitional justice have been isolated from each other. 
The study of transitional justice as an instrument for national reconciliation projects in 
various post-conflict environments has been academically recognised for ten years 
(Quinn, 2009b: p.7). In turn, this has encouraged scholars and practitioners of law and 
politics to focus their energies on the subject of post-conflict reconstruction; the 
process by which a society moves either from being in a state of war to a state of 




(Hegarty, 2002: p.99).  
 
While others view the subject of reconciliation as a subset to the study of transitional 
justice (see Darby, 2010), this thesis refuses to confine the concept of reconciliation to 
a rigid definition. ‘We can make the theory less restrictive (so it covers a broader 
range of phenomena and is exposed to more opportunities...)’ (King et al., 1994: 
p.16). Furthermore, Daly Sarkin and Erin Jeremy state that the epistemology of 
reconciliation in divided societies must be re-engineered by means of gaining a 
precise understanding of it. Additionally, integrative methods that are more sensitive 
to the subject must be used, rather than simply relying on international prescriptions 
(2007: p.27).  
 
For the purpose of our analysis, ‘reconciliation shall be defined as the attempt to build 
or rebuild a relationship of today that is not haunted by the vengeance of yesterday’ 
(Quinn, 2009b: p.5). Acknowledging that the dynamics of reconciliation operate at 
various levels, it is important to recognise that both personal and political 
reconciliation can mean very different things to different people. In some cases, 
reconciliation can mean mutual coexistence. In other cases, it signifies the 
normalisation of relations.  
 
Similarly to the likely situation of Kenya, at the national level, reconciliation 
symbolises re-establishment, and a broad sense of inter-ethnic relations can be seen as 
part of this reconciliation (see Huyse and Salter, 2008). This thesis recognises the 
difficulty of constructing a watertight definition of reconciliation. Some have 




in deeply divided societies (see Bloomfield et al., 2003). Post-conflict societies may 
be placed in the same category as countries with significant internal divisions 
resulting from severely oppressive practices, human rights abuses, communal 
violence, continuous repression by the state (or a particular dominant community in 
terms of power relation and material resources), or breaches in the civic trust. Hence, 
the study views reconciliation as an idea that must be located within a specific social 
reality and local contexts. As former Kenyan anti-corruption tzar, John Githongo 
notes, reconciliation begins with restoring the public’s faith in state institutions (state-
society relations) (2010: p.4). In other words, the two transitional justice mechanisms 
(the ICC and TJRC) explored in this thesis will be evaluated based on the extent to 
which they have succeeded in restoring harmony in state-society relations since 
February 2008.  For this is very consistent with the original 4 agendas as envisioned 
by the KNDR agreements at the national level, a power sharing agreement and blue 
print that not only ended the 2008 crisis, but open to a road map for translating the 
abstract ideas of national reconciliation and unity through the transitional justice 
institutions. 
 
In this thesis, a particular emphasis will be placed on how these transitional justice 
institutions reconcile or restore the normalisation of the social, economic and political 
positions of the IDPs, from being homeless to being reintegrated into society. If this 
process is carried out successfully, the IDPs are left with better prospects and a 
stronger degree of faith in the state apparatus and its ability to protect their safety and 
dignity in the long-term. Such a process of reconciliation focuses not only on what is 
commonly referred to in peacebuilding literature as ‘positive peace’ or ‘sustainable 




that have already been identified as being central to the liberal cosmopolitan aim to 
secure justice, democracy, peace and development. Specifically, Kenya’s final TJRC 
report hinted at the scope of this aim, 
 Truth commissions have traditionally been viewed as providing an alternative to the more 
traditional retribution-based view of justice. They are one of a number of institutional 
innovations that further restorative rather than retributive justice. The [Kenyan] 
Commission followed in the footsteps of many of its international predecessors in 
emphasizing an approach to justice that weighs more towards restorative than retributive 
justice… While the Commission adopted a notion of justice that encompasses more than its 
retributive elements such as punishment, it also recognises the important role that 
retributive criminal justice systems can have in furthering not only justice, but also truth 
and reconciliation. 
 
 The elements it identified include that: reconciliation is both a goal and a process; it is 
experienced at different levels (intra-personal, inter-personal, community and national); 
and that reconciliation has linkages to redistribution in terms of material reconstruction 
and the restoration of dignity. Similarly, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission conducted its reconciliation work on the premise that ‘there is no 




However, as shall be revealed in Chapter 3, the heavily political nature of the ICC and 
TJRC’s discourses has detracted focus away from the objective of addressing the 
humanitarian crisis in Kenya, concentrating it instead onto a politicisation of ethnic 
discourses of rights and inequality. As a result, this thesis focuses on the IDPs’ 
narratives in Chapters 4 and 5 in order to highlight the fact that these institutions 
failed to address the problems of the IDPs, whose political subjectivity and agency 




Having resolved the conceptualisation of political reconciliation through these two 
transitional justice mechanisms, it remains to elucidate the conception of peace that 
this thesis utilises. As the earlier discussion on the literature of the peacebuilding had 




‘positive peace’. This term came to evolve with Laderach’s coining of the term 
‘sustainable peace’, which drew partly from Ghali’s UN Agenda for Peace, the 
influence of which is easily identified in Kenya’s power-sharing agreement, KNDR 
Agenda Item Four: ‘Long-Term Issues and Solutions’ (see Table 2.2). In short, it is 
understandably claimed by most stakeholders in Kenya that, without addressing the 
long-term issues that lead to the 2008 crisis, the country remained in a permanently 
hostile condition of negative peace. Galtung describes this condition as being defined 
by the fact that, while direct violence in the form of actual political violence conflict 
has disappeared, the structural conditions that facilitate the outbreak of future violence 
remain intact.  
Table 2.2: Excerpt from the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation: The Power 
Sharing Agreement  
 
Kenyan National Dialogue and reconciliation Agenda Item Number 4: Longer-Term 
Issues and Solutions 
 
Poverty, the inequitable distribution of resources and perceptions of historical injustice and 
exclusion on the part of segments of the Kenyan society constitute the underlying cause of the 
prevailing social tensions, instability and cycle of violence. Discussions under this agenda 
item will be conducted to examine and proposed solutions for long-inter alia: 
 
I. Undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reform (constitutional review); 
II. Tackling poverty and inequity, as well as combating regional development 
imbalances; 
III. Tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth; 
IV. Consolidating national cohesion and unity (ethnic politics); 
V.  Undertaking a Land Reform; 
VI. Addressing transparency, accountability and impunity 
 
The conflicting parties agreed that Agenda items 4 would be resolved within a period of one 
year after the commencement of the Dialogue (launched 28th January 2008). 
 
Source: KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2009 
It is important to highlight the fact that, while Kenya has had to confront various types 
of internal violent conflict since it became independent (such as terrorism and militant 




inequality in rural areas and water and cattle rustlings among the pastoral 
community), this thesis concentrates its primary analysis on the 2008 post-election 
violence. By focusing primarily on this event, I am not suggesting that all other crises 
are irrelevant or unimportant. Indeed, they all indirectly connected to the realisation of 
positive peace and the future prevention of election violence. Yet, a detailed, extended 
analysis that covers every singly type of violence that Kenya has had to confront 
remains beyond the scope of this thesis. The structural causation of the 2008 crisis 
discussed in Chapter 3 can also be used to describe other types of violence that Kenya 
was forced to confront; however, this does not mean that I intend to expand my 
analysis to cover each type of violence. While others may disagree with this academic 
strategy, my intent is only to highlight that understanding these types of structural 
violence or negative peace as the primary causes of the 2008 crisis is crucial to 
realising potential threats to any current and future attempts to mitigate violent 
conflict, impunity and injustice. It is the question of how best to respond to violent 
conflict, impunity and injustice that are debated through the medium of the IDPs’ 
responses to the ICC and TJRC. 
 
A comprehensive analysis of agenda four of the KNDR agreement is also beyond the 
scope of this thesis; it even lies beyond the interim mandate of the ICC’s and TJRC’s 
jurisdiction in Kenya. Suffice to say, however, that the question of whether some of 
the agendas under item number four will be pursued remains uncertain. It is also 
unclear whether the pursuit of additional agendas will be allowed to exceed the 
KNDR’s stipulated target of one year. However, it is true to say that these agendas 
appeal directly and indirectly to the entire mechanism of transitional justice in Kenya, 




discussed in chapter 4, local politicians in Kenya often preach that the denomination 
of peace is a ‘political currency’. This claim is also popularly made by the ICC’s 
suspects, who are mostly advocates of negative peace. These local elites’ or political 
agents’ advocacy of negative peace as an alternative to justice in order is, of course, a 
pretext. Discoursing in favour of negative peace serves to inhibit and dilute the ICC’s 
proceedings, which not only renews the fictional clash between peace and justice, but 
also exposes the lack of understanding of power relations and ideological apparatus 
within the existing literature of transitional justice in Kenya. This brings us to the 
essential component of this thesis concerning the idea of justice as it is practised in 
Kenya. 
 
iii) The Idea of Justice and Transitional Justice Mechanisms or institutions 
Focuses in Kenya 
 
Having resolved the conceptualisation of political reconciliation through the 
transitional justice mechanisms, it remains to elucidate the conception of justice that 
this thesis adopts.  In this thesis, two major transitional justice mechanisms will be 
explored: the ICC, and the TJRC. Coinciding with the Rutie Tietel’s third genealogy’s 
call for a broader scope of transitional justice (see Teitel, 2000), the AU’s negotiation 
teams in Kenya seem convinced of the necessity of combining both retributive and 
restorative measures in mediating the power-sharing peace arrangement, and in 
making the language of transitional justice an integral part of the post-election 
violence agendas (interview with KAF officer no. 1, Geneva, November 25, 2010).   
Table 2.3: Excerpt from The Agenda Item Two – Measures to Address 
Humanitarian Crisis 
 
The final goal of the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation is to 




Source: KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2009 
 
In reviewing the literature on transitional justice, I have identified that the two major 
philosophical strands of justice (retribution and restoration) can be connected to the 
two popular transitional justice mechanisms that are most widely debated in Kenya: 
the tribunal and the truth commission. In addition, several other ideas related to 
justice (such as reparation, rehabilitation and redistribution) are explicitly and 
implicitly connected to the central theme of transitional justice as a mechanism. This 
mechanism, of course, is defined by the liberal peacebuilding agenda of reconciliation 
and positive peace at the local level, as well as a bottom-up approach and the focus on 
the victims or their dissident views. As such, this allows the thesis to capture and to 
contextualise the IDPs’ narratives as victims’ perspectives. While others might 
suggest that the incorporation of (re)distributive justice into existing philosophical 
concerns with transitional justice’s potential for implementing retributive and 
restorative justice is problematic (see Carranza, 2008; Duthie, 2008; Greiff, 2009; 
Mani, 2002; Miller, 2008), it will be nearly impossible for transitional justice 
mechanisms to deliver such ambitious demands for justice (Chapter 5). 
 
It is equally important to emphasise that such an expansive conception of transitional 
justice is not unique to Kenya, but shares a deep affinity with political liberalism or, 
more specifically, the theory of liberal cosmopolitanism discussed earlier. ‘The UN 
and other ‘experts’ in the field of transitional justice, have long, albeit implicitly, 
defined the end goal of peacebuilding and transitional justice operations as being the 
cultivation of some form of liberal democracy’ (Andrieu, 2014: p.86). Positive peace, 




as defined by Boutros Ghali, employs a wide range of political and legal mechanisms 
in its attempts to nurture democracy and to prevent the recurrence of violence. Such a 
hybrid approach to sustaining peace and to stabilising democracy has been proven not 
to be the most immediate means of securing a transition to democracy, as is 
exemplified by the protracted transitions of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the Ivory 
Coast. It is within this ‘paradox of success’ that transitional justice mechanisms are 
designed specifically with the aim of guiding the transition of these nations from post-
conflict societies into functional democracies. This brings our discussion to its 
primary focus of justice in Kenya, and how such a focus is connected to the post-Cold 
War idea of justice and its reliance on transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
As has already been discussed in the earlier review of transitional justice literature, 
there is continued disagreement as to whether justice should be viewed as a means or 
as an end (see also Bell, 2009; Haider, 2011; Sriram and Ross, 2007). However, the 
practical concern here is with the administration of justice vis-à-vis its mechanisms or 
institutions (Balasco, 2013: p.213). While this thesis focuses specifically on the 
transitional justice mechanisms of the ICC and TJRC in Kenya, constructing a 
broader and more normative definition of the objectives of transitional justice remains 
problematic (Gegout, 2013: p.815).  
 
The idea of having transitional justice institutions is strongly connected to the 
normative assumptions that the post-conflict society needs to confront the past in 
order to move forward. As such, direct amnesties that hinder criminal prosecutions, or 
which provide absolute pardon are no longer normatively acceptable. As a result of 




fieldwork in Kenya that researchers’ and policymakers’ conception of transitional 
justice as the idea of coming to terms with past crimes provides them with political 
and legal opportunities to handle post-election violence in a way that is based on the 
relatively similar analogy of peculiarity from cases like the Nuremberg trial or 
Rwandan genocide, which were believed to ‘transcend the domain of human affairs’ 
(Arendt, 1958: p.307) The glorification of a ‘before-and-after narrative of change’ - a 
particularity of the transitional justice experiment in Kenya - confirms the 
international, teleological view of justice, in that it is generally believed that after the 
presidential electoral crisis, Kenya will necessarily find itself in a better situation. 
This also suggests that such a teleological view of justice can be loosely connected to 
John Rawl’s Theory of Justice (1971);  
What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent and 
given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our 
aspirations, and our realisation that, given our history and the traditions embedded in 
our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine to us (p.510). 
 
However, few have normatively and analytically investigated whether the Rawlsian 
assumption that justice equals fairness can be easily accepted to promote the liberal 
cosmopolitan teleology of transitional justice when such mechanisms as a conditional 
institution were constructed to achieve ‘normal’ political transition or progress. As 
such, commentators like Kora Andrieu (2014) have confirmed that, while liberal 
political writers have cited John Rawl’s writings–which have controversially inspired 
Francis Fukuyama’s perverse views of liberal democracy as marking the end of 
history–in order to convince others that liberalism is a dominant institutional 
ideology, few have made empirical observations to the contrary, such as the fact that 
the Libyan National Transitional Council opted for Islamic law in the post-Gaddafi 




renewed idea of neo-imperialism in rejection of the ICC’s jurisdiction in Kenya have 
become powerful indicators that challenge the normative argument concerning the 
idea of justice based on liberal political institutions in international thought and 
practice (p.85).  
 
Specifically, as this thesis demonstrates, the retrospective analysis of the local 
activities of the TJRC and the international predisposition to normalising the rules of 
law through the ICC in Kenya have confirmed the Rawlsian notion that justice ‘does 
not answer the question of how to construct a just punitive system’ (Lang, 2008: 
p.22). To simply suggest, like Teitel (2008), that the primary objective of transitional 
justice is to install a Western notion of justice, enforces the erroneous assumptions of 
the positivist, legalist approach to power and ideology in post-conflict societies, 
which will be discussed in the final part of this chapter. Furthermore, drawing from 
the conclusions reached in both Chapter 4 and 5, I will elaborate in the final 
concluding remarks of my thesis (Chapter 6) that the differences between the local 
and international understandings of justice not only constitutes a philosophical 
obstacle to advancing the Rawlsian idea of administering justice in order to exact a 
just punishment, but also realistically undermines transitional justice’s means of 
promoting a liberal democratic society. These differences also inhibit transitional 
justice’s ability to reintegrate former antagonists in more neutral and peaceful spaces, 
or to re-create diverse imagined political communities that are open to the idea of an 
overlapping consensus or the plurality of political reason in public space. As will also 
be discussed in Chapter 6, in addition to the fact that both mechanisms are 
underpinned by the shared philosophical ideas of retribution and restoration, both 




constitutes part of the ideological apparatus of post-conflict peacebuilding, and the 
way that both mechanisms interact with the IDPs has made transitional justice 
instruments subject to a wider misperception among members of the public. Many 
members of the Kenyan politician seem to believe that they must choose between 
retribution (embodied by the ICC’s proceedings) or restoration (embodied by the 
TJRC). The Kenyan politicins believes that either forgiveness or punishment can be 
granted in the aftermath of the crisis. This dichotomy between retribution and 
restoration has resulted in the notion of justice being subjected to a form of political 
compromise. 
 
While research on transitional justice has expanded our understanding of the various 
contested functions of its mechanisms with regard to democratisation, peacebuilding 
and development, there is a overarching theme surrounding the placement of 
transitional justice in Kenya and Africa generally. This theme is of ‘…an application 
of justice for political change, and includes not only juridical answers to past 
repressions, but also restorative, administrative and economic measures’ (Subotic, 
2014: p.128). The hybrid features and multiple enunciations of transitional justice 
mechanisms that have recently appeared are designed with the specific purpose of 
managing transitions from post-conflict democracies.  Elections disputes in Africa 
and popular uprisings in the Arab world differ slightly from the clearer regime 
changes that occurred in post-authoritarian experiments in Latin America, as well as 
in the post-communist transitions of Eastern Europe.  
 
My observations of transitional justice institutions in Kenya have confirmed my 




and institutions of firstly within a context without a clear regime change, which tends 
to result in a horizontal expansion of transitional justice. Specifically, transitional 
justice tools are no longer relevant, as they are perceived as merely facilitating tools 
of political transition. However, they can be diversely applied in various contested 
settings, especially in that of reforming the state, guiding the deconstruction of its 
undemocratic political institutions and its transition from being conterminous with 
violence to being defined by a more peaceful order.  
 
Secondly, the application of the field is not fully dominated by the state actor alone, 
but moves instead in a direction that allows for vertical expansion. This is particularly 
true in relation to how various agents below the state (including residents of the IDP 
camps) are perceived as being particularly relevant in determining the direction or the 
legitimacy of the transitional justice institutions.  
 
In concluding my final remarks, Chapter 6 will include a reminder of the dangers of 
expanding the contested field of transitional justice. It is important that we 
differentiate our analysis of transitional justice functions in liberal political transitions 
from possible situations in which no liberal political transition takes place, such as in 
Kenya. An examination of the latter case requires a more nuanced level of attention in 
order to help researchers and commentators to explain why the majority of the ruling 
class remains opposed to credible transitional justice mechanisms. This is also 
important in helping to explain why it is important for civil society to play an active 
role in reducing the influence of state actors, and how the perspectives of the IDPs 
provide instructive lessons for international interventionists in terms of the ‘distance’ 




significance when considering that the ICC initially seemed to be a necessity, and 
much more legitimate than the country’s poor judicial system and entrenched culture 
of impunity. Consequently, Chapter 3 discuses the political and economic context of 
Kenya’s crisis and reveals the ongoing struggle between accountability and impunity 
in implementing the specific form of transitional justice mechanism concerned.  
 
However, it is imperative in the next part of our discussion to briefly conceptualise 
the terms ‘accountability’ and ‘impunity’ in order to set a backdrop against which to 
localise the idea of justice and transitional justice mechanisms discussed above. This 
conceptualisation is also important to assessing transitional justice as a form of 
accountability in Kenya. With such an understanding of justice and reconciliation in 
mind, the next section provides a proposal for understanding transitional justice as an 
accountability mechanism. 
 
D) Political Reconciliation through Transitional justice: Debating Accountability 
and Impunity in Kenya 
 
Having operationalised the key idea of justice and the focus of transitional justice in 
Kenya, it is important to elucidate the contextual understanding of transitional justice 
mechanisms installed in the aftermath of the 2008 presidential election crisis within 
the predominant theme that has dominated Kenyan politics for the past 20 years: 
accountability and impunity through multiparty democracies. Drawing from political 
and legal literatures, this section opens with an attempt to explain how accountability 
and impunity in the literature of Kenyan politics have been broadly understood. It 
then conducts an exploration of how such political struggles between accountability 




electoral democracies and reforms, which unfortunately remain theoretically 
insufficient to enhance the effectiveness of the concept of accountability.  
 
Secondly, I will briefly suggest how the post-election violence should be viewed as a 
constituent moment in renewing the whole idea of accountability and transforming it 
into a specific concrete agenda for criminal accountability through the ICC’s 
proceedings in particular.  
 
In the final part, I shall conclude that, despite the good intention of building a more 
robust, positive conception of international justice as part of the attempt to localise 
global transitional justice enterprises in mitigating the Kenyan crisis, it conceals a 
darker side to international justice. This negative aspect of transitional justice is 
represented by the predominant role of the local elite in politicising the ICC’s 
proceedings. While the crisis has inspired this thesis to attempt to capture the 
international policymaker’s determination (the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor) to expand the 
notion of accountability through the ICC’s proceedings in Kenya, the good political 
and normative intentions of expanding the concept ignores the structural international 
reality that conditioned the comparative transitional justice experiments. This reality 
was defined by many competing international and national political agendas, which 
diminished the sense of connection with the transitional justice institutions felt by 
those who suffered directly from the violence itself. This introduces the Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) tradition adopted by this thesis to highlight the fact that the key to 
unveiling the tacit observation of the ‘neutral’ position of transitional justice 
implementation in conflict zones lies in understanding the interplay between law and 




peacebuilding and transitional justice projects. The final discussion brings the reader 
to the conceptual framework proposed in this chapter: power and ideology in Kenyan 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). 
 
I) Defining Accountability and Impunity 
 
The study of politics has always been preoccupied with the state, the behavior of 
agents and the agents’ accountability to the state. In the literature of political studies, 
accountability refers to the extent to which government officials are compelled to 
answer for their actions (Young, 2010). According to Andreas Schedler, the political 
understanding of accountability comprises two major components: answerability and 
enforcement (1999: p.13). Schedler argues that ‘answerability’ refers to the obligation 
of public officials to explain what they are doing (p.14). Additionally, when 
informing the public about their public actions, politicians must provide facts in order 
to explain themselves (p.15). The second component, ‘enforcement’ refers to the 
capacity of citizens to impose sanctions on any public official who has violated public 
trust or laws (p.15). This refers to the collective public ability to reward good or 
punish bad behaviour through court processes, elections and commissions of inquiry. 
Such an understanding of accountability is explicitly and implicitly connected to 
studies that examine the structure of public administration in African public offices 
(see Okello and Sihanya, 2010; Schedler, 2002; Tshandu and Kariuki, 2010).  
 
As such, the post-election violence has reinvigorated works that examine the practice 
of accountably and impunity in state-society relations (Kanyinga, 2011: p.100). In 
Kenya, accountability ‘means the end of the political elite’s impunity in matters of 




(Mwangi and Holmquist, 2012: p.55). As will be discussed in the next Chapter 3, the 
recurring episodes of violence indicate the rudimentary features of impunity, which 
was a crucial element of the ruling class’ strategy for subduing democratic struggles 
in the 1990s. Such an understanding of impunity among local milieu can also be 
connected to the international understanding of impunity. To borrow Dianne 
Orentlicher’s definition, impunity means: 
The impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to 
account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since 
they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, 
tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making 
reparations to their victims (2005: p.14). 
 
Since campaigners for democracy and human rights in Kenya have been preoccupied 
with challenging leaders and holding them accountable, the agenda for administering 
justice to victims of post-election violence has endowed the struggle against political 
impunity with a new sense of urgency. Consequently, the fourth item of the KNDR 
agenda contributed to the Kenyan public’s increasing awareness of the need to 
address impunity by attributing accountability to perpetrators of electoral violence 
(Kanyinga, 2012: p.23).  
 
The notion of accountability here–in terms of enforcement and answerability–can be 
identified as political accountability, which features predominantly in studies of 
political parties, elections, the greater separation of powers and institutional reform. 
The danger lies in the fact that, since the political dispensation of the 1990s, 
liberalisation in Kenya has been regarded as a mere form of procedural democracy 
that focuses solely on elections, rather than on the substantive process of attributing 





In reality, the question of whether leaders can be held accountable by virtue of having 
being elected is structurally problematic, in terms of vertical and horizontal 
accountability. Under the old constitutional system (1963-2010), the president’s 
political party controlled parliament and elected judges. Indeed, during the de-jure 
single party period (1982-1992) neither the president, nor the cabinet, nor the MPs 
were accountable for their actions (Nasong'o, 2007: p.20). As a result, the legacy of 
the single-party system obscured the distinction between state and society even after 
the return of multiparty elections in 1992, in which the public were not encouraged to 
hold leaders accountable. Moreover, the idea of holding Kenyan leaders accountable 
by virtue of having been elected was largely driven by the international threat of aid 
sanctions, as ‘there were no true domestic political advances between the 1992 
elections and November 1997. The government neither made nor allowed any 
steps…other than holding by-elections as required [by the donor]’ (Brown, 2001: 
p.732). This has arguably diminished the public’s trust in the capability of elections to 
render leaders accountable for their actions, and has augmented their understandable 
fear that political tensions will degenerate into violence. Indeed, the solitary use of 
elections to determine accountability is limited, in that when ‘incumbents have been 
dreamed to abuse the electoral system to their own advantage, it has proved relatively 
easy to manipulate results despite observers and commissions’ (Baker, 2000: pp.203-
04).  
 
II) Transitional Justice Institutions as an Accountability Mechanism  
 
However, as has been discussed, answerability and enforcement are the most 
important factors in attributing accountability, and in ensuring that citizens are willing 




concerning the plausibility of expanding concepts of accountability, so that they 
transcend the procedural debate on electoral democracy.  
 
In order to be effective, the process of instituting a measure that holds Kenyan leaders 
accountable for their actions must be a continuous, everyday process, in which 
politicians are constantly subject to ‘answerability’ and possible ‘enforcement’ 
(interview with IDP no. 28, Nairobi, March 8, 2012). As one of the Kenyan 
politicians admitted, the daily discussion of criminal accountability that has been 
occurring since the post-election violence has reinvigorated public interest in 
allocating accountability by means of the ICC and TJRC (interview with a local MP 
no. 2, Rift Valley, March 14, 2012). Arguably, the idea that the process of 
establishing political accountability can be expanded to include criminal 
accountability has become increasingly relevant since the post-election violence 
(interview with Kenyan government officer, no. 1, Nairobi, March 17, 2012).  
 
Discussions about crime, punishment and responsibility have also invoked a 
philosophical distinction between responsibility and accountability in criminal justice.  
For instance, Douglas Husak, in his observation on the limitations of criminal law, 
refused ‘to exaggerate the linguistic games between two words’, since both refer to 
the same practical function of criminal justice (2007: p.72). Hence, what Schedler 
identifies as the element of answerability in political accountability is arguably 
present in the same understandings of accountability and responsibility to be found in 
the criminology literature. Indeed, the only difference is that when answerability is 
imposed by criminal justice apparatus, this affects the extent to which such apparatus 




elected individuals are responsible.  
 
As such, Husak reaches a similar conclusion to that of another criminal law 
commentator, Anthony Duff (2007). For Duff, a distinction must be made between 
political and criminal responsibility. By his reckoning, the former refers to the civic 
responsibility of the citizens to monitor the actions of the elected individual by 
making democratic decisions about election regulations, leadership ethics and the 
constitution (p.15). The latter refers to the more specific legal responsibilities of the 
accepted juridical authority to enforce civic and criminal regulations in order to 
govern the behavior of elected leaders behaviors, ensuring that they do not stray 
beyond the parameters of criminal justice by taking part in corruption and the 
pervasion of justice. While Duff’s conception of criminal responsibility may seem 
fairly acceptable, John Gardner has challenged his non-analytical assumptions about 
responsibility in respect to the administration of global criminal justice (2011: p.88). 
Gardner’s observations of recent international criminal justice stressed the importance 
of distinguishing between responsibility and accountability in their roles in political or 
criminal law (p.97). For Gardner, responsibility refers to the usage of the term prior to 
the violation of law or perpetration of crime, and is manifested by the responsibility of 
the state and the individual to uphold laws.  However, it is only the violation of these 
laws, by the state or the individual, that necessitates the attributing of criminal 
accountability. In other words, criminal responsibility emphasises the actor’s 
responsibility to observe the rule of law in order to prevent conflict, whereas criminal 
accountability is concerned with imposing criminal sanctions and legal punishment 





The proliferation of scholarly discussion on post-Cold War human rights laws, 
humanitarian machinery and various interim and permanent criminal institutions 
constitutes a critical switch in focus from criminal responsibility to criminal 
accountability. Regardless of Duff and Gardner’s position on the distinction between 
responsibility and accountability, in terms of their roles both before and after the 
perpetration of criminal acts, they are fairly similar to Schedler’s two components of 
political accountability: answerability and sanction. In this respect, recognising the 
distinction between criminal responsibility and criminal accountability provides a 
more precise and analytical conception of the term ‘accountability’ used by this 
thesis; what are politically understood by Schedler as answerability and sanction can 
be connected to what criminal law scholars regard as justice before (responsibility by 
virtue of being answerable) and after (accountability imposed by sanction or 
punishment) the violation in question.  
 
As such, commentators such as Raimond Gaita (2011: p.137) and William Schabas 
(2008b: p.265) have called for both legal and political scholars to recognise the 
political nature of crimes like genocide and crimes against humanity. This also means 
that the process of formulating a specific transitional justice mechanism has to be 
connected to the idea of accountability. In this respect, the two transitional justice 
mechanisms (the ICC and TJRC) serve to impose a greater degree of political, as well 









Figure 2.4: Expanding Accountability through transitional justice Mechanisms 
 
 
Source: created by the author. 
 
However, this requires an understanding of transitional justice as a political project, 
since transitional justice mechanisms themselves have been widely applauded for 
being effective devices for resolving conflict and for rebuilding war-torn societies in 
Africa (Mbugua, 2008: pp.3-9). Exploring transitional justice as politics requires 




transition from violence to peace.  
 
In reaching an understanding of the relationship between transitional justice and 
accountability, it is best to begin by examining what is commonly understood as the 
politics of justice during the transitional period (Sooka, 2009: p.24). However, the 
political nature of transitional justice remains under-theorized, and this has resulted in 
the failure of legal positivist writings to recognize its political dimensions.56 In such 
instances, while the NGOs produced bundles of ‘how-to’ reports on transitional 
justice, the political dynamics that shaped Kenya’s justice-and reconciliation-seeking 
policy remain unaddressed (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004: p.353). The reality is that a 
political understanding of justice had always been maintained during the negotiation 
of the KNDR agreement, which helped to incorporate transitional justice into the 
peacebuilding agenda (interview with AU officer no. 1, Addis Ababa, April 14, 
2012).  
 
The argument, then, is that the process of constructing accountability can be expanded 
to include the criminal accountability that it is necessary to impose in the wake of the 
post-election violence. Rather than simply relying on the election process, the study 
argues that both components of accountability–answerability and enforcement–could 
and should be the crucial factors in expanding the discourse on accountability to 
include the transitional justice measures (the ICC and TJRC). While Robert Pastor 
describes the influence of groups such as the INGO (whose observations of the 
                                                        
56  The limitations of legal measures in addressing past atrocities are owing simply to their legal 
characteristics, especially in terms of trial. Despite the strong features of retributive justice that have 
appeared since the trials of Nuremberg, the preference for prosecution may not be as effective as it was 
originally hoped to be. The lessons that have been learned from Rwanda and Sierra Leone have led to 
calls for a hybrid response to past atrocities. A political understanding of justice is the first step towards 




election processes are centered on the third dimension of accountability), the study 
further argues that the presence of international actors like the ICC is necessary to 
facilitating accountability measures. 57  Hence, the international dimension of 
accountability for mass atrocities, can be considered as the ‘third dimension of 
accountability’ (see Human Rights Watch, 2009).  
 
In theory, this dimension is arguably missing from the Kenyan public’s understanding 
of the justice- and reconciliation-seeking processes currently being implemented 
(Human Rights Watch, 2011: p.46). The projection of accountability through 
transitional justice mechanisms is not only limited to criminal prosecution, but also 
affects non-judicial measures, such as the TJRC. Gary Bass argues that the 
international dimension of accountability can be categorized as either political or 
legal, national or individual (2001: p.252). He further explains that there is an 
increasing focus on individual legal accountability for political action undertaken on 
behalf of the state (p.253).  
 
Indeed, the idea of political immunity, in which state leaders are shielded by the ‘Act 
of State Doctrine’,58 does not accord with international criminal laws.8 As has already 
been shown, accountability consists of two main components: answerability and 
enforcement. Consequently, the process of developing transitional justice as an 
accountability mechanism must include both. ‘Answerability’ refers to the ability of 
                                                        
57  The third dimension of accountability refers to the active engagement of the transnational 
actors. The author has borrowed this concept and used it to expand the idea of accountability to include 
the implementation of transitional justice in Kenya. See Pastor, 1999. 
58  The ‘Act of State Doctrine’ is part of the diplomatic convention that emerged in the 17th 
century. It is based on the principle of equal sovereignty, in which the state is obliged to respect the 
independence of other states, and a jurisdiction of one state is not applicable to other states. However, 
from the perspective of international customary and treaty laws, this doctrine is no longer relevant if 
the state leaders invoke immunity after the violation of international laws. For a lengthy discussion on 




the ruling class to justify the adoption of a particular transitional justice mechanism; 
‘enforcement’ refers to the ability of the public to enforce laws or sanctions on any 
leader who violates the law. This qualifies the public’s ability to challenge political 
leaders in court.  
 
The criminal proceeding that was enacted by the ICC should also be viewed as being 
a form of law enforcement in its prosecution of elected officials accused of being 
directly involved in post-election violence. Such a theoretical discussion of 
transitional justice as form of accountability clearly indicates that transitional justice 
is the result of the fusing of political consensus and legal considerations, and occurs 
as a result of a peace agreement for ending violence. Hence, transitional justice is not 
solely concerned with implementing a legal mechanism; it is also a political project 
that deals with past atrocities by applying the best measures for attributing 
accountability from a local perspective.  
 
Viewing transitional justice as a form of accountability is consistent with the 
schematics of justice suggested by the former chief prosecutor of the ICC, Louis 
Moreno Ocampo (ICC., 2009). In his media press conference at the opening of the 
ICC’s investigation in Kenya, he stated that the ICC would focus on the criminal 
prosecution of the masterminds behind the violence. The second level of justice that 
would be administered by the special domestic tribunal would focus on the mid- and 
small-scale perpetrators who cannot be tried under the Rome Statute. Finally, the third 
level of justice would focus on the efforts of the TJRC to administer restorative justice 
and satisfy the victims’ needs for reparation. Although pursuing the above theoretical 




the greater dilemma lies in accounting for the behavior of the ruling class and its 
response to transitional justice. Exploring transitional justice as politics helps to 
illuminate the positive and negative aspects of politics that transitional justice 
represents.  
 
III) Exploring the Limits of Transitional Justice Experiments in Africa: The 
Critical Turn 
 
Given the importance of politics in defining transitional justice mechanism as form of 
accountability, it is important to examine the positive and negative aspects of the 
politics of transitional justice. The positive aspects of transitional justice politics are 
represented by its use of the liberal peacebuilding idea of rebuilding post-conflict 
societies. One of the liberal cosmopolitan beliefs upon which transitional justice is 
founded is that the state has a particular responsibility to protect the individual human 
being and give them the protection of human security, human rights and humanitarian 
laws. Without dismissing the positive aspects of transitional justice politics, the 
practice of transitional justice in Kenya and many African countries (as discussed 
below) has become a political instrument with which the elite attempt to secure 
legitimacy rather than address the victims’ needs for justice (Southall Consultation, 
2012: p.7). Indeed, the shift in preference from the original argument for criminal 
accountability (as attributed by the ICC) to the restorative justice approach of the 
TJRC has reinforced the public impression that there is no such thing as ‘justice’ 
(interview with a retired judge no. 1, Mombasa, February 21, 2012).  
 
The proliferation of studies on post-conflict reconstruction exemplifies the tendency 




and the moral values that it represents. There is thus a growing body of literature that 
calls for an assessment of the political nature of the tsarina justice  experiment. Phil 
Clark’s study of the Gacaca court concludes with a reminder of the complexity of 
reading transitional justice as a ‘discreet legal process’ in post-genocide Rwanda, and 
calls for transitional justice commentators to recognise a ‘wider political contingency, 
cultural diffusion and historical legacy that requires a legal pluralism and more 
flexible methodology in interpreting and critiquing the process’ (2011b: p.27). 
Meanwhile, Tim Allen’s observations of the ICC’s indictment of Lord Resistance 
Army (LRA) warlords highlight the difficult task of the implementation of 
international arrest warrants in Northern Uganda. Allen also exposes fallibility of 
legal positivism’s denial of the crucial elements of ‘ownership’ and ‘victim’s 
perspective’ (2008: p.15). There are echoes of these critical observations in Tim 
Kelsall’s sociological analysis of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in which he 
likens the court’s artificial character and modus operandi to the act of driving a 
‘Mercedes Bens in the middle of a rural road full of potholes’ (2009: p.261). Studies 
of transitional justice institutions in Timor Leste, Cambodia and South Africa have 
also highlighted the predominant legal perspective adopted by positivist legal 
commentators, which posits that the popular associations of grandeur attached to these 
operations by the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials hinders the process of 
addressing victims’ needs for retributive justice. This has also resulted in the general 
failure of these operations to recognise the victims’ practical and immediate needs for 
material compensation, reparation and livelihood (Powell, 2010: p.245; Stanley, 2008: 
p.180; Stensrud, 2009: pp.13-14).  
 




TJRC’s proceedings in Kenya by suggesting that they are more concerned with 
politics than justice (Branch, 2012). Furthermore, in the author’s interviews with 
various individuals involved in the TJRC hearing sessions, many criticised the  
‘dramatic and performative aspects of transitional justice’, and its failure to address 
the actual grievances of the victims (interview with IDP no. 29, Nairobi, March 8, 
2012). With emotions running high, the media reports of the hearing sessions focused 
largely on the divisive political blame game being played by members of the ruling 
class, which only indicated their prima facie intentions to interfere with the hearings 
by requesting a legal injunction to stop the TJRC operations. This is a prime example 
of the persistent role of impunity in hindering the process of attributing accountability 
(interview with TJRC officer no. 3, Nairobi, February 6, 2012).  
 
In all the aforementioned works of transitional justice literature, commentators and 
former transitional justice policymakers have expressed their concerns about the 
tendency of current studies to focus on questions of whether the post-conflict 
experiment is legal or not, and whether it can be located within a dominant narrative 
of TJ that began with the post-1945 tribunals. Many of these critical perspectives 
confirm two major conclusions reached by Mark Drumbl, a former defense attorney 
in various trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (Drumbl, 
2007: p.61).  
 
Firstly, an increase in the number of international tribunals provoked a greater degree 
of critical focus on the retributive logic of punishment through the discourse of 
legalism and criminal violations (p.121). Secondly, the fact that the proceedings of the 




human rights advocates has resulted in there being a lack of recognition of the local 
ownership of the processes, and their connection to the victims themselves (p. 121). 
As such, transitional justice continued the polemic of human rights initiated by Harri 
Englund’s ethnographical evidence compiled in Malawi. By using a bottom-up 
approach that avoids focusing exclusively on the national elite, he suggests that the 
ideas of freedom and rights appear to impede the individual and communal struggle 
against poverty and injustice (2006: p.13). Instead of liberating the individual from 
oppressive power structures and their histories of violation, the international 
commitment to democratic citizenship and human rights in emerging democracies 
through the acceptance of foreign aid and the adoption of procedural democracy has 
repeated the technocratic mistakes of the problem solving approach adopted in 
econometric developmental studies and structural adjustments policy (p.17).  
 
As a result, subaltern agents who exist outside of the radar of the national elite invoke 
the abstract ideas of rights and justice in order to distinguish their genuine 
commitment to these ideas from the elite’s payment of lip service to liberal values. 
These individuals demonstrate their commitment to rights and justice by struggling 
for their rights in harsh economic conditions, and remaining subject to the rule of 
power structures. This is identified and discussed in the next section as the act of 
everyday resistance against the ruling class and foreign elites. Hence, while Tony 
Lang observes that the increasingly punitive nature of international justice produces 
more illiberal orders, and suggests that the juridical structure–as imposed by global 
constitutional reforms–may provide a more pragmatic means of reducing the 
structural tendency towards anarchy at the international scale (Lang, 2008: pp.130-




real danger of over-emphasising the legalistic nature of tribunals or transitional justice 
in dealing with mass atrocities, as well as the liberal values that they represent (see 
Clark, 2010).  
 
The fact that some African leaders invoked the language of human rights and 
exhibited impunity in challenging the legitimacy of the ICC’s intervention and its 
geographical imbalance in Africa only confirms the validity of Arlene Tickner’s 
question: ‘how well does IR [theory and practice] travel to other [non-western] 
regions?’ (2009: p.329). Two immediate responses should be highlighted here; firstly, 
the invocation of a liberal language of rights and justice by African ruling elites has 
confirmed their legitimate disconnection from the victims. This is particularly true of 
when these leaders challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction and impeded the criminal 
prosecution of some of the big fish; it is also manifest in the opposition of the AU 
leaders to the ICC’s intervention in Sudan, Kenya and Libya (see Brown and Sriram., 
2012; Lynch and Zgonec-Rozej, 2013; Waddell and Clark, 2008).  
 
Secondly, while the ICC have re-affirmed their commitment to combatting impunity 
and have questioned the AU’s political rhetoric of peace and justice, they have still 
failed to address atrocities committed by superpowers in other regions. Furthermore, 
they have acted on some erroneous assumptions and relied heavily on legalist 
discourse; this has provoked accusations that ICC’s commitment to victims extends 
only to prosecuting the national elite, but not to imposing measures to help them at a 
sub-national level by diminishing the power of the oppressive structures of post-






In the words of Thomson and Nagy, ‘legalism has failed’ to address the issue of 
power disparities in oppressive post-conflict environments (2011: p.30). Indeed, 
William Schabas had previously warned against the erroneous, institutionalist 
assumption that the ICC would meet unrealistic expectations in instituting reforms. To 
Schabas, fairness in the administration of the ICC cannot simply be ensured by 
implementing structural, institutional reforms, or by reducing the UNSC’s 
intervention in referring a case to the court (2008a: p.195). Dealing with the atrocities 
committed by leaders of rough states cannot be counted as part of the ICC’s success 
story if the prosecutor continually dismisses the atrocities committed by permanent 
members of the UNSC as a result of legality errors (p.196).  
 
In such instances, rather than romanticising the legal mechanisms, institutional 
reforms or the liberal cosmopolitan values that transitional justice represents, perhaps 
Cristian Bell’s innovative approach in contextualising transitional justice may lead to 
a greater recognition of politics in the debate surrounding it, thus providing a more 
fruitful understanding of its ambiguous role (see Bell, 2009). ‘What informed 
transitional justice as a field of knowledge [theory] and practice?’ (p.4). Bell argues 
that, as a field of theory, transitional justice was informed by the competition between 
various normative ideas; for instance, the debates between peace and justice, 
international and national politics, retribution and restoration, and law and politics 
(p.4). Simultaneously, however, as a form of policy of intervention, transitional 
justice enforces a dominant narrative of liberal peace; it offers a westernised notion of 
justice and a one-size-fits-all package for justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy 





Even in countries that are geographically located within the European domain (such 
as the Balkans and Northern Ireland), the transitional justice prescriptions issued by 
external mediators have not easily being accepted by the locals (Duffy, 2010: p.45; 
Peskin, 2011: p.73).  Having emerged in the 1990s, by 2001 the field had become 
more distinct; a liberal cosmopolitan approach began to be adopted, which provided a 
normative language of human rights and humanitarian intervention with which to 
pursue justice, and to apply transitional politics (Bell, 2009: p.5). However, the 
normative justification for human rights and humanitarian laws is not impartial, and 
does not address the substantive issue of which type of justice (retributive or 
restorative) should be implemented, and who is to decide on its execution (Thomson 
and Nagy, 2011: pp.28-30).  
 
As such, according to Bell, ‘[t]ransitional justice does not constitute a coherent field 
but is rather a label or cloak that aims to rationalise a set of diverse bargains 
[emphasis added] in relation to the past as an integrated endeavour.’(Bell, 2009: p.6) 
Bell identifies these diverse bargains as belonging to three distinct projects: 
I. Continuing the struggle against impunity, wherein transitional justice is 
understood as being a legal measure for addressing past violations of human 
rights; 
II. introducing a set of conflict resolution techniques that involve  the formulation 
of justice measures as a means of pressuring conflicting parties to return to the 
negotiation table; 
III. creating a standardised instrument for intervention under the multi-layered 





Although these diverse bargains are distinct from each other, they appear together as 
one package (transitional justice discourses) created with the help of international 
assistance in dealing with regime changes (Teitel, 2000: p.6). By romanticising the 
nature of transitional politics, the new regime that emerged during the transition 
perceived these diverse projects as tools (in the form of transitional justice) with 
which to elicit recognition of their legitimacy and gain assistance (in the form of 
liberal peacebuilding) from the international society (Garcia-Godos and Sriram, 2013: 
p.5). This regime claimed to be “a new regime” for managing post-conflict society.  
 
The striking similarity between Kenya’s transitional justice following the post-
election violence, the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) after the 
assassination of Rafic Hariri and the operations of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Court of Cambodia (ECCC) after power-sharing government in Cambodia support the 
evidence that, while these countries have undergone unclear transitions (since many 
of the accused suspects remained protected by the incumbent regimes), their “new 
regimes” declared themselves by appealing for international assistance. By adopting a 
particular transitional justice mechanism, the new regime invoked the authority of 
transitional norms as a way of communicating to the international society that they 
intended to uphold human rights laws and other international principles.  
 
The adoption of transitional justice policy (through KNDR, in the case of Kenya) was 
the mechanism with which the regime reinvented itself as a “new regime” entity, and 
convinced international society that it was committed to upholding liberal democratic 




The establishment of the GNU with its transitional justice agenda is solely dedicated 
to continuing the legacy of ‘grand corruption’… obviously it was formed because 
none of the ruling class predicted that they would be in positions of diminished status 
after the post-election violence. To be accountable for another Rwanda [the 1994’s 
genocide] will be risky to their powers and neo-patrimonial interests. The best that 
can be done is to ask for international assistance in stabilising the state (interview 
with a retired judge no. 2, Mombasa, March 15, 2012). 
  
In this respect, the judge reminds us of the fact that the crisis occurred and transitional 
justice was established within the confinement ‘of the post-colonial African state, 
since those who occupied the state never succeeded in building a local hegemony, and 
relied heavily on international recognition’ (interview with a retired judge no. 2, 
Mombasa, Kenya, March 15, 2012). After the crisis, they later abandoned the 
prospect of international assistance and reverted to their old mode of governance, 
which was dependent on the illegal use of violence and neo-patrimonial practice 
(Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: p.225-26). 
 
The invocation of transitional justice by the GNU can be interpreted as the process of 
reinventing a new legitimacy, since the country nearly collapsed following the post-
election violence. The acceptance of offers of international assistance and the promise 
to maintain respect for human rights was just another window dressing manoeuvre 
with which the weakened members of the ruling class reinforced their positions 
through the establishment of the GNU (Cheeseman, 2011; Kagwe, 2010; Murunga 
and Nasong'o, 2006; Mwangi and Holmquist, 2012; Nasong'o and Murunga, 2007). In 
parallel, Ian Taylor argues that the modus operandi of African rulers ‘are expressed 
through both the threat and actual use of violence and the immediate disbursal of 
material benefits… Without these twin strategies—both inimical to long-term 





The current perception in Kenya of the illegitimacy of the elite, and the fact that this 
elite depended on international assistance to negotiate power-sharing agreements 
during the crisis naturally affects the long-term function of transitional justice 
(Brown, 2013: p.239). As such, transitional justice should be viewed as the process of 
negotiation, and the attempt to legitimise new forms of power and political order. 
Transitional justice is not an objective process, and is never legally executed in 
response to past atrocities committed during the post-election violence. Rather, it is a 
means of negotiating a complex political scenario, which cannot be summarised 
vaguely as a moral conflict between good and evil.  
 
To set it alongside Friedrich Nietzsche’s maxim of ‘beyond good and evil’ (see 
Nietzsche, 2003), transitional justice should not be approached as a dogmatic scheme 
laden with morals, as it is envisaged by liberal cosmopolitanism. In On the Genealogy 
of Morals, Nietzsche criticises the personification of societal morals based on the 
monolithic allegories of good for the strong and bad for the weak (2008: p.57). To 
romanticise the rule of law is to neglect the essential characters of power; to 
depoliticise transitional justice is to repeat international peacebuilding’s mistake of 
negotiating transitional space through the empty vessel of the state (see also 
Richmond, 2011b).  
 
Perhaps the ethnographical research of Susan Thomson in Rwanda (2013) and Claire 
Moon’s discourse analysis on the TRC’s final report in South Africa (2008) can be 
said to have provided a more specific location of politics in transitional justice 
processes in specific terms of power and ideology. Drawing from Foucault’s works on 




power relations and ideological apparatus behind the transitional justice mechanisms 
implemented in both case studies.  
 
Any attempt to exclude power and ideology results in the implementation of justice 
measures that are alien to these post-conflict societies (Cole, 2007: p.186). In 
Rwanda, the discourse of legalism through the language of TJ has ignored the reality 
of how the state ‘employs disciplinary tactics [transitional justice] to make Rwandans 
behave in ways they might not themselves choose…’ (Thomson, 2013: p.10). In 
South Africa, the TRC’s final reports betrayed the victims, as the selective 
testimonials were politically utilised as forms of state apparatus for justifying the 
positions of the new, post-Apartheid ruling class through a vague ideology of 
reconciliation. The final reports also suppressed the grievances of certain victims 
when their narration of such grievances was deemed to be a threat to the African 
National Congress (ANC)’s vision of reconciliation (Moon, 2008: p.148).  
 
In Cambodia, the operations of the ECCC and its disconnection from the survivors of 
the Pol Pot regime indicated that the ECCC was also being used as a form of 
ideological apparatus by the incumbent government in maintaining its power and 
authority (Elander, 2012: p.113). ‘Why have a tribunal in 2006 when many of the 
survivors are already dead?’ (interview with ECCC observer no. 3, Paris, November 
29, 2010).  ‘Maybe we should have asked why old wounds were being re-opened by 
the tribunal, when the 1997 power-sharing government lacked credibility in the eyes 
of voters.’ (interview with a former ECCC observer no. 2, Paris, November 28, 2010). 
‘Were such past projects capable of fostering national identity when the incumbent 




1, Paris, November 27, 2010).  
 
In Benghazi, the simultaneous foreign authorisation of the ICC’s indictments and the 
UNSC’s resolution of a ‘No Fly Zone’ served to legitimate oppressive modes of 
governance, in which the transitional council perceived international assistance as a 
‘license’ to assassinate any passive bystander and unarmed civilian that was 
associated with the former Gaddafi regime (Neethling, 2012: p.38). ‘It’s ironic that 
you [international actors] are obsessed with the atrocities of Gaddafi, yet remain silent 
about the heinous crimes of the transitional authority’ (interview with AU officer no. 
1, Addis Ababa, April 14, 2012). ‘What makes the victorious forces’ show trial of 
Agusto Pinochet and Saddam Hussein different from the more “benevolent” 
ambitions of the ICC’s warranting of Gaddafi and Bashir?’ (interview with a local 
lawyer, Cairo, July 22, 2011).  
 
In this respect, scholars and commentators have confirmed transitional justice 
mechanisms as being the products of hierarchical relations. They can be identified as 
forms of ideological apparatus for enacting legitimacy, structured by the existing 
pattern of neo-patrimonial domination; as international-local bargaining chips for the 
elite, and as methods of historical exploitation used by those in power, ‘in which 
political leaders see their rights to rule as natural’, and the victims are treated as 
‘objects of manipulation’ (Thomson, 2013: p.11).  
 
In the aforementioned case studies, regardless of what position they hold and whether 
or not they reject violence, ordinary citizens must confirm their positions according to 




local politicians. For instance, unarmed civilians who belonged to the former Gaddafi 
regime and who continued to live in Benghazi were deemed to be traitors who 
deserved the death penalty (Çubukçu, 2013: p.57). Likewise, all Rwandan Hutus are 
considered to be perpetrators who are collectively guilty for the genocide (Thomson 
and Nagy, 2011: p.30).  
 
In Kenya, the Kikuyu residents of the IDP camps in Rift Valley are considered to 
have deserved to have been evicted from their lands and to remain homeless (Kossler, 
2008: p.42). This complicates the adoption of the legal taxonomy of perpetrator and 
victim in locating their positions and in assessing the victims’ claims for reparations. 
The national elite or local politicians’ identification of victims from residents of the 
IDP camps is not always accurate, and does not necessarily reflect the actual position 
of those IDPs who remained vulnerable or who have no political ties with the non-
Kikuyu community, for instance. For that, the liberal cosmopolitan project of 
transitional justice fails to acknowledge transitional justices position within a 
constellation of power and ideology; transitional justice is not only concerned with 
addressing past abuses of power, but is also part of the political process of enacting a 
new power through a state apparatus of ideology in order to subdue the victims’ 
demands that leaders be held accountable. Of particular relevance here is Foucault’s 
commentary on Carl von Clausewitz’s famous argument: ‘power is war, a war 
continued by other means.’ (Foucault, 1997a: p.61). Transitional justice, then, is the 
personification of this phrase, in that its mechanisms must recognise and ‘uphold the 
disequilibrium of forces that [were] displayed in war’. (p.62). Interpreting transitional 
justice as a form of power and ideology is crucial to understanding the dynamics of 









I) Foucault’s Method of Power and Knowledge 
In examining the transition from public prosecution methods adopted by the absolute 
monarch to the introduction of the modern prison system, Foucault revealed that the 
practice of modern justice consists of more than just the technical, administrative role 
of the judiciary; it also necessitates ‘an assessment of normality and a technical 
prescription for a possible normalization.’(Foucault, 1977: 21) In addition to passing 
judgement, the court must also identify the most suitable way of rehabilitating former 
criminals, according to the society’s standard of moral imagination (p.22).  
 
By charting the history of punishment and the changes to modes of punishment, 
Foucault attempts to highlight how certain ideas developed, or how certain discourses 
became dominant during a specific historical period (p.23). In such instances, 
transitional justice can be understood as the political process of consolidating the 
legitimacy of a new regime that emerges during a transition. This understanding has 
resulted in the projection of transitional justice as a dominant discourse, against which 
different political agents may be evaluated and disciplined. This discourse also allows 
these agents to evaluate themselves, and to change their behavior in accordance with 
the dominant discourses (Fontana and Pasquino, 1984: p.65).  
 
The assessment of conditions within which dominant discourses produces a set of 
norms (such as the rules of law, humanitarian intervention and human rights) with 




constitutes the bedrock of Foucault’s historical inquiry in Discipline and Punish 
(1977).  
 
In a realist understanding, power is understood as the property or attribute of the agent 
(Hayward and Lukes, 2008: p.7); for instance, actor A’s may be able to enforce actor 
B to do things that are in actor A’s interests (Lebow, 2013: p.62). The definition of 
power, in this sense, is based on the reductionist view that it is the property of the 
agency: actor A possesses the power to change actor B’s behavior so that it accords 
with the interests of actor A. Foucault introduced a different, ‘structural’ conception 
of power, in which it is not reducible to being defined merely as the property of the 
agent who exerts it (Neal, 2009: p.540). This concept of power has produced ‘a 
constellation of discursive structures, knowledge and practices…which create a set of 
rules and standards, with reference to which agents may exercise power over other 
agents, as well as over themselves’ (Manokha, 2009: p.430).  
 
Defining power based on Foucault’s concept however is fairly problematic. In the 
first volume of his History of Sexuality, he states that, ‘power is everywhere; not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And ‘Power,’ 
insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing...’(1998: p.93). One 
can argue that such a vague conception of power serves to oversimplify one of the 
most important aspects of the study of politics (Joseph, 2010: p.223). While Foucault 
conceives power to be omnipresent, he does not attempt to develop a grand theory for 
it (Death, 2012: p.7). The Foucauldian concept of power should not be understood as 




the process by which the agent continuously refers other agents and themselves to the 
dominant discourses.  
 
Rather than asking what power is, Foucault challenges us to examine how power 
operates. By referring to the dominant discourses, the agents position themselves 
within a constellation of power relations (Fontana and Pasquino, 1984: p.65). 
Foucault used the ‘archeological method’ to illuminate how particular discourses have 
become dominant, powerful and sustained within a particular historical contingency 
(2002a: p.152). According to Foucault, the dominant discourses determine the 
position of the subject/agent within a constellation of power relations (1998: p.73). 
The dominant discourses manifest themselves in political relations and ideas, which 
are made visible in the form of policies.  
 
For instance, the field of law produces the dominant discourses for the ideas of crime 
and punishment, as they are represented by the institutions of courts and prisons 
(Hammer, 2007: p.98). In Kenya, transitional justice has become the dominant 
discourse for the idea of accountability, as represented by the institutions of the ICC 
and the TJRC, as well as by the subjects (the deceased victims and the IDPs). The 
dominant discourses then determine the political agent’s position in the constellation 
of power.  
 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes the two key characteristics of his 
conception of power. Firstly, he demonstrates that power is not the property of the 
agent, but a strategy that is employed according to its efficiency (1977: p.26). In other 




and differ; when the agents interact with each other they will meditate on the 
dominant view of what is considered as normality (p.26). Secondly, power should not 
be understood as a form of oppression or domination of other agents (p.27).  
 
Power is both positive and negative in the way in which it produces the behavior 
(through consent and sanction) with which the agents attempts to conform to what is 
considered, by the standard of the dominant discourses, to be normal or accepted 
(p.27). Foucault’s disappointment with western Marxism, and the method of historical 
materialism with which it reduced the analysis of relations to a form of class partition, 
inspired him to focus on power. ‘For Foucault, historical materialism was inadequate 
in that it split…a division in critical theory between what human beings say and what 
they do...’ (Manokha, 2009: p.433).  
 
The Foucauldian method of historical analysis is known as ‘genealogy’, a term 
borrowed from Nietzsche (see Macmillan, 2009). As discussed previously, Foucault 
used the term ‘archeology’ to illuminate how certain narratives became the dominant 
discourses at certain points in history. Hence, it is important to clarify both terms. 
While the distinction between archeology and genealogy is contested in Foucauldian 
scholarship, Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham clarify that archeology can be 
understood as Foucault’s method; ‘genealogy is not so much a method, but a way of 
putting archeology to work, a way of linking it [the archeological examination of the 
past] to our present concerns’ (1999: p.31). Foucault used archeology to examine how 
certain narratives became dominant within a particular historical contingency, and 






The use of genealogy here does not suggest that contemporary or present historical 
development (history as present) is better than previous development (history of the 
past), but simply serves to highlight the discontinuities between them at any given 
historical juncture.59 For example, during the Cold War (history of the past), the 
concept of human rights was subject to heavy criticism; not only from the Soviet 
Union, which saw human rights as an extension of the oppressive features of 
liberalism and capitalism, but also from the Third World political movement, which 
believed in collective rights (see also Humphrey and Valverde, 2008).  Examples of 
this advocacy of collective rights are the promotion of ‘Asian values’ in Singapore 
and ‘African Socialism’ in Ghana.  
 
However, after the demise of the Soviet Union, human rights became more accepted 
as a liberal cosmopolitan project that served as part of the political agenda for 
peacebuilding and transitional justice. Accordingly, despite the non-western leaders’ 
continued criticism of the contemporary practice of human rights, the dispute has now 
become not so much about the liberal cosmopolitan values it represents (as it was 
during the Cold War), but more about the practice of human rights and the threat it 
creates for those in power.60  
 
                                                        
59  Unlike the ‘conventional historian’ who views history as a linear progress, Foucault and other 
Nietzschean historians emphasize the element of discontinuity in historical junctures. They compare 
the concepts of history of the past and history of the present to signify a historical discontinuity or 
break. For a lengthy discussion on the concept of history as past and present, see Dean, 1994.  
60  Since the propagation of liberal democratic values was inevitable following the Cold War, the 
current critiques on human rights focus more on its practice. For instance, the debate between the 
adoption of the western style justice versus the adoption of traditional justice in Africa represents the 
controversy surrounding human rights legal regimes that threatened their power positions, but not so 




Although both historical periods (the Cold War and the post-Cold War period) can be 
connected by the way in which international society responded to human rights issues, 
these issues performed different functions in both historical periods (Manokha, 2009: 
p.436). In short, genealogy refers to the process of contextualising history from past to 
present by highlighting the discontinuities in historical breaks:  
Contrary to “traditional” historical studies which examine particular events within 
grand explanatory systems and processes seen as linear evolutions, Nietzschean 
genealogy seeks to depict the present as finite, limited, even repugnant, simply by 
locating differences in the past. The Nietzschean historian begins with the present and 
goes backwards in time until a difference is located (p.436). 
 
 
Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault stresses that the ultimate aim of genealogy is: 
to spot the uniqueness of events, outside any monotonous finality; to look for them 
where we would least expect them and in what goes as having no history at all—
feelings, love, conscience, instincts; to capture their return, in order not to trace the 
curve of their slow evolution, but to find different stages at which they played 
different roles (cited in Manokha, 2009: pp.433-4). 
 
By adopting the Foucauldian, genealogical approach, we can uncover the forms of 
power to which the agent becomes subject, as well as the object of technologies of 
power (Foucault, 2002b: p.98). Such an examination of power feeds in to Foucault’s 
famous discussion of knowledge as it is embodied within the constellation of power 
relations. He has used the hyphenated term ‘power-knowledge’ to explain that power 
and knowledge are intertwined, and therefore interdependent: ‘there are no power 
relations without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ 
(1977: p.27).  
 
By examining the way agents exercise power over others and over themselves, 




For instance, in Discipline and Punish Foucault urges his reader to be critical of the 
invocation of the ‘Enlightenment’ as the age of reason, which is projected by 
proponents of liberal cosmopolitanism as ‘the historical reason’ for the protection of 
the human body from severe violations (p.23). Examining the transition from public 
torture to the birth of the prison system in the eighteen-century, he determines that 
this transition in punishment should not be perceived as denoting the better treatment 
of a human being, but as the configuration of power and its paradigm shift from the 
authority of the absolute monarch to that of the new, middle-class bureaucrat (p.24). 
In Foucault’s view, the change in the mode of punishment embodies the production of 
‘the new knowledge’ (1984: pp.45-6). While the form of punishment represented by 
the prison system may seem to be more humane in its focus on the rehabilitation of 
‘the soul’ rather than the brutal torture of the body, the prisoner’s body still represents 
an object of this new knowledge, and a reference point for it.  Foucault elaborates on 
this in his 1978 lecture, What is Critique?: ‘The word knowledge [savoir] is used to 
refer to all the procedures and all the effects of knowledge [connaisance] that are 
acceptable at a given moment and in a defined domain’ (Foucault, 1997b: p.394).  
 
To understand Foucault’s discussion on knowledge, we have to consider the two 
French words for knowledge; savoir and connaisance. The former refers to 
quantitative or empirical kinds of knowledge, whereas the latter refers to qualitative 
or experiential forms of knowledge. The difference between these two is akin to the 
difference between ‘I know the direction to St. Andrews in Scotland’ (a savoir – 
based on map) versus ‘I know the town very well as I used to live there’ (a 
connaissance – based on experience). In a Foucauldian sense, the body that is subject 




first body of knowledge (savoir) refers to the ‘officiated’ knowledge possessed by the 
public, which is directly connected to the normative justification of punishment as a 
mode of normalizing the ‘prisoner’s body’ until it is fit to return to society (p.29). The 
second body represents the soul (connaissance) of the new knowledge that is socially 
constructed by the prison system (p.30). To Foucault, this new constructed knowledge 
is hidden, and needs to be challenged because it is linked to a societal prescription of 
truth as the embodiment of knowledge (see Machava, 2011). This truth is never 
objective and is always accountable for positioning the agent within a constellation of 
power relations (Foucault, 1977: p.30).  
 
Taking an anti-humanist stance, Foucault explicitly rejects the liberal attempts to 
romanticise the celebration of human dignity, which can arguably be linked to the 
critical approach to human rights in assessing transitional justice experiments (see 
also Golder, 2010). For this, he introduces the term ‘discipline’, the process of making 
the body ‘docile and able to be ‘utilized’ (after a longer period in prison), so that ‘the 
new man can be produced’ (Foucault, 1977: p.137). In other words, Foucault uses the 
historical transition from public prosecution to the prison system as a turning point for 
the consubstantiality of power with knowledge, where the subject (prisoner) becomes 
an object that embodies the knowledge of how to discipline society (p.138). The 
consubstantiality of power with knowledge delineates the distinction between the 
subject and the object, in that the subject is transformed into a new object of 
knowledge (connaissance). Nevertheless, Foucault’s examination of the modern 
prison system displays some effective techniques for examining power in transitional 
justice processes, namely: 




accountability following post-election violence.  
 The idea of pursuing justice through multiple accountability mechanisms in 
Kenya (the ICC and TJRC), which embody the representation of ‘power-
knowledge’. 
 
II) Transitional justice as the Dominant Discourses of Accountability 
Following the post-election violence, the public debate on accountability and how to 
apply it through transitional justice mechanisms was renewed with particular 
reference to criminal prosecution. This political crisis has established transitional 
justice as the dominant discourse for accountability. Against this discourse, different 
political agents may be evaluated and disciplined, while simultaneously evaluating 
themselves in accordance with transitional justice. One of the victims admitted that: 
since 2008, everyone has been talking about transitional justice, especially the 
politicians. While the idea seems alien to most of the ordinary populace, it has 
become a ‘hot subject’ in everyday discussions among members of the political class, 
including those who previously believed that human rights are irrelevant and that 
none of the suspects would be prosecuted. They cannot escape talking about it 
(interview with IDP no. 31, Rift Valley, March 14, 2012). 
 
As shall be discussed in Chapter 3, the idea of accountability for the systematic 
violation of human rights and impunity is not a novel phenomenon in Kenyan politics 
(Oucho, 2010: p.491). However, while the demands for accountability have been 
being made since 1992 (for example, through multi-party elections and the 
establishment of the TJRC in 2003), the post-election violence constituted a critical 
shift in Kenyan history, and provided a space for the public (especially the victims, 
members of local civil societies and transnational actors) to implement mechanisms 
for attributing accountability in the form of transitional justice, particularly through 




criminal accountability mechanism, it was assumed that national reconciliation would 
take the form of retributive justice.  
 
However, agenda item number four of the KNDR agreement broadened the discourses 
of criminal accountability to include political reforms, constitutional reviews, 
electoral reforms and the addressing of corruption (Kanyinga, 2012: p.31). Prior to the 
post-election violence, the history of politics, violence and social processes in Kenya 
did not make the country suited to institutionalizing accountability through the policy 
of transitional justice.61  
 
Tellingly, scholarly writings on Kenyan politics and social history from the past thirty 
years have centered around three main themes; firstly, that of colonial and post-
colonial discussions of the challenges to nation-building processes (for example, see 
Anderson, 2005; Berman, 1990; Berman and Lonsdale, 1990b; 1990a; Branch et al., 
2010; Branch, 2011); secondly, the theme of the political economy of development, 
dependency theories and structural adjustment policies (for example, see Bates, 2005; 
Mueller, 1984; Hyden, 1987); finally, the theme of multiparty elections, the role of 
ethnicity, neo-patrimonial networks, constitutional reforms, the nature of 
democratisation, the country’s position in sub-regional and regional arrangements, 
and the international dimensions of Kenya (for example, see Branch and Cheeseman, 
                                                        
61  There is further disagreement within the literature of Kenyan politics, especially on whether 
the policy of transitional justice began in 2003 or after the 2008 crisis. Given the actual regime change 
that took place in the aftermath of the 2002 election, the 2003 TJRC task force should be given its due 
merit, as this was the first time the actual term or concept of transitional justice displayed itself in the 
contemporary politics of Kenya. Arguably, however, it was only following the crisis in 2008 and the 
TJRC’s first operations in 2009 that state actors, civil society and the IDPs began to engage in serious 
political discussions concerning transitional justice policy. It was only after the crisis and the 
commencement of the ICC’s proceedings that IDPs and ordinary members of society began to 






2009; Cheeseman, 2009; 2006; Cottrell and Ghai, 2007; Klopp, 2002; Kagwanja, 
2003; Kanyinga, 1998; Lynch, 2011b; Nasong'o and Murunga, 2007; Southall, 2005; 
Throup and Hornsby, 1998).  
 
However, few of these works commit to an extensive engagement with contemporary 
Kenya from the perspective of transitional justice, or the process of political 
reconciliation that began following the post-election violence. 62  In Foucault’s 
genealogical sense, the post-election violence constituted a historical shift, in which 
the previous struggles and focuses of accountability emerged as a new object of 
knowledge. This new object was transitional justice as a form of accountability, which 
has arguably become the dominant discourse subsequent to the events of 2008. 
Indeed, the process of integrating transitional justice as part of the power-sharing 
agreement signified the importance of debates concerning accountability in Kenyan 
politics (interview AU officer no. 1, Addis Ababa, April 14, 2012). 
 
Such dominant discourses have inevitability produced a set of norms and 
considerations based on those produced by previous post-conflict tribunal and 
peacebuilding missions, including those of Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone. Additionally, human rights practices in the African continent, the ICC’s 
ongoing intervention in African countries, the TRC operations in South Africa and 
western governments’ geostrategic interests in East Africa during the negotiation of 
the power-sharing deals and during the formulation of transitional justice as part of 
the KNDR agreement have also contributed to producing this set of norms (interview 
with an IJR officer, Cape Town, July 15, 2011). Within all these developments, 
                                                        




transitional justice has become the dominant discourse of accountability in governing 
the behavior of various political agents, especially among the senior officials of the 
GNU.63  
 
By drawing on Foucault’s two characteristics of power, we can demonstrate how 
agents increasingly evaluate themselves and other agents with reference to the process 
of implementing transitional justice mechanisms in Kenya.  As has been discussed, 
power is not a property that belongs to the agent, but is defined by the dominant view 
of what is considered acceptable. Additionally, power does not exist as a form of 
repression, but as both a positive and negative force with which the agent displays 
behavior that is consistent with the dominant discourses. Even during the absence of 
sanction (negative force), agents can exercise power over themselves to accord with 
the dominant discourses.  
 
The process of considering Foucault’s two characteristics of power helps to uncover 
various plausible explanations for the implementation of transitional justice by the 
Kenyan government. To simply accept the realist argument that transitional justice 
was imposed by the western government–or the African leaders’ argument that 
transitional justice is merely another neocolonial project–still fails to illuminate why 
the Kenyan ruling class initially co-operated with the ICC and the TJRC in addressing 
the systematic violation of human rights following the immediate period subsequent 
to the KNDR agreement (interview with KAF officer, no. 2, Geneva, November 26, 
                                                        
63  The post-election violence has become a significant event in contemporary Kenya in 
vindicating the importance of everyday discussions about accountability and the process of linking this 
accountability to justice. In contrast to South Africa’s TRC, Kenya’s reconciliation process places a 
strong emphasis on ‘justice’. The underlying idea behind it is that there is no reconciliation without 
justice, and there is no justice without accountability. Hence, the restoration process is understood as 
TJRC instead of TRC, in order to highlight the missing element of accountability (interview with TJRC 






Adopting Foucault’s method helps this thesis to precisely contextualise in the next 
Chapter 3, why the Kenyan ruling class initially continued to support transitional 
justice mechanisms after the violence, and why they later eventually rejected the 
parliamentary bill on the establishment of the special tribunal in favor of the ICC.  It 
also helps to explain why they later rejected the ICC, realigning themselves with the 
special tribunal and then attempting to replace it with the TJRC. The shifting 
preferences of the ruling class indicates the presence of a set of circumstances in 
which all the political agents are meditating on the acceptable standard of morality 
according to the dominant discourses of accountability (Wainana and Chepng'etich, 
2010: p.112).  
 
Specifically, while the ruling classes’ shift in preference from the original special 
tribunal to the ICC’s option could be considered as an attempt to avoid the realistic 
pursuit of justice, the ruling class could not escape from the demands for justice 
produced by the hegemonic discourses of accountability that arose following the post-
election violence. Whether headed by the special tribunal or the ICC, the pursuit of 
justice was inevitable, since the violence had weakened the political elite’s position. 
Indeed, the Waki Commission’s recommendation of the ICC’s approach to justice can 
be interpreted as the agent’s attempt to confirm to other agents’ behavior according to 
the dominant discourses; there must be a form of accountability in the criminal 
prosecution, since this accords with agenda items number three and four of the KNDR 
agreement (see Table 2.5). The MPs’ attempts to re-table the special tribunal after the 




(Wainana and Chepng'etich, 2010: p.113).  
 
Table 2.4: Excerpt from Various Agreements related to the Kenyan National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation 
Agreements Mandates/Jurisdiction 
Agenda Item Three – How to Resolve the 
Political Crisis 
IV. Regarding the need for a political 
settlement to resolve the current crisis, 
we agree on the following points: 
 
Such reforms and mechanism will comprise, 
but are not limited to; 
 
 A truth, justice and reconciliation 
commission 
 Identification and prosecution of 
perpetrators of violence. 
Agenda Item Four – Longer-term Issues 
and Solutions 
 Constitutional reforms 
 Police and Security reforms 
 Judicial reforms and vetting 
 Strengthening of anti-corruption 
laws/public accountability mechanism 
 Addressing issues of accountability and 
transparency 
Commission of Inquiry on Post-election 
Violence (hereafter known as Waki 
Commission) 
Identify and prosecution of perpetrators of 
violence, including state security agents 
Addressing issues of accountability and 
transparency 
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation 
Commission 
No blanket amnesty will be provided for past 
crimes. Individual amnesty may be 
recommended by the Commission in exchange 
for the full truth, provided that serious 
international crime (crimes against humanity, 
war crime or genocide_ are not amnestied, no 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
crimes covered by the commission 
Source: KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2009 
 
However, the avoidance of the ICC’s approach to justice through the re-tabling of the 
special tribunal bill was an idea that was later rejected by other MPs, especially those 
who were allied to Prime Minister Odinga (Wafula, 2009: p.2). This can be 
interpreted as the agent’s attempts to evaluate others based on the acceptable norms 
produced by the discourses of accountability, which proves that justice being delayed 




Kenyan government’s official stance, and he stressed that the TJRC should be a 
compliment (but not an alternative) to the prerequisite of establishing accountability 
by means of retributive justice (Office of the Prosecutor (I.C.C.), 2009d). By January 
2012, the ICC’s pre-Trial Chamber II had confirmed the charges against the ICC’s 
suspects and determined how the trial should proceed (I.C.C., 2012). Meanwhile, the 
TJRC commissioners clarified that the commission’s operation should not be taken as 
a form of ‘immunity’ from the pervasion (impunity) of criminal justice (Amolo, 2011: 
p.1). This obviously limited the agent’s initiative of refusing to conform to the 
acceptable moral standards set by the hegemonic discourse embodied by the ICC’s 
proceedings.  
 
To simply maintain the realist argument that agents behave according to their political 
interests does not explain why Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, did not 
absolutely defy the ICC’s proceedings after their names had been confirmed as being 
among those of the main suspects (Sriram. and Brown, 2012: p.225). The fact that 
both continued “to commit” to the ICC’s investigation indicates that the dominant 
discourses of accountability provided norms that enabled both politicians to positively 
comply with the ICC’s proceedings. Of course, this is not to suggest that, following 
the post-election violence, the Kenyan leaders suddenly began to respect human 
rights. Rather, it highlights the fact that the participation of Kenyatta and Ruto in the 
process of transitional justice signified that the hegemonic discourses of 
accountability defined the boundaries of what was politically permissible within the 
context of post-2008 Kenyan politics.64  
                                                        
64  While the behavior of Kenyatta and Rotu can be seen as politically motivated, the decision of 
both men to continue working with the ICC indicates shows that their behavior conforms to the 





The atrocities of the post-election violence justify the ‘political belief’ that no one 
should escape the reach of justice, and that any political debates must be connected to 
the idea of accountability (interview with local MPs no. 2, Rift Valley, March 14, 
2012). Hence, rather than initially dismissing the ICC as being another western, 
imperial form of intervention, the accountability discourses provided an opportunity 
for both Kenyatta and Ruto to ‘reinvent’ themselves as ‘accountable leaders’ during 
the 2013 election campaign. ‘Prosecutions are pending at the ICC against the 
presidential candidate in a program of ethnic cleansing that traumatized Kenya…after 
the 2007 elections. Yet those cases gave the two men’s jubilee alliance a priceless 
fillip in last week’s [2013] general election (Wrong, 2013). The way in which 
Kenya’s ruling class responded to the transitional justice mechanism reveals the 
constellation of power relations–the arena in which every agent evaluates one 
another–in which every agent must conform to the dominant discourses of 
accountability that operate within the transitional justice debate.  
 
Hence, the process of implementing transitional justice represents the embodiment of 
‘knowledge’, in which transitional justice poses a threat to the ruling class’ status quo 
(Kagwe, 2010: p.448). While the formation of the political class in Kenya has been 
fragmented by negative ethnicity and neo-patrimonial networks, the power-sharing 
formula endorsed by the KNDR agreements delineated certain political ‘boundaries’. 
The grand coalition government, comprised of various political agents all united by 
the one common purpose of avoiding the pursuit of justice, had “to operate” within 
these boundaries (Cheeseman, 2011: p.338). However, the hegemonic discourses of 
                                                                                                                                                              
big risk of endangering their positions as members of the GNU’s cabinet, and could have plausibly 




accountability limited their abilities to do so (Gekara, 2009: p.3); the best they could 
do was to resist the dominant discourses of accountability (represented by the ICC) by 
projecting their own, alternative discourses that embodied a different form of 
knowledge (through the suggestion of the TJRC): that of impunity (Klopp, 2009: 
p.145). 
 
III) Transitional Justice as the Embodiment of Power-Knowledge 
The TJRC, and the international and Kenyan media reports on the numbers of 
corpses, rape victims, refugees and IDPs have become objects of knowledge about 
accountability that are represented by the implementation of transitional justice 
mechanisms (see Somerville, 2009). This is part of the discourse of human rights, in 
which the victim is used as the object of knowledge that represents the conceptual 
understanding of violation and crimes against humanity (see Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2005).  
 
For instance, on the admissibility of Kenya’s post-election violence under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, there is continued skepticism among commentators as to 
whether those responsible for the atrocities committed during the post-election 
violence can be prosecuted under the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against 
humanity (Nmaju, 2009: p.79). However, after carefully analysing all of the evidence 
presented by the prosecutor, and the hesitation displayed by the Kenyan government 
in its request to defer from the proceedings, the ICC’s judges decided to confirm the 
charges. Citing Judge Katarina’s ruling, the entire process was aimed simply to fulfil:  
the purpose[s] of achieving justice - justice for all – for victims but, equally, justice 
for those who appeared before the Court [and] with utmost aims [to] bring peace to 
the people of the Republic of Kenya and [to] prevent any sort of hostility 





In such instances, the confirmation of the charges against the ICC’s suspects is 
arguably representative of the first type of knowledge (savoir) identified by Foucault: 
the officiated knowledge that is known by members of the international public.65  
 
The adoption of transitional justice through this ruling of the ICC represents the 
liberal cosmopolitan conviction that delivering transitional justice as part of the 
peacebuilding domains is an inherently good, moral project (see Zanotti, 2010). 
Human rights discourse often uses the terms ‘savior’, ‘responsibility to protect’ and 
‘punishing the barbarian’ in order to restore the sanctity of human dignity (Mutua, 
2001b: p.202). The problem is that: ‘while the image of good triumphing over evil to 
save the wretched may inspire a sense of moral righteousness, it fails to acknowledge 
that the wretched may aspire to an alternative view of dignity, rights, and the good life 
that offered by the savior’ (Evans, 2005: p.1050).  
 
Equally problematic is that the transitional justice mechanism, as promoted by liberal 
cosmopolitanism, is based on the hierarchical relationship between the savior and the 
victim, which can be understood as an exercise of power-knowledge. Thus, the blind 
application of a one-size-fits-all policy of justice can be read as the process of 
identifying the victims and then transforming them into new objects of knowledge. 
This process pits accountability against impunity (Gaitho, 2011: p.4). Yet, the victims 
of the post-election violence perceived that an alternative discourse of justice was 
being projected by the Kenyan ruling class.  
                                                        
65  Although the specific technical knowledge of TJ or the ICC is only possessed by the ruling 
class, it was commonly understood by victims that influencing the proceedings of the international 
court was above their political station. As a result, they were more optimistic about justice being 





The international pursuit of justice often ignores the deep fissures that exist between 
the various segments of post-conflict societies, and the fact that post-conflict 
governments do not necessarily represent the people’s interests (interview with a 
UNDP officer, Nairobi, March 17, 2012). While the GNU claimed that its swift 
creation of a new constitution and its co-operation with the TJRC and the ICC’s 
proceedings are evidence of its comitment to justice and reconciliation, the IDPs felt 
betrayed, since most of their reparative demands had not been prioritized. The only 
exception was when their MPs held a political rally, before the official campaign 
period of the 2013 election had started:  
They [the GNU] promised us money as allocated in the new budget so we can buy 
land, but none of this money has been granted to us, and we only see it when the 
leaders visit us. They allocate the money during their election rallies (interview with 
the Matatu driver, Eldoret, March 17, 2012). 
 
We didn’t have enough money to buy food for our daily meals, and the only time we 
received the money was during the rally. Why is there an election rally when the 
priority is to compensate us? I don’t understand this big man [the politician]; the 
election is not around the corner and the focus should be on addressing our needs, not 
on their campaigns! (interview with IDP no 10, Naivasha, February 7, 2012). 
  
Let me tell you! This big man only came with this briefcase full of money promised 
to us and started talking nonsense about the election and the ICC. How can they talk 
about good leadership and building a better nation, if they don’t even have a 
responsible leader? They look smart defending themselves from the ICC in a rally, 
but speechless at the Hague [ICC], and they continue to show injustice towards us by 
blocking our compensation (interview with the street Musician, Nairobi, March 9, 
2012). 
 
These testimonies reveal the existence of deeper tensions created as a result of the 
disparity between what the Kenyan government officially claimed had happened and 
what had actually happened to the IDPs since the crisis in terms of their needs for 
rehabilitation and reparation.  
 




Foucault’s second knowledge (connaissance), which is discussed above. This type of 
knowledge relied on the same subject–the victims–but these subjects were 
transformed into objects of knowledge that were specifically aimed at preserving the 
status quo of the ruling class. The idea was to replace the original hegemonic 
discourses of accountability with impunity. As Foucault observes: 
[t]he system of right, the domain of law, are permanent agents of these relations of 
domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Rights should be viewed, 
I believed, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods 
of subjugation that it instigates (1980b: p.96). 
 
Foucault’s skepticism about the impartial objectivity of law and human rights 
suggests the embodiment of power–knowledge that the ICC and TJRC’s proceedings 
in Kenya represent. The question, then, is not, “what is transitional justice in Kenya?” 
but, “how does transitional justice operate?”. While this still may sound like an 
abstract theoretical exercise, the implications of Foucault’s intellectual scaffolding are 
very significant for the examination of transitional justice dynamics in Kenya.  
 
Firstly, viewing transitional justice as power and the embodiment of the second type 
of knowledge (connaissance) challenges the notion that the terms ‘accountability’, 
‘human rights’, ‘justice’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘peace’ and ‘unity’ can be positioned 
neutrally, ‘outside’ of their political contexts: 
human rights law are expressions of the desire to create the proper order of things, the 
proper arrangements between subjects often imagined and constituted as parts of a 
greater whole (the state, the international community, the global economy). I want to 
suggest that the subjects and relations given form by these areas of international law 
are as integral to its political effects as are the substantive obligations … to which 
international agreements in these fields give rise. In other words, the forms of law are 
not apolitical or neutral (Orford, 2005: p.180). 
  
This allows the study to view both the ICC and TJRC’s proceedings in Kenya as 




political struggle between those who fought for accountability and those who stand 
for political impunity.  
 
Secondly, viewing transitional justice as power illuminates the complex socio-
political functions of the ICC and the TJRC’s current operations in Kenya. 
Transitional justice not only represents the liberal cosmopolitan conviction that the 
rule of law is objective and morally good, but also functions as a space in which the 
ruling class can discipline lower members of society. This political space is:  
centered on the body as a machine; its disciplining, the optimization of its 
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was 
ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines; an anatomo-
politics of the human body (Foucault, 1998: p.230). 
 
As such, the operations of transitional justice also reveal the everyday resistance of 
the IDPs in challenging the leaders and the fictional narratives of successful 
reconciliation projected by the KNDR’s policy (Chapter 4). By challenging the 
reconciliation- and justice-seeking policy projected by the ruling class, the reading of 
transitional justice as power uncovers the detachment of society from the state. It also 
reveals the bottom-up perspectives of everyday Kenyans on transitional justice; an 
example of what is termed here as ‘seeing like a state’ (see Scott, 1998). 
 
So far, the exploration of Foucault’s works helps us to contextualise transitional 
justice as power; it is important to observe, however, that he neglected the element of 
ideology. Foucault’s archeology allows us to frame the dominant discourses that arise 
from post-election violence. Through these discourses, the agents evaluate themselves 
and others within a constellation of power relations; in this context, the mechanism of 




However, Foucault refused to acknowledge the element of ideology as being 
associated with the state apparatus, asserting instead that understanding power as 
ideology constituted an oppressive form of power as promoted by Marxist writings 
(Fontana and Pasquino, 1984: p.65). As David Lecourt criticized, Foucault was 
concerned only with the ‘super-structure of power’, but remained silent on the 
positioning of ideology (1975: p.207).  
 
Althusser’s explanation of ideology as power, which will be discussed below, allows 
the study to channel Foucault’s dominant discourses and the idea of the embodiment 
of knowledge into a concrete mechanism of power: the transitional justice mechanism 
as the state’s ideological apparatus as part of the ideological apparatus of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. 
 
IV) Althusser’s Method: Transitional Justice as Ideological Apparatus 
Althusser’s concept of ideology as a feature of the ‘state apparatus’ is more 
persuasive (in regards to this chapter’s attempt to project the embodiment of power 
onto the two transitional justice mechanisms in Kenya) than Foucault’s structural 
explanations of power (2001: p.108). Althusser departed significantly from the earlier, 
Marxist view of ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ (Allman, 2001: p.47).  Marx used 
the term ‘ideology’ to uncover the erroneous projection or ‘capitalist’ idea of equality 
in social relations and modes of economic exchange (Althusser, 1971: p.12). As such, 
according to Marxist traditions, capitalism is based on oppressive inter-class relations 





However, Althusser advanced on Marxist’s method of ideology (as a means of 
uncovering hidden aspects of reality), taking it beyond its predominant associations 
with material or economic analyses (Albiac and Campbell, 1998: p.85). To Althusser, 
ideology can also be used to uncover different social and political realities. From an 
Althusserian perspective, due to the difficulties that the agent faces in grasping the 
‘real condition of its existence’ (the social reality), the agent uses ideology as a means 
of constructing its own social reality (2001: p.109).  The agent then comes to perceive 
this as the real state of affairs. As such, Althusser considers ideology to be a 
precondition of society, embedded in social practices (such as rituals) and producing 
socio-political identities for agents who become subjects (p.110). In other words, he 
attempts to describe the process whereby an individual becomes a subject. The 
individual’s desires, preferences, choices and judgments are shaped by the structure of 
established social practices; many of our social functions in society can be attributed 
to ideological practices (Wolff, 1998: p.92).  
 
To reveal how ideology can be more pervasive and substantial, Althusser introduced 
the concept of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) (2001: p.227). The ISA should not 
be confused with the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA). Althusser also recognised 
Foucault’s institutionalization of power (the embodiment of power-knowledge) and, 
in response to this, he explained the distinction between ISA and RSA (for example, 
see Moon, 2008; Navarro, 1998; Resch, 1989). The RSA, such as the police and army, 
exist to support the ruling class by maintaining control through violence (Fourtounis, 
2005: p.115). While RSA functions as a unified entity (through the state’s legal 
monopoly of force), the ISA is more diverse and plural (involving various non-




specifically connected to the ruling class’ desire to control or internalize the subject 
(citizen) though certain ideas (Althusser, 2001: p.98).  
 
In other words, ISA is about molding the internal or mental beliefs and perspectives 
of the citizen; indoctrination by propaganda has proved itself to be a more effective 
form of control than direct violence. If RSA performs functions that are solely violent, 
ISA functions through both ideology and violence (p.98). When the public challenges 
the state authority, the ruling class utilizes RSA to punish society. At the same time, 
they use ISA to shape the identity of individuals by penetrating the private (rather 
than the public) realm of the individual. This can be regarded as a process of altering 
an individual’s character by transforming him or her into a subject (for example of the 
usage, see also Wolff, 2005).  
 
Blending his Catholic educational background with an innovative reading of Marx, 
Althusser used the church as an example of an institution that has used this process 
(see also Boer, 2007). For instance, the church disciplines their worshipers by 
instilling in them the dogmatic belief that every person is required to surrender to the 
salvation of Jesus Christ in order to reconcile himself or herself to God (p.483). This 
dogmatic belief is a form of ideology that shapes Christian values, and which was 
institutionalized by the church itself (as the house of God) (p.484).  
 
However, throughout history, the church has acted as a form of ideological apparatus 
in serving the ruling class’ purposes through the papal institutions (the RSA). Hence, 




p.111). Repressive policies were employed during the initial period of Reformation 
that witnessed the rise of Protestantism (violence as a means of counter-reformation), 
but eventually become more ISA-oriented; the tenets of Christ and his apostles were 
used as an ideological apparatus for indoctrinating the worldwide Catholic community 
into believing that the papal institutions inherited their authority from Christ’s 
disciples (Boer, 2007: p.458). As such, according to Althusser, the Marxist concept of 
ideology is not only limited to economic analysis; it can also be integrated into the 
realm of politics, in which certain state apparatus are used to preach certain ideologies 
that are conducive to the interests of the ruling class (Kogler, 2006: p.187).  
 
By using Althusser’s methodology, it is possible to identify features both of RSA and 
ISA in the recent political history of Kenya, and the exploitation of the ordinary 
populace by the ruling class. Before the return of multiparty elections in the 1990s, 
the ruling class had lacked internal hegemony under President Moi’s regime, and his 
government relied on RSA to suppress the populace’s struggle for a democratic 
constitution with direct violence (Gitari, 2008: p.23). However, after the post-election 
violence in 2008, the ability of the GNU to wield power through RSA was 
constrained by what have been identified above as the dominant discourses of 
accountability (TJ) (see also Okello and Sihanya, 2010). Hence, the whole process of 
controlling the direction of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy should be 
understood as ISA rather than RSA-oriented.  
 
Transitional justice served as an ideological apparatus for those in power, who sought 




IDPs) into subjects who conform to the ruling class’ ideology of reconciliation. This 
ideology is defined by the preservation of the status quo and an entrenched culture of 
impunity, rather than of criminal accountability (Shah, 2013b). Hence, the 
implementation of both the ICC and the TJRC in Kenya can be identified as ISA, 
which is governed here by the reconciliation ideology of the GNU and produced by 
the KNDR agreements.  
 
Two major assumptions of Althusser’s concerning ISA are relevant here. The first 
assumption is that ‘ideology has a material existence’ (2001: p.109), and manifests 
itself through actions that are ‘inserted into practices’ (p.109). Ideology does not 
appear in the form of ideas, but can be identified on the basis of agents’ actions and 
behavior, which govern their positions as subjects (see also Wolff, 2005). Applying 
this assumption to the KNDR in Kenya allows us to consider the implementation of 
the transitional justice mechanisms (the ICC and TJRC) as attempts of the ruling class 
to propagate its own authoritative truth claims about political legitimacy, and to resist 
wider demands for establishing accountability (see Klopp and Zuern, 2007). Hence, 
the whole ideology of national dialogue and reconciliation (KNDR) derived its 
authority from the organisation of the subjects (the victims and the IDPs), objects 
(violations of human rights), and the concept of justice (through means of restoration 
or forgiveness, but not prosecution). In this way, the perpetrators are not directly 
identified or prosecuted (Robinson, 2011: p.17).  
 
By employing this ideology, the two transitional justice mechanisms have allowed a 




forward, prosecution was overlooked, as it was believed that trials would only 
destabilise the country (interview with ICTJ officer, no. 2, Nairobi, February 27, 
2012). Althusser’s reference to Pascal’s formula for belief (‘kneel down, move your 
lips in prayer, and you will believe’) is paralleled by the Kenyan elite’s political 
understanding of justice as simply being the ideological apparatus for reconciliation 
(2001: p.114), in that it is pursued with an ethos of ‘forgive and move forward, but 
don’t expect any justice’ (interview with an IDP no. 39, Rift Valley, March 2, 2013). 
Therefore, we can also use Althusser’s material conditions of reconciliation ideology 
to identify the concrete space in which to locate Foucault’s power relations.  
 
It is in this space that the Kenyan ruling class struggles to replace the dominant 
discourses of accountability with its alternative discourses of impunity in the process 
of undermining transitional justice operations. Hence, the ICC’s proceedings that will 
be explored in the next chapter 4 are concrete examples of a specific ideological 
apparatus for projecting the ruling class’ resistance to wider calls for criminal 
accountability. They also demonstrate the everyday struggles of the victims to 
challenge the hegemonic discourses of successful reconciliation promulgated by the 
GNU. In addition, the examples indicate how these mechanisms were used for 
purposes other than securing justice and reconciliation in Kenya, and further explain 
why the entire KNDR agenda is attainable, but not sustainable.  
 
The second’s of Althuserian assumptions: ‘All ideology hails or interpolates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjects’ (Althusser, 2001: p.110). The main purpose of 




produces its social condition, in which rituals ensure that the subject does indeed have 
a concrete existence (p.110). Indeed, it is ideology that brings the subject into being.  
 
Both the ICC and TJRC’s proceedings in Kenya are a form of ISA, in which IDPs are 
interpolated as the new political subjects for the GNU’s claims to transitional 
authority, and as evidence that the government represents the political community and 
must be assisted by the international society (Chapter 3). The KNDR agreements, the 
GNU media coverage that highlights the government’s commitment to reconciliation, 
reforms and justice and the new constitutional manifesto, and the TJRC’s final reports 
may appear similar to the recognition rituals for the ruling class’ ideology of 
reconciliation (the addressing of past wrongdoings). However, these two transitional 
justice mechanisms are the material conditions for the ideological commitment to 
justice and respect for human rights.  
 
By using Althusser’s ISA, these mechanisms can be exposed as being the rituals with 
which the GNU projects its alternative ideology: that of impunity. This alternative 
ideology was interpolated by the GNU’s ritual of shifting its preference, from its 
original commitment to criminal accountability to opting for the TJRC (amnesty). 
This can be read as an attempt to project the idea of a pervasive form of justice, in 
which the suspects of the post-election violence are not identified, prosecuted, or 
punished in any way (Jane, 2010). The idea of replacing the ICC with the TJRC can 
be viewed as a ritual for molding the alternative ideology, in that the public hearings 
of the TJRC are only designed to acknowledge the violence and palpably encourage 




perpetrator’ or any form of punishment (interview with an IDP no. 24, Rift Valley, 
March 7, 2012).  
 
If Althusser’s ISA allows the study to locate the process of transforming the victims 
into subjects of the alternative ideology of reconciliation (impunity), then Foucault’s 
power-knowledge helps to frame the transformation of the subject into the object of 
reconciliation ideology. Chapter 5 illustrates the process of transforming the victims 
into a subject of the reconciliation ideology of the ruling class, and how the subject 
becomes the object of the GNU’s knowledge of impunity. Hence, transitional justice 
is not simply a legal measure for imposing morality through laws, but is also a field 
that unravels the struggle between accountability and impunity. Drawing from 157 
testimonies of IDPs, small-holding farmers and state officials who were direct and 
indirectly involved in the ICC and TJRC’s proceedings, this thesis uncovers a deeper 
and more unsettling issue, which has been neglected by previous scholarship on 
transitional justice. This issue is the analysis of the salient characteristics of power 
and ideology, which could potentially serve as the starting point for future research on 
transitional justice as politics.  
 
F – Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by providing an overview of peacebuilding, transitional justice 
and power-sharing in order to highlight how the first two concepts intersect with 
power-sharing arrangements. This provides the epistemological inquiry for navigating 
towards an understanding of the complex dynamic of locating the anomaly of 




sharing upon justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya. In addition, this 
chapter has undertaken an exploration of how the key debates in liberal 
peacebuilding, transitional justice and power-sharing have helped this thesis to set up 
its parameters of analysis. This exploration has also helped to clarify the primary 
terms used throughout this thesis, such as ‘reconciliation’, ‘peace’, ‘justice’, and to 
broaden the scope of transitional justice research conducted by the author in Kenya. 
 
By revisiting key debates in liberal peacebuilding, transitional justice and power-
sharing, I have positioned the critical stance adopted by this thesis in line with CPS 
and CLS to reveal the deficiencies of post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional 
justice experiments in Africa in order to localise the peace process of the KNDR 
installed by the Kenyan government. Equally important is the fact that I identified the 
core theme of my research in Kenya, which is that the formulation of KNDR policy 
has served to make human rights violations subordinate to political impunity in 
justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy. The way forward lies in analysing the issue 
of justice and reconciliation in Kenya through the recognition of the complex local 
milieu, and the political considerations of the legal measures undertaken by the 
Kenyan government. This serves as the thesis’s launching pad for Chapter 3, from 
which I clarify the local context and illuminate the invisibility of the victim’s position 
in the top-down approach of the ruling elite and their international partners. 
 
In light of this understanding, I introduced the reader to my conceptual framework in 
order to guide the reader through my reading of transitional justice in Kenya. This 
reading is defined by twinning the struggle between accountability and impunity with 




of accountability is not novel, and has been one of the predominant themes of Kenyan 
politics and society since the return of multiparty elections. However, the notion of 
accountability has been limited to a discussion based solely on procedural democracy. 
I have argued that the debate over whether or not to hold the leaders accountable can 
be integrated into the contemporary debate on transitional justice processes in Kenya. 
Theoretically, Schedler’s two elements of accountability can be connected to two 
transitional justice mechanisms: answerability and enforcement through the ICC and 
TJRC’s proceedings. However, the process of holding leaders accountable through 
transitional justice mechanisms has been impeded by the entrenched culture of 
impunity. As such, any reading of the political reconciliation project designed by the 
GNU must contextualise it in terms of power and ideology.  
 
Drawing the theoretical perspective of power and ideology from the writings of 
Foucault and Althusser, and the existing works of Moon and Thomson, this chapter 
has presented a conceptual framework for connecting the two distinct transitional 
justice mechanisms that are currently being implemented in Kenya. As shall be 
discussed in the next three chapters, although each measure performs a different 
judicial function, they all share a common feature. They are not simple judicial 
measures for addressing past atrocities, but represent an incomplete process of 
reconciliation: a form of justice without punishment. In such instances, the political 
analysis of transitional justice suggested here helps to identify specific forms of neo-
patrimonial practices that were adopted in the wake of post-election violence.  
 
Of chief importance among these is the persistence of impunity, or the continued 




demands for accountability. Impeding and privatising the whole idea of justice and 
reconciliation by hijacking the justice-seeking mechanisms achieved this. What were 
initially understood in transitional justice literature as legal instruments for addressing 
past wrongdoings have become political devices that benefit members of the ruling 
class, rather than the victims. In the next Chapter 3, the discussion shall reveal the 
responses of the international and national elite to transitional justice mechanisms in 
Kenya. Followed by Chapter 4 and 5, the thesis reveals the responses victims through 
the narratives of IDPs. The use of this bottom-up approach helps to articulate a more 
nuanced understanding of justice and reconciliation from the perspective of those who 
directly subjected to violence.  
 
However, two points should be borne in mind here. Firstly, by sketching transitional 
justice as a form of power and ideology in this thesis, I do not claim this to be the 
absolute political reading of transitional justice in post-conflict societies, nor do I 
suggest that politics takes precedence over legal discourse. The conceptual framework 
suggested here simply follows the suggestions of Milja Kurki and Colin Wight that, 
rather than placing particular international phenomenon within the strict confines of 
IR theoretical analysis, various perspectives should be recognised and the diversity of 
IR theory should be celebrated (2010: p.28). For instance, the assumption that certain 
terms in the human rights vocabulary–such as ‘justice’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘victim’ and 
‘violation’–are subjective has only served to strengthen my support of Robert Cox’s 
claim that theory is always about someone or something (Moolakkatu, 2009: p.440).  
 
As such, transitional justice research should also consider questions surrounding 




which a given agent invokes the use of human rights vocabulary. In the case of 
Kenya, while the agent (the ruling class) understood the pervasive elements or 
dominant discourses of criminal accountability through justice and punishment, they 
were also capable of manipulating the dominant discourses by projecting an 
alternative one of impunity. A careful analysis of the agent’s behavior reveals that the 
impartiality of transitional language has been subjected to various political 
predilections which favor the ruling class and oppress the victims. The combination of 
Foucault and Althusser suggested here is not novel, but advances on the existing 
works of Moon and Thomson, and provides one of the plausible paths for reaching an 
understanding of the logic of politics in African studies, as well as of legal dynamics 
in post-conflict studies.  
 
Secondly, I do not suggest this is the best approach to contextualising the interaction 
between politics and law, or that it is more nuanced than the CLS approach to 
analysing transitional justice. Rather, I have proposed an alternative understanding of 
legal dynamism in politically structured environments (for similar advice, see Balkin, 
1987). This alternative understanding suggests that what was previously understood 
as transitional justice cannot be strictly confined to a legal positivist understanding of 
legal measures as being impartial to the complex issues that surround any political 
transition. The strict parameters delineated in Tietel’s Transitional Justice (2000) 
remain problematic. The issue is not whether the framework suggested by this chapter 
is either political or judicial, or whether or not the situation in Kenya provides a case 
study for transitional justice (similar conclusion made by Thomson and Nagy, 2011 





Rather, the aim is to highlight the danger that transitional justice represents in the way 
that it challenges the binary distinction between law and politics in Kenya. This 
chapter has also sought to prove that the terms understood in the field of transitional 
justice as ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ have not been applied to IDPs by the 
international and national elites. They have been victimised twice; the first time 
during the violence, and the second time after it. This is because those who claim to 
be victims are continually being violated by being made to wait for an embodiment 
justice that has never been delivered. If this is the case, there are reasonable grounds 
for venturing into the narratives of the IDPs, which will be explored in the Chapter 4 

































Chapter 3: Political Economy of Violence – Dealing with Post-election Violence 
and Developing Transitional Justice in Kenya 
 
 
‘Kenya has become a country of ten millionaires and ten million beggars.’ (J. M. Kariuki, A 
Kenyan politican, assassinated in 1975.) 
 
A – Introduction 
 
This chapter begins by revisiting the causes of the political crisis in the country.  
Although the immediate trigger for violent conflict was the dispute over election 
results, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (known also as the 
Waki Commission, after its Chairperson, Justice Waki) acknowledged that the 
underlying causes of the violence were much deeper, and included the inequitable 
distribution of resources, historical injustices, the systematic violation of human rights 
and an embedded culture of impunity (Waki, 2009: pp.345-51). Hence, the aim is not 
to provide a detailed analysis of the crisis, which has been documented elsewhere (see 
below), but to highlight the key causes of the crisis that have been implicitly and 
explicitly connected to the key themes of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in 
Kenya since February 2008.  
 
The second part briefly illustrates the nature of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) and the national dynamics that were present, and shows how the local 
dynamics converged to create the conditions in which the attempts to deal with post-
election violence inaugurated the coming into being of a justice- and reconciliation-
seeking policy. This highlights the difficulty of building a robust transitional justice 




measures are embedded in wider socio-political processes, power and ideological 
apparatus, based on framework developed in previous chapter 2. This chapter asserts 
that Kenya’s difficulty in developing a transitional justice policy is a product of the 
power-sharing arrangement, and that attempts to deal with post-election violence 
contribute to a process whereby political reforms and measures to end impunity can 
be regarded as part of the generative process of developing justice- and reconciliation-
seeking policy.  
 
B – Political Economy of the Post-election Violence 
Much has been written about the Kenyan post-election violence and, unsurprisingly, 
the 2008 crisis has led to the publication of special issues of The Journal of Eastern 
African Studies (2, 2, 2008), The Journal of African Election and the Les Cahiers 
d’Afrique de I’Est (38, 2008). The special issue of the Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies (27, 3, 2009) was later published in the edited volume Kenya’s 
Uncertain Democracy: The Electoral Crisis of 2008. However, echoing similar 
concerns voiced by William Zartman, most conflict analysis is based on 
epistemological assumptions about ‘meta-conflict’, or how and why the violence 
erupted (2001: p.15). Instead of engaging in a substantial analysis of the full details of 
the post-election violence, this section adopts an approach based on political economy 
in order to provide a better understanding of some of the issues to which the TJ 
mechanisms (the ICC and TJRC) implemented in Kenya must respond.  
 
Here, ‘political economy’ refers to the element of continuous ambiguity that has been 
produced and reproduced by the crisis; the 2008 post-election violence is not unique, 




Kenyan state-society relations (Anderson, 2005; Branch et al., 2010; Lynch, 2011b; 
Mueller, 2008). This helps to inform us how violent conflict has had a regressive 
effect on the democratic progress and justice-seeking processes that Kenya has 
arguably made since the early 1990s. Additionally, it shows us how the contested 
narrative of who is ‘right and wrong’ (a narrative that emerged as a result of the 
unequal distribution of wealth and power in Kenyan society) has provided further 
incentives to address the issue of criminal accountability, impunity and systematic 
violation of human rights (Kiai, 2008: p.143).  
 
It is equally important to highlight the fact that the causes of the electoral disputes 
themselves are contested within the literature of Kenyan politics. The theme 
suggested below does not imply the causes identified are necessarily the dominant 
factors behind the electoral disputes. Rather, I suggest that these causes are far from 
ideal, or that they have simply been selected on the basis that they are commonly cited 
in debates surrounding the nature of contemporary Kenyan politics, as well as those 
concerning the contextualisation of the issues of justice and reconciliation after the 
2008 crisis. Some of the discussions below are not solely related to electoral violence 
per se, but can be connected to further discussions of various types of violence faced 
by the country, namely the terrorist attacks and political violence by Al-Qaeda  upon 
the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998; the Al-Shaabab militancy’s bombardment of 
Westgate mall in 2013; the mobs of the criminal underworld that operated in the city 
through the transportation networks of Matatus; urban strikes by members of civil 
society; the democratic uprising of the 1990s; the failed military coup of 1982; rural 
inequality and land disputes; corruption and economic crimes; Shifta war; minority 




However, it is highly ambitious to mention all of these despite their interrelations with 
the broader concerns of justice and reconciliation that have emerged out of the local 
peace agenda that ended the electoral crisis. The fact that the local peace agenda was 
successful restored public faith in the state actors and local politicians. Suffice to say 
that the focus on the causes of electoral crisis relates to the thesis’ predominant 
intention of articulating concerns about justice raised during 2008 crisis, and how this 
lead to the institutional formation of transitional justice institutions. 
 
Most scholarly works on Kenya have identified four major structural and agency-
based explanations of the crisis, namely: i) the post-colonial state, the politicization of 
ethnicity and the neo-patrimonial logic of governance; ii) land disputes and historical 
injustices; iii) the normalisation and criminalisation of violence, and iv) the fallacy of 
democratic sequence. These explanations are briefly illuminated below. 
 
I) The Post-colonial State, the Politicization of Ethnicity and the Patronage 
System 
Most historical explanations of the modern crisis in Kenya follow a similar logic in 
assessing how the fictional character of the African state was created as a 
consequence of the ‘Scramble for Africa’ (Blundell, 1959; Branch, 2011; Elkins, 
2005; Leys, 1975; Lonsdale, 1967; Munene, 2005; 2012; Renison, 1963; Singh, 1965; 
Vasey, 1956). The creation of the colonial state was a means of strengthening the 
political and economic vehicles of imperial expansion, which altered the pre-existing 
logic of relations and governance that existed during the pre-colonial period 





While what has been defined as ‘pre-colonial understanding’ in terms of social 
relations and the fluidity of ethnic identity as modes of exchange and belonging is 
imperfectly understood, most historical studies of Kenya’s colonial period agree that 
the transfer of power over the vast territory known today as ‘Kenya’, from the private 
British East India company to the British Empire, marked the birth of the colonial 
state. This induced violent conflict between Europeans and various indigenous 
communities in Africa, and altered the existing pre-colonial modes of economic and 
social exchange (Berman, 1990; 1977; Hornsby, 2013; Zwanberg et al., 1975).  
 
While there were many contributing factors to the construction of the colonial state, 
arguably the chief among them was the ability to acquire Africans as a source of 
cheap labour and as a means of securing a buffer zone for the railway project from the 
existing British territory in Uganda to the port in the coastal province of Mombasa 
(inside Kenya), the colonial introduction of kipande (the identity card), the invention 
of Chieftaincy (a means of indirect rule) and the creation of colonial districts 66 
through forced segregation altered pre-colonial ideas of intermingling, and restricted 
the population’s freedom of movement (Coldham, 1979a; Lonsdale, 2004; Saether et 
al., 2000). As a result, new models for economic relations were created, and these 
impacted significantly upon the idea of ethnic attachment to certain spaces, ‘the 
separation and isolation of different ethnic categories took place…Luo, Kipsigis and 
Kikuyus workers [restricted from moving to other districts]. Each community kept to 
their category of jobs assigned… These workers lived separately…contributed to the 
                                                        
66  The colonial office created several types of district, including the ‘White Highlands’ (the most 
fertile region, which belonged exclusively to the European settlers for economic reasons related to cash 
crop production), ‘Native Reserves’ (mostly unfertile lands allocated to locals), ‘Outlying Districts’ 
and ‘Closed Districts’. The local population was forced to relocate to these specific districts, and this 
gradually endowed these districts with a new sense of exclusiveness. The post-colonial government 
retained these colonial state districts as part of the repopulation strategy of the new independence 




emergence of specific ethnic stereotypes’ and perpetuated future political ideas about 
ethnic exclusive confinement to certain districts’ (Wanyonyi, 2010: p.34).  
 
Bruce Berman’s analysis has confirmed how such exploitative colonial experiences 
triggered the moral economic crisis, which created new ‘rules’ of relations based on 
moral, economic and colonial assumptions about the inequalities, authorities and 
reciprocities that govern relations and conflicts based on patron-client relationships 
(Berman and Lonsdale, 1990b; Berman, 1991; Berman et al., 2009).  
 
The literature also highlights the imprecise usage of ‘tribal’, instead of the more 
neutral term of ‘ethnicity’, to describe social and political relations (Muigai't., 2004: 
p.201). The word ‘tribe’ is derived from the Latin word tribus, which denotes a mode 
of belonging to one united community that has nothing to do with blood or biological 
connection, referring instead to a group that unites in a particular place in order to 
settle down (in contrast to nomadic lifestyles) (Wa-Mungai, 2010: 75.). However, the 
usage of the word ‘tribal’ to refer to African populations carries the associative 
baggage of  ‘inferiority’, as Africans were subjugated by the colonial government 
instead of being made proper citizens (Wanyonyi, 2010: p.36). A study by Ranger 
also describes the different invention and usage of positive and negative ethnicity 
(2010: p.212). Hence, what is commonly described as ‘negative ethnicity’ refers to 
the use of ethnic identity for political purposes, such as that of mobilizing voters who 
share certain ethnic attributes to engage in violent conflict with other groups 
(Odhiambo, 2004: p.168). Effectively, this ensures constant conflict between different 
ethnic identity groups, which results in some groups negotiating their fusion with 




p.178). Such movements are continuously being exaggerated and redefined by the 
contested socio-economical and political environments in which the groups exist 
(Berman et al., 2009: p.466).  
 
The Kenyan modern crisis was orchestrated by the nature of the colonial state in such 
a way that the focus on the foundation of national conflict was directed internally on 
ethnic communities (Klopp, 2002: p.270). These communities were defined by issues 
of leadership and reciprocation between patrons and clients, while being connected to 
a state that was valued only as a source of wealth (Lynch and Anderson, 2013: p.87; 
Steeves, 2006: p.198). Ethnic politics were strengthened by a predatory colonial state, 
which is demonstrative of the purpose for which it was made: as an instrument to 
facilitate the economic exploitation of the majority for the privilege of the minority 
(Mutua, 2008: p.99).  
 
These specific understandings of the roots of the modern state crisis in Kenya are 
explicitly and implicitly connected to the larger literature concerning state crises in 
African politics, in which it is asserted that the post-colonial state relied on the extra-
judicial features of the Westphalian state. However, this state lacked the 
characteristics of empirical statehood or internal hegemony, as those who occupied 
the apex of the state failed to secure absolute legitimacy from their own citizens 
(Betts, 1990; Clapham, 1996; Herbst, 2000b; Jackson, 2005; 1990; 1984; Mamdani, 
1996; Nugent, 2004). However, recent studies by Tim Glawion have challenged the 
excessive use of terms like ‘weak or failed state’ in Africa, on the grounds that the 
debate about whether there is such thing as a ‘state’ in Africa is still ongoing (2013: 




describing the political trajectory in Africa (as Hegel himself recognised his limited 
understanding when he erroneously assumed that Africa was an unhistorical continent 
(see Taiwo., 1998)) this thesis suggests that it is expedient to examine how political 
authority has been historically and gradually developed in Africa (Glawion, 2013: 
p.40).  
 
Recognising the indication of neo-patrimonial logic and the crucial roles that external 
agents have played in the continuing process of constructing political authority in 
Africa (since the colonial era until the recent period of international intervention), 
perhaps post-election violence that revolves around power alternation is best 
understood as the process of developing political order that plays out gradually at 
various levels and involves various actors at lower levels of the state, before such 
contestations become transformed into more inclusive (and plausibly more peaceful) 
attempts to build legitimate political authority at the upper levels of the state 
(Cheeseman, 2008; Chris, 2009; Ismail and Deane, 2008; Ishiyama, 2009; Stevenson, 
2008).  
 
Indeed, in her study of post-genocide Rwanda, Susan Thomson expresses her 
preference for the term ‘regime’ rather than ‘state’, since what was formally 
understood as the state by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had only a tenuous 
connection to the majority of peasants who lived in Kigali (2013b: p.11). This 
connects to James Scott’s idea of ‘seeing like a state’, as such a state does not exist in 
the minds of its citizens (1999: p.200). In the case of Rwanda, the term ‘regime’ 
described the power relations between the RPF ruling elite and the ordinary peasants; 




Consequently, this raised questions about the nature of power relations, and the ability 
of the RPF regime to instill political order among the Rwandan population (Thomson, 
2013b: p.12).  
 
As such, several historical instances of pre- and post-independence periods in Kenya 
can be cited to support the argument that conflict is the struggle between various 
factions to develop political authority. A political struggle against the colonial 
political authority was visible during the pre-independence period; the struggles of the 
landless Kikuyus against both colonial British and loyalist Kenyans were represented 
by the 1952-1962 Mau Mau Emergency (Anderson, 2011: p.700). The struggle 
between competing interests of rival ethnic groups was exacerbated by the association 
of political affiliation with ethnic character that appeared in the 1950s (Gertzel, 1969: 
p.34). The restrictive British policy of basing political association on trans-ethnic 
communities in the 1957 district elections had an unprecedented effect on the future 
development of political organization.  
 
In the late 1960s, the independent political parties of the Kenya African Union 
(KANU) and the Kenya Democratic Union (KADU) were created, and fought for a 
political system that was free from ethnic bias (Nasong'o and Murunga, 2007: p.5). 
While there were various social movements and religious organisations based on 
ethnic affiliations that supported both KANU and the KADU, ethnic-based 
organisation were based on a positive sense of ethnicity (at least in this short period) 
in order to mobilise the population to strive for the greater cause of independence 
beyond ethnic boundaries; Kenya’s imagined political community would consist of 





In realising this dream of harnessing political authority, the KANU offered a jimbo (a 
unitary and centralized political order) manifesto, whereas the KADU67 offered a 
majimbo (a decentralized political order that guaranteed the protection of ethnic 
minorities) manifesto in its allocation of revenue, taxation, access to education and 
rural development (Mueller, 1984: p.419). KADU lost the elections, which lead to the 
installation of the KANU’s centralized version of political authority, with Western 
governments indicating their strong support for the party. This Western support for a 
centralized political authority can be partially explained by the fact that the structure 
of post-colonial African countries was affected by Cold War rivalries.  
 
In turn, at the domestic level, politics led to competition for access to economic 
resources and power among the various ethnic barons, exemplified in the political 
collusion of KANU (ruling from 1963 until 2002) with the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) in the 2002 election; both governmental and opposition politicians 
invoked a negative concept of ethnicity during the election processes, later 
abandoning their own ethnic communities and relying on the patronage system to 
enrich themselves, rather than addressing the wider issue of inequality among 
Kenyans.  
 
In such instances, the colonial logic of distinct ethnic groups affected national unity; 
political affiliations became concomitant with the ethnic community that each party 
was believed to represent. Thus, the construction of ethnic identities by the colonial 
                                                        
67  The KADU’s supporters were more inclined towards the Soviet bloc, and later the African 
Way of Socialism, based on the criticism that the centralization of political order offered by the KANU 
may have structurally marginalised the small ethnic groups, since bigger ethnic communities like the 





political authority was taken for granted by President Jomo Kenyatta’s regime in its 
projection of its own political authority. Relying on the indirect support of the 
external Western bloc duirng the immidiate post-colonial period (the early period of 
the Cold War), Kenyatta denounced his opponents (former KADU supporters) as 
being associates of the Soviet Union, and banned multiparty elections.68 Kenyatta’s 
opponents, led by Oginga Ondiga, had a different vision of developing political 
authority, which was based on the “African way” of socialism to reject ethno political 
organisation and raised concern over ethnic majority tyranny against small ethnic 
minorities (Odinga, 1967: p.45).  
 
Of course, his ‘egalitarian visions’ of political authority based on ideology and social 
class easily allowed the Kenyatta regime to denounce him as a traitor; with  a 
suppport of aid from Western government (p.76).  
 
One of the significant contributions of the early political struggles between two major 
factions of the above system of politics to contemporary demands of justice is that the 
old debate about majimbo institutional arrangements that was initiated by KADU 
‘reappeared’ within the anti-establishment rhetoric of the late 1980s, the democratic 
struggles of the mid-1990s and in the advocacy of human rights and local transitional 
justice among the opposition and civil societies in the 2000s (Anderson, 2010; Marie-
Emmanuelle, 2006). This helps to inform us about the modern and hybrid orgins of 
the politics of rights in the country’s attempt to move away from its past legacy of 
                                                        
68  One year after independence, KADU were dissolved and voluntary join KANU based on the 
premised that a single party system might provide strong unity. In 1966 former KADU leaders from 
Oginga’ supprters defected from KANU and won by-elections under new socialist party of Kenya 
People’s Union (KPU). There were later imprisoned by Kenyatta, marked strong sense of ethnic 
belonging to particular leader that continually appeared in every election crisis in Kenya, see Throup 




authoritarian rule.  
 
In summary, negative ethnicity as one of the fruits of colonialism played a pivotal role 
in explicitly and implicitly facilitating Kenyan politicians’ struggles to project their 
political authority with the indirect blessing of of superpowers or external agents 
(Brown, 2011; 2001; Brown, 2004; Muriuki, 1995; Munene, 2012). Consequently, 
negative ethnicity provided a means of mobalising political support when multiparty 
elections were reintroduced in the 1990s.  
 
Echoing Donald Horowitz’s constructivist approach to ethnicity in Africa in his 
earlier works (1985), Sebastian Elischer has identified three types of political party in 
modern Kenya: the mono-political party, the multi-ethnic alliance and the multi-
ethnic integrative party (2010: p.201). His conclusion is that, although ‘Kenyan 
parties have increasingly incorporated diverse communities they have consistently 
failed to bridge the country’s dominant ethnic cleavages’ (p.202).  
 
Hence, political parties are conflict-inducing; the return of multiparty elections in 
Kenya allowed the KANU to retain its incumbency for two more consecutive 
elections through violence (1992, and 1997), brought the NARC to power in 2002 
(through the same logic of ethno politics), and enabled the post-2007 power-sharing 
coalition between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Rahila Odinga (between 
April 2008 and March 2013), which was forged simply as a means of winning power 
(Anderson, 2003; Cheeseman, 2008; Mutua, 2008; Hornsby and Throup, 1992; 





Such a dilemma of ‘multi-ethnic coalitions reflects the demographic reality of Kenya 
as a country of ethnic minorities as opposed to a clear ethnic bifurcation in countries 
like Rwanda and Burundi’ (Kagwanja and Southall, 2010: p.6). As such, political 
crisis manifests itself in the leaders’ struggle to establish a political order based on 
negative ethnicity, which has consistently revolved around the four major ethnic 
communities: the Kikuyu (22%), the Luhya (14%), the Luo (13%) and the Kalenjin 
(12%). As regards the minorities, 38 other communities have been mobilized into one 
of the political alliances of the four major communities (p.7). Since then, the Kenyan 
political landscape has revolved around ethnic coalitions, viciously formed in an 
attempt to win elections, and this has predictably triggerred crisis (Klopp, 2001: 
pp.453-517). ‘If the December [2007] elections were hijacked, we all [Kenyans] 
blamed it confidently on tribalism. In any case, ...the violence that rocked the country 
seemed to pit certain tribes against others’ (Wanyonyi, 2010: p.33).  
 
Consequently, the post-election violence is a ‘fruit of perception’ and is caused by the 
repeated ‘blame game’ that results from the economic disparities between Kikuyus 
and other ethnic groups, as the former were first favoured by colonials and then 
favoured by the Kenyatta regime, which now spread the xenophobic message of ‘our 
turn to eat’ in relation to the opposition to  the incumbent (President Mwai Kibaki of 
Kikuyu). This message has become ubiquitous by dint of having been spread using 
social media and mobile text messages (Kagwanja and Southall, 2010: p.11). Indeed, 
Amy Chua’s analysis of the impact of the advancement of telecomunication 
infrastracture upon communal-based democracies has confirmed the global trend of 
targeting economically advantaged minorities in electoral campaigns for highly-




ethnic explanations alone are insufficient in an analysis of this kind without also 
considering interrelated injustices concerning land displacement and history.  
 
II) Land Displacement and Historical Injustice 
Given the abundant evidence for historical injustice related to land disputes 
perpetuated by the colonial government, nearly all election crises since the return of 
multiparty in the 1990s have revolved around land ownership in Kenya (Kamungi, 
2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Rutten and Owuor, 2009). The interconnection of land with 
the formation of social identity and individual self-mastery has been documented in 
Daniel Branch’s analysis of the landless Mau Mau, in which land was considered to 
be a material precondition for the reconstruction of identity and social status among 
the various ethnic communities in Kenya (2009: p.117).  
 
Current multiple land claims and disputes in Kenya can be traced back to the 
oppressive land policies undertaken by the Colonial Office, as well as by Kenyatta’s 
regime when the country achieved independence (Kilson, 1957: p.602). The British 
awarded the most fertile lands to European settlers for cash crop production, resulting 
in the forced eviction of various indigenous African populations who had hitherto 
occupied these lands to the infertile land areas (Coldham, 1979a: p.73).  
 
These land schemes provided the basis for the first land dispute, as those who were 
forcedly evicted had to settle down in other areas that were already occupied by other 
ethnic communities. The most famous among these colonial periods of land struggles 




loyalists and colonialists (Berman and Lonsdale, 1990a; see Berman and Lonsdale, 
1990b).  
 
When the country became independent, Kenyatta’s regime implemented a ‘willing-
seller and willing-buyer’ policy, which was partially funded by the World Bank to 
allow the new African elite to acquire land from the European settlers (as part of the 
arrangement of decolonisation, and the transfer of power) (Leo, 1981: p.218). Far 
from addressing the disputes surrounding the existing land plots that were previously 
taken by former colonials, Kenyatta’s regime magnanimously awarded most of the 
land plots (mostly in the Rift Valley69) that were taken from the Kalenjin and Nandi 
communities by the British to the Kikuyus’ patrons and their political clients from 
other ethnic communities. In the long term, this led to illegal land acquisition and an 
unequal pattern of land ownership determined by class and ethnic affiliations (see 
Coldham, 1979b; 1978; Harbeson, 1971).  
 
Hence, while many structural land injustices were triggered by colonial experiences, 
the post-colonial African elite is mainly responsible for exacerbating the crisis. This 
constitutes what Ian Taylor identifies as a ‘blind spot’ in the analysis of African 
politics, since the local instability that provoked international intervention (foreign 
aid, SAPs and sanctions) in many of these African crises was mostly caused by the 
mismanagement of state resources and the local elite’s abuse of power on achieving 
independence (2004: p.412). By exploiting ongoing continued land grievances, 
competition and ethnicity-based politics, politicians have constructed devices for 
inducing more violence.  
                                                        
69  The modern Rift Valley boundary traces its origins to the White Highlands created by the 
colonials. The legacy of cash crop farming left by the white settlers, and the fertile composition of 





Recent studies based on David Anderson and Emma Lochery’s map analysis have 
indicated the precise connection between land dipsutes and the movement of violence 
(2008: p. 332). A map anaylsis from satelite images of several provinces taken during 
the weeks of post-election violence has shown an empirical, visual correlation 
between violence and location; violence tends to move around the same plots of land 
that were historically claimed by many stakeholders (p.333). Thus, land has become a 
‘weapon of destruction’ (see Rutten and Owuor, 2009), through what has been 
identified by Sarah Jenkins as an ‘immigrant-guest metaphor’ (2012: p.3).  
 
Regardless of ordinary Kenyans’ ethnic origins and economic positions, those who 
vote for the local politician who is ‘considered’ to be local by the majority of voters 
will be treated as a ‘guest’, even if he mistreats the less-disadvantaged local 
populations (p.8). However, those who vote for a candidate who is deemed not to 
‘belong’, or who is not widely supported by local voters (even if the individual is not 
rich) will be considered as an ‘outsider’ or an ‘immigrant’ (Kagwanja and Southall, 
2010: p.8).  
 
Hence, the Kikuyus who enjoyed the benefits of Kenyatta’s land policy and settled in 
the Rift Valley (which had hitherto been considered as the homeland of the majority 
of the Kalenjin) are most likely to become a source of hatred among the populace and 
to be subjected to physical violence. Consequently, some of these have been forcibly 
displaced to locations outside the Rift Valley (Kamungi, 2009: p.352). Such a 
politically constructed metaphor as the ‘immigrant-guest’ metaphor challenges the 




(for example, see Huntington, 1993; Kaplan, 1993), involves people killing their 
opponents because of primordial differences or ‘ancient hatred’ (see Horiwitz and 
Horowitz, 1989).  
 
Similar studies of Rwanda (Kuperman, 2004), Burundi (Vandeginste, 2009), Northern 
Uganda (Borzello, 2007) and Mozambique (Schafer, 2007) have confirmed the fact 
that, while individuals do harbor different group affiliations in their various social and 
economic interactions during relatively peaceful periods, they kill each other during 
conflict because they were either forced to do so by their superiors, local politicians, 
warlords, or simply as a means of surviving the war. Such fluidity in the of identity 
conflict roles before, during and after the violent conflict challenges the existing 
notion of the dichotomy of perpetrator and victim in a debate about criminal 
accountability undertaken by the ICC’s proceedings (Chapter 4). At the same time, 
violence related to land displacement is connected to the increasing usage or 
normalisation of violence from the state down to illegal non-state actors.  
 
III) From Normalisation to Criminalisation of Violence 
Having considered the historical analysis of most election episodes and their recurring 
patterns of violence, perhaps Susan Mueller’s observation of Kenyan politics provides 
the most compelling explanation, with her claim that electoral violence in Kenya was 
predictable before the electoral crisis (2008: p.186). While many researchers of 
democracy have overemphasised the roles of formal institutions, the separation of 
power, political parties and regime transitions in their studies of democratisation in 
developing countries, they tend to ignore the incentives behind the agents’ behavior 





When elections, reforms and constitutional processes are accompanied by violence, 
the relationship between democratisation and violence must be explored. The 
assertion is not simply posited on the basis of the claims of opponents of democratic 
peace that democracy induces more violence or that an authoritarian regime is more 
pacifist. Instead, it draws from John Schwarzmantel’s analysis of how political and 
economic liberalisation that grew from the combination of international and local 
demands for procedural democratic discourse against the authoritarian regime in the 
1990s provided an incentive for economic activity with criminal70 features (2013: 
p.5).  
 
While the incumbent may perpetuate violence against anti-establishment movements 
to claim his legitimate rights of monopoly and to defend order, executing violence or 
legal enforcement in hybrid democracies like Kenya requires the state to sometimes 
opt for extra-judicial measures, such as political assassination and the recruiting of 
criminal groups (Mueller, 2008: p.190). This not only reflects the inability of the state 
to be seen as legitimate, but also obscures the distinction between what is lawful and 
unlawful. This creates a spiral effect in transmitting the use of violence from state to 
criminal non-state actors who perform vigilante functions (Lynch, 2013a: p.161). The 
paradigm shift in the repressive rules of the three major leaderships of Kenya 
indicates the transition from normalisation to the criminalization of violence, which is 
discussed below. 
 
                                                        
70  While the country does not display a prevalent pattern of homicide (in comparison to Western 
countries during the 1990s), there are various crimes related to mob justice, political assassination and 
urban gang violence that have not been captured and indexed by major international, regional, sub-




i) The First Republic: ‘Kenyatta State’ (1963-1978) 
If the previous sections have provided a more structural explanation for the crisis, this 
section enacts a crucial step in recognising the post-independence ruling elite’s 
liability in exacerbating the crisis. The literature on Kenyan politics highlights the 
legacy of Kenyatta and Moi’s repressive rules. For instance, during the immediate 
post-colonial period (1963-1978), Kenyatta relied on three administrative functions: 
‘republic of the elders, the orders of the state and accumulation of wealth’ (Berman et 
al., 2009: p.465). Donald Rothchild labels these administrations as ‘hegemonic 
exchange regimes’, in which a portion of the state’s power and resources were 
proportionally shared among key groups to ensure some degree of balance and 
accommodation, while democratic freedoms were simultaneously controlled, 
preventing a formal institutional arrangement from facilitating the nation-building 
process (1986: p.25).  
 
The government has several times included representatives from various key ethnic 
groups throughout different administrations, but in the vast majority of cases the 
ruling party has relied on the support of the ethnic group affiliated with the president 
(as Kenyatta did with the Kikuyu). As is confirmed by David Throup’s analysis of 
Kenyatta’s state, while the structure of the post-colonial state relied on the colonials’ 
projection of negative ethnicity, Kenyatta exploited the colonial system of provincial 
administration (instead of reforming it) to govern various ethnic communities by 
bribing their leaders (who included the elders and chieftains empowered by the 
colonials) with patronage resources (1987: pp.35-46). These included the power of 
any leader to use unrestricted and unlawful means to interrogate any person who was 





The accumulation of wealth or state revenue needed by Kenyatta to buy his clients’ 
loyalty was rewarded through neo-patrimonial means in the guise of his policy of 
Harambee (Let’s pull together) project (Hyden, 1987: p.125). This not only resulted 
in bribery, corruption and economic exploitation, but marked the beginning the ruling 
class’ unrestrained ‘eating’ that triggered the national economic crisis, constant 
budget deficits, outstanding debts and the nation’s dependency on foreign assistance 
(Swainson, 1978: p.362).   The process known as ‘localising’  (implemented using 
community projects that arose from harambee) can be viewed as the attempts of 
leaders to buy grassroots loyalty (during voting and elections) by providing instant 
material benefits. Hence, instead of addressing the unequal distribution of wealth 
resulting from negative ethnicity, harambee became the instrument with which the 
ruling barons were manipulated into vying with each other to secure Kenyatta’s 
various tenders in exchange for building their own clientalist networks and securing 
political supporters (Nyangira, 1978: p.16).  
 
ii) The Second Republic: President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) 
 
However, the Second Republic (1978-2002) under President Moi, who originated 
from the less disadvantaged 71  Kalenjin community, provided a precedent for the 
normalisation of violence in future election periods (Mueller, 2008: p.200). Owing to 
being unable to access the state patronage resources that Kenyatta had enjoyed by 
virtue of the Kikuyu’s better economic position and Kenyatta’s circles of support, as 
well as the simultaneous collapse in the global coffee market (Kenya’s main revenue), 
                                                        
71  There is a wider disagreement on the position of Kalenjin (the second biggest community in 
Kenya) as less advantaged in comparison to the Kikuyus’ economic and political positions. The 
position of disadvantaged Kalenjin cited by this thesis draws from the argument made by Susan 
Mueller (2008). The ethnic political dynamics among the Kalenjin as disadvantaged group in contrast 
to the Kikuyu have been challenge by Gabrielle Lynch’s I say To You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin 




‘Moi had to take away before he could give’ (p.201). Refusing to help the poorest 
Kalenjin constituencies through harambee, Moi adopted extra-judicial methods to 
curtail the Kikuyu’s economic position and displaced Kikuyus from many of their 
land plots in the Rift Valley that had previously been awarded to them by Kenyatta 
(Widner, 1993: p.15).  
 
The use of informal methods of violence and criminal gangs to control opponents 
became widespread following the failed military coup of 1982 and the return of 
multiparty elections in 1992 (Haugerud, 1997: p.86). Subsequently, this inspired other 
ruling KANU members and opposition political elites to utilise various criminal 
gangs, including the infamous Mungiki72, used by Kikuyu barons to retaliate. This 
predicament encouraged the privatisation and normalisation of violence, and made 
shadow organizations’ use of vigilante services widespread (see Anderson, 2002; 
Mueller, 2008). The 1990s witnessed a proliferation of vigilante groups, such as the 
Mungiki, the Kalenjin Red Warriors, the Baghdad Boys and the Sabaot Land Defense 
Force (SLDF) in various parts of the country (Lynch, 2013a: p.170).  
 
There are various important features that need to be highlighted here. Firstly, the 
proliferation of these illegal groups was not simply owing to the widening of 
democratic spaces (as a result of multiparty elections), but was largely facilitated by 
local politicians from both sides in facing stiff elections. As the elections created 
further competition between politicians, ‘the menu’ for mobilising supporters and 
creating fear among voters was supported by Moi’s use of illegal violence. As such, 
the widespread use of illegal violence became a political strategy for reducing 
                                                        
72  For a useful discussion about Mungiki and other criminal gangs in Kenya history and politics, 




international society’s calls for accountability for the systematic violation of human 
rights (Auerbach, 2003: p.262). These uninvestigated instances of violence have 
impeded the contemporary call for criminal prosecution, as accountability for the 
crimes is evenly spread among various political barons (every leader is responsible for 
some form of atrocity), which serves to perpetuate the cycle of impunity (Cheeseman, 
2011: p.352).  
 
Secondly, most of these illegal non-state actors performed vigilante and ‘welfare’ 
functions, including meting out illegal forms of punishment against members of the 
Kenyan population who lived within their own ‘shadow territories’ that were not 
under the fully observation of state enforcement officers, such as the Kibera slums. 
These actors also collaborated with certain high-ranking individuals within the police 
force (Henningsen and Jones, 2013: p.380).  
 
Thirdly, the process of political liberalisation produced illiberal democratic practices 
and increased the economic potentiality of crime features, as well as the growth of the 
black market and shadow activities beyond the state’s surveillance (Njeru, 2013; 
Adams et al., 2013; Thieme, 2013). Since the 1990s, the state has continuously failed 
to ensure public security, to facilitate growing economic activity and to curb youth 
unemployment and living costs. This has transformed some of the aforementioned 
illegal groups and led to the creation of new groups, who perform anything from the 
simple task of bidding politicians’ contracts during elections; to transnational, crimes, 
such as weapons and drugs smuggling and human trafficking (Lynch, 2013a; LeBas, 





To a certain extent, these criminal gangs are connected to more radical organisations; 
such as Al-Shabaab, with its links to Al-Qaeda, and Somali pirates in the Indian 
Ocean (interview with a former Mungiki member, Nairobi, March 2, 2012). For 
instance, the increased demand among Kikuyu politicians for illegal domestic groups 
like the Mungiki is dependent on the ability of more radical and transnational groups 
like Al-Shabaab to supply weapons for domestic use (interview with the US Embassy 
officer, no. 2. Nairobi, March 4, 2012).  
 
While the government has failed to investigate such connections, and indeed denies 
their existence (interview with local MP, no. 1, Central Provinces, March 12, 2012), 
the author’s daily interactions with several former Mungiki members in the Matatu 
(taxi) industry confirm that there is a line of informal communication between both 
groups (the Mungki and Al-Shabaab) in order to maintain supply lines for drugs and 
light weapons. These items are purchased in cross-border regions at illegal markets, 
controlled by other militant groups affiliated with Al-Shabaab (interview with a 
former Mungiki member, Nairobi, March 2, 2012). To date, the relationship between 
these groups has been based around the minimal73 function of securing weapons, 
rather than of collaborating in unleashing violence against the civilian population and 





                                                        
73  While both the Mungiki and Al-Shabaab share radical features, factors such as the prevalence 
of ethnic politics, religious differences and various political motives in their leadership have likely 





iii) The Third and Fourth Republics: President Mwai Kibaki (2003-2007), and 
the Flawed Power Sharing Coalition with Prime Minister Rahila Odinga (2007-
2013). 
 
What began as the normalisation of violence in the  Moi and Kibaki administrations 
(2003-2007) evolved into the criminalisation of violence during the Kibaki-Odinga 
(2008-2013), which blurs the boundary between lawful violence (that which is 
imposed by state institutions) and unlawful violence (which is that imposed by 
criminal gangs) (Lynch, 2013a: p.172). The shift from single to multiparty elections 
and the 2002 regime change from KANU to NARC served to perpetuate the false 
dream of economic prosperity and development (Joseph, 2013: p.325). The increase 
in political and economical liberalisations since 2003 has created the popular belief 
among Kenyans in the importance of accumulating wealth to obtain individual self-
mastery. Likewise, many Kenyans believe that political success can be obtained 
through large economic growth and material development per se.  
 
Lynch observes that Pentecostal preachers in Kenya place a particular emphasis on 
individual self-mastery through focus and concentration, using terms like ‘prosperity, 
self-resistance and wealth’ to signify a better Christian ‘status’ (2013: p.117). Far 
from motivating Kenyans to be productive in developing the nation, the limited legal 
means of accumulating wealth and the increase in the unemployment rate has 
strengthened a culture of political patronage and alliances, in which the ‘big man’ is 
relied upon to fund electoral campaigns and hire criminal gangs (Mati, 2013: pp.246-
250). As a result, the intertwining of democratisation and corruption perpetuates the 
cycle of impunity, as the country’s corrupt legal institutions have either purposefully 




accountable (Mwangi, 2008: p.283). Indeed, those who were appointed as anti-
corruption tsars were threatened with murder (see Wrong, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the failure of the 2005 constitutional referendum and the NARC 
government’s preoccupation with power wrangling ensured the failure of the Kibaki 
administration to demolish the repressive state system and its association with the 
systematic violation of human rights (Ghai, 2008: p.222). The country has witnessed 
the repeated high-profile economic crimes of the ‘Goldenberg’ scandal between 1991 
and 1993, and the ‘Anglo-Leasing’ scandal of 2003 during the tenure of Kibaki. Both 
scandals involved top profile politicians under protection of the government, and 
involved the illegal payment of the taxpayer’s money (36 million and 740 million US 
dollars respectively) for non-existent contracts (Harrington and Manji, 2013: p.17).  
 
These scandals can be viewed as manifestations of the fact that what initially 
appeared as liberalisation and the promise of a better future created a heightened 
sense of socio-economical insecurity among politicians, as the stolen money from the 
scandals were in part used to fund both KANU’s and the NARC’s acts of patronage 
and their criminal gangs during the 1997 and 2007 election campaigns (Mwangi, 
2008: p.284). While Kenya has enjoyed a better prospect of economic growth since 
2002 (Hope, 2012: p.5), the limited economic opportunity of the formal market, 
uneven development, a wider gap of inequality across ethnic lines, an increase in 
youth unemployment and the growth of new illegal settlements and slums in Nairobi 
have increased the involvement of young people in criminal gangs. For these 




economic position of communities when they received direct patronage in the form of 
resources from the incumbents (Lynch, 2013a: p.174).  
 
Such frustrations were also reinforced by the existing ‘perception’ that others 
(members of communities that directly benefitted from the incumbents, owing to the 
ethnicity of their citizens) do not deserve to hold a proper economic position (Lynch 
and Anderson, 2013: p.99). Thus, while political liberalisation of the early 1990s 
increased the contemporary and individual’s focus on wealth and prosperity, such 
elusive dreams encouraged the accumulation of wealth by criminal means due to 
greater rate of unemployment and limited official economic opportunity for everyone. 
What matters here is that democracy’s failure to prevent the recurring cycles of 
violence during the alternation of power reveals the ironical relationship that 
developed between democracy and the diffusion of violence, and the extent of the 
spread of criminal activity during the post-election violence.  
 
Violence, as illustrated by Peter Kagwanja, can be separated into three interrelated 
categories (2009: p.365). The first category is that of spontaneous violence in 
ethnically mixed urban constituencies as a consequence of the increasing interference 
of criminal gangs. The second category is that of violence organized by the powerful 
elites, who exploit the beliefs of their fanatic supporters and blame their loss of the 
election on the supporters of their opponents. This resulted in large-scale massacres 
and the displacement of inhabitants of the Rift Valley to other provinces. The final 
category is that of widespread, discriminate killings and rapes perpetrated by security 
forces (2009: p.369). Rather than simply typifying instances of the latter category as 




performed a “crime inducing” function; the fact that it was facilitated by the state 
raised legal and political questions about how to ascertain the facts in a crimes against 
humanity case based on the individual responsibility per see of the ICC’s suspects.  
 
In the increasingly hostile nature of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s 
prosecution and indictment of the African leaders, some skeptics of the system of 
criminality of the ICC  (Chapter 6) have criticised the court in relation to the ongoing 
debate concerning the focus on individual responsibility in state crime, post-conflict 
tribunals. These skeptics have objected that the ICC’s focus on individual 
responsibility is too simplistic, and that it does not consider the collective 
responsibility of state institutions for allowing such crimes to be perpetrated in the 
first place (see White, 2009). Here, the factors that distance international crime from 
ordinary crime in the eyes of a municipal court are the political motives and the 
‘systematic’ nature of the former (Lee, 2010: p.17). Yet one cannot establish a case to 
prosecute crimes against humanity on the sole basis of individual responsibility 
without linking the systematic nature of such crimes to the state apparatus that 
allowed them to be committed. The inherently criminal features of this kind of 
violence also question the nature of democratisation in Kenya. 
 
IV) The Fallacy of Democratic ‘Sequencing’ 
Various commentators have distinguished between procedural and substantive 
democratic processes that have been executed since the 1990s (Ake, 1991; Burnell, 
1998; Chabal, 1998; Diamond et al., 1995; Haynes, 1993; Joseph, 1997a; McFerson, 
1992). Studies of various political parties have identified the element of ‘clientelism’ 




election process (for procedural democracy) came to be regarded as a zero-sum game, 
the clientelist parties have come to be associated with vicious party formations, as has 
been ascertained by voting statistics for ethnic minority communities (Bratton et al., 
2004; Lindberg, 2003; 2004; Young, 2004a).  
 
Kenya has witnessed the repeated formation and dissolution of ‘briefcase political 
parties’, which featured ‘politicians shifting parties in every election since 1963 and 
had all one time served in government or opposition together’ (Kagwanja and 
Southall, 2010: p.11). For instance, Kibaki (2003-2013) had previously been 
appointed as Moi’s vice president (1978-1988) before he resigned from KANU 
(1988), going on to create his own party and later defeat Moi’s chosen successor 
(Uhurru Kenyatta) in the 2002 elections with NARC. Likewise, Rahila Odinga’s 
father (Oginga Odinga) was appointed as Kenyatta’s vice president (1964) during the 
de facto74 single-party period (1964-1981), before he resigned from KANU (1965) 
and won the 1966 by-election with his socialist party. Rahila Odinga had previously 
served as KANU’s secretary general and cabinet minister (after the 1997 election) 
during Moi’s final term (1997-2002). He later joined Kibaki in the 2002 election, 
breaking from the NARC government after the failure of the 2005 constitutional 
referendum. Kibaki (PNU) and Odinga (ODM) were opponents in the 2007 election; 
the same is true of the current President Uhurru Kenyatta and his vice-president 
William Ruto (2013). Uhurru Kenyatta retained his leadership of KANU after losing 
his presidency bid in the 2002 election. However, he later joined his former enemy, 
Kibaki, in the newly formed PNU (2007). Meanwhile, Ruto (formerly of Moi’s 
                                                        
74  The single-party period in Kenyan history can be separated into two main periods. The first is 
the de facto period, under the leadership of Kenyatta, ending with his death. When Moi took over the 
presidency (1978), he retained the de facto status quo until he amended the constitution and led Kenya 
into a de jure (official) single-party period in 1982. This transition was enacted as a result of the failed 




KANU) joined Odinga’s ODM in the 2007 election. The ICC’s indictment against 
both Uhurru and Ruto brought them closer together, as did the formation of the 
Jubilee alliance against Odinga’s ODM in the 2013 elections (Chaisty et al., 2014: 
p.7; Lynch and Zgonec-Rozej, 2013: p.9).  
 
A procedural focus on democratic studies has raised concerns about the substantive 
significance of democracy in Kenya (see also Lynch and Crawford, 2011). Advocates 
of democracy falsely assumed that the return of the multiparty system in 1991 would 
be permanent (for example, see Dunn, 1996; Karatnycky, 1999; Nodia, 2002), and 
that fair multiparty elections would serve as a form of conflict management (Chris, 
2009: p.40). Such a misleading hypothesis ignored the fact that the single-party period 
had limited Kenya’s actual electoral experience (Kihoro, 2005: pp.161-180). Rather 
than representing a democratic transition, electoral politics became the leitmotif of 
both Kenyatta and Moi in their efforts to retain their powers. When Kenya returned to 
a multiparty system, elections became a “Pandora’s box”; the accompaniment of 
voting with violence exacerbated existing civil tensions. Moi’s widespread use of 
intimidation in the 1979, 1983 and 1988 single-party elections continued unabated, 
even after the introduction of the multiparty system in 1991 (Mueller, 2011: p.99).  
 
Democracy in Kenya is subject to scrutiny because the democratic struggles only 
indicate a procedural approach to politics; it lacks a substantive foundation, or a firm 
connection to the masses (Ogude, 2002: p.205). The understanding of ‘substantive’ 
here relates to the extent to which the democratic process empowers the masses, 




often constitutes a unstable, procedural democratic experiment. This questions the 
origins of the wave of liberalisation in the 1990s (Ajulu, 2002: p.253).  
 
The erosion of the authoritarian regime, the failure of economic policies and the 
advent of the constitutional crisis not only explain the demand for democracy; they 
can also be viewed as the launching pads for Kenya’s journey into illiberal democracy 
in the 1990s (Bratton and Mattes, 2001: p.470). As revenue declined and debt 
increased, Moi’s patrons began to lose the political means to sustain themselves; this 
created a situation in which the search for patronage resources became complicated. 
To escape this predicament, President Moi sought foreign aid by accepting SAP 
(Brown, 2001: p.725). These external and internal forces inaugurated Kenya’s return 
to multiparty elections, and became a form of ‘political bribery’ for securing more 
foreign aid and maintaining the false promise of good governance (p.727). In such 
instances, political reform was conducted solely as an experiment in procedural 
democracy, as more elections meant more foreign aid.  
 
Meanwhile, the opposition perceived the return of multiparty elections as an 
opportunity to gain power.  Pushing for multiparty elections became a political 
gimmick for ousting Moi from power (Oloo, 2007: p.28). This accounts for why the 
return of the multiparty system saw an enormous increase in the registration of 
opposition candidates, who failed to unite under the banner of the democracy that they 
had previously fought for. The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), which 
began as a single opposition, was divided. This provided KANU with a better 





Ghandi and Prezoworski propose a novel explanation as to why a dictator provides 
legislative opportunities while simultaneously refusing to step down (2006: p.15). 
Electoral and legislative changes create opportunities for future opponents to co-
operate to a limited extent in joining the government after the election. Inevitably, it 
weakens the opposition’s voice, as occurred in the 1992 and 1997 elections. It can 
also lead to a state of rule without opposition, as was witnessed in the GNU (2008-
2013).  
 
The democratic experiment in 1990s Kenya can be viewed as a manifestation of 
Moi’s reluctance to step down, and of the democratic opportunists’ obsession with 
obtaining patronage resources. The multiparty system features all the greed, 
grievances and struggles of the previous political regimes; the election becomes an 
instrument for defeating ethnic opponents, without being genuinely representative of 
all Kenyans. Such a flawed democratic project generates widespread violent activity, 
as the democratic process (1992-2013) provided an opportunity for the political elite 
to hijack the political transition. The violence that precedes an election constitutes 
irrefutable evidence of the ‘sequencing democracy fallacy’, in which the incumbent 
impedes the democratic process by refusing to step down (see Carothers, 2007; 
Mansfield and Snyder, 2007).  
 
Since elections were unavoidable after the return of the multiparty system, the 
democratic process was undermined by ethnic barons in order to prevent the public 
from interfering with their obsession with the alternation of power holding (Bratton 
and Walle, 1997: p.202). Thus, the undemocratic measures became more complex and 




the domestic and international audience to institute reforms and to address human 
rights violations and impunity (Mueller, 2011: p.97). In such a scenario, if the 
incumbent fails to prevent a majority vote in favor of the opposition, or if he fails to 
remain in power by ‘stealing’ the election, then the establishment of a power-sharing 
government is unavoidable. This continues to occur because new democracies lack 
effective social contracts for opposing illegitimate violence, thus inviting political 
upheaval as the only means of opposing the corrupt behavior of the state. Branch and 
Cheeseman describe the dilemma as a ‘widespread malaise within 
democratisation’(Branch and Cheeseman, 2009: p.24). It was against this backdrop 
that violence broke out in the wake of the electoral crisis of 2007. 
 
C – Understanding the Crisis in Kenya: Post-election Violence and Transitional 
Justice 
 
Several characteristics derived from the above analysis are particularly important in 
exploring justice- and reconciliation-seeking policies. These characteristics shall be 
discussed as follows:  
I) On the Nature of Political Violence and the Scope of Transitional Justice in 
Kenya 
 
The electoral crisis ‘tapped into an atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay 
beneath the surface of Kenya but until now had not produced widespread mayhem’ 
(Gettleman, 2008). While the upsurge of electoral violence since the 1990s had 
structured the predominant theme of post-Cold War Kenyan politics, it is in fact a 
mistake to ignore the historical reality that existed before the 2008 crisis. Besides 
electoral types of violence, the country had previously been scarred by political 




the displacement and instabilities incurred by civil war since the formation of the 
colonial state in Kenya. While recent political violence in the form of electoral crises 
was significant and real enough, they cannot easily be identified as relatively more 
destructive or characteristically more unique than the various types of violence that 
have occurred throughout the history of the country. As such, to put the matter 
succinctly, while this thesis has focused specifically on the 2008 electoral crisis, the 
above discussion indicates that violence has been used as a principal instrument for 
the creation and consolidation of the authority of the state in Kenya throughout its 
history. Simultaneously, however, those who wished to challenge the state’s authority 
also regularly resorted to violence against the state.  
 
In this thesis, analysing violence in Kenya is consistent with the innovative and 
persuasive logic of violence proposed by Sathis Kalyvas (2006). According to 
Kalyvas, the superficial analysis of violence has been easily identified as an anomaly 
of peacetime politics. It has been marred by the consequential bias of drawing binary 
yet obscure distinctions between war and peace in international law research, and 
equates an additional research inquiry into civil war, for instance, with the violence 
perpetrated as a result of politics or crime (p.15). In Chapter 2, I largely agreed with 
Galtung’s provocative ideas concerning negative peace in order to formulate an 
understanding of the problematic and dialectic relations between peace and conflict, 
which feeds into Richmond’s criticism of the dangers of relying on the binary 
distinction between war and peace in IR scholarship. What is interesting here is that 
Kalyvas provides a similar response with particular attention paid to the impact of the 




peacetime politics upon the international legal response to crimes that are committed 
solely in response to violence.  
 
The danger of ignoring the fact that crimes that are committed as a result of political 
violence are also connected to negative peacetime conditions has recently been raised 
by one of the most celebrated professors of African politics and history, David 
Anderson. According to Anderson, there is a significant danger of distinguishing 
peacetime politics from violence decades into the future projection of the politics of 
peace in Eastern Africa (Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014: p.544).  
 
As Anderson points out, most researchers have failed to recognise that such a binary 
distinction in the case of Kenya creates conceptual bias or flawed presuppositions in 
analytically investigating the instances of structural violence or negative peace that 
occurred during peacetime. It also muddies the analysis of the criminal features of 
maintaining peace through political repression, extrajudicial homicide, and systematic 
violation of human rights (p.545). Accordingly, violence tells us more about social 
relationships, power and the shifting of character, as well as agency and structure. 
Consequent to this presupposition is the significance of locating the focus of 
transitional justice in Kenya on unspeakable crimes committed or perpetuated by the 
actors during negative peacetime, or without the occurrence of  ‘liberal’ regime 
change. This allows us to observe the political characters of the ICC’s primary 
suspects or ‘big fish’. As is discussed in Chapter 4, these figures preached peace in the 





Understanding the nature of political violence in Kenya as a combination of colonial 
legacy, international and regional contingencies and products of Kenya’s own agents 
is key to illuminating why the predominant agenda of building transitional justice 
institutions and debates in Kenya revolves around the political idea of reforming 
political institutions, bringing them out of their entrenched culture of impunity rather 
than initiating a linear liberal transition. To borrow the book title of one of the most 
renowned Kenyan legal scholars, Makau Mutua (2008), the process can be described 
as ‘taming the leviathan’. As such, the global transitional justice discourses were 
specifically tailored to a particular local milieu of Kenya, utilising various transitional 
justice mechanisms as modes of judicial statecraft in an age in which the ICC interacts 
increasingly with Africa and other hostile regions that have witnessed violence 
alongside a removal of effective justice measures or impunity. 
 
II) Transitional Justice is not Necessarily a Historical Injustice: A Specific Focus 
on Post-election Violence 
Simultaneously, however, while the above analysis has explored the continued pattern 
of violation or unspeakable crimes beyond the recent episodes of the electoral crisis of 
2008, it is unrealistic to propose a transitional justice agenda to probe the ability of 
each institution to address historical injustice. Indeed, the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) hinted at this issue when it recognised its limited 
capacity to address historical injustice despite the ambitious nature of the 
commission’s jurisdiction to cover a broad scope of violations that have occurred 
throughout Kenya’s history (T.J.R.C., 2013, Vol. 1, pp.55-71). While the scope of the 
ICC’s proceedings is limited to the suspects of the electoral crisis, the TJRC’s attempt 
to document the official narrative of the atrocities that the country has witnessed since 




periodical mandate. Rather, it should be viewed as an initiation sequence that exposes 
the findings to further public debate and scrutiny for future investigation and 
reconciliation.  
 
In short, both organisations operated as transitional justice institutions with a 
particular focus on post-election violence. Any extensive debates on their findings and 
their relations to other long periods of historical violations or injustice are likely to 
spark long-term formations of permanent judicial and political institutions to address 
wider reparation and reconciliation concerns, rather than relying heavily on the 
interim mandate of transitional justice institutions. However, given that the immediate 
concern of both transitional justice mechanisms in Kenya is widely with addressing 
the needs of the victims, this thesis’ focuses on the IDPs’ perspectives should be 
considered as normatively and politically valid. This is because focusing on the 
victims’ perspectives is one of the ways of measuring the primary ability of such 
transitional justice institutions to ensure the safety and dignity of the victims after the 
2008 crisis. Meanwhile, there has been a considerable amount of scepticism voiced in 
relation to the necessity of pursuing transitional justice given the relatively small scale 
of the post-election violence when compared to the large-scale conflicts of the 
neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone and South Africa. 
However, as Kagwanja and Southall argue, ‘post-election Kenya is an intellectual 
minefield, more fiercely contested and perhaps riskier than the post-Mau Mau 
scholarship’ (2010: p.1). This relatively small scale crisis challenges some of the 
major achievements that one of Africa’s few stable states has made since the end of 
the Cold War. It has reversed the significant continental progress made in 




international system, as well as its contribution to international security and order (see 
also Kiwuwa, 2013). 
 
III) Transitional Justice Agenda on Mitigating Impunity and Strengthening 
Accountability  
Analyses derived from the previous discussion have identified some of the major 
themes - such as state crisis, historical injustice, the diffusion of violence and the 
fallacy of the democratic sequence - that contribute to our understanding of the 
recurring pattern of violence and its criminalisation. The predictable yet 
unpreventable nature of the violence, owing to the culture of impunity and the illiberal 
(hybrid) democratic mode of governance (power-sharing) has transformed the debate 
about justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy into a politics of accountability; the 
primary concerned among members of the incumbent regime is with which 
transitional justice mechanism does not ‘threaten the leaders’ status quo’ (interview 
with KAF officer no. 2, Geneva, November 26, 2010).  
 
Hence, this thesis has been written on the basis of my belief in the necessity of 
embarking on a journey of academic inquiry that attempts to determine the ability of 
transitional justice institutions to harness greater political and legal accountabilities in 
Kenya. Advancing the particular case of how Kenyan society is able to come to terms 
with the post-election violence is key to understanding the potential of cultivating 
accountability and mitigating impunity. While the majority of transitional justice 
literature has concerned itself with the thematic focus of transitional justice 
institutions on addressing the greatest cause of human rights discourse and clear 
regime change, transitional justice in Kenya should be seen as a paradigm of 




on impunity and accountability, since this is what haunts the country’s troubled past. 
Pursuing a transitional justice agenda can be seen as one of the ways to exorcise the 
country’s past demons of violence, in particular the way the state and the ruling class 
orchestrated this violence through authoritarian rulings or extra-judicial killings, 
producing a sense of human insecurity among the country’s various ethnic 
communities and triggering the future seeds of discord. 
 
IV) Developing Transitional Justice Agenda and the Capacity of the State 
 
The question of the neo-patrimonial nature of the state, and the capacity of state 
institutions to implement transitional justice, may have a significant impact upon 
justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy (see also Bosire, 2006). Such a predicament 
‘can further deplete the capacity of state institutions; and the nature of the transition 
itself and its associated compromises’ (p.4). Additionally, socio-economic injustice, 
uneven development and corruption have been identified as causes and consequences 
that are explicit and implicitly intersected with the past wrongdoings of the political 
elite (see Greiff and Duthie, 2009).  
 
Though structural violence and the economic nature of the conflict have been 
acknowledged as concerns to be resolved by the peacebuilding and reconciliation 
policy in Kenya, more practical dillemas have appeared in expanding transitional 
justice missions to address the  comprehensive grievances of post-conflict societies. 
One of these dilemmas is the limited potential of transitional justice mechanisms to 
address the long-term pursuit of land tenure reform and security in Kenya (Chapter 5). 
Such a predicament creates unrealistic expectations of transitional justice, which is 




no relation to the competency of state institutions in times of transition. It also spring 
from to the issue of the unclear political transitions that have been enacted in many of 
Africa’s transitional justice experiments (minus South Africa, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone). This produces what Bosires has coined as an ‘overpromised and undelivered’ 
transitional justice in Africa (2006: p.6).  
 
D – Navigating Transitional Justice Policy after the 2008 Crisis  
 
 
I) Mediating the Crisis and Power Sharing Government in Kenya 
In the case of Kenya, while the facts and figures for the dead and missing may vary 
from one source to another, no less than 1,500 Kenyans have been killed, 600,000 
have been displaced and nearly 100 billion Kenyan shillings (USD 1.5 billion) have 
been lost (Snow, 2009: p.116).  
 
The violence broke out after the incumbent Kibaki was controversially declared by 
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) as the winner of the election (Mutua, 2008: 
p.25). The first instances of violence were recorded as having occurred in the 
strongholds of the ODM. In response to the ODM’s protests, supporters of Kibaki and 
the PNU lead by Uhuru Kenyatta later allowed the tension resulting from the election 
disputes to escalate into ethnic slaughter, rape and plundering. These atrocities 
included the mass burning of women and children in a church (see Kavulla, 2008).  
 
The intensity of the violence between 30th December 2007 and the first two months 
of 2008 terrified Kenyans, as well as members of the international community who 




News of the post-election violence quickly spread across the world. Shocking images 
of a nation engulfed by violence were splashed on local and international media 
outlets. Yet, the protagonists at the centre of the disputed presidential election, 
President Mwai Kibaki of PNU and Raila Odinga of ODM (hereinafter referred to as 
the Principals), took hard-line positions, each insisting they had won. 
 
The international community, with the African Union (AU) taking a lead, responded 
almost instantly, with all efforts channelled towards unlocking the political gridlock 
and bringing to cessation the violence that was steadily pushing the country towards 
disintegration.  From January 8 and 10, 2008, then AU Chairman, His Excellency John 
Agyekum Kufuor, President of Ghana, visited the country and initiated a mediation 
process between the Principals. After he left, and with the blessings of the two 
Principals, the mediation process was taken over by a three-member Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities (hereafter referred to as the Panel) composed of three African 
icons: former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former 
Mozambican Minister and First Lady Graça Machel and former President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa. 
 
The Panel, chaired by Kofi Annan, arrived in Kenya on January 22, 2008 and 
immediately proceeded to hold meetings with relevant stakeholders. Two days later, 
on January 24, 2008, the Panel managed to convene a meeting between the two 
Principals. A few days later, on January 29, 2008, the Kenya National Dialogue and 






With the Panel as mediators, the KNDR negotiations were conducted by 
representatives of the two opposing sides: the PNU side was represented by Cabinet 
ministers Martha Karua, Sam Ongeri, Moses Wetangula and Mutula Kilonzo, while 
the ODM side was represented by Musalia Mudavadi, James Orengo, William Ruto, 
and Sally Kosgei. The negotiating team agreed on an agenda comprising four main 
items (see Table 3.1). 
 
On February 28, 2008, after 41 days of intense mediation, the formal negotiations 
were concluded with the signing of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of 
the Coalition Government (hereinafter referred to as the Coalition Agreement) 
between the Principals. Upon the signing of the Coalition Agreement the crisis 
ceased. 
 
Despite the predictable and somehow preventable nature of the crisis, the donors and 
other mediating actors failed to learn from similar mistakes that they made during the 
1992 transition, and ignored the warning signals that were visible in the failure of the 
2005 referendum (Brown, 2009: p.389). As a result, they relied heavily on AU and 
East Africa’s fragile sub-regional arrangements to coordinate the crisis mediation 
strategy. In short, the socio-political predicament and the active engagements of all 
international, regional and local stakeholders contribute to the immediate restoration 
of peace and the viability of power-sharing arrangements (p.396).  
 
Arguably, Kenya’s attempts to deal with post-election violence were conditioned by 
an international proliferation of peacebuilding, which grew out of the existing debate 




the national political reconciliation project. Of key importance was the political 
attempt to address human rights violations and political reforms that emerged from 
the implementation of the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) 
agreement. 75  The agreement marked the establishment of a power-sharing 
government, whereby both conflicting principals (Kibaki and Odinga) agreed to find a 
durable solution to the post-election violence. 
 
The governmental tenure of the Government of National Unity (GNU) between 2008 
and 2013 was specifically designed to implement four agendas (see Table 3.1). On the 
basis of the Coalition Agreement, the National Assembly enacted the National Accord 
and Reconciliation Act on March 18, 2008. The National Accord paved way for the 
establishment of a coalition government and the offices of Prime Minister as well as 
those of two Deputy Prime Ministers. 
Table 3.1: Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
Through a mediation of H. E. Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities 
On the Resolution of the Political Crisis: Annotated Agenda Four 
At the fourth session held on 1 February 2008 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Kofi 
Annan, of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, the Parties of Kenyan National 
Dialogue ad Reconciliation on the resolution of the political crisis and its root causes, 
namely the Government of Kenya/Party of National Unity and the Orange Democratic 
Movement agreed on the following Agenda for the dialogue: 
Immediate actions to stop violence and 
restore fundamental rights and liberties. 
Both parties understand that resolving this 
crisis politically is a matter of immediate 
priority and have reiterated their commitment 
to finding a just and durable solution. 
Discussions on Agenda point 1 will bee 
conducted to identify and agree on the 
modalities of implementation of immediate 
action aimed at: 
 Stopping the wave of violence that 
has gripped the country since the 
announcement of the result of the 
Presidential Elections; 
 Enhancing the security and 
protection of the population and their 
                                                        
75  For a detailed discussion on the diplomatic process behind the establishment of the GNU, see 





 Restoring the respect for the sanctity 
of human life; 
 Ensuring the freedom of expression, 
press freedom and the right to 
peaceful assembly upheld; 
Immediate measures to address the 
humanitarian crisis, promote 
reconciliation, healing and restoration. 
Discussions will be conducted to identify and 
agreed on modalities of implementation of 
immediate measures aimed at: 
 Ensuring that the assistance to the 
affected communities and individuals 
is delivered more effectively; 
 Ensuring the impartial effective and 
expeditious investigation of gross 
and systematic violations of human 
rights and that those found guilty are 
brought to justice; 
 Ensuring the processes of national 
healing, reconciliation and 
restoration start at once. 
On how to overcome the current political 
crisis 
Under this Agenda item, the Parties will 
negotiate and agree on a solution towards 
resolving the political crisis arising from the 
disputed presidential election results as well 
as the ensuing violence in Kenya. 
 
The current crisis revolves, in large measure 
around the issues of power and the function 
of state institutions, It resolution may require 
adjustments to the current constitutional, 
legal and institutional framework. 
On addressing long-term issues and 
solutions 
Poverty, the inequitable distribution of 
resources and perceptions of historical 
injustices and exclusion on the part of the 
segments of the Kenyan society constitute he 
underlying causes of the prevailing social 
tensions, instability and cycle of violence. 
Discussions under this Agenda item will be 
conducted to examine and proposed solutions 
for long-standing issues such as inter alia: 
 Undertaking constitutional, legal and 
institutional reform 
 Tackling poverty and inequity, as 
well as combating regional 
development imbalances; 
 Tackling unemployement, 
particularly among the youth; 
 Consolidating national cohesion and 
unity; 
 Undertaking a Land Reform 
 Addressing transparency, 
accountability and impunity. 
Timetable 




between 7 and 15 days from the date of commencement of the Dialogue, with Agenda item 4 
would be resolved within a period of one year after the commencement of the Dialogue 
(launched on 28 January 2008) 
Source: (KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2008) 
 
Due to the significant of the crisis, the negotiation team concluded a series of public 
agreements, (a particular focused to Agenda Items 1 to 3), laying out the agreed 
modalities for implementing the broader objective of the KNDR process, which was 
‘to achieve sustainable peace, stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, as follows: 
 Agreed Statement on Security Measures, February 1, 2008. Under this 
Agreement, the parties committed themselves to take action to halt the 
violence. The Agreement called on the police to act in accordance with the law 
and to carry out their duties and responsibilities with impartiality. It called on 
all leaders to embrace and preach peace and further listed a range of measures 
to be taken towards restoring fundamental rights and civil liberties.  
 Agreed Statement on Measures to Address Humanitarian Crisis, February 4, 
2008. This Agreement laid out measures for the assistance and protection of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). It also proposed the operationalisation of 
the Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims 
of Post-2007 Election Violence. With respect to immediate measures to 
promote reconciliation, healing and restoration, the Agreement proposed that a 
truth, justice and reconciliation commission that includes local and 
international jurists should be established.  
 Agreed Statement on How to Resolve the Political Crisis, February 14, 2008. 
This Agreement, in the first instance, outlined a number of options that were 




of each option. It then charted the way forward, including: a forensic audit of 
the electoral process; comprehensive constitutional reform; establishment of a 
truth, justice and reconciliation commission; and the identification and 
prosecution of perpetrators of post-election violence. 
 
Following the signing of the Coalition Agreement, the Panel appointed Ambassador 
Oluyemi Adeniji, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, to conclude 
negotiations on Agenda Item Four. On March 4, 2008, the following agreements were 
signed. 
 General Principles and Parameters for the Inde-pendent Review Committee on 
the 2007 General Elections (IREC). Pursuant to this Agreement and the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Independent Review Commission headed by 
Justice Johann Kriegler of South Africa was appointed on March 14, 2008. 
After conducting a forensic audit of the electoral process IREC concluded that 
the polling process was undetectably perverted and that the recorded and 
reported results were so inaccurate as to render any reasonably accurate, 
reliable and convincing conclusion impossible. 
 
 General Principles and Parameters for the Commission of Inquiry into the Post 
Election Violence (hereafter known as the Waki Comission). This Agreement, 
together with the Commissions of Inquiry Act, formed the basis for the 
appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) 
headed by Justice Philip Waki on May 22, 2008. The CIPEV carried out 
investigations and issued its report in October 2008. The Report found that 
while the post-election violence was spontaneous in some areas, it was 






Accordingly, the KNDR is a broad and ambitious political reconciliation policy, 
which not only focuses on addressing post-election violence, but also attempts to 
reform the state structure that have provided the incentive for a continuous pattern of 
historical injustice since 1963. As John Githongo notes, reconciliation begins with 
reconciling and restoring public faith in state institutions (state-society relations) 
(2010: p.5). The four specific agendas, particularly agenda number four, clearly 
indicated KNDR’s broadly defined goal of obtaining an official acknowledgement of 
justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy (interview with KAF officer, no. 2, Geneva, 
November 26, 2010).  
 
The first agenda was achieved with the establishment of the power-sharing 
government of the GNU in April 2008. An amendment of the old constitution was 
made to allow for the creation of an interim post for the prime minister, which led to a 
power-sharing arrangement between President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga (see 
Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2: Excerpt from The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 
Preamble: 
There is a crisis in this country. The parties have come together in recognition of this crisis, 
and agree that a political solution is required. 
 
Given the disputed elections and the divisions in the parliament and the country, neither side 
is able to govern without the other. The needs to be real power sharing to move the country 
forward. 
 
A coalition must be partnership with commitment on both sides to govern together and push 
through a reform agenda for the benefit of all Kenyans. 
 
 
Descriptions of the Act: 
An Act of Parliament to provide for the settlement of the disputes from the presidential 
election of 2007, formation of a Coalition Government and Establishment of the Offices of 
Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Government of Kenya, their 
functions and various matters connected with an incidental to the foregoing. 
 





2. This Act shall come into force upon its publication in the Kenya Gazette which shall 
not be later than 14 days from the date of Assent. 
 
3. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the government of Kenya and two Deputy 
Prime Ministers who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with this 
section. 
 
(2) The person to be appointed as Prime Minister shall be an elected member of the  
National Assembly who is the parliamentary leader of – 
(a) The political parties that has the largest number of members in the National 
Assembly; or 
(b) A coalition of political parties in the event that the leader of the political party 
that has the largest number of members of the national Assembly does not 
command the majority in the National Assembly. 
 
(3) Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the elected 
members of the National Assembly to be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
4. (1) The Prime Minister: 
a) shall have authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions 
and affairs of the Government of Kenya including those of Ministries; 
b) may assign any of the coordination responsibilities of his office to the Deputy 
Prime Ministers, as well as one of them to deputise for him; 
c) shall perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President or 
under any written law. 
 
(2) In the formation of the coalition government, the persons to be appointed as 
Ministers and Assistant Ministers from the political parties that are partners in the 
coalition others than President’s Party, shall be nominated by the parliamentary 
leader of the party in the coalition. Thereafter there shall be full consultation with the 
President on the appointment of all Ministers. 
 
(3) The composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the relative 
parliamentary strengths of the respective parties and shall at all time take into account 
the principle of portfolio balance. 
 
(4) The Office of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister shall become vacant 
only if – 
a) the holder of the office dies, resigns or ceases to be a member of the National 
Assembly otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of Parliament; or 
b) the National Assembly passes a resolution which si supported by a majority 
of not less than seven days notice has been given declaring that the National 
Assembly has no confidence in the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister, 
as the case may be; or 
c) the coalition is dissolved. 
 
(5) The removal of any Minister nominated by a parliamentary party of the coalition 
shall be made only after prior consultation and concurrence in writing with the leader 
of that party. 
 
5. The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the 





6. The coalition shall stand dissolved if: 
a) the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or 
b) the coalition parties agree in writing; or 
c) one coalition partner withdraws from the coalition by a resolution of the highest 
decision-making organ of that party in writing. 
 
7. The prime minister and deputy prime ministers shall be entitled to such salaries, 
allowances, benefits, privileges and emoluments as may be approved by Parliament 
from time to time. 
 
8. This Act shall cease to apply upon dissolution of the tenth Parliament, if the coalition 
is dissolved, or a new constitution is enacted, whichever is earlier. 
 
Source: (KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2008) 
 
The third agenda was implemented by the establishment of the Waki commission (see 
Table 3.3). The Waki report findings contributed to the existing debate about whether 
to attribute accountability through criminal or retributive justice, and to a certain 
extent helped to implement restorative justice through the inception of the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The fourth agenda contributed not 
only to the ICC’s proceedings and the operations of the TJRC, but also to major 
institutional reforms. It also helped to promulgate a new constitution on August 27, 
2010 (interview with the CIC officer no. 2, Nairobi, February 7, 2012).  
Table 3.3: Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence 
Background 
Recalling that the Parties have previously agreed to: 
 
Identify and agree on the modalities of implementation of immediate measures aimed at: 
 Ensuring the impartial, effective and expeditious investigation of gross and 
systematic violations of human rights and that those found guilty are brought to 
justice. 
 
And have expressed a commitment to: 
 Identification and prosecution of perpetrators of violence, including State security 
agents 
 Addressing the issues of accountability and transparency 
 
The Parties to the National Dialogue and Reconciliation, together with the Panel of Emminent 
African Personalities (The Panel), agree to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry on 
Post-Election Violence (Commission of Inquiry) 
 




and surrounding circumstances related to acts of violence that followed the 2007 Presidential 
Election, (ii) investigate the actions or omissions of State Security agencies during the course 
of the violence, and make a recommendation as necessary, and (iii) to recommend measures 
of a legal, political or administrative nature, as appropriate, including measures with regard to 
bringing to justice those persons responsible for criminal acts. The Comission of Inquiry aims 
to prevent any repetition of similar deeds and, in general, to eradicate impunity and promote 
national reconciliation in Kenya. 
Key Activities 
The activities of the Commission shall be: 
To investigate the facts and circumstances related to the violence following the 2007 
Presidential election between December 28, 2007 and February 28, 2008. 
 To prepare and submit a final report containing its findings and recommendations for 
readdress, any legal action that should be taken, and measures for future prevention. 
 To prepare and submit a final report containing its findings and recommendations for 
readdress, any legal action that should be taken, and measures for future prevention. 
 To make a recommendations, as it deems appropriate, to the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
National Cooperation 
Kenyan authorities, institutions, parties and others shall fully cooperate with the Commission 
of Inquiry in the accomplishment of its mandate, in response to request for information, 
security, assistance or access in pursuing investigations, including: 
 Adoption by the Government of Kenya of any measures needed for the Commission 
and its personnel to carry out their functions throughout the national territory with full 
freedom, independence and security; 
 Provision by the Government of Kenya and all Kenyan State institutions of all 
information in its possession which the commission requests or is otherwise needed 
to carry out its mandate, with free access provided for the Commission and its staff to 
any achieves related to its mandate; 
 Freedom for the Commission to obtain any information its considers relevant and to 
use all sources of information which it considers useful and reliable; 
 Freedom for the Commission to interview, in private or any persons it judges 
necessary; 
 Freedom for the Commission to visit any establishment of place at any time; and 
 Guarantee by the Government of Kenya of full respect for the integrity, security and 
freedom of witnesses, experts, and any other persons who help its works; 
 
The Parties call upon the States, relevant UN and AU bodies and, as appropriate, national and 
internationally respected jurists or other nongovernmental organizations to provide 
information to the Commission of Inquiry related to the post-election violence, to make such 
information available as soon as possible and to provide appropriate assistance to the 
Commission. 
Composition 
The Commission of Inquiry will be composed of three impartial, experienced and 
internationally respected jurists, or experts in addressing the communal conflict or ethnic 
violence. Two of these shall be international and one shall be Kenyan. They shall be selected 
by the Panel following consultation with the Government/PNU and ODM, and appointed by 
the President. 
 
A Support Office, based in Nairobi and with adequate expert staff, will be established to 
provide support to the members of the Commission. 
Methodology 
The Commission of Inquiry shall develop its own work plan and procedures. These will be 
guided in all aspects by principles of fairness, impartiality, transparency, and good a faith. 




The Commission of Inquiry will start its works within 30 days following the appointment of 
its members. It will operate for three months, with an additional month if required. At the 
conclusions of its work it will submit a final report of its findings and recommendations to the 
President of Kenya, with a copy to the Panel. Main findings of the report will be made public 
within 14 days of submission, although certain aspects of the report or annexes may be kept 
confidential in order to protect the identity of witnesses or persons accused. 
Financing/Logistics 
The Commission of Inquiry will be funded by the Kenyan Government and the Trust Fund for 
the National Dialogue and Reconciliation, including support from door states or foundations. 
It will receive logistical support from the AU and the UN. 
Source: (KNDR Secretariat, Nairobi, 2008) 
 
In line with the four agendas derived from the KNDR, GNU has expressed its 
commitment to resolving the contentious issues that arose during the crisis with 
mechanisms that are commonly associated with transitional justice. However, there is 
an increasing amount of skepticism as to whether the KNDR can be considered as 
evidence of a transitional justice policy, since the country has not witnessed a 
substantive transition since 2003.  
 
II) Defining Justice and Reconciliation During Transition 
As a South African legal commentator has questioned:  
Can we have a [transitional justice] measure within such an unclear transition? There 
is more eagerness among the western partners and eminent AU officials to formulate 
a justice-seeking policy, but obviously the power-sharing deal between Kibaki and 
Odinga will affect capacity building for justice and reconciliation’ (interview with the 
IJR officer, Cape Town, July 15, 2011).  
 
Other commentators have also raised concerns about the issue of an unclear political 
transition. For instance, in his assessment of power-sharing in Africa, Andreas Mehler 
excluded Kenya from his comparative assessments in order to determine the effect of 
power-sharing on sustainable peace (2009: p.468). According to Mehler, Kenya can 




sharing and regime changes in Africa (p.468). Indeed, the predictable pattern of 
politics in Kenya has left many skeptics unconvinced that the measures for dealing 
with post-election violence can be genuinely considered as valid reasons for 
advocating transitional justice. It is arguable that, in Kenya, ‘the more things change, 
the more they stay the same’ (Cheeseman, 2009).  
 
The questions raised by an unclear political transition are among the critical issues 
that occupy the numerous commentators trying to assess the practicality of 
implementing transitional justice. As Laura Ariaza and Naomi Arriaza have noted, the 
main problems of transitional justice imply ‘a defined period of flux after which a 
post-transitional state sets in’(2010: p.206). Often there is the assumption that 
transitional justice is implemented immediately after a transitional period or a clear 
regime change.76 In reality, transitions can often be protracted and unpredictable. 
While there is no general agreement among the commentators on a rigid definition of 
‘transition’, scholars of comparative political studies are becoming increasingly 
interested in assessing the success of transitional justice measures in dealing with the 
past (Hazan, 2010: p.52). Ron Dudai and Hillel Cohen’s work on the Israel-
Palestinian conflict is indicative of this interest (2010). Both scholars have admitted 
that implementing transitional justice measures when the conflict is still in progress 
tends to raise eyebrows (p.228). However, several measures for dealing with past 
wrongdoings, such as those that allow both former Israeli soldiers and Palestinian 
militants to talk about their past atrocities, have been initiated by local NGOs (p.229). 
‘Many of these activities take place [under the] the radar of international observers 
                                                        
76  There has been further disagreement about defining the nature of contemporary political 
transition in Africa. While there is a general agreement that transitional justice is a legal measure 
implemented following regime change, the reality of transition in post-conflict society is not linear. See 




and may look surprising against the backdrop of the normally bleak report from the 
area’ (p.330).  
 
As Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne and Andrew Reiter have acknowledged, there are few 
scholarly writings that engage with the dilemma of executing transitional justice 
during an unclear political transition (2010b: p.806). As a result, while there has been 
an increase in international engagements with the field of transitional justice, there are 
various unresolved questions about the political transitions that have occurred in 
Africa, which need to be resolved (Bosire, 2006: p.3).  
 
An unclear political transition occurred in Kenya, and this requires a further 
examination of the relationship between transition and democratisation (Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2009; Bratton and Walle, 1994; Doepp, 1996; Joseph, 1997b; Ndegwa, 
1997). While the nature of democratisation in Kenya has been greatly disputed, it is 
understood that a democratic process is a continual process, which may be nonlinear 
as well as revisable, and which affects every legal and political instrument commonly 
associated with democratisation (Chabal, 1998; Ndegwa, 1998). Although the extent 
of democratisation in Kenya has been contested, there has been greater progress in 
political liberalisation, and larger demands have been placed on the rule of law since 
1992. This is apparent in further attempts to integrate Kenya into the international 
system, and to introduce liberal democratic ideas to Kenya’s politics (Pinkey, 2001: 
p.19).  
 
While Kenya’s transition was unlikely to be affected by warlords and civil war (as 




legacy, and consequently a weak opposition (Kihoro, 2005: p.147). Specifically, 
David Throup and Charles Hornsby argue that although the incumbent would retain 
control of the state, applying genuine political liberalisation was only possible by 
means of external pressure, which speeded the regime’s acquiescence to some 
changes (1998: p.15). As a result, demand that post-election violence be dealt with 
became a ‘constituent moment’, in which decades of struggle for greater political and 
economic dispensations paved the way for a debate on building a justice- and 
reconciliation-seeking policy (interview with a University of Nairobi lecturer no. 2, 
Nairobi, March 18, 2009).  
 
Burgis-Kasthala’s recent study of the contested nature of transition in Beirut and the 
creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has demonstrated that, while the 
country has not come to terms with its past by using transitional justice mechanisms 
in a ‘systematic manner’, the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2006 provided an 
opportunity for the government to impose a hybrid tribunal (2013: p.504). Hence, 
transitional justice flourished through the domestication of international legal norms 
and instruments when those in power ‘could not tolerate the murder of one of its 
own…billionaire property developer [Hariri]’ (p.504). In this sense, both Lebanon 
and Kenya’s narratives of political crisis created a sense of “novel needs” for 
transition, and did so by appealing to international norms (in this case, global 
transitional justice norms) related to their expression of peace and justice, regardless 
of their subjective definition of these terms.  
 
At the same time, both countries had seriously troubled pasts, and were trapped in 




peacebuilding that has commonly been imposed in managing conflicts such as those 
of Rwanda and Sierra Leone was similarly emphasized as being a viable remedy to 
violence during the negotiations surrounding the crisis in Kenya (interview with AU 
officer no. 1, Addis Ababa, April 14, 2012). The integration of transitional justice as 
part of the power-sharing formula in Africa’s recent election disputes contributed to a 
situation where there was an increased and transnational pressure upon the AU to 
address the issues of impunity and corruption (Killander, 2012: p.213).  
 
When the Kenyan leaders were occupied with brokering the power-sharing deal, both 
the UN and AU mediation teams emphasized the long-term nature of the 
peacebuilding agenda through transitional justice measures (fieldwork note no. 2, 
Nairobi, March 25, 2012). Conversely, the intellectual understanding of transitional 
justice at the domestic level in Kenya is evolving through key debates on 
peacebuilding (as is discussed in Chapter 2), as well as the changing of the national 
political landscape, which revolves around previous struggles for human rights and 
the politics of rights. In this respect, the attempts to deal with post-election violence 
can arguably be traced back to the fourth agenda of the KNDR agreement–that of 
addressing the long-term issues–and implementing a solution (see appendix 5).  
 
Moreover, as has been suggested by Godfrey Musila, the post-election violence ‘had 
the effect of resuscitating this [transitional justice] debate and refocusing political 
players on the country's troubled past’ (2009a: p.449). For instance, the establishment 
of the TJRC on February 2009 revealed the renewed urgency of this debate, which is 
‘itself inseparable from the wider political context regarding…reforms’ (p.449). Any 




including the TJRC, which would expose to scrutiny the overall structures of injustice 
in the country’ (p.450). In such instances, the ‘historical legacy, the dynamics of a 
coalition government and succession battles that come with it are already defining not 
only the ‘kind’ of justice but also the role of various actors’ (p.451).  
 
Nevertheless, the 1992, 2002 and 2007 elections could have been considered as 
political transitions if they had been followed by substantive changes (Barkan, 2011; 
Berman, 1998; Branch and Cheeseman, 2010; Harbeson, 1998; Murunga and 
Nasong'o, 2006; Long et al., 2013). The failure77 of the 2005 constitutional project 
and the return of electoral violence in 2007 can be seen as indicators that the Kenyan 
government is concerned with preserving its status quo as a power holder. However, 
the focus on the four agendas in the wake of post-election violence should be seen not 
as a transition, but rather as a continuation of the already existing struggle for 
democracy and human rights in the face of the unwillingness of Kenya’s ruling class 
to pursue political reform and justice. Kenya’s attempts to deal with the post-election 
violence through KNDR has created a situation in which the previous national 
policies for addressing underdevelopment, corruption, democracy deadlock, negative 
ethnicity and governance intersected with the post-2008 process of debating and 
establishing the transitional justice policy. In this respect, it is also important to look 
at the milestone of transitional justice prior to the 2008 crisis in order to understand 
how the previous attempts to deal with human rights violations have been subverted 
and diverted by the ruling class. 
 
                                                        
77  For a detailed discussion on the constitutional review project in Kenya, see Cottrell and Ghai, 




III) Pioneering Transitional Justice Before the 2008 Crisis 
Given the contested location of transitional justice after the 2008 crisis, it is important 
for us to look at the rise of human rights discourse that took place during the period of 
transitional politics between 1992 and 2008 (Gona, 2010: 230). This enables one to 
understand how the issues of human rights struggles (before 2008) and accountability 
that arose from the post-election violence became the face of impunity, while being 
simultaneously subordinate to it.  
 
Written in the context of increasing domestic pressure being placed upon the GNU to 
come to terms with its past atrocities, Musila’s works may provide some insightful 
perspectives on the past and present struggle for human rights (2009a: pp.445-64). 
Without considering the human rights and constitutional discourses that appeared 
following the political dispensation of the 1990s, it is impossible to understand the 
milestones in the development of transitional justice in Kenya.  
 
The viability of transitional ustice in present-day Kenya is connected to two major 
challenges that the country had faced in the past. Firstly, all political or legal 
initiatives to address the issues of rights, reforms and justice met with premature ends, 
or were subverted by the regimes of Moi (1978-2002) and Kibaki (2003-2013) 
(p.448). Various investigative and reform commissions that were either initiated by 
the government or by civil society succeeded only with the publication of the 
findings, but these were later abandoned or undermined by the government at the time 
(Steeves, 1997: p.32). As such, the reports that have been produced have been 
referred to collectively as a  ‘paper-protection mechanism’; the findings on paper 
looked promising, but the actual attempts to implement the recommendations were 




the causes of ethnic land displacements in the Rift Valley and the Coastal Province 
(during the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively) were subverted by Moi. Following 
the publication of the findings, Moi’s administration imposed legislative amendments 
to reduce the jurisdiction of the commission, and it was eventually disbanded 
following the 1997 elections (Mutua, 2001a: p.102).  
 
Secondly, while various demands have been made for greater reforms and 
accountability for human rights violations, there have been several attempts by senior 
members of Moi’s and Kibaki’s administrations to reduce the momentum of the 
reforms agenda with various personal vendettas (Musila, 2009a: p.449). Despite 
numerous promises made by the government to implement reforms and anti-
corruption agendas, parliament’s actual imposition of laws and regulations to this 
effect never took place, or were simply challenged by various court injunctions on the 
request of individual MPs. This constitutes an abuse of power and the legal process 
(see Musila, 2007). The purpose was simply to buy more time, and so the process of 
resolving issues related to reforms, corruption, human rights and justice was often 
delayed until the government term ended (Mati, 2013: p.237).  
 
Major reforms initiatives have been halted in order to pave the way for elections. For 
example, during the first constitutional reviews project (1995-2002) initiated by Moi, 
religious and civil society proposed a general amnesty (pardon) for Moi’s past 
atrocities in return for the incorporation of bills of rights within the suggested 
constitutional draft (Okuku, 2002: p.90). However, several MPs diverted this course 
of action by proposing a truth commission with limited powers of investigation, 




2002: p.494). Of course, the project never took place, as the Moi’s government was 
dissolved for the 2002 election.  
 
It was only through the regime change from KANU to NARC after the election that 
transitional justice found its intellectual strength when Kibaki established the first 
TJRC task force in 2003 to gauge public opinion as to whether the truth-commission 
was necessary. The commission was chaired by Kenyan born legal expert Makau 
Mutua, who was based in New York (2004). Kibaki also appointed the renowned 
constitutional Professor Yash Ghai as chairman of the new constitutional project 
known as Bomas (2007), as well as John Githongo to the post of anti-corruption 
commissioner. In so doing, Kibaki ostensibly demonstrated his commitment to 
reforms and justice (see Wrong, 2010).  
 
The results were obviously devastating, and reversed the progress that the country had 
hitherto made in democratisation. ‘Despite ninety percent of the Kenyan population 
agreeing that the transitional measures were a precondition of a democratic transition, 
the TJRC had to be abandoned because of the hostility between Kibaki and Odinga’ 
(Musila, 2009a: p.449). The obsession of both principals with the pre-power-sharing 
agreement in the NARC resulted in the failure of the 2005 constitutional referendum 
and the electoral violence of 2007 (Mutua, 2008: p.95). 
 
IV) The Public Perception of Government’s ‘Lip Service’: The Legacy of the 
Colonial State’s Resurfaced 
Given the failure of previous inquiries to address the violation of human rights, there 
has been a significant change in perception amongst the ordinary populace about the 




businessman, Mombasa, February 20, 2012). During the 2002 transitions that brought 
the NARC to power, Kibaki’s promise of transitional justice remained undelivered. 
The pitfall lies in the reality that the NARC did not only contain pro-reform and 
human rights advocates, but included former KANU politicians who defected for fear 
of losing their patronage resources and becoming subject to future prosecution 
(Lynch, 2011b: pp.183-4). Moreover, several senior politicians (including Kibaki 
himself) were listed in the investigation report as key suspects in the perpetration of 
the 1990s electoral violence (Kenya., 2004: pp.25-37).  
 
The failure of NARC to implement its promised justice measures strengthened the 
populace’s impression that politicians wear ‘the same shoes as the colonial master’ 
(interview with an IDP no. 24, Rift Valley, March 7, 2012). The failure to fulfil 
promises of justice owing to the commission’s shortcomings has been connected to 
the colonial legacy. The works of John Oucho that deal with the effect of the Kenya 
Land Commission (1932-33), give a vivid impression not only of the immediate post-
colonial period of land policy under Kenyatta, but also of the failure of the Colonial 
Office to award additional forms of land restitution or compensation78 to those whose 
native land had been confiscated by the state (2002: pp.71-91).  
Kenyans first learned that lesson in the early 1930s when the Kenya Land Commission, 
authorised by London, conducted what was the largest oral history exercise in Africa before 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It paid scarcely any heed to its African 
witnesses. Their first-comer land remained under late-coming, state-favoured, white farms and 
ranches (Lonsdale, 2008: p.310). 
 
As Lonsdale notes, the recommendations for these forms of compensation were 
ignored by the Colonial Office, which generated discord with respect to post-colonial 
                                                        
78  What is understood today in the literature of transitional justice as ‘reparation’ is not a novel 
phenomenon in the local context of Kenya, since the fact that material reparation for land taken by the 
colonial and post-colonial governments is understood as a reasonable compensation is based on mutual 
agreements observed by recognised arbitrators. In this case, the awarding of compensation involved 




land injustices. Hence, the unwillingness of the colonial office’s government to 
compensate those whose land had been taken by the state encouraged the growth 
amongst the post-independence ruling class of a similar culture of reluctance to 
respond to official recommendations.79  
 
This legacy of failing to respond to the land commission’s reports impacted 
significantly on post-colonial Kenya’s structure of governance. Those in a position of 
state authority tended to resist any measures–including the commission’s report on 
impunity and human rights violations–that were considered to undermine state power. 
Historically, the violations of human rights were intricately connected to the unlimited 
power of the presidency (in the old constitution), the corrupt judiciaries (appointed by 
the president) and the rubber stamp function of parliament (which was controlled by 
the president’s ruling party, especially during the single-party period). This created a 
cycle of impunity, in which the ruling class continued to abuse their immunity and 
official positions, and refused to admit their abuse of power to the criminal 
investigation. Consequently, this helped to subvert any legal attempts to prosecute 
their unconstitutional behavior (Smith, 2009: p.894).  
 
As a result, politicians were willing to use extra-judicial means of retaining power, 
including population displacement, torture, illegal land grabbing, forced eviction and 
the incitement of violence (see T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol IIA). The re-introduction of 
multiparty politics in the 1992 election and the regime change in that of 2002 did not 
prompt a more democratic or peaceful transition, nor result in suspects being made 
                                                        
79  The continued legacy of impunity that can be traced back to the colonial administrative 
culture is not to fully blame for Kenya’s colonial crisis. However, to identify this as the root of the 





accountable for past atrocities (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. I, p.72).  Consequently, the 
victims’ demands for reparation for past violations remained unaddressed. When 
these issues were resurrected during the post-election violence, a call for political 
accountability and the removal of impunity (which caused the systematic violation of 
human rights) became the main objectives of the KNDR agenda. However, the 
existing political complexities in building robust transitional justice policy in Kenya 
were heavily conditioned as well by questionable external motives. 
 
 
V) The Cautionary Tales of Transitional Justice and the External Motives of 
Intervention 
In Africa, the return of multiparty democracies, neoliberal reforms and the process of 
enacting a state’s transition from being a host to violent conflict to becoming the 
subject of justifying or having a peace process have reinforced the significance of the 
transitional phase (Mutua, 2008: pp.53-72). A further attempt to correct past injustices 
and historical violence by using transitional justice has been applauded as a pivotal 
step in effecting political transformation, democratic consolidation, economic growth 
and establishing sustainable peace in Africa (Clarke, 2009: pp.2-45).  
 
From such assertions, transitional justice came into being as part of the human rights 
language employed in international campaigns against impunity, corruption, 
economic mismanagement and social inequality (interview with KNHRC officer no. 
1, Nairobi, February 28, 2012).  
 
Rather than simply being endorsed by international society as a part of the promotion 




been hijacked by many competing transnational agendas (Mutua, 2004: p.67). ‘[It is 
within the] active domain of policy […and] practices by the United Nations, and 
supported by regional organizations, International Financial Institutions, bilateral 
donors, and specialized NGOs of International Centre of Transitional Justice [ICTJ] 
based in New York’ (Sriram, 2007: p.583). The increased involvement of the donor 
community, the MNCs, the IFIs, and NGOs is evidenced through their invocations of 
a language for human rights in their investment projects (Brown, 2009: p.400).  
 
Since the establishment of the ICTJ’s Nairobi office in 2009, nearly 200 Western 
investments in tourism in Mombasa and agro-business projects in Central Province 
have cited the normative objectives of transitional justice as preconditions for a 
greater transparency in creating a friendly business environment (interview with ICTJ 
officer no. 1, Nairobi, February 26, 2012). During the 2012 Trade Exhibition, the EU 
business delegates invoked Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)80 alongside abstract 
ideas of transitional justice, which raised serious concerns among the local 
businessmen who had been interacting with the foreign business community for 
decades (interview with smallholding farmer no. 2, Rift Valley, February 25, 2012). 
To the local business community, while the international commitment to resolving the 
2008 crisis is a welcome development, the ‘overwhelming’ and political debates 
surrounding the transitional justice options in Kenya have affected their business 
transactions with foreign business partners. The predominant business exchanges and 
foreign direct investments currently ongoing in the country have mostly been 
outsourced from the same Western countries who pushed for aid sanctions in 1992, 
and who have applied pressure for greater transparency since 2008. As such, the 
                                                        
80  For a useful discussion on examining the relationship between Corporate Social 





political debate surrounding the transitional justice options have introduced a 
‘language’ for providing the foreign business partners with additional conditions for 
manipulating the country’s troubled legacy of human rights and constraining an equal 
bargain and exchange with the local business community. This means that there are 
less business opportunities for the local traders who rely on concluding transactions 
with their western business counterparts (Balistreri et al., 2009: p.678). Without 
dismissing the potentially positive effects that transitional justice may have on local 
business confidence,81 the tendency to mix the actual priority of addressing human 
rights violations with the execution of investment agendas has reinforced the victims’ 
perceptions that attempts to address post-election violations through transitional 
justice only serve the interests of a few, particularly the power holders (interview with 
IDP no. 22, Rift Valley, March 2, 2012).  
 
The increased justifications for foreign investments through the transitional justice 
paradigm have diverted the human rights violations narratives into profitable agendas 
(interview with KNHRC officer no. 2, Nairobi, March 2, 2012). The invocation of 
CSR within the MNCs that are concerned about human rights violations does not 
address the victims’ demands for justice, nor does it attribute any responsibility to 
MNCs for the local population. The conceptual confusions of the MNCs about their 
human rights responsibilities has than reduced the vulnerability of the victims to being 
a mere matter of materialism (Radtke, 2012: p.3). As a result, the process of 
intervention to rescue victims is subject to the economic value of natural resources or 
trade opportunities that can be located within the conflict zone (Miller, 2008: p.281).  
 
                                                        
81  For a lengthy discussion of how the relationship between transitional justice and a business 





During the negotiation of power-sharing agendas in Kenya, the geostrategic interests 
of the Western donors became the crucial factor in determining the proposals of the 
UN, the AU and the western mediation teams (interview with an MOF official, 
Nairobi, March 24, 2012). Often, the MNCs and the donor community highlight the 
land claims 82 of the squatters and IDPs as a justification for funding the NGOs’ 
production of a report that will be used as the basis for a policy recommendation for 
the embassy in its operation of intervention and crisis mediation (interview with 
Kenyan NPI officer, Nairobi, March 10, 2012). As a result, the violation of human 
rights related to land disputes has been taken advantage of by the government and 
external actors, not in order to address the squatters and IDPs’ land claims, but as a 
means of serving the MNCs’ needs for land and property rights for their private 
investments (O'Brien, 2011: pp.17-33). The squatters’ original claims of land 
ownership have been ignored, and the court has met with considerable difficulties in 
mitigating the issue, since the contested land was illegally transferred and acquired 
with fabricated documents that passed between local politician and the related MNCs 
(Junda, 2013: p.7). A further attempt to scrutinize the MNCs’ fabricated land 
entitlement was hampered by the poor national land record, and the refusal of the 
district officer in Nairobi to be interviewed by the author (see also Manji., 2012; 
Southall, 2005). Meanwhile, the recent discovery of oilfields (Editor., 2013: p.1) in 
Kenya has led to an increase in the attempts of the Vancouver-based company, Vanoil 
Energy, to persuade the Canadian Foreign Office to direct its diplomatic missions 
towards assisting the Kenyan government in its legal mitigation of land disputes. The 
area in question is near to the future oil refinery hub, which has been named the Lamu 
                                                        
82  For a detailed discussion on the relationship between land tenure reforms and transitional 




Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transit Corridor (LAPSSET) 83  project (interview with 
Kenyan government officer; Nairobi, March 18, 2012). These land disputes are 
connected to the squatters’ claims that their land was illegally acquired by politicians 
and Vanoil Energy (interview with local squatter; Nairobi, April 3, 2012).  
 
On the one hand, Western diplomatic missions have emphasised the importance of the 
narratives of human rights violations and the atrocities of post-election violence vis-à-
vis transitional justice; on the other hand, the MNCs have taken advantage of human 
rights agendas in order to secure investment projects (interview with local MP no. 1, 
Central Provinces, March 12, 2012). In other words, the invocation of transitional 
justice is a process driven by the calculations of local politicians and by transnational 
profitable considerations.  
 
The transformation of human rights violations into private investment agendas has 
contributed to the creation of a predicament in which a discourse on violations 
becomes an instrument for intervention that serves the interests of the MNCs and the 
African elite, but not the victims (see also Bachmann and Honke, 2009; Bachmann, 
2012). If the external prescription for addressing human rights violations vis-à-vis 
transitional justice is taken with the AU’s liberal peace formula in drafting the power 
sharing agreement, the problematic possibility arises that the effect of power sharing 
could limit the implementation of transitional justice policy on a local level.  
 
                                                        
83  LAPSSET is the Lamu’s regional trade corridor that encompasses several hubs, including oil 
pipelines from neighboring countries. The discovery of new oilfields within the corridor’s boundaries 
is certain to trigger the development of Kenya’s first oilfield at Bargoni; the nearby land areas have 
been historically associated with several land disputes by the squatters displaced by post-election 
violence. The oil discovery has lead to the first oil exploration contract between Vanoil Energy and the 
Kenyan government. There is a serious concern among the locals that the contract excludes the Bargoni 




As mentioned, the liberal mode of peacebuilding in Africa has produced what Taylor 
defines as a ‘virtual peace’, which only satisfies the interests of the donors and the 
domestic African elites, but which is not strongly connected to the interests of the 
ordinary populace (2007: p.158). As a result of this virtual peace, the enforcement of 
transitional justice as part of the power-sharing deal has only produced a ‘fiction of 
justice’, which has arguably only served the interests of the local elite and 
transnational actors; however, it has not met the international expectations for the 
rules of law in post-conflict society, nor the victim’s demands for justice (Clarke, 
2009: p.40).  
 
For the Western donors, as long as the country remains generally stable, there is no 
reason ‘to rock the boat’ (interview with Canadian High Commission officer, Nairobi, 
March 6, 2012). However, the US Embassy officer admitted that ‘the ICC 
interventions have further complicated the US’ official stance in balancing a call for 
justice [in Kenya] with the US’ position as a non-party to the Rome Statute 
convention’ (interview with US embassy officer; Nairobi, March 4, 2012).  
 
While the increase in private foreign business interests in Kenya’s human rights 
records has complicated the transitional justice debate, a local political attempt to 










VI) Flawed Options Between Criminal Prosecution or Truth Commission: The 
Politics of Accountability within the Government Circles 
Following the establishment of the KNDR, the initial attempt to deal with post-
election violence was made with the establishment of the Waki Commission, which 
was responsible for investigating the facts surrounding the violence. By October 
2008, the commission had concluded its report, and had recommended legal measure 
for prosecuting those who orchestrated the violence through the establishment of a 
domestic special/hybrid tribunal (Waki, 2009: p.18). Learning from the failure of 
previous commission reports, the commission activated a self-enforcing mechanism84, 
promptly handing over the boxes of evidence and the names of twelve Kenyan 
individuals suspected of being directly responsible for the post-election violence 
(Sriram. and Brown, 2012: p.224). The recipient of the boxes was Kofi Annan, who 
chaired the AU mediation team in negotiating the establishment of the power-sharing 
government in Kenya. The Waki report was made easily accessible to the public, but 
the twelve suspects’ names were withheld. This juxtaposition in the release of 
information can be explained by two main concerns.  
 
Firstly, the suspects’ names served as a pre-emptive threat to both the factions of 
Kibaki and Odinga (interview with AU officer no. 2, Addis Ababa, April 15, 2012). 
None of the politicians from either faction could be seen to have any knowledge as to 
who had been listed as a suspect, as this would have placed them under immense 
                                                        
84  In the literature of the ICC, there is has been a great deal of discussion on the concept of 
positive complementary. To strike a balance between state sovereignty and international intervention, 
the term ‘positive complementary’ denotes the extent to which court jurisdiction compliments national 
processes. The court also has a responsibility to ensure the municipal process of prosecuting the 
suspects is conducted in accordance with international laws and norms. Waki’s self-enforcement may 
be read as positive complimentary, since failure to establish the domestic tribunal was followed by the 




pressure to pursue justice in a limited time frame. The government’s failure to co-
operate in establishing a special domestic tribunal provided the Waki Commission 
with a valid justification for handing over the sealed envelope to Kofi Annan. 
Secondly, the commission chose to hand the sealed envelope directly to Kofi Annan, 
rather than submit it to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC. This increased 
pressure on Annan to create a special tribunal, since none of the Kenyan politicians 
had enough confidence in the local court’s ability to provide justice. Instead, they 
placed their faith in the AU mediation team chaired by Annan as the most likely 
means with which to establish a power-sharing government (interview with the KAF 
officer no. 1, Geneva, November 25, 2010).  
 
The commission’s symbolic handing over of the sealed enveloped to Annan as a 
strategy for securing the local tribunal also served as a means of avoiding the 
consequences of the ICC’s intervention, as the jurisdiction of the ICC extended 
beyond the influence of Kenya’s ruling class (interview with the IJR officer, Cape 
Town, July 15, 2011). By passing the envelope to Annan, the Waki commission also 
signaled its disappointment in the fact that Annan had failed to secure the domestic 
special tribunal, despite having been directly responsible for negotiating the power-
sharing government and its agenda for addressing the causes of the post-election 
violence.85  
 
                                                        
85  The agenda for addressing the post-election violence was made substantively possible through 
the active engagement of Annan. Hence, the creation of the Waki Commission and the 
recommendations of the ICC had to be made through the authority of Annan after the failure of the 
commission to secure the local special tribunal. By doing so, the politicians could not question the 
legitimacy of the recommendations for criminal prosecution, as the recommendation of the commission 




However, Annan did not immediately pass the sealed enveloped to the OTP. Instead, 
he granted an additional third deadline after two previous extensions of the original 
(see Chapter 4). Realising that the Kenyan government had no further intention of 
keeping their promise to pursue justice86, Annan then passed the sealed envelope to 
the OTP (Rice, 2009). A consequence of this self-enforcing mechanism was to situate 
the ICC as a plausible authority. As Kenya is a signatory of the Rome Statute, it is 
legally obliged to create internationally recognised judicial measures for prosecuting 
any crimes defined by the statute, on pain of facing an ICC intervention. 87  The 
domestic special tribunal, given its similar features to the SCSL (Sierra Leone) and 
ICTR (Rwanda) was expected to resolve the issue of poor domestic judicial capacity, 
and was regarded as the best solution for meeting the victims’ demands for retributive 
justice (Murithi, 2010: pp.97-8). However, this tribunal was never created and on 
February 6, 2009, a parliamentary bill to establish the local tribunal was rejected by 
MPs (Wanjuro, 2009: p.1).  
 
Sriram and Brown have explained that, despite acknowledgements of the critical 
implementation of the Waki reports, the MPs voted against it for various reasons. One 
of these was their belief that, once created, the tribunal might have become 
ineffective, as had occurred in the ICTR (2012: p.225).  Politicians also believed that 
either themselves or their allies might be prosecuted, and that the proceedings could 
take many years. This was the case in the ICTY (Former Yugoslavia) (p.225). At the 
same time, the OTP extensively engaged with the GNU, attempting to convince them 
                                                        
86  The government’s promise of delivering justice through a local tribunal as part of the political 
ploy to delay the ICC’s investigation in Kenya was proved to be singularly empty (interview with AU 
officer no. 2, Addis Ababa, April 15, 2012). 
87  The ICC’s central aim is to support the post-conflict criminal tribunal. On the grounds of 
insufficient evidence of the post-conflict regime’s having a strong judicial capacity, the court has been 




of the importance of initiating the special tribunal proceedings. In this way, further 
ICC interventions could be avoided (Office of the Prosecutor (I.C.C.), 2009a).  
 
Disappointed with the empty commitments made by the GNU senior officials, Annan 
passed on Waki’s sealed envelope and evidence to the office of the ICC’s Chief 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, in July 2009 (Office of the Prosecutor, 2009). 
Following these incidents, the Kibaki administration abandoned further attempts to 
establish the domestic special tribunal, and declared that it would first focus on 
judicial and policing reforms (Wanjuro, 2009: p.1). However, the announcement of 
the Kibaki administration was met with vociferous criticism, as a result of the 
succession of failures that the TJRC task force had met with since 2003.  
 
In September 2009, the ICC’s prosecutor announced that he would pursue the 
investigation of the suspected perpetrators (Office of the Prosecutor (I.C.C.), 2009b). 
In response to this development, the government backbench MPs introduced a revised 
bill on the special tribunal as a private individual motion in November 2009, which 
was later boycotted by the majority of MPs (Jane, 2010: p.1). Meanwhile, the motives 
and the appointment of the TJRC raised eyebrows in light of the debate concerning a 
suitable method of trial for the perpetrators of post-election violence, and whether or 
not to focus on a restorative justice agenda (interview with TJRC officer no. 1, 
Nairobi, February 5, 2012).  
 
Having considered the failure to establish the special tribunal, an immediate 
establishment of the TJRC was owing to the lack of a coherent justice–and 




the best measure for dealing with post-election violence was hampered by the 
politicisation of the accountability measures. From the above discussion, it can be 
further suggested that the pursuit of transitional justice has been carried out in a 
divisive political environment (interview with TJRC officer no. 2, Nairobi, February 
6, 2012). As Musila points out, whether in relation to ICC’s proceedings, the special 
tribunal or the TJRC, the debate surrounding the measures for dealing with post-
election violence has been politically conducted in isolation (2009a: p.445). Thus, it 
has provided a false start for transitional justice options; these options are summarised 
below. 
 
Firstly, a choice between two types of the aforementioned transitional justice 
mechanisms (ICC and TJRC) forms the basis for what has been identified in Chapter 
1 as a debate between peace and justice; a choice between amnesty (TJRC) or the 
prosecution of ‘the big fish’ (ICC) (Kenyan Human Rights Comission, 2010: p.23).  
Such a deadlock in discussion reflects the ongoing acrimony between the two major 
factions (PNU and ODM) of the GNU, which has almost certainly affected the 
formation of a coherent justice-and reconciliation-seeking policy.  
 
Secondly, top-profile political and cabinet meetings held in an attempt to reach a 
decision about coming to terms with post-election violence have been conducted in a 
divisive political environment, and have affected the structure of national debates on 
reconciliation and unity (Musila, 2009a: p.450). This debate approaches the notion of 
justice from the perspective of contested and contentious ideas of negative ethnicity 
and the punishment of political opponents. At the incipient stages of defining a 




personal leadership crisis between Kibaki and Odinga and their power-sharing deals, 
rather than the immediate need to resolve the humanitarian crisis, population 
displacement and inter-ethnic animosity (Southall Consultation, 2010: p.15).  
 
Thirdly, approaching transitional justice as an instrument for pursing various political 
agendas, the PNU faction dominated the cabinet discussion on KNDR and opted for 
the TJRC without the majority support of the ODM faction, which opted for criminal 
prosecution (Musila, 2009a: p.50). Rather than representing the PNU and ODM’s 
collective commitment to justice and reconciliation, the public perceived that the 
competition between Marta Karua’s (Minister of Justice, PNU) proposal for TJRC, 
and Prime Minister Odinga’s (PNU) defeated bill for the establishment of the special 
tribunal reflected the polarised ethnic barons’ agenda for justice.  
 
The PNU, which were declared as the winner of the election, opted for amnesty in the 
form of the TJRC. They may have done so to safeguard their positions, whereas 
members of the ODM (which lost the election) preferred punishment to carrying out a 
personal vendetta against the PNU (interview with the US Embassy officer, Nairobi, 
March 4, 2012). This delayed the immediate need for national reconciliation. Finally, 
as the majority of Kenyans desire justice, especially those who were profoundly 
affected by the violence, justice within the national sphere seems to have become 
highly politicised, and has come to be defined by the fictional narratives of ethnicity-
based justice (Musila, 2009a: p.50); ODM voters demand prosecution, and Kalenjin 
and Luo communities are perceived as being witch-hunters of PNU voters, 




As a result, the GNU is unable to determine what kinds of justice measures are best 
for Kenya.  
 
Given the extensive ‘politicking’ attempts by the ruling class in Kenya to hinder the 
pursuit of justice, it is essential to briefly explore the critical position of civil society. 
While their presents in championing the discourse of political rights and civil liberties 
continued to be seen as an imperative in maximising the impacts of seeking justice 
and reconciliation, what will be argued next is the existing political debates 
concerning transitional justice among the ruling class in Kenya have somehow 
conditioned the limited operations for the civil society, thereby creates cacophony 
among local civil society during the contemporary judicial-civil attempts of limiting 
the ruling class’ politicking of transitional justice. 
 
VII) The Role of the Civil Society (CSO) in Transitional Justice Agenda: Critical 
but Unconstructive? 
Within the literature of transitional justice, the position of Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) is often recognised and cited as crucially critical and yet ambiguous in either 
influencing the national transitional justice agenda or increasing the public pressures 
upon the incumbent regime to implement the final report of the truth commissions 
(Rubin, 2014: p.98). This was not only highlighted by the few of the world mostly 
recognised truth commissions, such as the Argentina’s National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Person (Crenzel, 2011: p.75.) and the South Africa’s TRC 
(Verdoolaege, 2006: p.75.), but as well appreciated by Priscilla Hayner, in reporting 
the works of various truth commissions across the globe since 1974, 
the strength of civil society in any given country . . . will help determine the success 
of any truth commission. Because of their ability to generate public pressure to push 




in human rights monitoring, the contribution of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) can be critical. Yet despite the evident opportunities, the relations between 
truth commissions and NGOs have sometimes been strained (Hayner, 2011: pp.223-
224). 
 
Yet, as confirmed by the recent analysis by Lydia Bosire and Gabrielle Lynch, the 
reality is ‘mixed evidence’ in Kenya (2014), and further hinted by the national’s 
TJRC final report in May 2013 that the commission frustration with the level of 
commitment provided by the CSO only exacerbated the existing bad perceptions of 
the TJRC among the Kenyan public, foreign donors and legal commentators in 
regards to the CSOs’ attempts to “rescue” transitional justice agenda from the ruling 
class brinkmanship games in Kenya (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 1, p.154).  
 
Writing within the context of the 2003 TJRC Task Force headed by Makau Mutua and 
the more recent of the post-2008 TJRC works, Lynch and Bosire highlighted makes a 
contribution to the literature by providing an early case study of the Kenyan TJRC 
and the role of civil society (p.258). It also reveals the relative power wielded by a 
small number of vocal organisations, which can speak directly to the international 
community through their networks and contacts as well as to the Kenyan public 
through their civic education programmes, press statements and regular contributions 
to opinion editorials in leading national newspapers (p.258).  
 
As vividly illustrated in the previous section on pioneering the transitional agenda 
before 2008 crisis, the 2003 task force works that came into being after the 2002 
election were seen by many commentators as a key that defined the ‘unfinished 
business’ or eventually developing higher expectations among the public upon the 





While many of the human rights activists that fought against the systematic violations 
of human rights of President Moi regime was later elected to the parliament in 
aftermath of the peaceful 2002 elections, the 2003 TJRC task force and its 
recommendation of documenting national records of violation and injustice are itself 
subjected to Kenya’s well accustomed of political impunity that remained pervasive 
after the election, witnessing various attempts to bribes the 2003 TJRC task force 
officers and other CSOs that supports its judicial attempts to create the first body that 
investigates on the past injustice since the country achieve independence (2006: p.38). 
In short, three main reasons inmate why the TJRC was not created in July 2004 (as 
recommended by the task force), and only resurfaced after the 2008 crisis: 
 
Firstly, many politicians from the previous era of President Moi’s regime shifted their 
political alliances to the NARC (the opposition) in the 2002 elections and perceived 
TJRC as a real threat to their political positions, and similar negative reactions were 
resurfaced as well among the politicians that were later indicted by the ICC after the 
2008 crisis and perceived both ICC and TJRC as part of the international as well as 
national CSOs’ juridical attempts to sanction against the leaders and their political 
malfunctions (Bosire and Lynch, 2014: p.259). 
 
Secondly, as illustrated by Bosire and Lynch, the option of blocking the legal 
formation of the TJRC among the politicians ‘provided relatively easy’ since the 
proposed TJRC in 2003 was fictionally perceived by the politicians as a novel 
phenomenon in Kenya (p.260). Yet, the irony is that the establishment of the TJRC 




back then, including from the victims of human rights violations form the era of 
president Moi. However, the existing attempt of the ruling elites to sideline the 
important of having the TJRC was later exacerbated by the split political and legal 
views among the CSOs. Most interestingly is on the controversial claimed by the 
2003 task force’s report over the ninety percents supports of the public Kenyan upon 
the needs to establish the TJRC (p.260).  
 
Yet as Bosire and Lynch noted, the actual public individual views collected by the 
task force are less than 1,000 peoples, and the report itself ignored the reality of the 
‘regional’ or provinces differences in viewing the needs of transitional justice agenda 
through the establishment of the TJRC. Indeed there are wider divisive views whether 
the country needs to priorities the truth commission (as understood by the public 
through the idea of having the TJRC), or justice (as understood by many as 
prosecution through a municipal criminal proceedings) since 2003 (p.262). 
 
Finally, in the event of the international actors remained optimistic with the newly 
elected president Kibaki and his NARC government plans of greater reforms and 
democratisation and robust economic growth, have somehow demotes the immediate 
needs of national TJRC and hides the peculiarity of politics of divisive views of 
public and splits positions of the CSOs on the transitional justice agenda (p.263). This 
was especially the case as the government simultaneously undertook ‘radical surgery’ 
on the judiciary, established commissions of inquiry into corruption cases, introduced 
free primary school education and oversaw a period of relatively impressive economic 
growth (Nasong'o, 2005: p.75). Many donors saw the NARC transition as a success 




the 2008 crisis and how the violence is ethnically charged refocuses the international 
attentions on Kenya’s troubled past.  
 
As such while the post-election violence provided an instructive opportunity for the 
TJRC to be fully institutionalised, the commission takes bolder ambitious step by 
retrospectively probing on the historical injustice which is beyond immediate focus of 
the 2008 crisis. In, short the 2013 TJRC report and its works was build from the 
previous unfinished business and momentum chartered by the 2003 task force, and a 
centralise agenda on a truth commission, which personalised88 by Makau Mutua and 
few of the related CSOs while pitched their differences from more pragmatics and 
majority CSOs that fought for broader justice, including reforming judiciary and the 
old constitution in order to harness greater justice dispensation.  
 
This revealed the fact that there is more wider disagreement even among the CSOs at 
national level whether the country have affirmatively justify on the needs of 
institutionalising the TJRC, and to certain extend, reinforces the existing politicking 
attempts by the ruling elite to water down the transitional justice policy in Kenya. In 
the Chapter 5, I detailed the analysis that while positioning my disagreement with the 
TJRC official position to look at such ambitious mandates of historical injustice as 
transitional justice beyond the 208 crisis since this only produced a ‘paradox of 
success’, and an unintended consequence where the overwhelming debates on which 
                                                        
88  While the appointment one of the renown Kenyan legal experts based in Ney York to chair the 
2003 task force were regarded as a welcome development for the nation’s future of democratic 
reforms, human rights and quest for justice, majority of CSO’s with more rudiment networks of 
grassroots that championed human rights and justice have eventually isolated themselves from Mutua’s 
task force and he eagerness to institutionalised the country’s first truth commission. In the aftermath of 
the 2002 elections, majority of the CSOs in Kenya seeking broader justice and not limited to the 
dispensation of justice through TJRC per see. While the proliferations of CSOs since the 1990s lead to 
the stiff competition among these non-state actors in order to capture the wider public and civic 
attentions, few questioned Mutua’s task force’s final report and its methodology in the collection of the 




agenda to focus among the ruling class and TJRC officers have structurally sidelining 
the immediate needs of serving the victims, especially the IDPs. 
 
One of the important perils of building transitional justice agenda through TJRC is 
divisive political view of justice and reconciliation among the CSOs in Kenya. During 
the 2003 task force crusades lead by Mutua, the central focused remain on defining 
the legal framework at the national level through a having a mandate on truth 
commission that eventually leads to greater justice dispensation and constitutional 
reforms, especially the retributive elements of transitional justice. While his active 
roles in spearheading justice are solely based on the imperative agenda of the TJRC, 
in which later reluctantly supported by other CSOs who are more keen on broader 
ideas and inspections of injustice, the post-2009 agenda of TJRC was now lead not by 
those who previously associated with Mutua, but by the new CSOs network, the 
Concerned Citizen of Peace (CCP) (Bosire and Lynch, 2014: p.266.).  
 
In contrast, for the other ‘human rights’ groups, the disputed election and postelection 
violence served as a critical juncture that ended their previously accommodating 
stance towards government elites. These groups formed a separate network, Kenyans 
for Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ), and sought to expose election rigging, question 
the legitimacy of election results, document human rights abuses and hold those most 
responsible for the postelection violence criminally accountable (p267).  
 
The emerging of these new CSOs under the CCP provides new directions of the 2009 
TJRC which politically and legally redefined the pursuits of transitional justice as a 




than dispensing comprehensive values of justice, especially the criminal prosecution 
path of it that envision by KPTJ and, as understood well by the international 
commentators that worked on the truth commission issues; a renewed debate whether 
to priorities vague ideas of peace or justice resurfaced even among the CSOs and 
somehow mirrored the politicisation of justice among the ruling class, thereby creates 
a popular misperception among the public that justice and peace are two different 
things. As well summarised by both Bosire and Lynch, 
While an in-depth discussion of ‘peace’ and ‘human rights’ groups is outside the 
scope of this article, it is important to note that this distinction was embraced by 
CSOs during and after the postelection crisis, as Kenyans interested in transitional 
justice clustered into two main (and sometimes overlapping) groups, each with its 
own aims, approach and niche in the market of social change. Both groups advocated 
for peace and justice, but from different angles. Roughly, the former, which seemed 
to coalesce around the new CCP network, focused on reconciliation and coexistence, 
while the latter documented violations of human rights as they were going on and 
emphasized the importance of tackling Kenya’s culture of impunity (p.268). 
 
The imperative positions of the CCP and its predominant concerned of restorative 
justice, forgiveness and reconciliation compared to KPTJ that are more critical and 
nuance in their positions on securing post-conflict justice in Kenya is fairly 
understood through the CCP’s outstanding transnational networks with the former UN 
Sectary General, Kofi Annan in mediating the power sharing and transitional justice 
agenda; General Daniel Opande who championed the peacekeeping misisons in Sierra 
Leone; and Ambassador Bathuel Kiplagat who secured the credible mediation team in 
mediating the South Sudan crisis p.269). In return, these three diplomatic giants 
utilsed the CCP networks to secure a mediation team for negotiating power sharing 
government in Kenya, including an invitation to a world distinguished scholar of truth 
commission, Priscilla Hayner, which allows Priscilla to significantly contribute the 
provisional draft of the TJRC (p.269).  
 




agreement and its focus of transitional justice agenda were seen by other CSOs as a 
‘triumph of reconciliation’ or peace aspects of the transitional justice agenda. While 
KPTJ and those who affiliated with previous Mutua’s task force renewed their 
interests with an immediate priority of the criminal prosecutorial options, CCP’s 
realistic path to transitional justice institutions via TJRC sit very well with the ruling 
class’ preference on the restorative rather than retributive elements of transitional 
justice by the time the ICC start its probes on the 2008 crisis. This was evident when 
the initial draft of the TJRC bill proposed by the CCP was considered by the Ministry 
of Justice in drafting the legal bill of the TJRC for the first time reading or to be 
tabled at the parliament, and eventually captured the popular attentions of the majority 
of the Kenyan MPs who seek to use the national agenda of establishing the TJRC as a 
pretext to sideline the Waki report’s calls for a domestic special tribunal. Of course, 
the contestation of approach and strategy to secure transitional justice options in 
Kenya among the CSOs have provided the political leverage for the MPs to create a 
fictional and polarisation ideas of justice, triggering the initial popular misperception 
among the public on flawed transitional justice options. 
 
By comparing the way the ruling class responds to the CSOs contestation views and 
strategies during the formation stage of the 2003 Task Force and the 2009 TJRC, it 
can be argued here that while both are broadly defined as a restorative justice 
instrument (although they both recommended criminal features of justice), the former 
were unanimously perceived as a potential ’Trojan horse’ that ‘inspired’ further 
demands of reforms and justice dispensation, and therefore rejected at all cause by the 
ruling class and this was considered as a major blow to those CSO’s who fought for it. 




by the ruling class given the predominant theme of ‘accountably’ and transnational 
pressures of criminal prosecution, and therefore they have reluctantly endorsed the 
TJRC bill as an alternative to the ICC’s options. The consequence upon the CCP’s 
actual good intention and version of transitional justice was obvious here when they 
were easily being manipulated by the ruling class defiance of credible justice options 
in Kenya, either in the form retribution or restoration. 
 
Nevertheless, one important lesson can be identified here. The polarisation among the 
CSOs’ strategy toward defining transitional justice agenda in Kenya only provides 
further incentives for the ruling class to politicise transitional justice options. To 
certain extend their critical but not really constructive responds toward TJRC 
mirrored the CSOs operations during the bleak period of the singe-party democracies 
in the 1980s. In regards to CSOs and democratisation struggles in Kenya, as 
eloquently argued by Shadrack Nasong’o, due to the official banned of the opposition 
party activities before 1991, many anti-establishment democratic and human right 
struggles take its roots through CSOs banner (2007: p.52). Ironically, in the aftermath 
of the return of multiparty democracy have witnessed a tremendous registration of 
various CSOs into active political parties that seek to challenge the incumbent 
President Moi of KANU regime during the 1992 elections. This not only obscured the 
distinction between CSOs and political party but also, contributes to problematic 
democratic trajectory in Kenya since civil society remained subject to political traits 
and manipulations (Oloo, 2007: p.95). While the post-2008 crisis CSOs’ polarisation 
and frustration with the government have not resulting them to register as an active 
political party and to contest in the 2013 election, they have ‘provided a space’ for 




predilections views of justice, therefore remained inefficient to sanction the state.  
 
In addition, during the crucial period of institutionalising transitional justice options in 
Kenya, the CSOs demonstrated higher level of animosity by disfranchised and 
disengaged in more constructive manner with the TJRC formation, resulting a 
difficult task of justice and reconciliation, resulting their domain of civic and judicial 
activation spaces were malignly captured by the state.  
 
While the CSOs’ critical position are subject to wider academic debate, in the sense of 
the various non-state actors’ roles during the continued democratic struggles in Kenya 
(for example, see Godsater and Sodernaum), the heavy diversion of the CSOs and its 
isolation from constructive engagement with the TJRC have reinforced the popular 
depictions of the commission’s inability in pursuing its mandate, coupled with 
defiance of the ruling class led to its effective roles. Resulting a disconnection of the 
Kenyan’s truth commission from the moral signaling of the healing and reconciliation 
tasks that commonly were being associated with other renounced TRCs, like in 
Argentina, South Africa and Sierra Leone.  
 
The contesting agenda of justice among the CSOs have revealed the state-society 
competition between the ruling class and the CSOs in order to capture the ownership 
of the TJRC and shifted its human rights exercise into a site of power struggles. Thus, 
despite the concerted efforts of individual TJRC staff and some significant technical 
achievements in terms of data collected and opportunities for selected witnesses to tell 
‘their stories,’ politically the TJRC process is widely considered to have been 




decided not to explore on their roles and contributions to the IDPs perspective on 
transitional justice throughout the author’s research. Given their critical but not really 
constructive positions, then there is a reasonable reason to bring the conceptual 
framework discussed in the previous chapter 2 as the way to locate the logic of power 
and ideology in contextualising transitional justice processes in Kenya. 
 
E – Conclusion: Bringing Power and Ideology in Understanding Transitional 
Justice in Kenya 
Throughout the above analysis, I have identified two major findings that allows me 
utilised the conceptual framework that I developed in the previous chapter 2 on 
bringing power and ideology in understanding transitional justice in Kenya, with a 
peculiarity focused on the IDPs in the next two chapters. These two findings shall be 
explored in turn. 
I) Transitional justice Institutions as the Site of Power Struggles and Ideological 
Apparatus of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. 
I have demonstrated that given the increasing interaction between multiple transitional 
justice mechanisms in the pasts of Latin American and various African countries, and 
considering the AU’s commitment to striking a balance between retributive justice 
and restorative justice during the institutionalisation process of the ICC and TJRC in 
Kenya, the ICC prosecutor wished to use Kenya as an example of how to end 
impunity or the evasion of justice (Office of the Prosecutor (I.C.C.), 2009c). Indeed, 
the prosecutor suggested a ‘three-pronged formula’ in September 2009.  
 
From the perspective of the ICC, the idea was to divide and expand the predominant 
elements of the retributive justice via the world court, so that the ICC would try the 




by politicians to subvert the criminal proceedings would be avoided. In the second 
phase of justice, the special domestic tribunal would prosecute mid- and low-level 
perpetrators who could not be prosecuted under the Rome Statute’s mandate. Finally, 
the TJRC would focus on restorative justice and on making recommendations for 
reforms, compensating the victims, and reconciling all Kenyans (Office of the 
Prosecutor (I.C.C.), 2009d).  
 
While such a pragmatic approach to executing justice is easily understood in theory, 
in reality the main impediments to it are not the idiosyncrasies of the relative types of 
transitional justice mechanism being debated, but the limited amount of jurisdiction 
they receive from the state. The shifting preferences of the ruling class for either the 
ICC or the TJRC suggest that their primary objective is to subvert justice-seeking 
measures (Asaala, 2010: p.389). As Mwangi Gthnji and Frank Holmquist admit, the 
political class became a constant hindrance to the pursuit of reforms and justice 
(2012: p.73). While victims were waiting for justice to be delivered, politicians could 
not decide which options least threatened their positions. Hence, the debate on how to 
build a coherent justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy is ‘more about politics than 
justice’ (Branch, 2012). ‘The variety and scope of concerns to be addressed by 
Kenya’s transitional justice process requires an inclusive approach that acknowledges 
not only physical but also structural violence’ (Musila, 2009a: p.459).  
 
A detailed analysis of the above discussions has revealed the heavy involvements of 
international and national elites, and CSOs’ participation during the formation stage 
of the two aforementioned transitional justice instruments. For that, to contextualise 




acknowledge that the theme of justice here is embedded in the wider political 
contingency of the society. This is to say that any measure for dealing with post-
election violence must contextualise the broader socio-political power dynamics 
within which justice is delivered. If transitional justice is a contested space, power 
relations between the major actors who are directly and indirectly involved become 
important factors in designing and determining the legitimacy of the justice 
mechanism, and in navigating law and politics during the uncertain political 
environment (see McEvoy and McGregor, 2008).  
 
However, international legal scholars have often ignored the political process and the 
agents, ideological apparatus and power relations that shape the dynamics of 
transitional justice. Ruti Teitel was among the first to argue that transitional justice 
should be counted among the ‘uncontested realms’ and remain removed from politics. 
Ironically, however, Teitel (2000: p.5) also posits the idea that establishing 
accountability in order to end impunity is driven by the top-down approaches and 
exclusive political projects of the ruling class, for whom the purpose of transitional 
justice is not to restore justice but to secure legitimacy for the post-conflict barons 
(2005). The Kenyan case demonstrates that the issue of justice is inseparable from the 
complexity of local politics, which is a predominant theme in the works of Burgis-
Kasthala on Lebanon (2013); Elander on Cambodia (2012); Hohe on Timor Leste 
(2003); Kelsall on Sierra Leone (2009); Thomson and Nagy on Rwanda (2011) and 
Quinn on Haiti (2009a).  
 
In the aforementioned studies, transitional justice mechanisms altered the hitherto 




period, as the process of integrating international jurisdiction contributed to the blind 
prescription of a one-size-fits-all policy. As such, transitional justice served as an 
instrument for securing or restoring the political elite’s legitimacy rather than 
addressing the victims’ immediate need for justice and reconciliation.  
 
II) The Question of ‘Agency and Structure’: The ‘Invisibility’ of the IDPs 
Through power and ideology, I have also displayed the active roles played by the 
national and international elites in mediating the transitional justice institutions in 
Kenya, but not on the missing of other actors or agents, namely the IDPs; the location 
of a critical agency or agent.  
 
My critiqued will be likely argued that due to the my CLS stance, I might have taken 
a reductionist approach in viewing transitional justice or law as subject to political 
instrument of those who wielded the power; a notion of sovereignty. 89  While a 
positive appreciation goes to those genuinely concerted their efforts in restoring 
justice and reconciliation in Kenya, one should be able to be fairly critical in 
questioning the meaning of this legal dynamics to the victims of the 2008 crisis. 
Indeed, this pragmatic approach would fairly considered in Kofi Anan’s thought when 
he urged the Kenyans not to vote for the ICC’s indictees, nearly five years after he 
chaired the first mediation meeting that established the power sharing government 
(BBC News, 2012).  
 
                                                        
89  In general, a perspective that law tends to serve as an instrument of power politics were 
synonym with the political realism traditions (see Morgenthau, 1948), as well as the American legal 
realism (see Altman, 1986) and to certain extends, have been widely used by the legal positivism to 
counter CLS’ rejections of law as neutral from politics while both American legal realism and CLS do 
not necessarily shared similar views on this positions. While CLS reject the absolute distinction 
between law and politics, they views the nature of the relations is dialectical but not necessarily equal 




For that, creating a standard setting on the rules of law and human rights through 
transitional justice policy cannot be simply justified as a successful story of resolving 
the crisis, or as an absolute indicator for considering the ruling class’ commitment to 
justice and reconciliation (Garcia-Godos and Sriram, 2013: p.38). Yet, from the 
perspective of those who suffered from the gross violation of human rights, we should 
be able to at least to reveal an indication of the conflicting parties’ commitment to 
justice.  
 
While a continued praised should goes to those who have made a substantive efforts 
in institutionalising the legal frameworks of transitional justice institutions in Kenya, 
a continued inquiry need to be affirmatively explained why the gap still appear 
between the normative framework of the rules of law that had been layout and the 
actual realisation of the transitional justice mandate upon the victims (for example, 
see Satkunanathan, 2014). Without venturing into a deeper philosophical inquiry of 
the different between ‘law’ and ‘justice’ like the one that precisely understood in St 
Augustine’s maxim that ‘unjust law is not a law at all’ (1993: p.15), it is a common 
sense to anyone, including those IDPs that I have met, that while a robust legal 
framework of transitional justice through ICC’s active engagements and TJRC 
parliamentary bills and its ambitious formations is a precondition to path of justice, it 
does not neutrally lead to the acquiesces justice either in the form of retribution or 
restoration. 
 
 However, I do not intend to naively view transitional justice processes in Kenya as 




relations not binary but dialectic90, and requiring us to recognise the position of the 
agency in the interplay between law and politics in analysing transitional justice 
institutions in Kenya, and this allows me to highlight the missing jigsaw puzzle of 
recognizing the imperative roles of the agents in understanding transitional justice 
processes in Kenya; in this case, my focused will be on the location of the IDPs as one 
of the victims of human rights or subaltern agent. This brings my attention to the 
question of agency and structure in social science. 
 
The debate on agency and structure in recent scholarship in IR and transitional justice 
is well documented in Tony Lang’s Punishment, Justice and International Relations: 
Ethics and order after the Post-Cold War (2008) and Phil Clark’s observation of 
victim perspective as an agent in transitional justice processes in Rwanda (2014). 
Accordingly, what is broadly understood, as an actor in IR literature can be similarly 
termed as an agency/agency in broader debate of social sciences, 
At it core, agency is the capacity to change the world. This capacity, however, is not 
simply a psychical characteristic; a hurricane changes the world, but we do not 
conventionally describe a hurricane as having agency. Rather, agency connects the 
psychical capacity to change with either an analytical or evaluative dimension (Lang, 
2008: p.48). 
 
The longstanding ‘structure–agency’ debate in the social sciences centres on the 
ability of individuals to determine autonomously their own actions and destinies 
within social, political, cultural and economic constraints (Clark, 2014: p.194).  
 
In short, the sociological debates on agency-structure have gained prominence 
location in IR scholarship through the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of 
                                                        
90  In this thesis, I used the word ‘dialectic’ as a philosophical expression on how we could 
reconciles two or more opposing views on the relations between law and politics. I borrowed this 
termed from the Hegelian dialectic, in which the assumption that law remain separated from politics is 
the thesis, and all law equal to politics will be the antithesis. Therefore, my pragmatic views or 
synthesis would suggests that the relations between law and politics are dialectic or constituting each 
other: while law is not equal to politics, but political considerations constitutes certain legal 
predispositions, as well certain political values conditioned certain legal interpretations with or without 
intentions. I build this understanding based on a combination two different CLS’ tradition of Holmes’s 




International Politics (1979). Waltz argued that IR analysis is best explained at the 
systematic level, or ‘structure’ of the international system. Developing his ideas on 
neorealism, he further concluded that the anarchic international system produced 
agents (both state and non-state actors) who pursue the same goals of survival and 
national interest through power politics and alliance. However, the publication of 
Alexander Wendt’s ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’ 
(1987) launched more analytical engagement with the concept of agent in IR. Inspired 
by Marxist Critical Theory and in responded to the Waltz’s reductionist stands, Wendt 
along with other Constructivist theorist, argues that Waltz’s neorealist failed to 
recognise how the intentions, preference, values and ideas that agents promote result 
not just from their internal properties but also from the social structures within which 
they operate. Hence, the predominant views of Constructivist views that agent do 
exist independently from the structure in which they operate, but they are partly 
conceived by those structure. It is also important to acknowledge that the above 
depictions of a general debate on agency-structure in IR draws from a deeper 
philosophical linages of three major competing theories in social sciences as follows: 
 
 Firstly, the structuralism perspective based on the scholarship of Emile 
Durkheim in highlighting the vital role of ‘social facts’ that structure, organise 
and constraint individual behavior (agent). In Rules of the Sociological 
Method, Durkheim argues that social facts are ‘collective habbits [that] find 
expression in definite forms [such as] legal rules, moral obligations, popular 
proverbs, social conventions, etc’ which emphasise that the ‘structure’ of the 
society (1938: p.45.), rather than independent individual choice eventually 





 Second, the agency-centric view draws on the work of Max Weber to counter 
the structuralist perspective, especially its perceived neglect of individual 
agency. In Economy and Society, Weber argues that we should understand 
human agency as ‘“action” insofar as the acting individual attaches a 
subjective meaning to his behaviour – be it overt or covert, omission or 
acquiescence’ (1978: p.4). Weber argues that individuals are not supine 
objects whose behaviour is determined by prevailing social and political 
structures but rather rational, motivated actors whose conduct should be 
interpreted according to the explicit or implicit meanings they ascribe to it. 
 
 Third, various authors have attempted to bridge the divide between 
structuralist and agency-centric theories by emphasising a dialectical, rather 
than binary, relationship between structure and agency. Anthony Giddens 
proposes the ‘duality of structure’ in which ‘the structural properties of social 
systems are both medium and outcome of practices that recursively organize’ 
(1984: p.25). Giddens argues that individuals act within prevailing social 
structures, rules and conditions, while actively shaping these, such that we 
should view structures as ‘more “internal” than exterior to [individuals’] 
activities’ (p.25). However, as various critics have argued, Giddens’ theory 
still preferences individual agency over structural constraints, viewing the 
latter as fundamentally an expression of the former (for example, see Archer, 
1982). In the process, Giddens appears to overstate individuals’ ability to 






A second major attempt to combine structure and agency within a single theoretical 
framework is Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’. In Bourdieu’s theory, the 
‘habitus’ – roughly akin to agency – constitutes ‘socialized subjectivity’, a deep 
embodiment of the ‘field’ (or structures) within which it exists (1992: p. 126). 
Bourdieu’s theory of the dialectical relationship between structure and agency echoes 
Giddens’ theory but emphasises the extent to which structure is deeply embedded 
from the outset within the identity and behaviour of individual agency. Like Giddens, 
Bourdieu usefully shifts the discussion beyond the strict separation of structure and 
agency but, in doing so, has garnered justifiable criticism. Where Giddens’ dialectical 
theory overstates the role and influence of agency, Bourdieu overstates the importance 
of structure. In arguing that the habitus is so heavily socially constituted by the field – 
that structure so profoundly defines agency – Bourdieu, like Giddens, is at risk of 
conflating the two. 
 
In this thesis attempts to appreciate the position of the IDPs as an agent/agency, the 
theoretical starting-point for the analysis of the position of the IDPs in the next two 
chapters therefore is that we should be wary of reductionist empirical examinations of 
the Durkheimian or Weberian variety that explore only structure or agency, and 
should focus instead on their complex intersections. This dialectical approach – which 
echoes Clark’s recent examination in Rwandan transitional justice institutions (Clark, 
2014) and Newbury and Newbury’s call (2000) for examinations of ‘the interaction of 
local agency with elite policy’ – is arguably central to the analysis of IDPs perspective 





While the aimed of this thesis to highlight the ‘invisibility’ of the IDPs’ as an agency 
in illuminating how politically unsuccessful is the transitional justice institutions in 
addressing the needs of justice and reconciliation, we should considers their subaltern 
positions and complex intersections with the structure (the Kenyan state system, elite 
policy and ruling class as part of the international system). Thus, drawing from the 
growing body literature on transitional in Kenya (Bosire, 2009; Brown and Sriram, 
2012; Igwe, 2012; Kimundi, 2011; Lynch and Zgonec-Rozej, 2013; Lynch, 
2012/2013; 2010b; Musila, 2009a; Murithi and Ngari, 2011; 2010; Nmaju, 2009; 
Opalo, 2012; Sriram. and Brown, 2012; Waweru, 2010) and the author’s personal 
interactions with various actors in Kenya , the analysis (in the next Chapters 4 and 5) 
focuses on the behavior and responses of IDPs to the politics of justice. This may help 
to illuminate the relative failure or success of transitional justice mechanisms in 
coming to terms with its past sin of election violence, and to provide some new 






Chapter 4: ‘ICC for the Big Man, But Not For Us’91: The IDPs’ Everyday Narratives of 
Resistance to the ICC’s Proceedings 
 
‘The ICC need to distinguish victor’s justice from survivors’ justice. In avoiding the pitfalls of Nuremberg, 
in beginning to establish a credible regime of international justice, the ICC must decide whether it is truly 
the court of last resort, or a court that resorts to the whims of the powerful.’ (Mahmood Mamdani, 
Distinguished Professor of African Politics) 
 
A – Introduction 
Chapter 2 has provided an epistemological discussion of the interaction between Transitional 
Justice and liberal peacebuilding through power-sharing arrangements. In addition, the 
discussion also expands the theoretical analysis of accountability, and examines how the 
attempt to establish criminal accountability through transitional justice mechanisms was 
countered by an entrenched culture of impunity. As such, Chapter 2 suggests a conceptual 
framework for understanding power and ideology in relation to locate transitional justice 
processes and institutions in Kenya. As a consequence to the legal and political theories 
surveyed in that Chapter 2, the previous Chapter 3 has elucidated that such an interaction 
evidently occurred in Kenya’s attempts to end post-election violence with transitional justice 
agenda.  
 
The discussion of this chapter is concerned with the perspectives and narratives of residents of 
Kenya’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)’ camps, or of those who formerly lived at the 
camps, particularly in relation to the shortcomings of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s 
intervention and its failure to advance criminal accountability. This chapter argues that, while 
                                                        
91  Interview with IDP no. 39, Rift Valley, March 2, 2013 
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the ICC’s engagement in Kenya is necessary92 to combating impunity, the ICC’s positive 
contributions are limited93 in the sense that they do not address the victims’ needs to be able to 
live a normal life and to be reintegrated into society. Therefore the ICC has failed to perform 
the basic functions for which it was created; namely, those of deterrence and retributive justice 
(Smidt, 2001: p.178).  
 
The ICC’s proceedings have failed to deter the suspects (see Table 4.1), and their political 
influence has increased the widespread sense of insecurity among IDPs. This challenges the 
generic assumption of the former ICC prosecutor that the court would deter any further 
outbreaks of political violence in Kenya (Corder, 2013). While the ICC has prevented electoral 
violence from being repeated during the 2013 election, it has failed to normalise the IDPs 
livelihood, since the ICC’s proceedings have exacerbated ethnic hostilities and made more 
Kenyan citizens vulnerable to violence (see Carrier and Kochore, 2014; Lynch, 2013a; 
Ombati, 2013; Patinkin, 2013).  
 
To avoid the threat of violence from militias connected to the ICC’s suspects (see Henningsen 
and Jones, 2013; Kagwanja, 2009; Peters, 2011; Waki, 2009), the IDPs employed methods of 
‘everyday resistance’. These later developed into acts of political protest against the ICC, such 
as the IDPs’ strategy of voting for election candidates who were ‘big fish’ or indictees 
(fieldwork note no.4, Rift Valley, April 7, 2013).  
                                                        
92  By ‘necessary’, it is meant that the ICC’s intervention in Kenya is an indispensable requirement for 
instituting law and order, and cannot be replaced by the alternative local measures advocated by the Kenyan 
government. However, the ongoing debate on justice renders the processes of the ICC effective to a certain 
extent, in that the ICC concerns itself solely with members of the ruling class. As a result, the immediate needs of 
the victim are overlooked. See Oku, 2010   




While the ICC’s crusade against impunity is a welcome development for many of those who 
reside in conflict zones in Africa (Waddell and Clark, 2008: p.70), there is a widening gap 
between the ICC’s understanding of how justice should be administered and the everyday 
narrative of justice at the IDP camps in Kenya (Nmaju, 2009: p.91). Instead of fulfilling its 
primary function of ‘retributive justice’ (as it has been extensively defined in the Preamble of 
the Rome Statute) (Ghandi, 2012: p.149), the ICC has become an instrument for advancing a 
specific form of knowledge94 about the politics of human rights, peace and justice, which does 
not address the actual needs of the victims who reside in the IDP camps. This knowledge is 
characterised by the mode of interaction between the ICC and the Kenyan ruling class. It is the 
exclusivity of such hostile interactions that removes the victims’ needs from the equation.95  
 
If the primary focus of all the legal proceedings of the court is supposed to be with providing 
justice for the victims in question, surely there is an obligation for advocates of the ICC to 
                                                        
94  Here, ‘knowledge’ refers to the political construction of knowledge produced by the ICC proceedings in 
relation to the Kenyan victims, rather than the technical jargon of the legal processes. The ICC represents a 
politics of knowledge, and the contest between the ICC and the Kenyan government concerning the narrative of 
justice. The ICC claims to represent the victims in its attempts to establish political accountability and to end 
impunity; the Kenyan government stands for defending the ICC suspects from prosecution. Yet the victims are 
reluctant to take sides, since what they understood as human rights, peace and justice have been marginalised and 
excluded by both parties. Hence, the victims’ rejection of the ICC’s proceedings in the 2013 elections is not a 
sign that they are allying themselves with the ICC suspects, but is simply demonstrative of a reluctance to adopt 
any critical stance. The fact that some of the ICC prosecution witnesses decided to drop their testimonies 
arguably supports the proposition that the ICC’s form of knowledge and authority no longer represents the 
victims’ interests. For a useful discussion on the politics of knowledge and truth in Kenya, see Cohen and 
Odhiambo, 1992.  
95  A few weeks before the 2013 election, some of the ICC’s prosecution witnesses decided to withdraw 
their testimonies against Kenyatta (see Table 4.2). Both instances challenge the narrative of justice that claims 
that the ICC represents the IDPs, Starkey, 2013a.    
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steer the legal96 discussion of the criminal proceedings towards the recognition of the concrete 
needs of those who suffered from the violence to be able to live a normal life. The ICC 
ultimately attempts to achieve this goal for the Kenyan victims through its policy of 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). As this chapter illustrates, however, 
this obligation was never fulfilled. The result is that the IDPs have lost their faith in the ICC’s 
pursuit of justice and reconciliation, while the ruling class has become increasingly detached 
from its commitment to delivering justice for the atrocities committed during the post-election 
violence. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the nature of the IDPs’ understanding of justice, and to 
reveal the socio-political reasons that motivate them97 in their resistance against the ICC’s 
proceedings. This chapter draws from interviews with the IDPs, and identifies the various 
forms of everyday narratives and resistance among the IDPs that were later translated into the 
political act of voting for President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto 
during the 2013 election as a sign of protest against the ICC.98 By doing so, the victims made a 
political decision not to take the ICC’s side in its struggle against impunity; simultaneously, 
they also refrained from lending their support to the entrenched culture of impunity that ICC’s 
suspects represent. The victims’ decision to vote for Kenyatta and Ruto was simply one of 
many acts of political protest against the ICC, and its claim that it provides justice for victims.  
                                                        
96  Most of the Kenyan victims have no legal knowledge of the ICC’s proceedings. Their understanding is 
based on the politically biased reports of those living outside of the IDP camps. Interview with IDP no. 40, Rift 
Valley, March 2, 2013. 
97  The rationale of choosing Rift Valley is informed by the pattern of post-election violence that occurred, 
and on the basis of some groundbreaking studies, Anderson and Lochery, 2008.  
98  85 of the IDPs interviewed by the author decided to vote for Kenyatta and Ruto in the 2013 election. 
While they are not politically very keen to support the Kenyatta-Ruto alliance, they decided to vote for the 




The first part of the discussion briefly re-visits the ICC’s proceedings and its suspects in 
Kenya, and discussed further the uneasy relations between Kenya and the ICC, in order to 
highlight how the ICC’s focus on individual suspects has ignored the displaced victims. 
Additionally, this chapter locates and examines the victims’ everyday narratives of justice and 
resistance. This part of the analysis has been conducted on the basis of the premise that an 
understanding of the “social reality” of the IDPs helps us to understand their needs for justice 
to be delivered as a result of the interaction between government officials and ICC personnel.  
 
As such, the IDP communities provided three main explanations for their everyday 
understanding of justice and resistance. Firstly, there is the claim that ‘the ICC treated us like a 
property, but not as humans’ (interview with IDP no. 41, Rift Valley, March 2, 2013). The 
second mode of reasoning is embodied by the question: ‘why bother about the ICC when we 
are still living in fear?’ (interview with IDP no. 42, Rift Valley, Kenya, March 2, 2013). 
Finally, many of the victims shared the sentiment that ‘we vote for the ICC suspects to protect 
ourselves from those who assume that they know what’s best for us’ (interview with IDP no. 
43, Rift Valley, March 2, 2013). Accordingly, these narratives (see the Introduction of this 
thesis, on the section of the methodology) highlight the central theme of the victim’s 
perspective being neglected by existing ICC literatures on Kenya (see Branch, 2012; Brown 
and Sriram, 2012; Kimundi, 2011; Lynch and Zgonec-Rozej, 2013; Murithi and Ngari, 2011; 
Musila, 2009a; Nichols, 2013; Nmaju, 2009; Sriram. and Brown, 2012). This chapter’s 
findings are an attempt to fill the gap by highlighting the differences between the victims’ 




B – The ICC’s Proceedings and Its Suspects in Kenya 
In the second part of Chapter 3, I explored the key events that transformed the political and 
legal attempts to resolve the post-election violence into a transitional justice agenda with a 
brief discussion of how the Waki Commission’s reports lead to the extensive politics of justice 
and reconciliation among the ruling class in Kenya. This form of politics was implemented by 
the elite in order to avoid the pursuit of effective criminal proceedings from taking place 
within the municipal, legal jurisdiction of Kenya, producing dire consequences for the ICC’s 
intervention as the only viable option for implementing the mandate of the Waki Commission 
in bringing the classified names of the twelve suspects99 of the post-election violence to the 
attention of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC. However, the origin of the ICC’s intervention in 
Kenya began slightly earlier than the release date of the Waki report and its recommendation 
to trust the ICC as being a final solution to crossing the threshold of international criminal 
jurisdiction in Kenya. The following Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarise the criminal proceedings 
of the ICC and provide a summary of its cases in Kenya respectively. 
 
Table 4.1: The Chronology of the Criminal Proceedings (until December 2014) 
 
Dates Key Events Comments 
February 5, 2008 The Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) of the ICC attends a 
media press conference, in 
which he states his intentions to 
conduct a careful and thorough 
investigation of the crimes 
committed during the period of 
post-election violence. 
 
October 15, 2008 The reports of the Waki  
                                                        
99  While speculation varies, the original twelve suspects that have been identified by the Waki Commission 
have never been declassified. Chief among various reasons for this, cited after the release of the report, are issues 
relating to national security, since the identified suspects are big names in the arena of Kenyan politics. 
Hypothetically, their declassification may destabilise future attempts to restore peace and national unity in Kenya, 
as well as potentially inhibiting future criminal investigations conducted by the ICC. 
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commission are officially 
released to the public. 
December 6, 2008 Date of the first deadline. Just 
24 hours before the deadline, 
both the president and the 
prime minister declare their 
commitment to following the 
Waki report’s 
recommendations. This 
includes the establishment of 
the special tribunal. 
 
January 29, 2009 Date of the second deadline. 
This marks the beginning of a 
crucial period, during which the 
Kenyan parliament passes the 
legislation of the domestic 
special tribunal bill in order to 
provide legal jurisdiction in the 
creation of the special tribunal 
through extraordinary legal 
measures, rather than the 
ordinary criminal procedure.  
 
 
Unfortunately, no legislation is 
passed either before or after the 
second deadline. After the 
second deadline, the prime 
minister makes three attempts to 
pass legislation. Each of these 
attempts are made between 9 and 
12 February 2009, when the 
majority of MPs vote against the 
bill on the rhetorical basis that 
the Kenyan juridical system is 
incapable of implementing such 
a tribunal.  
 
On the third attempt, the MPs 
reject the bill once more.  This 
time, they chant the slogan: 
‘don’t be vague, let’s go to The 
Hague’ [referring to the ICC]. 
A few months after 
the second 
deadline. 
At the end of February, Annan 
grants the third extension, but 
on July 16, 2009 he passes the 
sealed envelop to the OTP. 
 
July 2009 On the instructions of the Waki 
commission, Annan hands over 
the sealed envelop (in which 
are enclosed the classified 
names of the twelve suspects) 
to the OTP of the ICC. 
Instead of calling for immediate 
investigations to be made, the 
prosecutor engages in a series of 
dialogues with the Kenyan 
government in an effort to 
persuade it to initiate a domestic 
special tribunal instead of 
dragging the ICC’s feet over the 
soil of Kenya. 
 July 3, 2009  The OTP engages in further 
closed-door discussions with 
the representative of the 
Kenyan government. During 
these discussions, the Kenyan 
government signs a positive 
complementary contract, in 
which the OTP grants an 
extension of the existing 
deadline until September 30, 
2009. 
The aim of the extension is to 
allow time for the gathering of 
sufficient evidence, so that the 
proceedings of the domestic 
tribunal can be effectively 
conducted.  
 
Failure to do this would have 
resulted in the automatic legal 
assumption that the Kenyan 
government wished to 
voluntarily surrender its 
jurisdiction over the investigation 
and prosecution of post-election 
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crimes to the ICC. 
 
Subsequent to signing the 
contract with the ICC, the 
Kenyan government makes no 
substantive effort to investigate 
the crimes and prosecute the 
offenders. 
October 2009 The Kenyan government 
attempts to replace the 
necessary approach of 
retributive justice with the 
TJRC’s approach of restorative 
justice. In doing so, it violates 
the contract that it had signed 
with the OTP. 
 
November 6, 2009 The ICC Presidency authorises 
the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the 
ICC to precede a case on 
Kenya. 
 
November 5, 2009 The OTP invokes Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute, which 
provides the prosecutor with 
proprio motu, or the authority 
to initiate an investigation 
based on the information about 
the crimes that he had received 
from Annan and the Waki 
Commission. 
Articles 12 to 15 of the Rome 
Statute provide a legal 
explanation of the ways in which 
the court can exercise its 
jurisdiction. 
 
The court has three main options; 
it can begin institute a policy of 
self-referral by the state party to 
the Rome Statute, which 
occurred in the case of Northern 
Uganda in 2003. 
 
Secondly, the court can opt for 
case referral by the UNSC, as 
was applied to the case of 
Sudanese President Bashir in the 
Darfur situation in 2009, and to 
that of Libya’s late President 
Muammar Gadhafi and his son in 
2011. 
 
Finally, there is the option of the 
case referral being made by the 
OTP; Kenya becomes the first 
case for which this option is 
chosen. 
March 31, 2010 The Pre-Trial Chamber II 
authorises the OTP to conduct 
an investigation. 
The chamber’s judges, Ekterina 
Trendafilova, Hans-Peter Kaul 
and Cuno Tarfusser, deliver the 
written ruling that the Kenyan 
case can be considered as 
controversial, since for the first 
time in the history of the ICC, 
the prosecutor had invoked his 
own authority in order to initiate 





However, Judge Kaul voices a 
dissenting legal opinion, as the 
ruling to grant the authorisation 
had been passed by a 2-1 
majority vote. 
December 5, 2010 The OTP makes a public 
announcement of the six 
suspects from the twelve 
original names listed in the 
sealed envelop, who he believes 
to be most responsible for 
crimes against humanity during 
the period of post-election 
violence. 
The first case is that of the 
Prosecutor vs. William Ruto, 
Henry Kosgey and Joshua Sang, 
who are mostly known to be 
allied to Prime Minister Odinga’s 
faction of the ODM. 
  
The second case is the 
Prosecutor vs. Francis 
Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Ali, who are mostly 
associated with President 
Kibaki’s faction of the PNU and 
the state apparatus, which are 
themselves structured around  the 
systematic element of state-
sponsored violence. 
December 2010 and 
March 2011 
Various Kenyan MPs attempt to 
table a motion to vote for 
Kenya’s withdrawal from the 
Rome Statute.  
 
The aim is to disempower the 
ICC and to remove Kenya from 
its jurisdiction. 
Parliamentary speakers rule out 
the motion, as it is considered 
unconstitutional. 
January 31, 2011 The Assembly of the AU 
endorses Kenya’s motion to 
place the issue of deferral from 
the ICC’s investigation in 
Kenya on the UNSC’s agenda. 
 
March 18, 2011 The UNSC holds an open 
discussion and listens to the 
Kenyan perspective on the ICC, 
in which it is argued that 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
would allow the government to 
implement alternative judicial 
mechanisms. 
Some of the UNSC members 
agree that, instead of the ICC, the 
domestic tribunal should handle 
the case. This is based on the 
idea that the ICC is 
complimentary to the state 
system.  
 
However, most UNSC members 
argue that the situation in Kenya 
does not constitute a threat to 
peace and security as defined by 
the Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute. Therefore, the UNSC 
members favor the ICC option. 
March 19, 2011 The UNSC rejects the Kenyan 
request without voting on it.  
 
This is partly owing to the fact 
that some members of the 
Justifications for rejection: 
1) The Kenyan case was neither 
referred to the ICC through 




power-sharing government in 
Kenya did not support the 
deferral request made to the 
UNSC, especially those allied 
to Prime Minister Odinga. He 
sent a letter dated the 13th 
March 2011, which requested 
that the UNSC reject the 
government’s official request 
for deferral. 
2) Referral consideration comes 
into effect only after a year 
has elapsed since the 
confirmation charges. The 
investigation had just started 
and the charges had not been 
confirmed. 
 
3) The attempt to reject the ICC 
proceedings by trying the 
suspects in a municipal court 
would have exposed them to 
political manipulation. There 
are historical precedents for 
this; many of the previous 
cases of extra-judicial killing 
associated with top 
government officials have 
remained unaddressed.  
March 31, 2011 Kenya makes an additional, 
direct request to the ICC to 
terminate its investigation in 
Kenya, on the basis that the 
OTP’s investigation has a 
destabilising effect on the 
government’s attempt to restore 
peace and security (Article 19 
of the Rome Statute). 
The court creates an additional 
appeals chamber to determine the 
merit of the request. 
April 4, 2011 The ICC rejects Kenya’s 
request on the basis that there is 
insufficient evidence to prove 
that the investigation conducted 
by the OTP affects the 
government’s reconciliation 
policy under the KNDR 
agreement. 
 
April 7-8, 2011 The six suspects attend the 
confirmation hearing of the 
charges.  
During the hearing, one of the 
chamber’s judges – Judge 
Trendafilova – raises her 
concerns about the 
‘inflammatory speeches’ made 
by some of the suspects, 
suggesting that they had been 
trying to incite violence in Kenya 
since the announcement of their 
names as suspects in December 
2010. 
August 30, 2011 The Kenyan government files 
another motion to challenge the 
admissibility of the Kenyan 
case. However, the ICC’s 
appeals chamber rejects it for 
the second time. 
 
January 23, 2012 The chamber’s judges give a 
majority ruling on the 
confirmation of the charges 




The charges against the other 
two were dropped. 
May 24, 2012 The four ICC suspects appeal 
against the decision made 
earlier, and the judges reject it 
again. 
 
March 11, 2013 The new OTP, Fatou Benouda, 
withdraws her cases against 
Francis Muthaura.  
 
The Judges terminate the cases 
against him on March 18, 2013. 
Reasons: 
1) The potential witnesses had 
died. 
2) Some witnesses were afraid 
to testify. Others admitted 
that they lied in their earlier 
testimonies. 
3) There was a lack of co-
operation from the Kenyan 
government, and a plausible 
case to be made that 
witnesses were intimidated 
by the government into 
testifying. 
April 10, 2013 The original trial date for Ruto 
and Sang is deferred to May 28, 
2013. 
This decision was made at the 
request of the defense team in 
order to allow more preparation 
time. 
April 11, 2013 The original trial date for 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Francis 
Muthaura is deferred to July 9, 
2013. 
The judges consider the suspect’s 
status as the 2013 presidential 
candidate. 
May 28, 2013 The second trial date for Ruto 
and Sang is deferred again to 
September 10, 2013. 
The Judges consider the elections 
that took place in March 2013, 
and reject the request to have a 
trial at Nairobi or Arusha, opting 
instead to commence at The 
Hague. 
July 9, 2013 The second trial date against 
Uhuru is deferred again to 
November 12, 2013. 
 
September 10, 2013 Trial of Ruto and Sang 
proceeds, and continues until 
January 2014. 
 
November 12, 2013 The second trial dates against 
Uhuru are deferred again to an 
unconfirmed date in 2014. 
Various commentators apply 
considerable political pressure in 
relation to: 
1) Uhuru’s new position as the 
head of state. 
 
2) The recent terrorist attack in 
Nairobi. 
 
3) Western geostrategic 
interests and the increase in 
regional political instability 
in East Africa. 
February 5, 2014 Lawyers representing Uhuru, 
the OTP and the victims meet 
to determine the actual date for 
Uhuru’s trial. 
None of the realistic expectations 
have been met. The outcome of 





Uhuru’s legal teams request that 
the OTP withdraw her case 
against Uhuru, due to her failure 
to establish a direct connection 
between the evidence that had 
been presented in previous 
proceedings, and the legal 
accusation that had already been 
made.  
 
The OTP also comes under 
heavy criticism from legal 
experts representing the victims 
for not revealing the actual 
evidence to support her claim 
that she does not receive a 
reasonable degree of co-
operation from the Kenyan 
government during the new 
investigation. 
December 5, 2014 The OTP of the ICC filed a 
notice to withdraw charges 
against President Uhuru 
Kenyatta. This left the current 
proceedings with the two 
existing and ongoing cases of 
the ICC against William Ruto 
and Joshua Sang.  
 
In addition, in relation to the 
ongoing claim made by the 
OTP of the ICC regarding the 
intimidation of her witnesses, 
an additional third case is 
currently pending at the Pre-
Trial Chamber stage. A trial 
against Walter Osapiri Barasa 
commenced on September 1, 
2013. Unlike other Kenyan 
suspects, the OTP of the ICC 
issued a warrant of arrest 
instead of a summons to appeal 
against Barasa on October 2, 
2013, which required the 
Kenyan government to 
surrender him to The Hague. 
 
The Prosecution alleges that 
Walter Osapiri Barasa is 
criminally responsible as a 
direct perpetrator, under article 
25(3)(a) or alternatively article 
25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute for 
three counts of offences against 
the administration of justice, 
consisting of corruptly 
The collapse of the case against 
Uhuru Kenyatta was expected by 
many given the extent of various 
political pressures.  
 
Consequently, this renewed the 
fictional sentiments among the 
ruling elite in Kenya and at the 
AU level that the jurisdiction of 
the ICC must be challenged in 
order to shield the leaders from 




attempting to influence three 
ICC witnesses. 




Table 4.2: Summary of the Kenyan Suspects and the Cases Progress 
 
 
The suspects Charges Status at the ICC 
William Ruto 
(the current Deputy 
President of Kenya) 
 
His position during 
the charges: the 
Minister for Higher 
Education, Science 
and Technology and 
an ODM member of 
the Kenyan 
parliament. 
Accused as a criminally 
responsible and indirect co-
perpetrator on the basis of article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome statute for 
the Crimes against Humanity of: 
1. murder (article 7(1)(a)); 
2. deportation or forcible 
transfer of population 
(article 7(1)(d)); and 
3. persecution (article 
7(1)(h)) 
 
 The additional initial charges: 
1. torture (article 7(1)(f). 
This charge was rejected 
by the Judges. 
 
He was issued a summons to 
appear on 8th March 2011. He 
appeared to confirm the charges 
on April 7, 2011. The hearing of 
the confirmation of charges was 
scheduled for between September 
1 and 8, 2011.  
 
The judges determined that there 
is a case against him on January 
23, 2013; initially, they decided 
that the trial would begin on April 
10, 2013. However, the judges 
allowed the defense lawyer a 
postponement of the trial to May 
28, 2013 in order to allow the 
suspect more time to prepare. The 
trial was postponed again, and it 
has been confirmed that it will 
commence on September 10, 2013 
at The Hague, and not in Kenya or 
Tanzania as his lawyer requested. 
Henry Kosgey 
(not a member of the 
current parliament) 
 
His position during 
the charges:  the 
Minister for 
Accused as a criminally 
responsible and indirect co-
perpetrator based on article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome statute for 
the Crimes against Humanity of: 
1. murder (article 7(1)(a)); 
2. deportation or forcible 
He was issued a summons to 
appear on March 8, 2011. He 
appeared to confirm the charges 
on April 7, 2011. The hearing of 
the confirmation of charges was 
scheduled for between September 




an ODM member of 
the parliament 
transfer of population 
(article 7(1)(d));  
3. persecution (article 
7(1)(h)); and 
4. torture (article 7(1)(f). 
 
The judges ruled that there is not a 
case against him on January 23, 




His position during 
the charges:  the 
Head of Operations 
and radio presenter 
of the Kalenjin 
(vernacular 
language) radio 
station KASS FM 
Accused as a criminally 
responsible and indirect co-
perpetrator based on article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome statute for 
the Crimes against Humanity of: 
1. murder (article 7(1)(a)); 
2. deportation or forcible 
transfer of population 
(article 7(1)(d)); and 
3. persecution (article 
7(1)(h)) 
 
 The additional initial charges: 
torture (article 7(1)(f). This 
charge was rejected by the 
judges. 
He was issued a summons to 
appear on March 8, 2011. He 
appeared to confirm the charges 
on April 7, 2011. The hearing of 
the confirmation of charges was 
scheduled for between September 
1 and 8, 2011.  
 
The judges determined that there 
is a case against him on January 
23, 2013, and initially decided that 
the trial should begin on April 10, 
2013. However, the judges 
allowed the defense lawyer a 
postponement of the trial to May 
28, 2013 in order to allow the 
suspect more time to prepare. The 
trial was postponed again, and it 
has been confirmed that it will 
commence on September 10, 2013 
at The Hague, and not in Kenya or 
Tanzania as requested by his 
lawyer. 
Francis Muthaura 
(not a member of the 
current parliament) 
 
His position during 
the charges:  the 
Head of Public 
Service, Cabinet 
Secretary and 
Chairman of the 
Allegedly criminally responsible 
as an indirect co-perpetrator 
based on article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome statute for the Crimes 
against Humanity of: 
1. murder (article 7(1)(a)); 
2. deportation or forcible 
transfer of population 
(article 7(1)(d)); 
3. rape (article 7(1)(g)); 
He was issued a summons to 
appear on March 8, 2011. He 
appeared to confirm the charges 
on April 8, 2011. The hearing of 
the confirmation of charges 
hearing was scheduled for 
between September 21, and 
October 5, 2011. 
 






4. persecution (article 
7(1)(h)); and 
5. other inhumane acts 
(article 7(1)(k)) 
 
The additional initial charges: 
other forms of sexual violence 
(article 7(1)(g)). This charges 
was rejected by the judges. 
is a case against him on January 
23, 2012. However, the new OTP, 
Fatou Bensouda, filed a notice on 
March 11, 2013 to withdraw 
charges against him after the 
prosecutor identified a substantial 
number of ‘severe challenges’ 
during the investigation, in that: 
1. The potential witnesses 
had died. 
2. Other witnesses were 
afraid to testify. The key 
testimony that the 
prosecutor relied on to 
build a case against him 
was that of the fourth 
witness (also known as 
Witness 4). During the 
trial to confirm the 
charges against Muthaura, 
the four witnesses claimed 
that they had a substantial 
knowledge of a ‘secret 
meeting’ organized by 
Muthaura and Kenyatta, 
which was held on 
January 3, 2008. In this 
meeting, the two leaders 
allegedly directed the 
Mungiki to carry out 
crimes. Muthaura’s lawyer 
challenged the credibility 
of Witness 4’s testimony, 
but the judges accepted it. 
However, after the 
confirmation of the 
charges in January 2012, 
the witness admitted in n 
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interview with the OTP to 
lying about some earlier 
parts of this testimony, 
and to receiving payment 
to withdraw it. In 
response, the OTP decided 
to exclude Witness 4’s 
testimony from the trial. 
3. A lack of cooperation 
from the Kenyan 
government, especially in 
providing the evidence 
requested, as well as 
access to witnesses. 
 
In response, the judges terminated 




President of Kenya) 
 
His position during 
the charges:  the 
Deputy Prime 
Minister and 
Minister of Finance, 
Chairman of KANU 
and a PNU member 
of the Kenyan 
Parliament 
Allegedly criminally responsible 
as an indirect co-perpetrator 
based on article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome statute for the Crimes 
against Humanity of: 
1. murder (article 7(1)(a)); 
2. deportation or forcible 
transfer of population 
(article 7(1)(d)); 
3. rape (article 7(1)(g)); 
4. persecution (article 
7(1)(h)); and 
5. other inhumane acts 
(article 7(1)(k)) 
 
The additional initial charges: 
other forms of sexual violence 
(article 7(1)(g)). The judges 
rejected these charges. 
 
A summons to appear was issued 
on March 8, 2011. He appeared to 
confirm the charges on April 8, 
2011. The hearing of the 
confirmation of charges was 
scheduled for between September 
21, and October 5, 2011. 
 
The judges determined that there 
is a case against him on January 
23, 2013, and it was initially 
decided that the trial would begin 
on April 11, 2013. However, the 
judges allowed the defense lawyer 
a postponement of the trial to July 
9, 2013 because of the 2013 
presidential election in Kenya. The 
trial was postponed again, and it 
has been confirmed that it will 
commence on November 12, 2013 
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New charges were later added 
by the OTP and accepted by the 
judges in March 2013, which 
included the extensive firing of 
gunshots charge that linked 
Kenyatta to the systematic crime 
(in Nivasha, Rift Valley) 





at The Hague, and not in Kenya or 
Tanzania as requested by his 
lawyer. 
 
As a result of the withdrawal of 
the testimony of ‘Witness 4’, 
which lead to the termination of 
Muthaura’s cases, Kenyatta’s 
lawyer requested that his case 
should be dropped, since the 
charges against him relied on the 
same witnesses. In addition, his 
lawyer requested the court to refer 
his case back to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, so that the admissibility 
of his case could be re-considered 
in light of the technicality errors 
made by the OTP.  
 
However, the OTP rebutted the 
argument that the withdrawal of 
the charges against Muthaura has 
no factual (de facto) or legal (de 
jure) implications for the case 
against Kenyatta. In response, the 
judges decided that the OTP 
should amend her charges against 
Kenyatta. By doing so, the OTP 
added the new charge of the firing 
of extensive gunshots in order to 
establish that the systematic 
crimes of Mungiki are believed to 
have been instructed by Kenyatta. 
From an evidential perspective, 
the amendment signified the 
OTP’s legal burden to fulfil her 
duty in presenting evidence to 
support the allegation. As a result, 
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Kenyatta was accused as an 
individual instead of a co-
perpetrator in all the charges made 
against him. 
 
The OTP decided to terminate her 
prosecutions against Kenyatta by 
December 2014, which was a 
major blow to the ICC’s crusade 
against impunity in Kenya. 
Furthermore, following the ICC’s 
trial, the judges insisted that the 
OTP decide if she wanted to 
proceed with her cases against 
Kenyatta given the substantial 




(not a member of the 
current parliament) 
 
His position during 
the charges:  the 




Commissioner of the 
Kenyan Police  
Allegedly criminally responsible 
as an indirect co-perpetrator 
based on article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome statute for the Crimes 
against Humanity of: 
1. murder (article 7(1)(a)); 
2. deportation or forcible 
transfer of population 
(article 7(1)(d)); 
3. rape (article 7(1)(g)); 
4. persecution (article 
7(1)(h)); and 
5. other inhumane acts 
(article 7(1)(k)) 
He was issued a summons to 
appear on March 8, 2011. He 
appeared to confirm the charges 
on April 8, 2011. The hearing for 
the confirmation of the charges 
was scheduled for between 21 
September 21, and October 5, 
2011. 
 
The judges declined to confirm 
that there is a case against him on 
January 23, 2013. The ICC 
dropped it suit against him. 







C - When the ICC Met Kenya: A Battle between Law and Politics? 
Given the complexity of the ICC’s pursuit of justice in Kenya, there are growing concerns 
regarding the bleak future of the ICC’s direction in Africa, as well as the fact that the ICC’s 
pursuit of its legal operations seem to be compounded with an element of political crusade. 
This issue will be discussed below. 
 
There has been an abundant amount of literature produced on the ICC since the introduction of 
the Rome Statute in 1999 (Bourgon, 2003; Ceretti, 2009; Francis and Francis, 2010; Linton, 
2001; Mantovani, 2003; Mundis, 2003; Picciotto, 2004; Sands, 2003; Seils, 2007; Zappala, 
2003), as well as on the ICC’s uneasy relations with African nations, despite Africa’s active 
involvement with the court during the first decade of its existence (Babiker, 2010; Bikundo; 
Clarke, 2009; Clark, 2010; Clark, 2011a; Ford, 2009; Jalloh et al., 2011; Plessis, 2010b; 
Tenove, 2013; Triponel and Pearson, 2010; Vinck, 2010).  
 
While some commentators have described the birth of such a court as the victory of 
accountability over impunity (Moghalu, 2006: p.15; Ocampo, 2009: p.12; Sellars, 2011: 
p.1087), the aforementioned literatures have revealed some of the shortcomings of 
international criminal justice, and challenged Hannah Arendt’s assertion that the discrete legal 
function of any international tribunal is simply to administer justice (see Arendt, 1977). In this 
respect, it still remains to be seen whether the Eichmann trial allowed Prime Minister Ben 
Gurion to accomplish his mission to solidify Israel’s national identity by invoking past 
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calamities (p.57). Only time can measure the extent to which a war tribunal can succeed in 
rewriting history and politics (Schabas, 2014: p.9).  
 
Even if one agrees with Arendt’s assertion that the primary function of a court is to restore 
rights, it is crucial to highlight Mark Drumbl (2007: pp.3-6.) and William Schabas (2006: 
pp.425-6) concerns about the growing number of non-legal functions performed by the 
international tribunal, as well as the extent to which politics has been trespassing on the 
domain of law. In this respect, the following remarks from Sir Geoffrey Nice QC are relevant 
to our observations of the ICC in Kenya: 
The doings of judges and lawyers cannot be fully trusted. This is not because they are 
inherently untrustworthy, but rather because citizens cannot afford to place too much of their 
trust in the workings of the law. The law has become something of a religion; the lawyers and 
judges of the international body that represents the citizen are viewed as priests and oracles, 
capable not only of separating judgement from argument, but of speaking the truth. Does the 
law merit this respect? Is it capable of executing more than its basic function, especially when 
dealing with large-scale civil and international conflict? (Nice, 2013) 
 
Interestingly, Nice was also hired by the Kenyan government in its legal quest to challenge the 
ICC’s intervention, despite the country voluntarily submitting her sovereignty to the court’s 
arbitration (see Table 4.1). His critical reflections on the ICC are in keeping with his 
reputation as ‘the devil associate’; his reputation precedes his legal opinion considering his 
defense of many of ‘the Big Fish’, or indictees of unspeakable crimes in the Balkans and 
Africa (interview with KNHRC officer no. 3, Nairobi, March 1, 2013).  
 
Regardless of whether or not Kenya has the legal right to challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
depictions of the ICC’s proceedings have been subject to various political biases, which has 
resulted in increasingly awkward relations between the African Union (AU) and the ICC 
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(Mutua, 2010: p.8). Assuming that Nice is genuinely questioning the ability of the court to 
‘speak the truth’, then it is easy to perceive that law and politics cannot be separated in the 
language for describing the ICC’s proceedings in Africa: 
Once you acknowledge that the role of the prosecutor has a strong political dimension, then 
you either solve it by getting a prosecutor who is recruited for political expertise and judgment, 
or you provide some other mechanism to provide political oversight for the prosecutor. These 
are my preliminary reflections (Schabas, 2009). 
The ICC insists, like other judiciaries, that it is not influenced by politics, but by the law. In the 
Kenya cases, however, both the state and the defendants’ responses to the ICC led to politics 
intruding upon the law. The defendants have used strategies of delay, mobilization of regional 
support, and alleged intimidation by supporters successfully to win the presidential election 
and to postpone their trials until after they gained power (Mueller, 2014: p.14). 
 
As it is irrelevant to what extent those who fought and protested against the ICC appear to be 
innocent in their statements, their perspectives provide a persuasive summary of popular 
political opinion (interview with smallholding farmer no. 2, Nairobi, February 25, 2012).  
 
While some may optimistically suggest that the primary focus of the ICC’s crusade against 
impunity in Africa is a welcome development (Plessis, 2010b: p.46), it is disputable to what 
extent it has reduced the perpetration of mass violence (Nmaju, 2009: p.83), and whether it 
signifies that Africa plays a leading role in International Criminal Law (ICL) (Bensouda, 
2012; Editor, 2012). Some commentators have raised concerns about the post-colonial 
sentiments shared by AU leaders, as well the future of the victims who still reside in conflict 
zones (Opalo, 2012). However, accusations concerning the ICC’s geographical imbalance in 
focus (mainly in Africa) must be assessed in relation to the admissibility of Africa’s individual 
cases at The Hague, rather than by adopting the naive perception that the court is reminiscent 




Evidence gathered to this date suggests that not all African nations question the jurisdiction of 
the court (for example, Botswana). Some, like Uganda, have only recently questioned the 
authority of the ICC, after realising that being a head of state and having strong economic ties 
with western governments does not guarantee political assurance that the ICC’s ongoing 
investigations in their country will not consider crimes committed by the state (Starkey, 
2013b). The recent situations in the Ivory Coast and Libya have further confirmed that the 
leaders’ involvement in unspeakable crimes indicates that the ICC may seem a viable solution 
to the moribund state of justice in many African nations (interview with the Canadian High 
Commission officer, Nairobi, March 6, 2012).  
 
Ironically, the ICC’s recent proceedings in the aftermath of the 2013 elections in Kenya have 
shown that even the legal task of fighting impunity is too difficult for it to accomplish (see 
also Brown and Raddatz, 2014; Dowden, 2013; Mueller, 2014). Structured by western 
geostrategic interests in East Africa, some major partners (especially France, Germany, 
Denmark, Japan, Australia, the US and the UK) have softened their tone in relation to the ICC, 
particularly when confronted with an increasing pressure to secure an “unholy alliance” with 
Kenya in order to safeguard their economic and security-based interests in regional trade, 
rebuilding Somalia and countering Al-Shabaab’s recent terrorism in Nairobi (Brown and 
Raddatz, 2014: p.12).  
 
While most of the western donors (except the US) are members of the Rome Statute, which 
theoretically compels them to establish a ‘minimal contact’ with both Kenyatta and Ruto, they 
 
 323
have adopted a diplomatic strategy in Kenya that is markedly different from that which they 
apply to Sudan (p.13). While both countries remain under the surveillance of the ICC, Kenya 
has been granted political exceptionality as a result of its continued “commitment” to the 
ICC’s proceedings (p.13). Indeed, recent works by Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz 
(2014) have revealed the iterative cacophony of western donors’ responses to pressures for 
democracy, justice and peace in Kenya from the 1990s until the 2013 election.  
 
While various Western donors seem to be vastly influential in introducing a greater amount of 
political liberalisation through aid sanctions, they have proven themselves to be reluctant in 
this pursuit. Additionally, they have sometimes underestimated the ruling class’ strategic 
options in defying the ICC (p.1). Foreign donors tend to defend their economic interests by 
opting for peace and stability, rather than by echoing the liberal cosmopolitan language of 
criminal accountability that sacrifices long-term objectives for democracy and human rights 
(see also Whitaker, 2010). This has resulted in repeated inconsistencies in their exertion of 
political pressure in their attempts to produce more desirable democratic outcomes.  
 
In this respect, the works of Brown and Raddatz can be connected to the edited works of 
William Brown and Harman Sophie (2013), which challenge the traditional, analytical 
assumption of IR that the passive condition of African leaders wield little agency in defying 
international sanctions and pressures. In confronting international pressure for Kenya to 
comply with the ICC, the ruling class has come to depend on donor funding or external 
patronage from other sources, including China and India (Brown and Raddatz, 2014: p.5). In 
such instances, the Kenyan government has proven to be very adaptive in countering western 
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diplomats’ calls for justice and accountability. The growing support of China for the Kenyan 
government has also caused western nations to reverse their official positions in an attempt to 
safeguard their primary economic interests (p.6). As such, the ruling class has been able to 
ensure that it receives a continual supply of foreign aid while it continues to impede the 
process of dispensing justice to the victims.  
 
Indeed, as has already been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there is ample evidence to suggest 
that the Kenyan ruling class (including the ICC’s suspects) has dragged the court more in its 
own politically zealous direction, rather than co-operating with it in its performance of legal 
tasks. For instance, the government had many opportunities to implement the domestic 
tribunal, as was suggested by the Waki Report and advised by the ICC. However, the MPs 
(including the ICC’s suspects) chanted the slogan, ‘don’t be vague, let’s go to The Hague’ 
(African Confidential., 2010). Furthermore, after the confirmation of the court’s jurisdiction 
over Kenya’s post-election violence in January 2012, the government spent most of its time 
and the taxpayer’s money in implementing its policy of “shuttle diplomacy”, abusing the court 
proceedings, hiring the best legal counsels to defend the suspects, challenging the court’s 
jurisdiction and declaring its intention to remove the Rome Statute from the 2010 constitution 
(Chapter 3).  
 
In fact, the most awkward and pessimistic pre-election predictions for the country’s future 
international relations with its western partners have not stopped the majority of voters from 
voting for both Kenyatta and Ruto (Fortin, 2013). Some have simply suggested that negative 
ethnicity has played a persistent role as a factor that allowed both of these suspects to unite 
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their ethnic powerhouses of support from both Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities (from which 
Kenyatta and Ruto originate respectively), as well as other communities that were profoundly 
affected by post-election violence. Consequently, this gained Kenyatta and Ruto the votes that 
allowed them to win (Lynch, 2014b: p.8).  
 
Others have suggested that it was the ICC’s indictments of both suspects that altered the 
unpopular status that they had held during the period of the 2008 crisis, transforming them into 
political stars. It was this sudden popularity that allowed them to garner votes, and to make the 
bold claim that voting for them would allow the public to voice its opposition to the ICC 
(Cheeseman et al., 2014: p.6).  
 
By romanticising the ICC’s neocolonialism, by criticising the UK’s initial refusal in 2009 to 
help address the long-term problems caused by the colonial atrocities committed during the 
Mau Mau uprising and by underscoring the UK’s rejection (as one of the UNSC’s permanent 
members) of Kenya’s deferral request, both Kenyatta and Ruto succeeded in obtaining a 
majority of votes (50% + 1) (BBC News, 2013). Inspired by the US’s tentative response to the 
Rome Statute, both suspects ignored the call of the Obama administration for Kenya to 
observe its legal commitment to the ICC (Ongiri, 2013).  
 
Yet to suggest that voters are illiterate and motivated by negative ethnicity alone is to deny the 
complexity of Kenyan social relations and identities (Shah, 2013a: p.9). ‘No single ethnic 
group comprises even a quarter of the country’s population’ (Ferree et al., 2014: p.3). Recent 
quantitative analysis by Karen Ferree, Clark Gibson and James Long on a sample of Kenyan 
 
 326
voters in the 2013 elections has shown that, while negative ethnicity remains an important 
factor that informs voters’ preferences and candidates’ strategy for gaining votes, its presence 
in the 2013 elections was less obvious in comparison to the four elections that have occurred 
since 1992 (p.7). Given the previous positions of the two leading candidates–Kenyatta and 
Rahila Odinga–as members of the Government of National Unity (GNU, 2008-2013), they 
were perceived by voters as part of ‘the incumbency’ (p.8). This resulted in an unlikely 
situation, in which the election–instead of being a contest between government and 
opposition–became an arena in which those who fought for justice and reform through the ICC 
and the new constitution (Odinga’s Coalition of Democratic Reforms, CORD) were pitted 
against those who preached economic growth, peace, stability and employment (Kenyatta’s 
Jubilee Alliance). This can be characterized as a battle between the ‘analog clock’ of older 
generations of politicians (Odinga) and the ‘digital’ age of post-independence, technocratic 
generations (Cheeseman et al., 2014: p.7).  
 
Although the final results of this contest did not plunge the country into another chaotic period 
of violence, there is no definitive evidence to suggest that it was not informed by a flawed 
logic on both sides (Opalo, 2014: p.11). Voters who supported Odinga’s position were clearly 
in favor of continuing the ICC’s proceedings, but the majority of younger generations were 
persuaded by Kenyatta’s vision of economic growth and his aim of increasing employment 
enlargement (Ferree et al., 2014: p.5). Indeed, even among the few middle class Kenyans who 
interacted with the author, many of these later confirmed that they voted for the suspects as a 
symbol of protest against the earlier appearance of Obama, Hillary Clinton and other ‘western 
hypocrites’ in the country, which created a predicament in which it was likely that the old 
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rhetoric of neo-colonialism would be ‘renewed’ (fieldwork note no. 4; Rift Valley, April 7, 
2013).  
 
To these individuals, Obama appeared to be a product of the American political system, as 
well as an embodiment of the ‘myth of the American Dream, even if he’s not white’ 
(Interview with a local businessman, Mombasa, February 20, 2012). Even after Obama’s 
origins were demystified after the 2008 presidential elections in US, some perceived him as a 
‘fallen angel’ who failed to realise his manifesto. By failing to close Guantanamo Bay, and to 
reverse the US’ position in the Rome Statute conference, Obama provided: 
a good example of how bad American policy can be, but it is worse when someone who was 
viewed by many (especially Kenyans) as a new hope only succeeds in reinforcing the 
stereotypes created by the global media: that those who are perceived as good Samaritans from 
Africa are only good at doing a bad job outside Africa. This reminds the rest of the world that 
there are few good people in it, and that there are more bad leaders in Africa, which keeps 
people constantly hopeless!  (interview with IDP no. 44, Nairobi, March 6, 2013). 
 
In short, western geostrategic interests and the ability of the ICC suspects to secure the 2013 
presidential trophy have limited the ICC’s function of deterring the suspects from engaging in 
further political activity that could counter its proceedings (Brown and Raddatz, 2014: p.8; 
Lynch, 2013b: p.5; Mueller, 2014: p.7). The next section will show how, within such a 
complex voting pattern, those IDPs who cast their votes in the March 2013 election began 
with everyday narratives and acts of protest, and later translated their everyday acts of 
resistance against the ICC’s dominant narrative of justice into the act of voting. While recent 
special issues of the Journal of Eastern African Studies (2014) dedicated to the 2013 election 
have extensively covered the Kenyan elections–with their focus on the “big man” and how the 
ICC’s pending cases enriched the existing discussion on the bleak state of democracy and 
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justice in Kenya–few critical works have articulated the perspectives of ordinary people, 
especially the IDPs, and their reasons for voting for the suspects.  
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter reveals the bottom-up perspectives of those IDPs with 
whom the author interacted over a number of years, and who cast their votes in the 2013 
elections. While political modes of analysis have a tendency to emphasise the spectacular 
dimensions of major events within a particular historical contingency, the IDPs’ everyday 
narratives, social history and acts of pacifist resistance to violence have proven to be more 
subtle and sustainable in confronting power relations (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000: p.9).   
 
Due to the complexity of the IDPs’ identities and political motives, the next section of analysis 
will attempt to reveal how the dominant understanding of justice among the national elite and 
the ICC is “oppressive” in its attempt to discipline IDPs with its relentless focus on the twin 
struggles of establishing accountability and combatting impunity. Even if the attempt to 
establish accountability were self-imposed, it does not account for the other dimension of 
justice: that of satisfying the victims’ needs to normalise their livelihood, rather than 
remaining permanently trapped in a twilight zone of displacement camps and becoming 
stateless people (see Pillay, 2013). The enthusiasm for these twin struggles was not shared by 
many IDPs, as the ICC’s dominant struggle against the national elite was politically structured 
by a top-down, imposed image of negative ethnicity and power relations. While the IDPs’ 
social relations and modes of exchange have been structured by existing forms of patronage, 
their narratives of justice and peace are best confined to their socioeconomic condition as 




It is very hard to foresee any possibility that our demands for justice and reparation will be met 
by the court. While the government’s efforts to hijack the ICC are minimal, we don't see how 
this ICC will eventually help us (interview with IDP no. 54, Rift Valley, March 8, 2013). 
 
The ICC’s progress is a welcome [development] considering the challenges that face us in our 
pursuit of justice, but since the intervention of the court our life in the camp has remained the 
same, as we have not resettled yet. I am not asking for immediate results, as we know that the 
road to justice is very long because of the difficulties created by our politicians. But why can’t 
we at least leave in peace? (interview with IDP no. 62, Rift Valley, March 10, 2013). 
 
As the deadline for the ICC trial approaches, the more I fear for the safety of my family, as 
people say that those who try to co-operate with the court [as witnesses] face threats from 
unknown gangs that must be hired by some big men [politicians] in Nairobi (interview with 
IDP no. 18, Rift Valley, February 15, 2012). 
 
Accordingly, these narratives reveal the daunting challenge of translating the ICC’s 
proceedings into the lexis of the everyday understanding of justice shared by the affected 
communities, especially those who remain vulnerable at the camps.  
 
As the government has been too “busy” with politicising the ICC’s proceedings, the 
dissemination of knowledge about these proceedings amongst the IDPs in Kenya by the NGO 
and the ICC representatives is almost insignificant, except for items of information that have 
been cherry picked by the mainstream newspapers in Kenya (Igwe, 2012). As has been 
admitted by those who worked with the ICC, its inability to provide fast-track information and 
its limited ability to counter criticisms about its public image from academia and the media 
have worsened the ICC’s already negative reputation in Africa (interview with the ICC officer, 
The Hague, February 12, 2013).  
 
Such a politicisation of the ICC by Kenyan leaders, and the meager dissemination of 
knowledge about its proceedings, have raised questions as to exactly whose narrative of peace 
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and justice the ICC has been representing thus far. Are there alternative narratives to be 
related, depending on the victim? Can we locate everyday narratives of justice and resistance 
within the IDP camps? As will be discussed, the majority of IDPs’ decision to vote for the 
ICC’s indictees does not simply suggest that they believe Kenyatta and Ruto are innocent (as 
is widely claimed by both), but is rather a sign of protest (fieldwork notes no. 4, Rift Valley, 
April 7, 2013).  
 
The ICC’s intervention in Kenya has only reinforced the victims’ perceptions that the process 
is highly political, and fulfills functions other than those of deterrence or retributive justice 
(interview with IDP no. 51, Rift Valley, March 7, 2013). ‘The ICC may be viewed as a 
rhetorical device, expressing international condemnation of horrific events’ (Francis and 
Francis, 2010: p.71). The remainder of the discussion of the IDPs’ critical reflections below 
does not simply suggest that the court should not be used to mitigate the effect of the leaders’ 
unspeakable crimes; rather, it shows how a more nuanced recognition of how the ICC was 
brought into play in Kenya has allowed the ruling class to shift the primary attention away 
from the victim, and how the ICC’s vague legal rhetoric of justice is misguided. In this titanic 
clash between the ICC and the ruling class, the IDPs’ sense of optimism about the realistic 
pursuit of the ‘justice cascade’ has degenerated into the pessimistic view of the “casket of 
justice”, or incapable of combating the ruling class’ practice of impunity.  
 
D – The Everyday Narratives and Resistance among the IDPs 
Throughout the author’s period of interaction with those residing at the IDP camps, the 
victims cited three main reasons for their rejection of the ICC’s narrative of justice, and 
described their resistance as being an attempt to construct their own space to which they could 
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escape from the politicisation of the ICC and avoid having to interact with ICC personnel. 
While they prefer not to be considered as victims anymore, the social stigmatisation and 
economic constraints heaped upon the victims prevented them from being able to consider 
themselves as “normal” in comparison with other Kenyans who did not suffer directly from 
the post-election violence, and who do not reside at the IDP camps (interview with IDP no. 45, 
Rift Valley, March 6, 2013).  
 
Generally, since 2009, those who reside at the camps100 have not been afraid of speaking 
against the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). Indeed, they have done so 
in spite of the fact that the local authorities in charge of monitoring the camps’ residents tend 
to threaten the residents and warn “outsiders” not to speak to them (interview with IDP no. 61, 
Rift Valley, March 9, 2013). The number of residents has decreased, but this does not signify 
that many former residents have been successfully reintegrated into society.101 Only a few 
have managed to return to the region that they originally came from before the post-election 
violence.  
 
The majority of interviewees expressed their intentions to settle at the camp permanently 
(fieldwork note no 2, Rift Valley, March 25, 2012). However, those who leave the camps and 
then return after some time incur the displeasure of the jemadari (officer or local authority) 
                                                        
100  The camps and the IDP camps will be used interchangeably. There is more than one camp, but 
throughout this chapter, the specific location of the camp being referred to shall not be identified in order to 
ensure the future safety of the IDPs. 
101  To this date, there is no official or precise statistic that determines how many IDPs have been 
successfully resettled. The numbers released by the government are also contradictory to the reports released by 
the UNCHR. Elhawary, 2009; Lynch, 2009; Robinson, 2011. . 
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responsible for monitoring the camps’ residents (interview with IDP no. 5, Rift Valley, 
February 21, 2009).  
 
The local population living outside the camps considers the camps’ residents to be watu 
wazimu (mad people), and advised the author to avoid them (interview with IDP no. 1, Rift 
Valley, February 09, 2009). Many IDPs are socially stigmatised and viewed as ‘unwanted’ by 
local Kenyans living outside the camps, who believe that the camps are full of petty criminals 
(interview with smallholding farmer no. 1, Rift Valley, February 24, 2012).  
 
While some of the camps’ residents are still living in fear, especially with the 2013 election 
date approaching, the residents who engaged with the author did not hesitate to tell their 
stories. Through these daily interactions, the author discovered some of the deep-rooted 
assumptions underlying some of the residents’ decisions to avoid ICC personnel in 2009 and 
2010. It transpired that some of the residents had been avoiding ICC personnel out of fear of 
other IDPs who expressed their support for the ICC’s suspects; they also avoided ICC 
personnel as a sign of protest against the progress of the Kenya case at the ICC (interview with 
IDP no. 38, Rift Valley, April 10, 2012). The victims’ interactions with ICC personnel only 









I) The ICC ‘Treated Us Like Property, Not As Humans’. 
For the camp’s residents, the ICC’s initial involvement came as a welcome relief, since none 
of the Kenyans believed that justice could be successfully administered by the national court 
system (interview with IDP no. 2, Rift Valley, Kenya, February 10, 2009). However, when the 
ICC representative and the local NGOs began the process of recruiting witnesses for the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)’s case against the ICC’s suspects, some residents decided not 
to participate.  
 
In my second period of fieldwork in 2012, some of the camp’s residents revealed their doubts 
about the ICC’s ability to provide justice, and when confronted with the question as to whether 
the ICC’s contribution towards establishing justice and reconciliation in Kenya was a 
necessity, they responded negatively. Lucy, a 56-year-old ethnic Kikuyu said that, ‘the ICC 
only came when they needed us, and then later abandoned us’ (interview with IDP no. 19, Rift 
Valley, February 16, 2012). Others also described their feelings of being ‘disturbed’ by the 
frequent visits of local NGOs and the ICC representative (interview with IDP no. 16, Rift 
Valley, February 13, 2012). Jennie, a 45-year-old ethnic Kalenjin described how, at first, she 
had no problem with the visits, as she was so eager to tell her stories. However, some became 
more reticent after these visits from outsiders became more frequent (interview with IDP no. 
17, Rift Valley, February 14, 2012). As Kenneth, a 35-year-old ethnic Luo affirmed:  
I always viewed their visits with a sense of relief that I was safe to talk freely, but how can I 
share the most humiliating parts of my life - about my wife and daughters being raped in front 
of me by some of those connected to the local politician – when I cannot trust the ICC as my 




When asked about whether he had lost hope that the ICC would provide justice, Kenneth (who 
had worked as a teacher prior to the post-election violence) did not hesitate to admit that he 
had.  
 
During my third visit to the same camp in February 2013, I met with some of the previous 
residents whom I had previously interviewed, who admitted that they felt betrayed by the ICC, 
because the court had treated them like “property”. Their lives had also been made more 
difficult by the ICC’s indictment of their president. Patrick, a 38-year-old former tea leaf 
picker said that ‘the local NGOs did come to visit us, and we knew that these people had 
previously represented the ICC when they needed our stories, but they treated us like we were 
sick and needed help’ (interview with IDP no. 39, Nairobi, March 2, 2013). One of the former 
residents at one of the camps, a 23-year-old ethnic Kalenjin called Cindy, told me her story: 
I decided to leave the camp in November 2012, although I am not sure what future there is for 
me and my illegitimate child, or whether people will except me or not. I know that my 
husband, parents, neighbors and friends will never accept me after being raped and surviving. 
But the feeling of staying at the camp is worse. People think that they are safe living here, but 
those that I thought were our saviors [the ICC personnel] were only interested in hearing our 
stories, and then they left us with nothing. They said we needed help, but we need more than to 
just tell our story. We are also human beings, and we need to move forward so that we can start 
a new life (interview with IDP no. 55, Rift Valley, March 8, 2013). 
 
From these narratives, it is obvious that the residents feel that they were betrayed by the local 
NGOs and the politicians who campaigned102 for the ICC in its attempts to recruit witnesses.  
 
                                                        
102  It was difficult for the author to determine whether, by ‘outsiders’, the residents were referring to the 
ICC’s representative, the local NGOs or other international development agencies. However, some of the 
residents affirmed that nearly all of those visitors (including researchers like myself) asked them to complete a 
similar ICC questionnaire, fieldwork note no. 2, Rift Valley, March 25, 2012. 
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The initial optimism that justice would be dispensed after the post-election violence 
transformed into a feeling of being “harassed” by the ICC’s visits. While being visited by the 
ICC representative, the residents felt that they were being treated like property. Being treated 
like ‘property’ refers here to the ‘feeling of being possessed and incapable of doing something 
meaningful in life as a human being or an autonomous agent’ (interview with KNHRC officer 
no. 3, Nairobi, March 1, 2013). According to the phenomenology of victimhood, the pain and 
trauma sustained by victims during the violence itself is the initial phase in the individual’s 
journey towards realising his or her life potential (Walker, 2006: p.14).  
 
While violence reduces the agent’s capability to pursue his or her aspirations, the ICC’s 
continuous visits - which focused solely on the victims’ testimonies – shattered the victims’ 
normative expectations that are so fundamental to their collective sense of being human 
(fieldwork note no. 4, Rift Valley, Kenya, April 07, 2013). The societal expectation of being 
able to exist as a ‘normal’ human is shattered not only when human rights are violated, but 
also when the post-conflict initiative romanticizes the strategy of ‘healing’ the victim’s 
traumatic experience (Scarry, 1988: p.35).  
 
The feeling of insecurity that necessitates psychological healing may be crucial during the 
immediate aftermath of violence, but as time passes the victim’s expectations become less 
concerned with the direct focus on justice or trial as seen at The Hague, and more with the 
gradual process of societal reintegration. The IDP camps have created a “psychological 
boundary” between the resident victims and other Kenyans who live outside the camps; camp 
residents feel less human as representatives of the ICC and international development agencies 
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treat them like they are ‘abnormal’, or as property that needs to be appropriated (Parsitau, 
2011: p.496). Consequently, their needs to be integrated back into society are ignored. ‘When 
we asked those outsiders [ICC representatives]: when can we live like normal people, as we 
are tired of this endless pursuit of justice?’ They said, ‘justice is a long process’ (interview 
with IDP no. 28, Nairobi, March 8, 2012).  
 
Hence, the victims’ feelings of being treated like property transformed the IDP camps into a 
communal space, in which the victims could plan how to avoid the ICC by lying and 
pretending to co-operate with international agencies. Frank, a 34-year-old Kikuyu, 
summarised this strategy thus: 
When the outsiders [international NGOs and ICC representatives] came to us, we had few 
options. We pretended that were so busy with daily tasks even though we had no formal jobs, 
so they avoided us. Of course! We could not talk openly about politics or else the local 
authority in charge of monitoring our camp would have accused us of inciting violence. We 
sometimes meet people from outside the camps scribbling about what those Nairobians think 
about the ICC, and we tell the same stories to those outsiders so that they are satisfied, even 
though the stories are mostly lies (interview with IDP no. 23, Rift Valley, March 2, 2012). 
 
Frank’s narrative reveals the everyday form of non-cooperative measures adopted by the IDPs. 
The strategy of telling lies, or of repeating similar stories about the ICC that they heard from 
Kenyans who had traveled to Nairobi, became a way of creating a dominant narrative about 
the ICC that did not actually represent the victims’ own stories: ‘We mostly have our own 
opinions about the ICC and justice, but those who came to visit us only wanted to confirm 
their perspectives, but were not interested in our opinions. So we tell them what they want to 




Though Frank’s narrative does not represent that of every IDP, it does help to explain why 
some of the victims hired by the OTP as witnesses later dropped their testimonies (see Table 
4.1). While the actual prosecution witnesses remain in inaccessible locations, some of those 
residing at the camps had some prior knowledge of the witnesses, particularly those who used 
to be connected to them.103 Camp residents recognise that the camp itself marks a social 
boundary that segregates them from the rest of the outside world, but this does not mean that 
they share a collective view of justice as it is advocated by the ICC, especially since the ICC’s 
proceedings place them in more vulnerable situations. 
   
II) ‘Why Bother When We Are Still Living in Fear’. 
The camp residents have also recently expressed their feelings of insecurity as the ICC’s 
scheduled trial date approaches. ‘Every time we hear in the news that the ICC is tightening its 
grip on Kenyatta and Ruto, we become more fearful for our lives, since not everyone supports 
the ICC’s indictment of both suspects’ (interview with IDP no. 56, Rift Valley, March 08, 
2013) Indeed, those who publicly express their support for the ICC will become targets for 
others who support Kenyatta and Ruto: 
A group of youths walked around and tried to harass anybody that was known to support the 
ICC. The group was not a big crowd, but the police just did not take any measures to stop them 
from beating a weak old man and his wife (interview with IDP no. 57; Rift Valley, March 9, 
2013) 
 
A 41-year-old former teacher from an ethnic Kalenjin community further explained that: 
                                                        
103  It was impossible for the author to hear the first-hand perspective of the victims hired as witnesses by 
the OTP, as for security reasons they do not currently reside in Kenya. However, some of the IDPs had some 
prior knowledge of the pressure placed on their friends to be hired as witnesses. The decisions of many of the 
OTP’s key witnesses to drop their testimonies in Kenyatta’s case were informed by similar feelings held by the 
victims that the author had interviewed. Fieldwork notes no. 3, Nairobi, February 28, 2013. 
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The ICC is what I was expecting, but I am more worried about the safety of my family. A 
group of men from the camp surrounded our tent, chanting: ‘Hague! Hague! Hague!’. They 
basically tried to tell everyone at the camp to isolate me because I was trying to co-operate 
with the NGOs who represent the ICC in Kenya (interview with IDP no. 58, Rift Valley, 
March 9, 2013). 
 
Given the ICC’s failure to maintain the security of the IDPs still residing at the camps, some 
of the residents adopted a political standpoint of neutrality, not taking the side of either the 
ICC or its suspects: 
I have made up my mind not to support the ICC. We cannot accept whatever is being reported 
by the newspaper [the politician’s criticisms of the ICC]. We simply agreed with Ruto’s 
campaign so that we could get more money to buy food. What madness that they try create 
here, after all the madness that pushed us to live in this camp! The ICC is even crazier because 
those lawyers [referring to the OTP] can walk safely without being harassed. Unfortunately, I 
don’t have enough money to hire a guard every time the gangs harass my family. So I decided 
to remain quiet unless those [international] people come with money (interview with IDP no. 
59, Rift Valley, March 9, 2013). 
 
These everyday narratives reveal deep feelings of insecurity, as the agents of the ICC’s 
suspects were organising an election campaign at the camps. The victims remain in fear as 
long as these suspects can walk freely in the country.  
 
Some of the victims cannot accept the fact that the judicial proceedings are taking longer than 
they expected. ‘I will only see justice when they [the ICC’s suspects] are put behind bars’ 
(interview with IDP no. 56, Rift Valley, March 8, 2013). Others have less of an understanding 
about the proceedings: ‘I don't understand what the ICC is all about, because my life is still 
haunted by the violence. I live in the year 2013, but it feels like living in 2007’ (interview with 
IDP no. 65, Rift Valley, March 10, 2013). If justice must be seen to be delivered, there is 
obviously a huge difference between judicial processes as they are administered at The Hague, 




Such feelings of fear among the victims challenge the legal assumption that the ICC is a 
transitional justice mechanism for ending impunity. The chief focus of the OTP’s litigation in 
Kenya was on ending the cycle of impunity. Accordingly, the OTP made this statement based 
on the bald assumption that it would be less difficult to pursue justice in Kenya in comparison 
with more complex situations, such as those of Northern Uganda, Sudan, and the Central 
Republic of Africa (interview with the ICC officer; The Hague, February 12, 2013).  
 
Chapter 2 also gave elaborate details of the origins of impunity in Kenyan politics, and the 
importance of advancing political accountability through the mechanism of transitional justice. 
While the origins of impunity are the concern of the investigations conducted by ICC 
personnel in Kenya, in terms of the local background of challenging the pursuit of justice, 
pinpointing the language of impunity was legally understood by the OTP as constituting one 
of the many objectives of justice as embedded in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, which: 
….determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes [crime against 
humanity, genocide, war crimes and aggression] and thus to contribute to prevention of such 
crime, … (Ghandi, 2012: p.149) 
 
The ICC representative also admitted that: 
There is no way that the [Kenyan] suspects can make themselves immune to prosecution, as 
the evidence is very extensive. Yet we cannot prosecute everyone, and we can only focus on 
the big fish. It is the domestic prosecution that must address the lesser perpetrators (interview 
with the ICC officer; The Hague, February 12, 2013). 
 
This language of impunity became the specific focus of the OTP’s investigations in Kenya’s 
post-election violence, since the relationship between the violence and the cycle of impunity 
has already been extensively documented (see T.J.R.C., 2013). However, such an 
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understanding of impunity and the advancement of accountability does not facilitate a local 
legal process of prosecuting lesser perpetrators, since some of those accused perpetrators 
remain free and maintain strong ties to the government (interview with KNHR officer no. 3, 
Nairobi, March 1, 2013).  
 
This leads to an additional question: how effective is the ICC’s focus on the big fish in 
building the momentum of domestic prosecutions against lesser perpetrators? According to the 
Kenyan government’s unverified statistics, by August 2011 there had been 9000 criminal 
cases related to the post-election violence reported since March 2008 (interview with Kenyan 
government officer no. 2, Nairobi, March 18, 2012).  However, nearly 8000 of these cases 
were put on hold by the attorney general and eventually dismissed by the police (Nichols, 
2013). The Kenyan government simply claimed that it had no substantive evidence for all of 
these cases, despite the number of deaths that were reported. In addition, the government made 
the unfounded claim that at least 356 of the cases had been brought to local courts, despite the 
fact that no convictions resulting from these cases have ever been reported in the mainstream 
newspapers (interview with Kenyan government officer no. 2, Nairobi, March 18, 2012). In 
addition, the government claimed that at least 900 perpetrators of rape and sexual assault have 
been convicted. From the official report released after the post-election violence, the number 
of deaths is estimated at around 1100, and only three criminal cases related to these deaths 
were convicted by the local court (U.N.C.H.R., 2008a: p.16).  
 
However, the Kenyan government made another unverified claim that 49 cases had been 
convicted, rather than three (interview with Kenyan government officer no. 2, Nairobi, March 
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18, 2012). Even after considering the small number of cases that the government claims have 
been concluded, the actual number of the cases concluded is less than five percent of the 
original report of 9000 cases. Indeed, according to the 2012 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
report, out of the five percent of cases mentioned by the government, not one perpetrator has 
been convicted of crimes against humanity as they are defined by the 2009 International 
Criminal Act. Instead, they have been convicted of civil assault against neighbors, cattle 
looting and civil disobedience (Human Rights Watch, 2011: p.12).  
 
In other words, no perpetrator has been convicted on the grounds of having committed crimes 
against humanity, despite the government’s claim that they can conduct judicial process that 
are equal to the ICC’s proceedings (p.27). Consequently, these facts send a clear message to 
the IDPs that the ICC’s focus on the big fish does not catalyse the advancement of criminal 
accountability through the process of domestic prosecution handled by the government 
(Human Rights Watch., 2011: p.35).  
 
Secondly, it informs the victims of the lack of integrity in the government’s commitment to 
prosecuting the ICC’s suspects through a municipal court. ‘In Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, 
the rule of law is still weak, politicised, and hard to enforce; individuals are often sanctioned 
for trying’ (Mueller, 2014: p.2). Finally, IDPs are unlikely to display any inclination to help 
the ICC or the domestic court, seeing as they function as pretexts for the ruling class to witch-




Furthermore, neither the Rome Statute nor domestic criminal laws are being implemented with 
the aim of securing the fundamental rights of the victims of mass atrocities to retributive 
justice and the deterrence of future transgressions (Mueller, 2014: p.9): ‘the ICC does not cater 
to my need for justice, nor does it do anything to improve the government’s opinion of it’ 
(interview with IDP no. 60, Rift Valley, March 9, 2013). Indeed, the success of the 2013 
election that saw Kenyatta elected as president reinforced the beliefs of local human rights 
activists that the ICC has failed to break the cycle of impunity in Kenya (interview with 
KNHRC officer no. 3; Nairobi, March 1, 2013).  
 
The above discussion reveals the extent to which the justice that has been administered at the 
ICC differs from the conception of justice shared as understood at the camps. The legal 
process of addressing the post-election violence has matured in the context of the rise of 
criminal tribunals and an increase in political knowledge about justice; the ICC may have 
shaped the March 2013 election, yet the Kenyan ICC indictees have become “immune” to the 
humanitarian question about what constitutes political justice for IDPs.  
 
Ironically, while the OTP of the ICC glorifies the atrocities to which the victims have been 
subjected and the stateless conditions of the IDPs in her crusade against Kenyatta and Ruto, 
she now occupies a similar position to the indictees (see also Editor, 2012). This is because 
both the OTP and the indictees use victims as primary objects of knowledge in their attempts 
to pursue and defy accountability respectively. In this ‘clash of the titans’, the judicial and 
non-judicial battles between the OTP and the indictees “disciplines” the IDPs, and disconnects 




What the victims initially perceived as measures for addressing humanitarian crises and 
administering justice for violations of human rights have “mutated” into a banal conception of 
justice that is disconnected from the IDPs themselves. The ICC has become an irrelevant 
entity that initially created a sense of closeness (in terms of time and space) between it and the 
IDP camps when the ruling class challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction. Eventually, however, the 
close proximity between The Hague and Rift Valley was widened by the high level of 
animosity that victims felt towards the ICC when it failed to ensure their safety every time the 
OTP tightened her grip on the suspects (interview with IDP no. 60, Rift Valley, March 9, 
2013).  
 
At the time of writing, the OTP has been making repeated allegations that the Kenyan 
government intimidated her witnesses (see Opiyo, 2014). While the veracity of such 
allegations remains to be seen (since the OTP has not provided specific evidence to support 
her claim) (Ochieng and Jennings, 2014), the IDPs who were not recruited as witnesses by the 
OTP have been subject to various forms of intimidation, as well as the threat and actual use of 
violence from various vigilante groups connected to the suspects (Kenyan Human Rights 
Comission, 2012: p.42). Within such a hostile environment defined by complex power 
structures, the IDPs have remained victims.  
 
In this respect, despite the fact that it was initially perceived as being directly connected to the 
victims, the ICC has become a tool for the elite (as well as for international policymakers) to 
make the IDPs’ lives more unbearable. This is owing to the fact that the elite and the 
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international policymakers have only taken a sensational interest in their stories and narratives 
of displacement (fieldwork note no. 4, Rift Valley, April 7, 2013). Hence, the ICC’s 
administration of justice is partial, and differs markedly from the IDPs’ understanding of 
justice.  
 
Consequently, the victims manifested their everyday resistance through non-cooperative 
modes of behavior, avoiding international agents who asked about them for their opinion of 
the ICC. They have also been forced to tell lies in order to survive, and to escape from the 
power structures of the international and national elite, around which the ICC trials revolve. 
Given the persistence of impunity, the failure of the ICC to reduce the vulnerability of those 
survivors who reside far from the palace of justice at The Hague has given rise to the popular 
understanding that the ICC’s proceedings have only succeed in making the IDPs’ lives more 
difficult.  
 
To some, the ICC has become an ‘unexpected oppressor’ (interview with IDP no. 66, Rift 
Valley, March 10, 2013). ‘We were so naive to believe they were benevolent’ (interview with 
IDP no. 64, Rift Valley, March 10, 2013). ‘The ICC is like the big man [politician], and when 
they behave as such, they are not for us!’ (interview with IDP no. 47, Rift Valley, March 6, 
2013). As a vehicle of justice, ‘the ICC’s proceedings in Kenya lack clarity and cooperation, 
and this limits the ICC’s ability to end impunity’ (interview with retired judge no. 2, Nairobi, 
March 15, 2012). Consequently, the IDP communities developed a political consciousness in 







III) ‘We Vote for Kenyatta and Ruto as a Sign of Protest’. 
The actual number of IDPs who voted for Kenyatta and Ruto is difficult to determine, as the 
Kenyan Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) refused to publicise the 
actual number of registered voters from the IDP camps who voted for Kenyatta and Ruto 
(interview with IEBC officer, Nairobi, April 15, 2013). The IEBC claimed that they withheld 
this information to maintain the security of the residents, which is understandable given the 
vulnerability of the IDPs. However, nearly 80% of the IDPs interviewed by the author publicly 
expressed their intention to vote for Kenyatta and Ruto (fieldwork note no. 4, Rift Valley, 
April 07, 2013).  
 
Several days before and after the election on March 04, 2013, some of the IDPs decided to tell 
their stories in order to explain why they intended to vote for the suspects. Anna, a 27-year-old 
ethnic Kikuyu, shared her views: 
Previously, I had always believed that the ICC was the only way for me to reconcile myself 
with my past. But I have decided to vote for Kenyatta and Ruto because I am tired of waiting 
for a dying form of justice. Why wait for The Hague? By voting for Kenyatta, I hope I can 
reconcile myself with my past and move forward (interview with IDP no. 42; Rift Valley, 
Kenya, March 02, 2013). 
 
While Anna’s generic narration differentiates between justice and peace, 37-year-old Sam 
gave a different narrative: 
I didn’t vote because of my ethnicity [as many analysts assumed] or because Kalenjin Ruto is 
allied with Kikuyu Kenyatta. I voted because I felt frustrated with the ICC’s endless processes. 
I don’t think that the ICC’s suspects are innocent, judging by the way they have recently 
behaved. I am voting for Kenyatta not because he is innocent, but because we are upset with 
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those who worked for the ICC. I think those [referring to former Prime Minister Odinga] who 
tried to champion the ICC were trying to protect themselves, and used our need for justice 
from the ICC as a political weapon to be used against Kenyatta (interview with IDP no. 41, 
Rift Valley, March 2, 2013). 
 
 
Sam’s narrative gives a vivid illustration of the political standpoint of the IDPs who decided to 
vote as a sign of protest. However, Sam and his friends had taken part in a more everyday act 
of protest before the election day, when they organised a series of secret group discussions in 
the camp, going from one tent to another and trying to convince others to vote for the ICC’s 
suspects. By doing so, they believed that they would send a clear message that the political 
leaders who supported the ICC were opportunistically trying to win the votes of the IDPs 
solely to gain political popularity, and that they would later forsake the victims. This view was 
shared by 29-year-old Akelo, who had registered as a voter in Odinga’s constituency: 
I will never vote for Odinga, although he comes from the same community as me. I think he 
betrayed us this time. I tried many times to bring our security issues to him when we were 
trying to co-operate with the ICC as potential witnesses. But his people [referring to Odinga’s 
political aides] asked me to be quiet. When I related this to the NGOs who supported the ICC, 
they also asked me to remain silent. So I decided to quietly convince other people [emphasis 
added] who had previously voted for Odinga to protest by voting for his main rivals, Kenyatta 
and Ruto (interview with IDP no. 43, Rift Valley, Kenya, March 3, 2013). 
 
 
When asked whether or not she was worried that the ICC’s proceedings would be impeded if 
Kenyatta and Ruto won the election, Mary, a 56-year-old widow, said, ‘it will be another hell 
[disaster] if violence erupts this time, but at least this will send a clear message to the ICC, 
who are still sleeping. Maybe our votes will be like the ringing of an alarm bell for them’ 




However, there are others who decided not to vote this time. 25-year-old Maina, who had 
previously lived in the camp, stated that, ‘the best thing would be for me to go somewhere 
safer, though the police told us that it would be safer to vote. Not voting will also make me 
less guilty because I believe in the ICC, but I don’t think we will see justice any sooner’ 
(interview with IDP no. 48, Rift Valley, March 6, 2013). However, not all residents 
interviewed by the author shared Maina’s sentiments in one respect or another. 26-year-old 
Gracious described her situation: 
The rest of us either traveled to a place where we could register as voters, or we voted from the 
camps. I don’t think that Kenyatta and Ruto are a good choice. But I am more devastated by 
the behavior of those working for the ICC, because the court has failed to secure our needs. To 
me, justice means the ability to live like a normal person, and to bring food to the table. The 
ICC’s indictment against Kenyatta and Ruto has failed to make the government any more 
committed to addressing our needs. I have more enemies in 2013 than I did in 2007 (interview 
with IDP no. 67, Rift Valley, March 10, 2013).  
 
 
To the IDPs, ‘justice’ represents the ability to live like other normal Kenyans (interview with 
IDP no. 69, Rift Valley, March 11, 2013), to be ‘resettled in society’ (interview with IDP no. 
70, Rift Valley, March 11, 2013), to ‘bring food to the table’ (interview with IDP no. 72, Rift 
Valley, March 12, 2013) and to maintain friendly relations with neighbors from different 
communities (interview with IDP no. 73, Rift Valley, March 12, 2013). Yet it is clearly 
impossible for the ICC to satisfy such broad expectations of justice within a fortnight, 
considering that the actual trial has not even begun.  
 
These narratives not only inform us about the difference between the victims’ expectations of 
justice and justice as it is dispensed by the ICC; they also inform us about the residents’ 
everyday acts of resistance. These acts began with the IDPs’ daily behavior of avoiding those 
who represented the ICC, as well as refusing to trust the politicians who had championed it. 
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The IDPs who suffered directly from the violence espoused different views about justice from 
those of the AU leaders who criticised the ICC’s neocolonialism. These narratives also show 
that the IDPs developed a political consciousness with which they could initially engage in a 
form of silent protest against the ICC, and then give their protests a “voice” at the polling 
station. Of course, this action was based on their assumptions that the ICC would increase its 
focus on its suspects, and re-evaluate its strategy in limiting their reckless behavior.  
 
This explains why some IDPs from various communities (including those who had previously 
voted for Odinga) decided to vote for Kenyatta. In 2009, those residing at the IDP camps 
expressed their moral support for Odinga, because of his consistent stance on the ICC in 
Kenya. However, by February 2012, the IDPs who interacted with the author had expressed 
their concerns about some of the politicians’ manipulative way of using the ICC as a means of 
securing political popularity (Odinga), and of avoiding delivering the justice that they had 
promised (Kenyatta). While Kenyatta and Ruto’s behaviour was generally understood as an 
attempt to politicise the ICC in time for the 2013 election, the IDPs expressed their feelings of 
vulnerability towards those who had advocated the ICC in Kenya. They also argued that the 
ICC should not be silenced when their own interests as victims had been hijacked (interview 
with IDP no. 74, Rift Valley, March 12, 2013). The standpoint of these IDPs was shared by 
Odinga’s campaign manager: 
I had to accept that two years after collecting 1.4 million signatures in support of the ICC, 6.1 
million Kenyans [voters] stated emphatically that they do not agree with what I assumed was 
the Kenyan position on the ICC (Wambugu, 2013). 
 
The casting of votes for Kenyatta gained momentum from a series of disappointments that the 
IDPs met with during the ICC’s lengthy judicial processes. This also spurred more IDPs to 
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adopt strategies of everyday protest, such as avoiding those who claimed to have their best 
interests at heart (interview with IDP no. 49, Rift Valley, March 7, 2013). While they initially 
believed that only the ICC was capable of prosecuting the suspects, they eventually lost faith 
in justice when the ICC officials, and the local NGOs who championed the ICC, ignored the 
IDPs’ vulnerability. Simultaneously, however, the “alliance of the accused” (Kenyatta and 
Ruto) marched to this election with a belief in the need to prioritise “peace” over justice 
(Lynch, 2013b: p.15). This provided fueled the public’s belief in such peace narratives, 
although the fact that the IDPs voted for the suspects is by no means a signifier of their belief 
in these narratives (interview with IDP no. 50; Rift Valley, Kenya, March 07, 2013).  
 
The alliance of the accused emphasises what has been characterised by commentators as a 
similar rhetoric of the ‘ideology of order’ during the election of 1974: the ruling class’ 
persistent practice of impunity and resistance to accountability, camouflaged by the preaching 
of peace and stability (Cheeseman et al., 2014: p.10). While the post-election violence served 
as a reminder to members of the public to emphasise the importance of having peaceful 
elections in 2013, such narratives of peace (as manifested by stability, rather than the ICC’s 
ongoing prosecution) were concealed by various leaders’ vendettas.  
 
Firstly, Kenyatta’s defiance of the ICC led ‘to a ‘negative peace’ characterized by cessation of 
hostilities, rather than a ‘positive peace’ built on trusting and harmonious inter-ethnic 
relations’ (p.11). Secondly, Odinga used his support for the ICC as a means of punishing his 
political nemesis by convincing the masses that the 2013 election results were rigged, and that 
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electing Kenyatta would mean sacrificing justice for the tyranny of peace (p.11). Neither of 
these two heavyweights, of course, were genuinely concerned with the welfare of the IDPs.  
 
The ICC has ignored the fact that their legal battle to provide justice for the Kenyan victims 
was structured by misguided politics; the failure of the ICC to recognise this lead to the 
continual disappointment of the IDPs’ hopes, causing them to reject the ICC by voting for its 
suspects. The IDPs came to perceive voting as being integral to their survival, which shows 
that their voting for the suspects was not motivated by the belief that Kenyatta and Ruto were 
innocent (interview with IDP no. 52, Rift Valley, March 7, 2013).  
 
Similar acts of everyday resistance that became translated into the act of voting can be 
observed in Yash Ghai’s reflection (2005) on the failure of the constitutional referendum. By 
analysing what began as acts of everyday resistance, he found that many ordinary Kenyans 
translated their acts of protest into the act of voting. When voters cast their votes, they 
effectively rejected the former Attorney General, Amos Wako’s draft of the constitutional bill, 
which was altered during the Kibaki regime that existed between 2003 and 2007 (Cottrell and 
Ghai, 2007: p.23).  
 
The only difference during the 2013 elections was that the IDPs’ votes for Kenyatta and Ruto 
were motivated by the idea that ‘sometimes you have to make it look worse in order to gain 
more attention [from the ICC]’ (interview with IDP no. 68, Rift Valley, March 11, 2013). 
Despite those who reside at the camps being largely aware of the crimes for which Kenyatta 
and Ruto are accused, voting for both is understood to be the most strategic option for 
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“exposing” the shortcomings of the ICC, so that the court will refocus its attention on 
delivering justice and on compensating for the government’s neglect of the victims104. Indeed, 
the OTP’s focus on collecting more evidence against the suspects has made those living at the 
camps more vulnerable to repercussions from Kenyatta and Ruto’s diehard followers 
(interview with KNHRC officer no. 3, Nairobi, March 1, 2013).  
 
In theory, the victims’ participation is not essential to the ICC’s proceedings, and the court 
may eventually decide on a form of reparation that could appear reasonable to the victims 
(Boyle, 2006: p.311). In addition, an independent body related to the ICC, known as the ‘Trust 
Fund for Victims’, is responsible for implementing reparations that the ICC awards to the 
victims. These reparations include material compensation, rehabilitation and psychosocial 
support (see International Criminal Court., 2013). Victims can also request reparations from 
the trust fund independently, especially in cases where the convicted perpetrators of the crimes 
against humanity do not have sufficient assets to compensate for the damage he or she 
inflicted upon the victims.  
 
However, the ICC is far from reaching its final verdicts concerning the Kenyan cases. 
Consequently, this limits the ability of the trust fund to provide the necessary reparations 
required by the IDPs. In municipal court practice, victims’ rights are respected through the 
practices of civil and common law (Garkawe, 2003: p.347). In civil law cases, the victims who 
                                                        
104  When the IDPs are confronted with two options, they tend to vote for the ICC’s suspects instead of 
Odinga’s CORD. Despite Odinga’s persistent championing of the ICC, many of the IDPs believe that Odinga 
betrayed them when he was still prime minister. Hypothetically, the IDPs may have voted for Kenyatta and Ruto 
in an attempt to draw attention to Kenya’s precarious condition at the ICC. Fieldwork note no. 4, Rift Valley, 
April 7, 2013. 
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are deemed to be the most vulnerable and to have suffered the gravest abuses could present 
their opinions to the judges. In common law, the victim’s opinion is crucial, especially in 
convicting criminals. However, the practice of either civil or common law is not necessarily 
applicable to the ICC proceedings (Stahn et al., 2006: p.225). This constrains the ability of the 
ICC to consider the situation from the victim’s perspective.  
 
In March 2012, the ICC delivered its first ruling in the case of Thomas Lubangga of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and convicted him guilty of conscripting children, which 
resulted in an important precedent of immediate reparation for the underage victims (Babovic, 
2012: p.125). While the ruling recognises the central role of the victim’s opinion in developing 
a specific mechanism for the reparation of the victims, the process of implementing the ruling 
through the Trust Fund is limited by the financial constraints of the body, thus rendering it 
incapable of meeting broader reparation demands that may arise in the future. 105  The 
sentencing of the perpetrators is only one of the many elements of satisfactory justice as it is 
understood by the victims (Cohen, 2002: p.15).  
 
Furthermore, various studies concerning South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
recognise that the demands of the victims are various. The guarantee that the crime will not 
happen again, a form of reasonable restitution that would enable them to ‘return’ to the lives 
that they had lived before the conflict took place and the necessary amount of psychological 
support to reintegrate them into society are all demands that the victims require the court to 
                                                        
105  The ICC Trust Fund’s finances depend upon its limited funding from state parties, private donors, 
organisations and individuals. This system of funding is far from adequate, considering the existing number of 
large-scale financial reparation demands being made by victims.  
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meet (Wilson, 2001: p.232). However, the ICC’s Trust Fund is currently unable to facilitate 
the IDPs’ needs, while the new government under President Kenyatta has failed to fulfill his 
promise in his election manifesto to re-settle the IDPs within his first 100 days of governance 
(Munyeki, 2013).  
 
The Kenyan IDP narratives that have been discussed above confirm that the ICC’s failure to 
recognise the political upheavals in Kenya has reinforced the victims’ understanding that 
justice is primarily concerned with trial and sentencing. This confirms the disparity between 
the ICC’s understanding of justice and justice as it is understood by the victims themselves. 
The Kenyan cases reveal the existence of a huge gap between the incapacity and limitations of 
the ICC, and that the ICC is incapable of meeting the expectations of justice held by the IDP 
community (Sriram. and Brown, 2012: p.243).  
 
E – Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate several lessons that can be learned from the Kenyan 
cases. Firstly, given the pervasive role of impunity in election-related violence, the ICC’s 
engagement may seem necessary to advancing accountability; however, the actual results of its 
intervention remain to be seen. Moving beyond a legal analysis, this chapter has identified that 
the problem does not consist in negotiating the rule of law (the administration of justice), but 
in how to cultivate a political culture that respects the law, and in determining for whose sake 
justice is being administered. The admissibility of the Kenyan case at the ICC has provided an 
instructive opportunity to engage in a ‘wider debate about democratization and transitional 
justice’ (Cheeseman et al., 2014: p.3), and to examine the ICC’s placement within a 
constellation of power relations. It also provides an opportunity to examine its limitations in 
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deterring future violence, in the event that such violence is renewed by the recurring cycle of 
impunity. 
 
Secondly, by analysing the uneasy relations between the ICC and the Kenyan elite, the 
findings of this chapter support the conclusion reached by Susan Mueller in her works 
regarding the interplay between law and politics. A central theme in Mueller’s (2014) recent 
works on the ICC in Kenya also features in her previous and noteworthy study of the post-
election violence (2008). The theme concerns the critical obligation to examine the roles of 
informal norms, political behaviors, power dynamics and the ability of the agent to comply to 
formal laws and international norms. This approach is recommended in contrast to the focus 
on formal institutions, political parties and the legal ratification of the Rome Statute. In this 
respect, the question is not really to what extent the ratification of the Rome Statute or the 
creation of more international tribunals sanction the leader’s crimes, but to what extent the 
informal norms or practice of neo-patrimonialism explains the leader’s decision to comply 
with or to challenge the rules of law.  
 
Before the 2008 crisis, the ICC did not pose a threat to the ruling class, and the country was 
keen to observe its statute. However, subsequent to the electoral crisis and the ICC’s 
increasing focus on Africa’s ‘Big Men’ (Bashir and Gadhafi), the court became a game 
changer; not only in relation to the Kenyan election, but also in relation to African regional 
leaders’ policy of isolating themselves in order not to comply with the court (Mueller, 2014: 
p.14). The initial optimism that the ICC’s suspects displayed in rejecting the dominant 
discourses of accountability (2008) degenerated into a pessimistic approach, with which the 
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suspects’ were able to defy the court and to promote dominant discourses of impunity (2013). 
While Mueller’s analysis has answered the question of how the ruling class successfully 
defied the ICC, this chapter’s observations of the IDPs’ everyday narratives and acts of 
resistance have attempted to define the power relations that informed the IDPs’ rejection of the 
ICC.  
 
The IDPs’ acts of everyday resistance against the ICC confirms the notion that the ICC serves 
as an instrument for harnessing or contesting power between international society and the 
Kenyan ruling class, but not for providing justice to victims. Thus, as a challenge to the ICC’s 
claim that it provides justice for victims, this chapter illustrates why the ICC is currently 
failing to do so from a bottom-up perspective as a result of the IDPs’ decision to vote for the 
suspects. As has been specified, this was not because they believed that the suspects were 
innocent, but because the ICC had failed on two accounts. It had failed to make the IDPs less 
vulnerable, and failed to understand their wider expectations of justice (retributive and 
restorative).  
 
As such, the IDPs’ critical perspective on the ICC’s moribund form of justice also confirms 
Peter Dixon and Chris Tenove’s (2013) recent theoretical analysis of ICC as a tool of 
transitional justice. Dixon and Tenove suggest that, while the ICC has become a global 
normative authority respected by policymakers and commentators in identifying specific 
examples of human rights violations and mechanisms for addressing impunity and crimes 
against humanity, such liberal, judicial and hegemonic forms of authority ‘are often 
unavailable to other transitional justice approaches, whose forms of authority may be well-
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recognized in local context’ (p.394). As a result, while the ICC allows us to visualize the 
“international reality” of judicial sanctions against human rights violations, its limited 
prosecution strategy–and the confinement of its discourse to violations alone–does not 
necessarily represent the interests of the victims and their wider understanding of justice. In 
these circumstances, the legal dialogue concerning the ICC becomes a political arena for 
power struggles between those suspects who remained in power and the international 
prosecutors who were so eager to police the state, as the ICC had failed to alleviate the 
unintended consequences produced by its twin struggles to establish accountability and 
combat impunity. A careful look at the ICC’s focus on collecting evidence and prosecuting 
suspects reveals how the politics of human rights and justice used by the ICC and the Kenyan 
ruling class does not accord with the victims’ fundamental, concrete understanding of justice.   
 
Thirdly, a legal analysis alone is insufficient in conducting an examination of the local milieu 
and the ICC’s placement within the constellation of power relations between the international 
and national elite, as well as the relations of these elites with the IDPs. The IDPs’ vulnerability 
highlights the physical extent to which they have been neglected as a ‘body’ that is subject to 
the political constructions identified (in Chapter 3) as the ‘embodiment of knowledge-power’.  
 
Justice manifests itself here as the exclusive political knowledge possessed by the ICC and the 
ruling class, but not by the IDPs. It is the same type of knowledge that has been used here to 
inform us about transitional justice as a form of discursive power in relation to impunity; it is 
this form of power that leads to the administration of partial justice, or justice without 
punishment. As such, the increasing number of countries ratifying the Rome Statute through 
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legal analysis alone does not constitute a sufficient explanation for why some of these 
countries later defied the ICC. Only by tracing the trajectory of such judicial systems within 
the constellation of power relations and everyday narratives is it possible to explain the 
interplay between politics and law in transitional justice. While the ICC functioned as a means 
of securing legitimacy for its suspects in the 2013 election and demonstrated a rhetorical 
(ideological) commitment to reforms, its deficiencies also question the ICC’s dominant 
narrative of justice (accountability), in that its goals of executing justice and pursuing 
accountability in order to end impunity were contested by IDPs. 
 
Finally, the IDPs’ everyday narratives and acts of resistance, their non-political acts of 
avoidance, non-cooperative behavior and their practice of telling lies can be characterised as 
the strategy of passive dissent, or the ‘weapons of the weak’. These weapons serve as the 
expression of dissatisfaction with and rejection of the ICC’s vulgar language of justice. This 
not only challenges the ICC’s inherent assumption that it acts in the best interests of the 
victims, but also reveals the widening gap between the IDPs’ understanding of justice and that 
of those in power.  
 
What began as the passive act of avoiding the ICC’s representative developed into an active 
rejection of the ICC when the IDPs voted for Kenyatta and Ruto. Contrary to Susan 
Thomson’s (2013b: p.194) findings concerning the avoidance of the Gacaca court by Rwandan 
peasants, the Kenyan IDPs decided to give voice to their tacit avoidance of the ICC by voting 
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for Kenyatta and Ruto.106 Drawing a conclusion similar to that reached by Thomson, however, 
one can assert that the Kenyan IDPs’ understanding of justice and their avoidance of the ICC 
reveals a system of power relations, in which the IDPs’ narratives represent the voice of the 
critical agent that has been victimised by the ruling class and ignored by the ICC proceedings. 
In such a context of oppressive power relations, the weak IDPs developed a political 
consciousness with which to reject the ICC, not in order to support the suspects but to draw 
international attention to their vulnerabilities: more violation equals more attention.  
 
The consequence of the IDPs’ actions was the recent occurrence of two important events in 
Kenya; firstly, the OTP compiled a review of the victims’ testimonies in order to revise her 
prosecution strategy against Kenyatta and Ruto (Office of the Prosecutor (I. C. C.), 2013). 
Secondly, the UNCHR and the western donors decided to rechannel their contributions of 
foreign aid (which was intended for the resettlement of IDPs) through the NGOs, rather than 
directly transferring it to the government (Horn and Seelinger, 2013). However, a further 
analysis is required in order to illuminate how transitional justice, as a site of power struggles, 






                                                        
106  Instead of not taking sides, the IDP decided to translate their everyday acts of protest into the act of 
voting for the suspects. In Thomson’s study, the Rwandan peasants only practiced everyday acts of resistance by 




Chapter 5: The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) as Ideological 
State Apparatus (ISA): Preaching Peace to Defy Justice 
 
‘The world is not dialectical - it is sworn to extremes, not to equilibrium, sworn to radical antagonism, not 
to reconciliation or synthesis. This is also the principle of evil.’  
(Jean Baudrillard, French Sociologist) 
 
A – Introduction 
Chapter 4 provided an examination of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)’ everyday 
narratives and acts of resistance against the ICC in order to characterise the ICC’s proceedings 
as a site of power struggles. To continue our observation of the ideological nature or apparatus 
of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya, this chapter turns its focus to the 
second transitional justice mechanism that has been applauded by the Kenyan government, 
namely the TJRC (see Table 5.1).  
 
Rather than echoing the conventional assertions of existing transitional justice literature that 
non-legal (restorative) mechanisms like the TJRC or other Truth Commissions (TRCs) that 
existed in South Africa (Clark, 2012b), Sierra Leone (Shaw, 2007), Haiti (Quinn, 2009c) and 
Timor Leste (Drexler, 2013) compliment the retributive nature of the ICC proceedings (see 
Hayner, 2011), this chapter advances on the argument of Chapter 3. Chapter 3 featured the 
argument that transitional justice was transformed from a discursive form of power (struggles 
between accountability and impunity) into a concrete institution or ideological apparatus that 
was wielded by Kenya’s ruling class in an effort to secure legitimacy without providing justice 
to the victims. If Chapter 4 discussed how the IDPs were excluded by the ICC, this chapter 
mainly focuses on the relationship between the ruling class and the victims through the lens of 
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the TJRC’s proceedings. This chapter turns its attention to the works of the TJRC and 
determines the extent of its immediate relation to the IDPs on the basis of three major 
assumptions:  
 
 First, given the controversy surrounding the formation of the TJRC as a political 
attempt to replace (but not to compliment) the primary requirement of criminal 
accountability in initiating justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy after the post-
election violence, there is a valid justification for suggesting that the TJRC’s 
proceedings is actually part of the ruling class’ clandestine scheme to endorse impunity 
and to defy criminal accountability (Lynch, 2012/2013: pp.130-1).  
 
 Secondly, given the primary aim of the TJRC or similar restorative justice mechanisms 
(as in South Africa’s attempts to promote reparation and prioritise amnesty), it is 
highly probable that such a performative project will be instrumentalised by the ruling 
class to claim amnesty using ‘acknowledged systematic impunity’ rather than being 
used to prosecute suspects (Gona, 2010: p.245; Mamdani, 2002: p.37). As such, the 
TJRC was formed with the aim of ‘claiming amnesty, buttressing impunity and 
substituting criminal justice’ (interview with IDP no. 75, Rift Valley, March 13, 2013).  
 
 Finally, what is generally understood as the moral, political and legal task of 
unearthing past wrongdoings through methods of inquiry and victims testimonies can 
be perceived as a form of  ‘poisonous knowledge’ that intensified political tensions, 
prolonged negative ethnic relations, and led to a protracted period of human rights 
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violations and decades of economic deprivation when the final report was not followed 
by substantive implementation (Clark, 2013; David and Choi, 2005; Hayner, 2011; 
Kelsall, 2005; Verdoolaege, 2006). In this respect, non-legal mechanisms replicated 
rather than rectified the diabolical situations in which the victim was manipulated 
rather than empowered (Drexler, 2013: p.86).  
 
This chapter’s vein of analysis focuses mainly on the IDPs that followed or participated in the 
TJRC’s hearing sessions in Rift Valley, Kenya. The author’s semi-structured interviews and 
informal conversations with these IDPs constitute the primary body of data or material 
reference for the purpose of analysing their perspectives, in order to elucidate how the TJRC 
served as a ritual for the recognition of the ruling class’ ideological commitment to partial 
justice and reconciliation.  
 
In the growing integration of African nations into the international system through the liberal 
cosmopolitan language of transitional justice (see Nee. and Uvin, 2010), the neo-patrimonial 
mode of governance cannot survive unless it renews itself through the cycle of impunity in 
defying the transnational call for criminal accountability (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. IIA, pp.147-
551). As such, the primary analysis should focus on exposing how the ruling class’s 
ideological commitment to justice and reconciliation (through the TJRC) supports the cycle of 
impunity or the pervasion of justice.  
 
This chapter uses Althusser’s understanding of ISA to determine how the TJRC, using specific 
means of visualisation–by understanding their vulnerability and expressions of loss and fear–
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inculcated those IDPs into believing in patronage relations and enforcing their ties to the 
political elite. Chapters 2 and 3 have illustrated how the ruling class’ politics of control before 
the 2008 crisis were manifested by the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA).  
 
Joseph Gitari’s (2008) research on the politics of domination and repression in Kenya between 
1902 and 2002 has confirmed Presidents Kenyatta and Moi’s widespread deployment of 
violence in their efforts to retain power on the pretext of maintaining peace and order. This 
chapter shows how, since the 2008 crisis, the ruling class has preferred to employ ISA rather 
than RSA. The rise of the dominant discourses of accountability marked an increase in focus 
on the debate surrounding transitional justice mechanisms (Chapter 3). Rather than simply 
creating relational positions through power relations and the IDPs’ everyday acts of resistance 
(Chapter 4) against the ICC’s proceedings, the discourses of accountability projected by the 
TJRC became a ritual of recognition, through which the ruling class attempted to convince the 
Kenyan masses that they were committed to pursuing justice and reconciliation, as dictated by 
the KNDR agreement. This allowed them to utilise the TJRC operations as a means of 
internally inculcating the support of those who were directly affected by the post-election 
violence, turning the victims into subjects of political manipulation. As such, this chapter 
focuses on the IDPs who observed the TJRC’s proceedings, and how their participation and 
appearance allowed them to be transformed into subjects for further political manipulation. 
These individuals were transformed from being victims into becoming political subjects of the 






Three major concerns animate this chapter: First, the discussion on the popular depiction of 
TJRC or restorative justice in post-conflict reconstruction policy signified the ‘increased 
judicialisation’ or ‘centralisation’ of legal pluralism in conflict management or the pursuit of 
justice an environment of ongoing conflict. However, the call for more flexible methods (such 
as the adoption of non-legal methods such as TRC) as proposed by legal pluralism, repeated 
the shortcomings of ‘formalism’ by legal positivism, and made the execution of justice in 
Africa reminiscent of colonialism, in the duality of administering colonial indirect rule and 
customary laws. Rather than complimenting the primary focus of criminal justice (via the 
ICC), the pluralising approach to transitional justice and the employment of bottom-up 
approaches to non-legal measures (via the TJRC) in transitional justice global enterprises 
constituted a repetition of colonial features, in that the TJRC’s proceedings were mediated by 
the state and the national elite, but not the victims.  
 
Secondly, by briefly observing the promises and the pitfalls of the TJRC proceedings in 
Kenya, this chapter attempts to reveal that the TJRC was not installed in an effort to pursue 
justice and reconciliation, but to help the ruling class to retain impunity. Finally, this chapter 
illuminates the IDPs’ attendance at the TJRC public hearing sessions as a form of expression 
of vulnerable individuals; consequently, this shows how they became subjects of political 







B – Legal Pluralism and the Legitimacy of the Non-Legal Mechanism of the TJRC 
Given the limitation of criminal prosecution’s effectiveness and the proliferation of TRCs in 
the recent development of a transitional justice industry (Chapter 1), works by Rosemary Nagy 
have confirmed the significance of the legal pluralist approach in order to understand the 
location of law in post-conflict environments (see Nagy, 2013). Indeed Ruti Teitel’s adoption 
of a constructivist method in defining transitional justice has confirmed two important features 
of legal pluralism in transitional justice literature (2000).  
 
First, the diversification and increased localisation (instead of internationalisation) of 
transitional justice mechanisms in their adoption by post-conflict societies; secondly, the 
adoption of various non-legal, indigenous and neo-traditional mechanisms alongside that of 
the formal legal tribunal (Nagy, 2013: p.81).  
 
Such pluralist and comprehensive approaches to transitional justice are significant for two 
reasons. First, scholars and commentators recognise the limitations of legal tribunals in 
addressing mass atrocities, and advocate broader goals for political reconciliation in post-
conflict-societies (Clarke, 2009: p.67). Secondly, these approaches suggest the wider potential 
of non-legal measures–such as public testimonial and investigation commissions–to address 
wider issues of justice and reparation (Clark, 2011b: p.15). In such instances, while the 
‘increased judicialisation’ in addressing mass atrocities has renewed scholarly interest in 
examining the viability of legal pluralism in post-conflict environments, transitional justice 
has replicated the dual interaction between indirect colonial rule and customary law during the 




Accordingly, what is broadly understood as legal pluralism begins with the socio-
anthropological examination of legal functions in a colonial administration (Griffiths, 1986: 
p.34). However, according to Nagy, transitional justice mechanisms represent a ‘new legal 
pluralism order’ in which the pursuit of various legal and non-legal mechanisms in liberal 
peacebuilding projects ‘take place through the interpenetration of a variety of legal and 
normative order across different social-legal fields at the international, transnational, state, and 
community levels’ (2013: p.83).  
 
Focusing her analysis on the TRC in South Africa, the Gacaca Court in Rwanda and the use of 
mato oput in northern Uganda, Nagy asserts that transitional justice, as the new form of legal 
pluralism, has challenged the legal positivists’ understanding of law as being simply derived 
from the closed, top-down structure of the state system. ‘Law is not simply a set of rules, but 
constitutive of and constituted by social, economic and political relations’ (p.83). Yet the 
diversification and hybrid nature of various legal orders and approaches have become 
hegemonic and have adopted a reductionist stance, even in pursuing restorative justice 
mechanisms, such as the TRC. In this respect, Nagy cited John Griffith’s conceptualisation of 
legal centralism in order to explain how the reality of implementing legal plural arrangements 
in the transitional justice industry replicated rather than contradicted legal centralism (see 
Griffiths, 1986). To Griffith, legal centralism is based on the social assumption that legal order 
and its mechanisms derive uniformly from the state, since there is no plausibility of executing 




In contrast, legal pluralism does not deny the crucial element of the state to execute law, but 
criticises the failure of legal centralism to recognise various forces, including the roles of non-
state actors and customary law (understood as non-western here) in shaping the formulation, 
dynamics and sources of law enforcement and authority (Tamanaha, 1993: p.194). As such, 
‘law is heterogeneous and subject to “the political mobilisation of competing social forces” 
across an interdependent web of “semiautonomous social fields” (Nagy, 2013: p.83).  
 
While recognising the popularity of the legal pluralist approach in examining various 
transitional justice mechanisms, Nagy has suggested that what is perceived as the diversity or 
hybridity of legal orders in post-conflict environments actually resembles legal centralism in 
the execution of a one-size-fits-all transitional justice policy (p.83). Nagy’s criticism prompts 
this thesis to suggest that there should be a greater recognition of the primary assumption of 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) about the interaction between politics and law when transitional 
justice interacts with liberal peacebuilding practices. This has been eloquently demonstrated 
by Kieran McEvoy in his analysis of transitional justice in Northern Ireland.  
 
Taking a CLS stance, he expose one of the legal positivist assumptions about ‘formalism’ in 
legal practice, and suggests that such features can be identified through the standardised 
assumptions of many international lawyers and human rights advocates working in the field of 
TRC, particularly the assumption that justice is a universal and uncontested system of 
knowledge that remains separate from political transition (McEvoy, 2008: p.19). ‘The 
centrality of law in “dealing with the past” is not unsurprising. Law speaks to qualities such as 
rationality, certainty, objectivity, universality, and uniformity that are highly prized in times of 
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profound social rupture’ (Nagy, 2013: p.83). Hence, what were initially perceived as hybrid or 
pluralising legal approaches in recognising the non-legal mechanisms of transitional justice–
and the bottom-up approach to it–have eventually become hegemonic and centralised on a 
global scale through the adoption of a one-size-fits-all TRC or TJRC model.  
 
This is evident in the UN Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-conflict Societies (Sriram, 2010: p.280). Additionally, commentators have advocated 
both legal and political objectives for liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice (Garcia-
Godos and Sriram, 2013: p.7); furthermore, there has been an importation of similar TRC 
industries (or a “lesson learning approach”) from Argentina to South Africa, and later from 
South Africa to Kenya and other African countries (Lynch, 2012/2013: p.130). As a result, 
what were generally understood as non-legal mechanisms (such as the TJRC) in their 
complimenting of the primary requirement of criminal accountability have become hegemonic 
and ‘externalised from the lives of the ordinary people’ (Nagy, 2013: p.83).  
 
The danger lies in the reality that what began as a non-legal mechanism from a legal pluralist 
standpoint has gravitated towards legal centralism and produced a hegemonic global template 
of restorative justice. What may seem to have been anchored in a bottom-up approach to peace 
or localizing transitional justice, was later initiated or taken for granted by the ruling class in 
its definition of a form of transition that does not meaningfully articulate the needs of the 
victim. ‘In Kenya, our TJRC is similar to South Africa’s TRC model, though even I 
sometimes found that we were not scrutinising whether the use of such mechanisms has 
affirmatively been justified’ (interview with TJRC officer no. 4. Nairobi, February 7, 2012). 
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The installation of the TJRC in Kenya was initially inspired by the “success story” of South 
Africa’s TRC; however, it may plausibly end in a failure to project this form of TRC, as 
occurred in Haiti (Quinn, 2009c) and Timor Leste (Grenfell, 2009). 
 
 
C – The Chronology and Jurisdictions of the TJRC in Kenya 
There has been a wealth of literature produced on the TJRC in Kenya (Kioko, 2002; Lynch, 
2012/2013; Musila, 2009a; Mutua, 2004). However, there have been various attempts to help 
Kenya to come to terms with its troubled past through the work of truth commissions and 
various task forces prior to the 2008 crisis. Therefore, the following tables 5.1 and 5.2 
summarise the institutionalisation of the TJRC. 
Table 5.1: The Chronology of the TJRC Operations (until May 2013) 
 




Kituo cha Katiba organized a 
Workshop in Nairobi on the 
theme ‘Revisiting Transitional 
Justice: A Non-partisan and 
Non-Governmental 
Engagement.’ The objective of 
the workshop is to make the 
issue of justice and truth as one 
of the  major issues during the 
2007 election. 
 
On February 28, 2008, after 41 
days of intense mediation, 17 
the formal negotiations were 
concluded with the signing of 
the Agreement on the Principles 
of Partnership of the Coalition 
Government (hereinafter 
referred to as the Coalition 




The period towards the general 
election was also characterised 
by intense violent activities by 
militia groups, especially the 
Mungiki sect and Sabaot Land 
Defence Force (SLDF). The 
government responded to the 
violence with great force.  
 
In November 2007, the KNCHR 
published a report on extra-
judicial killings. The report 
concluded that the police could 
be complicit in the killing of an 
estimated 500 individuals 
suspected to be members of the 
outlawed Mungiki sect, 12 which 
had wreaked terror in many parts 
of Central Kenya and areas of 
urban informal settlements in the 
capital city Nairobi. 
 
Thus, the general elections of 
December 27, 2007 were 
conducted in a volatile 
environment in which violence 
had been normalised and ethnic 
relations had become poisoned. 
In effect, fertile ground had been 
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prepared for the eruption of 
violence.  
 
On March 4, 2008, the General 
Principles and Parameters for the 
Commission of Inquiry into the 
Post Election Violence (the Waki 
Commission) were signed. This 
Agreement, together with the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 
formed the basis for the 
appointment of a Commission of 
Inquiry into Post Election 
Violence (the Waki Commission) 
headed by Justice Philip Waki on 
May 22, 2008. The CIPEV 
carried out investigations and 
issued its report in October 2008.  
 
The Report found that while the 
post-election violence was 
spontaneous in some areas, it 
was planned and financed in 
other places. 
 
The Waki Comission generated a 
sealed list of individuals alleged 
to have borne the greatest 
responsibility for the post-
election violence and 
recommended the formation of a 
special tribunal, within a 
specified time, for the 
prosecution of these individuals, 
failing which the list would be 
handed over to the Prosecutor of 
ICC for appropriate action 
(Chapter 4). 
 
Parliament failed to establish 
such a tribunal within the 
specified time and the sealed list 
of names was as a result handed 
over to the then ICC Chief 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo. A series of events 
followed thereafter, leading to 
the indictment of six Kenyan 
individuals before the ICC. 
 
The flawed options between two 
criminal proceeding options 
(Chapter 3) lead to the idea of 
using the TJRC as an alternative 
to both types of criminal 
prosecutorial options. However, 




March 4, 2008 Beside the establishment of the 
aforementioned of the above 
commissions, the AU mediation 
team appointed Ambassador 
Oluyemi Adeniji, a former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Nigeria, to conclude 
negotiations on Agenda Item 
Four.  
 
The General Principles and 
Parameters for the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission were signed 
(TJRC Agreement).  
This Agreement formed the basis 
for the establishment of the 
TJRC. The details of the 
Agreement are discussed in 
detail in Table 5.2. 
May 9, 2008 The legislative process 
officially commenced on May 
9, 2008 with the publication in 
the Kenya Gazette of the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission Bill by the 
Ministry of Justice, National 
Cohesion and Constitutional 
Affairs (Ministry of Justice). 
This was slightly more than one 
month outside the timeline 
given in the TJRC Agreement 
Parties to the TJRC Agreement 
had anticipated that the 
Commission would be created 
within four weeks of signing the 
Agreement. This timeline was 
both ambitious and impractical 
for two significant reasons.  
 
Firstly, four weeks was too short 
a period for the legislative cycle 
to run full course, considering 
that the National Assembly was 
required to enact several other 
pieces of legislation emanating 
from the KNDR process.  
 
Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, four weeks was too 
short a period to allow for 
sufficient consultations with and 
meaningful participation of 
stakeholders in the legislative 
process. 
October 23, 2008 After going through the full 
legislative cycle, the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Act 
became law on October 23, 
2008. The Act received 
Presidential Assent on 
November 28, 2008 and came 
into operation on March 17, 
2009. 
The publication of the Bill was 
greeted with much criticism, 
especially because stakeholders 
claimed that they had not been 
meaningfully engaged in its 
drafting. Moreover, several of its 
provisions on the mandate and 
operations of a truth commission 
(such as provisions on amnesty) 
did not reflect internationally 
accepted standards. This 
prompted civil society 
organisations to prepare reviews 
of the Bill for consideration by 
the Ministry of Justice and the 
National Assembly. 
 
The Multi-Sectoral Task Force 
on the TJRC, an umbrella body 
of CSOs which later evolved into 
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the Kenya Transitional Justice 
Network, prepared a detailed 
memorandum proposing 
amendments to the TJRC Bill, 
especially in relation to its 
provisions on the following: 
objectives and functions of the 
Commission; economic crimes; 
independence of the 
Commission; amnesty; and 
implementation of the 
recommendations of the 
Commission.  
 
Amnesty International raised 
similar issues and even expanded 
the concerns. 
 
Some of the concerns and 
proposals made by the various 
CSOs were taken up by the 
Ministry of Justice and 
ultimately by the National 
Assembly. For example, the 
hitherto broad amnesty 
provisions were amended to 
allow for conditional amnesty for 
a very narrow list of crimes. 
April 2009 The Selection Panel placed an 
advertisement in the Kenya 
Gazette and in three daily 
newspapers inviting 
applications from persons who 
met the qualifications set forth 
in the Act for nomination as 
commissioners.  
 
The Act required that the 
Commissioners include 
individuals with knowledge and 
experience in human rights law, 
forensic audit, investigations, 
psycho-sociology, 
anthropology, social relations, 
conflict management, religion 
and gender issues.  
 
The Act also included a broadly 
worded qualification designed 
to protect the process and the 
broad mandate of the 
Commission from any 
interference due to conflict of 
interest. The Act thus required 
that commissioners be persons 
who had ‘not in any way been 
involved, implicated, linked or 
The TJR Act provided for the 
appointment of nine 
Commissioners; six Kenyan 
citizens appointed through a 
national consultative process and 
three non-citizens selected by the 
African Union Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities.  
 
The Act required gender equity 
(and geographical balance in the 
case of Kenyan citizens) in the 
selection of the Commissioners. 
 
The selection of the Kenyan 
Commissioners was done 
through a broadly consultative 
process that involved civil 
society and Parliament. The 
process began with the creation 
of a Selection Panel composed of 
nine individuals nominated by 
various religious and 
professional organisations in the 
following proportion:  
 two individuals 
nominated by a joint 




associated with human rights 
violations of any kind or in any 
matter which is to be 
investigated under this Act’. 
 
The Selection Panel sub-
contracted a human resources 
firm to conduct short-listing of 
applicants on its behalf. The 
firm received a total of 254 
applications. Out of these, 47 
applicants were selected for 
interview by the Panel. After 
conducting interviews, 15 
names were forwarded to the 
National Assembly for 
consideration. The National 
Assembly deliberated the 
suitability of the 15 individuals 
and narrowed the number of 
candidates to nine.28 The Panel 
of Eminent African 
Personalities forwarded three 
names to the National 
Assembly, which in turn 
forwarded those names together 
with those of the nine Kenyans 
to the President. 
 one person nominated by 
the Law Society of 
Kenya (LSK);  
 one person nominated by 
the Federation of 
Women Lawyers (FIDA 
Kenya); 
 one person jointly 
nominated by the Central 
Organisation of Trade 
Unions (COTU) and the 
Kenya National Union of 
Teachers (KNUT);  
 one person nominated by 
the Association of 
Professional Societies of 
East Africa;  
 one person nominated by 
the Kenya National 
Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR);  
 one person jointly 
nominated by the Kenya 
Private Sector Alliance 
and the Federation of 
Kenya Employers 
(FKE); and 
 one person nominated by 
the Kenya Medical 
Association (KMA) 
July 22, 2009 By Gazette, the President 
appointed the following nine 
individuals to serve as members 
of the Commission:  
 Bethuel Kiplagat 
(Kenya); 
 Kaari Betty Murungi 
(Kenya); 
 Tecla Namachanja 
Wanjala (Kenya);  
 Gertrude Chawatama 
(Zambia); 
 Berhanu Dinka 
(Ethiopia); 
 Ahmed Sheikh Farah 
(Kenya); 
 Tom Ojienda (Kenya); 
 Margaret Shava 
From among the Commissioners, 
the President appointed 
Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat as 
Chairperson to the Commission. 
The President also appointed 
Betty Murungi as Vice-
Chairperson, though the Act 
made it clear that the Vice- 
Chairperson was to be chosen by 
the Commissioners themselves 
and not the President. 
 
Shortly after the members of the 
Commission were appointed, the 
Cabinet issued a statement 
indicating that instead of 
establishing a special tribunal to 
try those who were allegedly 
responsible for the 2007/2008 
Post-election Violence, it would 
be seeking an expansion of the 
Commission’s to include dealing 
with these cases. This decision 
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(Kenya); and  
 Ronald Slye (United 
States). 
was highly criticized by a broad 
sector of Kenyan society and 
would later have an impact on 
the work of the Commission 
although the decision never saw 
the light of day. 
 
Firstly, the decision created the 
impression that the government 
was inclined to using the 
Commission as a shield against 
those who were alleged to bear 
responsibility for the post-
election violence. 
 
Secondly, a section of CSOs and 
donors resolved not to work with 
or fund the Commission until the 
Cabinet’s decision is reversed. 
August 3, 2009 The Commissioners were 
sworn into office.  
During their inaugural meeting, 
and in accordance with Section 
11(2) of the TJR Act, 
Commissioners elected Betty 
Murungi as the Vice-
Chairperson.  
 
However, as will be discussed in 
detail later, Betty Murungi 
subsequently resigned, first as 
Vice-Chairperson and then as a 
Commissioner. While the 
President was required to gazette 
her vacancy within seven days of 
her resignation so that a 
replacement could be chosen, 
such notice was never published 
and thus no replacement was 
ever provided.  
 
From mid-April 2010 the 
Commission operated with only 
eight full-time Commissioners. 
When Ambassador Kiplagat 
stepped aside in November 2010 
for sixteen months, the 
Commission operated with only 
seven full-time Commissioners. 
August 2010 The Commission recruited 304 
statement takers and deployed 
them across the country to take 
statements from victims, their 
families and witnesses. 
Amongst those recruited were 
individuals who were victims of 
violations that fell under the 
Commission’s mandate and 
scope of inquiry. Sections of 
The Commission did not take 
these concerns lightly. The 
decision to engage victims as 
staff members was based on 
comparative experience.  
 
Many truth commissions across 
the world have involved victims. 
Some of the best known truth 
commissions have had victims as 
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civil society and others raised 
the concern that engaging 
victims as staff of the 
Commission was inappropriate.  
 
They argued that victims would 
be partial by virtue of their 
experience and their 
engagement as staff of the 
Commission would 
compromise the statement 
taking process. 
Commissioners and 
Chairpersons; for example, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
chaired the South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. 
Truth commissions are designed 
to be victim-centred, though not 
victim-dominated, processes.  
 
Engagement of victims facilitates 
access to victim communities, 
and promotes ownership and 
legitimacy of the process. The 
right to effective remedy requires 
that victims are involved in the 
processes of finding solutions to 
and redress for violations.  
 
Therefore, the question before 
the Commission was not whether 
to engage victims but in what 
capacity and under what terms. 
Firstly, victims had to qualify for 
the position they applied for just 
like any other applicant and go 
through the interview process. 
Secondly, the Commission 
limited the recruitment of victims 
to statement takers and civic 
educators.  
 
In the area of statement taking 
the Commission also adopted the 
policy that any individual could 
request a different statement 
taker than the one before them, 
thus ensuring that individuals 
who gave statements were 
provided the safest and most 
effective environment in which 
to tell their stories. Victims were 
not hired as investigators or as 
researchers, or in any positions 
which involved analysis of 
violations and identifying those 
responsible for such violations. 
In addition, the Commission took 
measures to ensure that cases of 
conflict of interest were 
minimised.  
 
The engagement of victims by 
the Commission also had an 
important reparatory dimension 
to it. It symbolised restoration 
and affirmation of the dignity of 
victims and their right to access 





As documented in the TJRC 
Report Volume Two, the 
majority of victims of torture and 
detention under President Moi’s 
regime remained unemployed, 
decades later. Those who were 
university students at the time of 
their detention and torture had 
their education and careers 
abruptly and indefinitely cut 
short. Members of the Kenya Air 
Force who were suspected to 
have been behind or supported 
the 1982 attempted coup d’etat 
had their careers in the armed 
forces abruptly terminated and 
the stigma surrounding their 
discharge from the Force made it 
impossible to secure employment 
in any formal institution.  
 
The small number of victims that 
the Commission engaged as 
statement takers and civic 
educators expressed gratitude 
that such an opportunity had 
been offered to them. 
2010 In 1972 the Kenyan Parliament 
passed the Indemnity Act, 
which restricts the ability of 
individuals to make claims 
arising from acts committed by 
the Kenya armed forces and 
others acting on behalf of the 
government for any act they 
committed during the so-called 
Shifta War (25 December 25, 
1963 – December 1, 1967).  
 
The restriction on, among other 
things, any proceeding or claim 
to compensation is itself 
restricted to acts committed 
only in a part of Kenya: the 
former North Eastern Province 
and Lamu, Tana River, 
Marsabit and Isiolo districts. 
 
The Indemnity Act thus 
purports to institutionalise 
impunity for human rights 
violations committed by those 
acting on behalf of the 
government during a prescribed 
time and in a prescribed area. In 
From its inception, concerns 
were raised about the impact of 
the Indemnity Act on the 
Commission’s work. Some were 
concerned that the Indemnity Act 
prevented the Commission from 
investigating, researching, 
discussing, or commenting on 
violations that occurred in the 
areas and during the times 
covered by the Act. Others 
argued that the Commission 
should devote some of its 
operational resources to pushing 
for repeal of the Indemnity Act. 
Still others refused to engage 
with the Commission unless and 
until the Act was repealed. 
 
In interpreting the scope of its 
mandate, the Commission 
obviously had to address the 
applicability and effect of the 
Indemnity Act on its activities. 
After thoroughly considering the 
issue, the Commission concluded 
that the Indemnity Act did not 
apply to the work of the 
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other words, it attempts to 
create a separate legal regime 
with respect to accountability 
for the Shifta War.  
 
To qualify for legal protection 
under the Indemnity Act, an 
individual’s action must have 
been done in good faith and 
‘done or purported to be done 
in the execution of duty in the 
interests of public safety or the 
maintenance of public order, 
otherwise in the public 
interest’. 
 
Since the passage of the 
Indemnity Act many have 
argued for its repeal, including 
and not surprisingly, residents 
of the affected areas. 
Parliament voted to repeal the 
Indemnity Act in 2010.  
 
The President however refused 
to assent to the repeal and thus 
the Indemnity Act continues to 
be part of the laws of Kenya. 
Commission and thus could not 
restrict in any way the work of 
the Commission. There are two 
arguments that support the 
Commission’s conclusion.  
 
First, the Indemnity Act makes it 
clear that its restrictions with 
respect to accountability do not 
apply to ‘the institution or 
prosecution of proceedings on 
behalf of the government’. This 
section makes clear that the focus 
of the legislation is on restricting 
the right of private individuals to 
bring a claim for compensation 
or other form of accountability. 
The Commission is an 
independent government 
commission that was created by 
and works on behalf of the 
government. As such the 
Commission clearly is engaged 
in ‘proceedings on behalf of the 
government’ and thus its 
operations are excluded from the 
provisions of the Indemnity Act. 
 
Second, even if one were to 
argue that the Indemnity Act by 
its terms applies to and thus 
restricts the powers of the 
Commission, the passage of the 
TRJ Act, which, under this 
argument, conflicts with the 
provisions of the Indemnity Act, 
would prevail as it was passed 
after the Indemnity Act. It is a 
fundamental principle of the rule 
of law that if two pieces of 
legislation conflict, the one 
passed later in time applies 
unless the later legislation makes 
clear that it is subject to the 
previous legislation.  
 
In this case, Parliament passed 
the TJR Act in 2008 and decided 
not to make the Commission 
subject to the Indemnity Act. 
This argument is strengthened by 
the fact that Parliament did 
expressly indicate that the 
Commission is subject to other 
pieces of legislation that conflict 
with the TJR Act, such as the 
Protected Areas Act. 
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July, 2011 The Commission was accused 
of corruption and other 
financial improprieties.  
 
Reports surfaced in the media 
alleging corruption within the 
Commission. The media reports 
appeared to reference internal 
documentation of the 
Commission although sourced 
through other organisations.  
 
This prompted the Commission 
to undertake urgent internal 
investigations. It was found that 
the media reports were 
unfounded. The investigations 
were undertaken with the 
generous cooperation of an 
organisation in which the 
individual who released the 
false information worked.  
 
The Commission was dismayed 
to learn that the information 
was based on selective release 
of misleading information from 
within the Commission by 
individuals linked to 
Ambassador Kiplagat. 
Near the end of 2011 and into 
early 2012, new stories of 
financial mismanagement at the 
Commission surfaced in the 
press again. These stories were 
based on a confidential 
management letter that had been 
sent to the Commission by its 
external auditor. The letter from 
the auditors was a typical 
management letter – written after 
an initial review of the 
Commission’s accounts and 
requesting clarification on a 
number of matters.  
 
As part of the auditing process, 
and not the end of it, 
management letters do not 
provide a reliable indication of 
the state of an organisation’s 
financial affairs.  
 
Unfortunately copies of the 
management letter were leaked 
from inside the Commission to 
numerous media houses. 
Established media houses 
contacted the Commission and 
when the nature of the document 
they had been given was 
explained to them, they declined 
to publish the story. Some 
papers, however, did publish a 
series of stories alleging that the 
Commission’s auditors had 
found massive fraud and 
corruption within the 
Commission.  
 
In fact, the Commission had 
already responded to the 
management letter answering 
each of the queries raised by the 
auditors, which eventually 
resulted in an audit report that 
raised absolutely no concerns 
relating to financial 
mismanagement or improprieties, 
much less corruption. The 
Commission immediately posted 
the audit report on its website. 
 
Even after the audit report was 
published on the Commission’s 
website, the Nairobi Law 
Monthly printed a story based on 
the misinformed media reports 
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appearing several months earlier 
in segments of the alternative 
media commonly known as the 
gutter press. Even more 
disappointing was the fact that 
Nairobi Law Monthly did not 
contact the Commission for a 
comment, or try to verify its 
story. This was particularly 
unfortunate as the Nairobi Law 
Monthly went on to name 
specific Commissioners and staff 
members as having stolen money 
from the Commission. The ironic 
reality is that the Commissioners 
had in fact lent money to the 
Commission at a time when it 
had not received quarterly 
funding from the Treasury to 
enable the Commission to 
perform its core functions.  
 
Those who reported on the 
matter misread the financial 
documents given to them – or 
were relying upon the 
interpretation of those documents 
given by individuals who wanted 
to harm the reputation of the 
Commission. Thus, those 
Commissioners who were the 
most generous were the ones 
most unjustly vilified in 
publications such as the Nairobi 
Law Monthly. 
November 2011 to 
May 2012 
In line with the TJRC 
Agreement, the TJR Act 
required the Commission to 
operate for a period of two 
years, 42 preceded by a three-
month establishment phase. 
 
The two-year operational 
period granted to the 
Commission was ambitious 
even in the best of 
circumstances, considering the 
breadth and complexity of the 
Commission’s mandate. The 
Commission’s material 
mandate was by far the 
broadest of any truth 
commission ever established, 
encompassing inquiry into 
violations of civil and political 
rights as well as socio-
economic rights. Its temporal 
As the end of the operational 
period approached, the 
Commission assessed the 
progress it had made in executing 
its mandate and the outstanding 
workload via its capacity.  
 
The Commission concluded that 
it would be unable to finalise its 
work within the two years 
statutory limit.  
 
By June 2011 the Commission 
had conducted hearings in North 
Eastern Province and partially in 
Western Province. With six (6) 
provinces to go and a series of 
other mandate operations that 
had not been executed, the 
Commission reached the 
considered opinion that it would 
not finalise its work within the 
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mandate was similarly wide, 
spanning December 12, 1963 to 
February 28, 2008, a period of 
just less than 45 years.  
 
Beyond the magnitude of the 
task the Commission faced 
several challenges and 
difficulties that had the effect of 
hampering its work and slowing 
implementation of its mandate.  
 
In particular, the Commission 
lost considerable time and 
credibility at the beginning of 
its term due to the controversy 
that surrounded the suitability 
of its Chairperson which lasted 
fifteen months from the 
appointment of the 
Commissioners in August 2009, 
to the stepping aside of the 
Chairperson in November 2010.  
 
The Commission also suffered 
financial and resource 
constraints that stalled its 
operations for the better part of 
its first year of operations. As a 
result, the Commission was not 
able to begin operating 
substantively and effectively 
until September 2010, a full 
year after its establishment. 
remaining three months. 
 
Thus, on June 24, 2011, pursuant 
to section 20(3) of the TJR Act, 
the Commission requested the 
National Assembly to extend its 
tenure for a period of six months 
as expressly provided for by the 
Act. 
 
The National Assembly did not 
consider this request until two 
months later, on August 18, 2011 
whereupon it voted to extend the 
Commission’s term as requested. 
 
May to August 
2012 
The second extension. Despite 
the fact that the Commission 
had been granted an extension, 
the outstanding workload 
remained enormous and 
demanding. Although it 
adhered to a compact timetable, 
the Commission concluded 
hearings in April 2012 having 
conducted 220 well attended 
hearing sessions during which 
more than 680 individuals 
testified before the 
Commission.  
 
In March 2012 when the 
Commission concluded its 
individual hearings, it had less 
than a month to finalise and 
submit its report. This proved to 
be an impossible task. The one 
month period was only 
sufficient to process transcripts 
Faced with this challenge, the 
Commission requested that the 
three-month statutory winding up 
period provided to the 
Commission (May 3, to August 
3, 2012) be reallocated to its 
operational period to give the 
Commission an additional three 
months to work on the report.  
 
Under the circumstances 
obtaining then, this was the best 
request that the Commission 
could make. To effect the request 
an amendment to the TJR Act 
had to be made.  
 
While the Commission expressed 
its request towards the end of 
April, it was only on 7 August 
2012 that Parliament considered 
and approved the request. By that 
time, the relevant period over 
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of hearings that the 
Commission had conducted in 
January and February 2012, 
leaving the key task of report 
writing undone.  
 
 
which an extension had been 
sought had already lapsed.  
 
In essence, the Commission 
operated in legal limbo for three 
months as it waited for 
Parliament to consider its 
request. Although the 
Commission continued to write 
its report during this period, the 
uncertainty over its legal status 
impacted negatively on its 
operations.  
 
Firstly, the Commission could 
neither conduct certain mandate 
operations (such as notifying 
adversely mentioned persons of 
their right to respond to 
allegations levelled against them) 
nor incur expenditures on 
mandate related operations.  
 
Secondly, the Commission 
suffered high turn-over of staff 
during this period. As a result, its 
capacity to operate at an optimal 
level was significantly reduced, 
especially as it had a lean staff 
complement to begin with. 
August 2012 to 
May 2013 
With a second extension, the 
Commission was expected to 
deliver its report on August 3, 
2012. However, as it has been 
indicated above, Parliament did 
not consider the Commission’s 
request for an extension until 
August 7, 2012.  
 
This was mainly due to the fact 
that the Commission was 
compelled to review its position 
on passing on various aspects 
of its mandate to the 
implementation mechanism to 
be established at the end of the 
life of the Commission. 
For the above reason, the 
Commission once again 
requested an extension of tenure 
to enable it finalise its report. On 
November 27, 2012, the National 
Assembly unanimously voted to 
extend the Commission’s 
operational period to may 3, 
2013. 
May 2013 The four volumes of the final 
reports was officially were 
handed by the Commission to 
the newly elected President 
Uhuru, as well as for the public 
access.  
 





Table 5.2: The Mandate and Jurisdiction of the TJRC 
The TJRC Agreement 
The TJRC agreement spelt out the general parameters, guiding principles and the broad 
rules that would govern the creation and operation of the Commission. In particular, the 
following general parameters were agreed upon:  
 A truth, justice and reconciliation commission was to be created through an Act of 
Parliament and adopted by the Legislature within four weeks.  
 
 The Commission would inquire into human rights violations, including those 
committed by the State, groups or individuals. Such inquiry was to include but not 
be limited to politically-motivated violence, assassinations, community 
displacements, settlements and evictions. The Commission was also to inquire into 
major economic crimes, in particular grand corruption, historical land injustices and 
the illegal and irregular acquisition of land, especially as related to conflict or 
violence. Other historical injustices were also to be investigated.  
 
 The Commission was to inquire into events which took place between December 
12, 1963 and February 28, 2008. However, it was also mandated to look at 
antecedents to this period where necessary in order to understand the nature, root 
causes, and context that led to such violations, violence, or crimes.  
 
 The Commission was to receive statements from victims, witnesses, communities, 
interest groups, persons directly or indirectly involved in events, or any other group 
or individual; undertake investigations and research; hold hearings; and engage in 
activities as it determined to advance national or community reconciliation. The 
Commission was permitted to offer confidentiality to persons upon request, in order 
to protect individual privacy or security, or for other reasons. The determination as 
to whether to hold its hearings in public or in camera was left to the sole discretion 
of the Commission.  
 
 Blanket amnesty would not be provided for past crimes. Provision was made for the 
proposed commission to recommend individual amnesty in exchange for the full 
truth. Serious international crimes including crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
or genocide were not amnestied, nor were persons who bore the greatest 
responsibility for crimes that the Commission would cover. 
  
 The Commission was to complete its work and submit a final report within two 
years. The final report was to state its findings and recommendations which would 
be submitted to the President, and made public within fourteen (14) days before 
being tabled in Parliament. 
 
It was also agreed that the proposed Commission would reflect the following principles and 
guidelines, taking into account international standards and best practices:  
 
 Independence: The Commission was to operate free from political or other 
influence. It would determine its own specific working methodologies and work 
plan, including those adopted for investigation and reporting. It would also set out 
its own budget and staff plan.  
 
 Fair and balanced inquiry: In all its work, the Commission was to ensure that it 
sought the truth without influence from other factors. In representations to the 
public through hearings, statements, or in its final report, the Commission was to 




 Appropriate powers: The Commission was given powers of investigation, 
including the right to call persons to speak with the Commission and powers to 
make recommendations to be considered and implemented by the government or 
others. These recommendations could include measures to advance community or 
national reconciliation; institutional or other reforms, or whether any persons were 
to be held to account for past acts.  
 
 Full cooperation: Government and other state offices were to provide information 
to the Commission on request, and to provide access to archives or other sources of 
information. Other Kenyan and international individuals and organizations were 
also urged to provide full cooperation and information to the Commission on 
request.  
 
 Financial support: the parties were to encourage strong financial support to the 
Commission. The Government of Kenya was expected to provide a significant 
portion of the Commission’s budget. Other funding could be obtained by the 
Commission from donors, foundations, or other independent sources. 
 
On the composition of the Commission, the TJRC Agreement stated that: 
 The Commission would consist of seven members, with gender balance taken into 
account. Three of the members were to be international. The members were to be 
persons of high moral integrity, well regarded by the Kenyan population, and to 
possess a range of skills, backgrounds, and professional expertise. As a whole, the 
Commission was to be perceived as impartial and no member was to be seen to 
represent a specific political group. At least two and not more than five of the seven 
commissioners were to be lawyers.  
 
 In keeping with international best practices and to ensure broad public trust in and 
ownership of the process of seeking the truth, the national members of the 
Commission were chosen through a consultative process. The Commissioners were 
to be named no more than eight weeks after the passage of the Act that established 
the Commission.  
 
 The three international members were to be selected by the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities, taking into account public input. 
Objectives and Functions of the TJRC 
The objectives and functions of the Commission were respectively spelt out in sections 5 
and 6 of the TJR Act. Although these objectives and functions were outlined in two 
separate sections of the Act, the Commission proceeded with its work with the 
understanding that both sections essentially related to its mandate and there were no strict 
distinctions between its objectives, on the one hand and its functions, on the other.  
 
Section 5 of the TJR Act provides that ‘the objectives of the Commission shall be to 
promote peace, justice, national unity, healing and reconciliation among the people of 
Kenya’. These objectives must be understood from a historical perspective, and 
particularly, in relation to both historical and immediate reasons leading to the formation of 
the Commission. Volume one of the TJRC Report recounted that history, but it must be 
emphasised here that central to establishing the Commission was the stark and painful 
realisation that Kenya’s past and history could no longer be ignored or ‘swept under the 
carpet’. The past had to be confronted.  
 
Thus, when the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Bill, 2008 (TJR Bill) was introduced in 
Parliament for debate, the Minister for Justice stated in her ‘Memorandum of Objects and 
Reasons’ that:  
               […] The Bill is borne of the realisation that lasting peace and co-existence cannot prevail in   
               Kenya unless historical injustices and violation and abuse of human rights have been     




The Minister further explained that:  
The Bill emanates from the deliberations of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
Committee which was formed after a political crisis ensued following a dispute on the 
outcome of the Presidential Election held on 27th December, 2007. The political crisis 
brought to the surface deep-seated and long-standing divisions within the Kenyan society 
and to heal those divisions, a raft of constitutional, legal and political measures to defuse 
the crisis were proposed, among them being the formation of a Commission to deal with 
historical injustices and violation of human rights. The establishment of the Commission 
was conceived with a view to addressing historical problems and injustices which, if left 
unaddressed, threatened the very existence of Kenya as a modern society.  
 
The fact that the past had to be confronted was eminently clear to the National Assembly 
when it sat to debate the TJR Bill. In seconding that the Bill be read a second time, a 
member of the KNDR team indicated that: 
[…] the events of the last General Election taught this country a lot of painful lessons. It 
has given us a chance to reflect on our past. It has become absolutely necessary to bring 
our past to some closure so that we can move ahead as a country. The Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission is the avenue through which Kenyans from all walks of life, 
and with truth, justice and reconciliation being their mission, come together to express 
themselves in this exercise so that they can bring their past to a closure and open a new 
chapter for us to move ahead as a country. It became clear that among the things that 
informed the near destruction of our country in the last General Election were issues that 
have been pending for a long time. There were historical injustices and prejudices that 
were informed by past events, deeds and actions by individuals, organisations and 
governments. It is necessary for us to bring that to a closure so that Kenya can exit from 
these prejudices and perceived or real injustices that were meted to the people of Kenya, 
thereby causing the mistrust that exists between our citizenry. The Bible says ‘if you know 
the truth, the truth will set you free’. It is important for us to get to know the truth so that, 
as a country, we become free. It is important for the things that have been said about 
people and communities be known. The truth about government bodies, individuals and 
public officers must be known. The truth must be known so that we can set our country 
free. It is said that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. It is, therefore, 
important for us, as a country, to deal with injustices that have been meted upon citizens of 
our country, whether they are perceived or real so that again we can live in a just society. 
 
In addition to stating the objectives of the Commission, section 5 also indicated 10 ways by 
which those objectives should be achieved. When these modes of achieving its objectives 
were read together with section 6 of the Act, the Commission found it necessary to 
conceptually cluster its functions into four broad categories, that is, functions relating to: 
creating a historical record; victims, perpetrators; and the report. 
On a Historical Records 
Although the TJR Act does not create a hierarchy in relation to the functions of the 
Commission, it is noteworthy that the first two ways in which it envisaged that the 
Commission would execute its objectives is through the compiling of a historical record. In 
this regard, section 5(a) mandated the Commission to establish an accurate, complete and 
historical record of gross violations of human rights committed in Kenya by various state 
actors between December 12, 1963 and February 28, 2008. Section 5(b) mandated the 
Commission to establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent 
of violations of human rights. In this regard, the catalogue of specific violations that the 
Commission investigated is provided and discussed in detail further below. 
On victims  
Victims are at the heart of a truth-telling process and the operations of a truth commission. 
The process ought to give agency and recognition to victims. Ultimately, it should provide 
redress to victims. The process itself should be sensitive and humane. 
 
According to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims, ‘victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their 
dignity and human rights and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, 
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physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families’. In 
this light and in keeping with international standards, sections 5 and 6 of the TJR Act 
mandated the Commission to carry out the following functions with respect to victims:  
 Identify and specify victims of violations; 
 Determine ways and means of redressing the suffering of victims;  
 Provide victims with a platform for non-retributive truth telling; 
 Provide victims with a forum to be heard and restore their dignity; 
 Investigate into the whereabouts of victims and restore their dignity; and  
 Recommend reparation measures in respect of victims.  
 
The Commissions faithfully performed these functions. On identifying and specifying 
victims of violations, the Commission has compiled and published in this Report a list of 
victims of various violations committed during its mandate period. The list contains the 
names of victims who submitted their cases to the Commission and as such, it is not a 
complete list of all people who suffered violations during the mandate period. In relation to 
determining ways and means of redressing the suffering of victims, this report contains a 
catalogue of recommendations aimed at repairing the harm suffered by victims. The 
Commission’s measures intended to ensure that victims have a platform for non-retributive 
truth-telling are discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
In a nutshell, the Commission held various forms of hearings which provided victims with 
the opportunity to narrate their stories and in the process restore their dignity and 
commence a healing process. 
 
On perpetrators  
While victims are at the heart of a truth-telling process, the involvement of alleged or actual 
perpetrators is equally important for optimum success of the process. Firstly, for a complete 
and accurate story of violations, the perspectives of both victims and perpetrators are a 
requisite. For this reason, section 5(a) of the TJR Act required the Commission to record 
the ‘motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for commission of the violations’. 
Secondly, inter-personal reconciliation between a victim and a perpetrator is by necessity 
dependent on the participation of both parties. Of course, a victim may reconcile with his 
situation and even forgive the perpetrator without the two ever meeting, but the benefits of 
a healing and reconciliation process are maximised when both parties have a joint forum for 
constructive engagement.  
 
For these reasons, the TJR Act mandated the Commission to provide perpetrators with a 
platform for non-retributive truth telling and a forum to confess their actions as a way of 
bringing reconciliation. However, knowing that a careful balance must be struck between 
reconciliation and justice, the drafters of the TJR Act also recommended that the 
Commission should determine perpetrators of violations and where appropriate recommend 
their prosecution. The Act also mandated the Commission to facilitate the granting of 
conditional amnesty to perpetrators who make full disclosure of their involvement in 
violations. The Commission’s approach in relation to this specific mandate relating to 
amnesty is discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
 
In respect to determining perpetrators of violations, the Commission has published in this 
report names of individuals who were alleged to have committed gross violations of human 
rights during its mandate period. The Commission received allegations against 54,000 
individuals. However, the list of alleged perpetrators contained in this report is only limited 
to those who were afforded an opportunity to respond to allegations levelled against them. 
Due to limited resources and time constraints, the Commission could not notify all alleged 
perpetrators of the nature of allegations raised against them. As such, the Commission had 
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to prioritise its work in relation to sending out notifications to alleged perpetrators. The 
criteria used included looking at the gravity of the violations and the frequency of an 
individual’s appearance in the Commission’s database as a perpetrator. 
 
On the report  
The functions of the Commission in relation to preparing this Report were outlined under 
sections 5(j) and 48(2) of the TJR Act. In essence, the law expressly required the 
Commission to do two main things in this report: document its findings and make 
recommendations flowing from those findings. The Act stipulated that the 
recommendations of the Commission should include the following:  
 Recommendations for prosecution  
 Recommendations for reparation for victims  
 Recommendations on specific actions to be taken in furtherance of the 
Commission’s findings  
 Recommendations on legal and administrative measures to be taken to 
address specific concerns identified by the Commission  
 Recommendations relating to the mechanism and framework for the 
implementation of its recommendations and an institutional arrangement.  
 
Due to the numerous yet interrelated issues that it was called upon to document, the 
Commission grappled with how best to structure this Report. Several options were 
scrutinised and after lengthy discussions, the current structure was adopted. 
Temporal Mandate 
The Commission’s temporal mandate was one of the least understood aspects of its 
mandate despite efforts by the Commission to educate the public on this subject. This 
situation arose because up until its formation, disagreements were still rife as to which 
period the Commission should cover in its inquiry. Before the Task Force on the 
Establishment of a TJRC, a considerable number of people were of the opinion that a 
Kenyan truth commission should have a temporal mandate dating back to 1895 when the 
boundaries of what is now Kenya were demarcated. In essence, there are those who wanted 
the envisaged commission to address violations and atrocities committed during the 
colonial period. The Task Force, while agreeing that the colonial period was marked by 
unspeakable atrocities, rejected the idea that a truth commission should inquire into issues 
dating as far back as 1895. The Task Force explained its position thus: 
  
First, that period (1895-1963) is too remote in time, and the questions that it raises are too complex 
for a transitional justice instrument like a truth commission. Evidence would be scant; many of the 
perpetrators are long dead or are in the United Kingdom. Secondly, the answerable power is not 
Kenya, but the United Kingdom, and truth commissions are not generally established to investigate a 
remote, departed power. Finally, extending the truth commission to the colonial period would be an 
impossibly expensive, laboriously prohibitive, and practically unmanageable exercise. For these 
reasons, the Task Force rejects 1895 as an impracticable time-line, and instead recommends that the 
Kenya government sets up a less ambitious vehicle, such as a committee of eminent Kenyans to 
examine a limited set of issues relating to the colonial period. 
 
For the colonial period, the Task Force recommended that ‘a less ambitious vehicle, such as 
a committee of eminent Kenyans’ be constituted for purposes of examining ‘a limited set of 
issues relating to the colonial period’. For the truth commission, the Task Force 
recommended that its temporal mandate be limited to the independence period. It offered 
four reasons for this position:  
 
The Task Force therefore is of the view that a truth commission ought to cover the period from 1963 
to 2002, the post-colonial era and the period KANU ruled the country […] the reasons for this 
choice, which the Task Force endorses, are rational, compelling, and unassailable. First, the period 
combines the first and the second regimes under KANU, and as such cannot be said to be selective 
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or directed at any particular community. This is important because a truth commission cannot be 
legitimate if it appears to be an instrument to settle scores against a particular former regime, 
community or individuals. Secondly, the post-colonial period is very present, and not remote. Many 
of those who served in the independence government are still alive. Thirdly, it stands to reason that 
Kenyans ought to rightly audit their own state, not the colonial British state. Fourth, the human rights 
violations and gross economic crimes that the majority of Kenyans want investigated were 
committed over the last forty years. Lastly, the investigation span of the last forty years is financially 
feasible and defensible, practical, and could be carried out within a two-year period. It is for these 
reasons that the Task Force recommends that a truth commission cover the period from December 
12, 1963 to December 31, 2002. 
 
As described in the previous Chapter, the recommendations of the Task Force were never 
followed through. However, when the question of establishing a truth commission returned 
to the table under the KNDR process, the issue on the temporal mandate of the commission 
returned with it too. Perhaps, acknowledging that there were still some agitating for the 
colonial period to be the subject of inquiry, parties to the TJRC Agreement decided to limit 
the commission’s mandate to the independence period but they also agreed to give it room 
to look into events prior to this period. According to the Agreement: 
  
The Commission will inquire into such events which took place between December 12, 1963 and 
February 28, 2008. However, it will as necessary look at antecedents to this date in order to 
understand the nature, root causes, or context that led to such violations, violence or crimes. 
 
In terms of the TJRC Agreement, the TJR Bill delineated the Commission temporal 
mandate to focus on the post-independence period, from 12 December 1963 when Kenya 
got its independence to 28 February 2008 when the National Accord was signed. But it also 
clearly indicated that the Commission would be empowered to look into the colonial period 
in as far as this period was relevant for understanding ‘antecedents, circumstances and 
context’ of violations committed after independence. When the Bill was introduced in 
Parliament, the Minister for Justice explained the proposed temporal mandate of the 
Commission in the following words:  
Clause 5 gives the objectives of the Commission as to promote peace, justice and national 
unity, healing and reconciliation among the people of Kenya. The Commission will, 
therefore, be establishing an accurate, complete and historical record of violation and 
abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted on Kenyans by the state, public 
institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired, between 12th December, 
1963 and 28th February, 2008.  
 
These two dates are significant. 12th December 1963 is when we attained Independence 
while February 28, 2008 is the date when the National Accord was signed. So, we want to 
examine how we have dealt with each other as an independent state. However, Clause 5A 
(i) recognises that we may need to go beyond 12th December 1963 to the antecedents, 
circumstances and factors so as to contextualize such violations. If we need to go beyond 
12th December 1963 to discover the genesis of the problem, the proposed Clause 5B does 
indicate that we can go as far back as possible in order to establish a complete picture of the 
causes, nature and extent of the gross violation of human and economic rights committed 
between the period I have stated and including antecedents and circumstances. 
 
Despite the above clear explanation, some members of Parliament still proceeded to lament 
that the proposed temporal mandate was too limiting to the extent that the colonial period 
was not covered. The words of Njeru Githae, then an Assistant Minister of Local 
government, are instructive in this regard:  
 
It is unfortunate that we have come up with the date of 12th December1963 when Kenya attained 
Independence. If I would have been asked, I would have said we need to go backwards to when 
Kenya as a nation we know today, first existed. I would have gone back to 1895. This is the time that 
some of the so-called historical injustices started. I have talked of the year 1895 because before then, 
Kenya, whether a colony or a protectorate did not exist. This then would have given Kenyans an 
opportunity to go as far back as memory can remember. This would give the basis for the so-called 
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historical injustices. Some of the so-called historical injustices are actually a result of colonialism. 
 
After clarifications, those who harboured fears such as is quoted above came to understand 
that the envisaged commission could inquire into the colonial period. No changes were, 
therefore, made to the clauses in the TJR Bill relating to the temporal mandate of the 
Commission. Thus, in the TJR Act, the first part of the relevant sections mandates the 
Commission to investigate violations of human rights that occurred in Kenya between 12 
December 1963 and 28 February 2008.38 The second part mandates it to look into 
‘antecedents, circumstances, factors and context’. 
 
Notwithstanding the clear authority, even obligation, in the Act to examine the pre-
independence period for the root causes of the violations committed since independence, 
many Kenyans remained under the impression that the temporal mandate of the 
Commission strictly covered the period between December 12, 1963 and February 28, 
2008. For instance, in a letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs, the Release Political Prisoners Trust sought the 
review of the TJR Act because they claimed, amongst other reasons, that: 
 
It ignores a crucial and critical part of the Kenyan history. It starts from 1963, yet some of 
the root causes of the issues that date back to the colonial era are not covered in the Act. 
Kenyans need to know why the period before independence is being left out of the TJRC 
and why some Kenyans have been left out of the process, yet they have the living 
testimonies and memories of the history and real life experiences; not allegations. To us, 
the scope on the search for justice through TJRC should cover the history of our country as 
a whole.  
 
The Kenya National Liberation War Veterans Association expressed similar sentiments. In 
a submission to the Commission, the association lamented that:  
The TJRC Act of 2008 excludes the colonial period. Hence our members ranging from 
3,500 are being left out in the truth-telling process of our country; being left out of this 
process leads to suffocation of Kenyan history and what haunt[s] us as a nation up to date.  
 
Indeed, similar concerns became one of the grounds of a suit seeking the dissolution of the 
Commission. As discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this Volume, the applicants in the 
case of Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 Others v TJRC and Bethuel Kiplagat challenged the 
statutory mandate of the Commission, arguing that the TJR Act was defective and 
unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded the periods before December 12, 1963 and 
after February 28, 2008 from the Commission’s temporal mandate. The court dismissed the 
contention on a technical ground, though in doing so it incorrectly accepted the underlying 
assertion that the Commission was precluded from looking at events before or after the 
prescribed temporal mandate: 
We note that the ex parte applicants are concerned with human rights violations which 
occurred prior to 12th December 1963 and after 28th February 2008, which are not 
covered under the TJRC Act. It is arguable as to whether the legislature was right in 
excluding those violations. This issue and other equally pertinent issues which have been 
raised can only be determined in a properly pleaded case, preferably in a constitutional 
reference.  
 
In addition to raising concerns about the perceived legal inability for the Commission to 
inquire into events that occurred during the colonial period, some people went further to 
assert that the Commission’s mandate should have been extrapolated to cover the period 
after 28 February 2008. For instance, in its letter already alluded to above, the Release 
Political Prisoners Trust argued that:  
 
The [TJR] Act also ignores the period after February 2008, when other human rights violations took 
place, especially the killing of human rights defenders GPO and Oscar King’ara of Oscar Foundation 
on March 5 2009 and the recent Mathira killings among other happenings that leave questionable 





This was an erroneous assumption. But first, it must be emphasised that being a temporary 
body, a truth commission must have a time-bound mandate. Its focus should be on past 
violations, as has been the case with all truth commissions across the world. The role of 
investigating ‘new’ and ‘current’ violations traditionally rests with permanent bodies such 
as the police department or national human rights institutions. Occasionally, commissions 
of inquiry are constituted to investigate particular current events or violations.  
 
With these caveats in mind, the Commission nevertheless proceeded with its work with 
the understanding that it could, in certain circumstances, inquire into events that occurred 
after February 28, 2008. Firstly, borrowing mutatis mutandis from the ‘continuing 
violations’ doctrine developed by human rights treaty bodies, the Commission could 
extrapolate its mandate beyond 28 February 2008 if a violation under its inquiry was a 
continuing violation. That is, the violation commenced during the mandate period but 
continued after that period. For example, some of the people displaced during the 2007-
2008 Post-Election Violence remain in camps and have not been compensated for their 
losses. As such, the Commission required all individuals filling out a Statement Form to 
indicate whether the violation they were recording was a continuing violation. 
 
Secondly, the Commission was expressly mandated to ‘investigate any other matter that it 
considers requires investigations in order to promote and achieve national reconciliation’. 
Therefore, notwithstanding that a violation or event occurred after its formal mandate, the 
Commission could investigate it, provided that such an investigation was necessary for the 
promotion and achievement of national reconciliation. Moreover, from a pragmatic point of 
view, it was important for the Commission to constantly take into account current 
developments which could impact on its work.  
 
Despite the many concerns raised about its temporal mandate, when the Commission 
undertook its civic education campaigns and explained its mandate, many came to 
understand that the temporal mandate of the Commission was flexible and that its inquiry 
was a contextual one that required all events to be taken into account including those that 
had occurred prior to and after its formal mandate period. 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 1, pp.39-62.) 
D - When Justice Remains Elusive: the TJRC in Kenya 
From the above timetables, several important features of Kenya’s TJRC can be deduced here. 
As has been eloquently argued by David Forsythe, transitional justice is not solely concerned 
with prosecution, but also with truth commissions (2011: p.576). As such, the primary reason 
for why Kenya initiated various ‘complex rituals’ is because the TJRC and the ICC were 
necessary to healing the body politic, ‘the cleansing they produce of the body politic is 
necessary for the succeeding regime to start its mandate with a clean slate’ (p.576). Until 
recently, the debate about utilising restorative justice mechanisms has been renewed in the 
context of responding to post-election violence; the said mechanisms have become 
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controversially associated with ongoing democratic struggles, rather than signifying a 
transition or regime change (see Brown, 2013; Hayner, 2011; Vandeginste and Sriram., 2011). 
In Kenya, the TJRC has been utilised to address impunity 
Today, the choice of public truth-telling or punitive justice has been replaced by a new 
package approach that views truth telling, prosecution and reparations as complementary 
processes that can and should occur concurrently. This is evident in Sierra Leone, where TRC 
– based largely on the South African model – ran alongside the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
and also in Kenya, where the country’s on-going Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) has run parallel to International Criminal Court (ICC) 
investigations…(Lynch, 2012/2013: p.130) 
 
While the TJRC is supposed to run concurrently with the ICC, the reality is that the initial 
establishment of the TJRC has been compromised by the ruling class’ attempt to replace 
demands for criminal accountability and investigations with the implementation of restorative 
justice (Chapter 3). In line with special issues of the International Journal of Transitional 
Justice (2008), in which various scholarly works examined the interaction between 
peacebuilding and transitional justice, one of the TJRC advocates in Kenya has suggested the 
importance of its proceedings and final reports in calling for a wider recognition of the issue of 
economic injustice and land reforms (see Musila, 2009a). Of course, Musila was not able to 
make this suggestion without substantive criticism from commentators who call for a more 
pragmatic reconsideration of various unrealistic nation-building goals that, owing to the 
shortcomings of the TJRC, have not been met (Bosire, 2006: pp.1-5).  
 
Indeed, a resettlement scheme involving the purchasing of new land for the IDPs has been 
impeded by illegal land acquisitions and land-related disputes (Manji., 2012: p.468; Southall, 
2005: p.149). The scheme has also been hampered by new illegal land transfers by the MPs, in 
which land that was reserved for the settlement scheme has not been granted to many of the 
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IDPs who are still living at the camps (Elhawary, 2009: p.135; Robinson, 2011: p.7). ‘They 
promised land, but we were forced to resettle at the slums’ (interview with IDP no. 76, Rift 
Valley, March 14, 2013). Even those who participated in the TJRC public hearing session on 
land injustice issues have remained homeless (interview with IDP no. 77, Rift Valley, March 
14, 2013). Hence, the displacement camp has become a permanent symbol of resistance, not 
because the IDPs refused to resettle, but because they were forced by local authorities to 
evacuate the camps and move to nearby slums in Nairobi, which transformed their economic 
status from that of ‘displaced victims’ into ‘homeless citizens’ in the urban slums (Gallaher et 
al., 2013: p.395).  
 
Fearing to create new types of land disputes that could displease the local politicians, the 
authorities swiftly closed the major camps and forced the displaced victims to resettle in slums 
while their demands for reparation remained contested (Shutzer, 2012: p.357). The real danger 
of utilising TRCs to address economic injustices and national developmental issues, as 
suggested by Huggins (2009), Kioko (2002), Musila (2009a) and Nagy (2012), is that it 
ignores the establishment of judicial commissions that actually specialise in land tenure 
reforms; truth commissions established in illiberal democratic environments (such as those of 
Kenya, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and Burundi) are not equipped to address land grievances 
(see Lynch, 2013a; Millar, 2010; Rutherford, 2012; Taylor, 2013).  
 
Ironically, while the broad-based focus of the historical injustice including land and other 
socioeconomic issues are explicitly discussed and attached to the TJRC final recommendation 
on reparations, the report itself indicated the reality of its temporal jurisdiction and the 
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existence of more relevant institutions or commissions to deal with such long-term agendas 
that beyond the scope and probe of the TJRC (see Table 5.3).  
Table 5.3 Excerpts from the TJRC Final Report, Volume 4 
 
 In thinking about and formulating recommendations, the Commission took note of 
the fact that the Commission was established as part of the Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation process which led to the initiation of numerous reforms and 
mechanisms intended to address long-standing historical issues. As a consequence, 
many of the issues that the Commission was tasked to address have been addressed 
(either in whole or in part) or are in the process of been addressed. For instance, the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 has dealt with or laid the basis for addressing such issues 
as historical land injustices and economic marginalization.  
 
 The Commission was also aware that there have been established in recent time a 
number of permanent institutions charged with dealing with the very issues that the 
Commission was mandated to inquire into. These include:  
1. The National Land Commission, which has the mandate to deal with, among 
other issues, historical land injustices;  
2. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission, which has the mandate to 
foster national cohesion and unity;  
3. The National Gender and Equality Commission, which has the mandate to 
promote and protect the rights of minority and vulnerable groups, including 
women and marginalised groups;  
4. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, which has the mandate to 
investigate cases of corruption and economic crimes;  
5. The Commission on Revenue Allocation, which has the mandate to determine 
allocation of revenue; and  
6. The Independent Police Oversight Authority, which has the mandate to, inter 
alia, inquire into killings committed by the police. 
 
 In essence, the Commission’s work evolved at a particular historical moment that 
coincided with a reform process. Thus, the Commission viewed its role as that of 
building on the existing reform initiatives.  
 
 Like truth commissions before it, the Commission had to consider whether or not to 
recommend lustration. The term lustration is derived from the Latin lustrum and 
refers to a process of purification. In the field of transitional justice, the process of 
lustration has been used to remove from public office individuals who are associated 
with past human rights violations. It has also been used to prevent individuals 
associated with human rights violations from holding public office in the future.  
 
 The United Nations recognise the important role that vetting and lustration can play 
in the prevention of future human rights abuses and violations by the State. Lustration 
can serve two purposes: preventing the recurrence of human violations by public 
officers who have committed such violations in the past, and restoring the 
population’s trust in the State after a period of systematic human rights violations.  
 
 The process of lustration has been controversial in many societies when it has been 
used to remove from office all individuals associated with past political regimes. For 
example, lustration has been used in former communist countries to remove all 
individuals associated with the past communist regime, and in Iraq to remove all 
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officials associated with the deposed Baath Party. In the context of Kenya, this kind 
of mass action is not recommended.  
 
 However, the prevalence of impunity throughout the history of Kenya compelled the 
Commission to consider lustration for past abuses committed by individuals while 
acting in an official capacity. The Commission considered that tackling impunity is a 
necessary and urgent step in the full restoration of the rule of law in Kenya, in 
establishing lasting peace and stability, and in fostering reconciliation. For this 
reason, the Commission has recommended that specific individuals should not hold 
public office in Kenya’s constitutional order on account of their past conduct and/or 
decisions which resulted in gross violations of human rights. 
 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 4, p.8.) 
As such, while during the author’s viva of his doctoral thesis, the external examiner raised the 
issue of considering the broad-based focus of the justice demands by the IDPs as one of the 
ways to recognise the relevant needs of broad mandates focuses by the TJRC, yet the author 
remained skeptics on the inability of the commission to fulfill such ambitious tasks. In short, is 
not whether the transitional justice institutions that were established in Kenya satisfies all the 
IDPs’ demands of justice, but whether even in such realistically limited pursuit of prosecution 
and reparation, some of the major demands will be considered and eventually implemented. 
As hinted above, not only this overlapped with the existing and other permanent institutions 
that more directly relevant to address such wider scopes, but most importantly, it overstretched 
the already burden of the TJRC’s mandate and jurisdiction, and at worse, ignores the political 
reality of Kenyan politics. The reality that the main challenge of the transitional justice 
institution in this country is not whether there is or not a huge numbers of legal and non-legal 
bodies to sanction the state leaders’ unacceptable of political and legal behaviours, but a 
political constrained that were conditioned by the ruling class brinkmanship games upon the 




Furthermore, the above excerpt highlight the fact that the TJRC recognised the entrenched 
culture of impunity and the commission proposes the idea of lustration or vetting the identified 
officers from their public services, which means without doing so it only reinforced the wider 
public perception of the state refusal to be disciplined or ‘punished’ for their crimes and 
unacceptable political, moral and legal behraviours while running the public office. 
 
In such instances, the final reports produced by the commissions caused a proliferation of 
more land disputes among the ruling class, while the IDPs were forced to resettle at the slums. 
‘While elephants fight, we stink like rats’ (interview with IDP no. 13, Rift Valley, February 
10, 2012). ‘Ask any of the IDPs, and they will confirm that their human security is being 
compromised by the daily fear of violence and being evicted from their families’ lands’ 
(interview with USAID officer, Nairobi, February 15, 2012).  
 
From their initial position as landless victims to their later status as ‘slum citizens’, their 
unaddressed grievances regenerated the diffusion of urban violence, informal markets and 
criminal groups (LeBas, 2013: p.257). As such, further attempts to utilise the TJRC in 
resolving broader issues of economic injustice, land reforms, underdevelopment and 
corruption only signified transitional justice as ‘a paradox of success’, in that the more one 
expects it to deliver, the more likely it is that transitional justice will produce minimal results 
(Balasco, 2013: p.198).  
 
Given the paradox of success currently embodied by the TJRC in Kenya, the current focus on 
demands for compensation are likely to ensure its failure. This is what occurred in Haiti and 
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Timor Leste in relation to the similar focus of the national elite on broader economic 
injustices, and their political attempts to hijack the TJRC proceedings (see Karanja, 2010). 
After three requests to extend the deadline had been made, the TJRC finally completed its six 
volumes of reports in May 2013. The release of its final report elicited a variety of responses, 
and in the following Table 5.4, the overall recommendations of the TJRC report findings can 
be summarised as follows: 
Table 5.4 The General Recommendations of the TJRC Final Reports, 2013 
Recommendations  
 The Commission recommends that the President, within six months of the issuance 
of this Report, offer a public and unconditional apology to the people of Kenya for 
all injustices and gross violations of human rights committed during the mandate 
period.  
 The Commission recommends that State security agencies, and in particular the 
Kenya Police, Kenya Defence Forces, and the National Intelligence Service 
apologize for gross violations of human rights committed by their predecessor 
agencies between December 12, 1963 and February 28, 2008, especially acts of 
extra-judicial killings, arbitrary and prolonged detention, torture and sexual 
violence.  
 The Commission recommends that the Kenyan Government considers entering 
into negotiations with the British government with a view to seeking compensation 
for victims of atrocities and injustices committed during the colonial period by 
agents of the colonial administration. This should be done within 12 months of the 
issuance of this Report.  
 The Commission recommends that the British government offer a public and 
unconditional apology to the people of Kenya for all injustices and gross violations 
of human rights committed by the colonial administration between 1895 and 1963.  
 The Commission recommends that the Judiciary apologise to the people of Kenya 
for failing to address impunity effectively and perform its role of deterrence to 
prevent the perpetration of gross human rights violations, during the period 
between December 12, 1963 and February 28, 2008.  
 The Commission recommends the creation of a National Human Rights Day on 
December 10, to coincide with the international Human Rights Day, which will be 
used to promote respect for human rights in Kenya.  
 The Commission recommends that the judiciary fast-tracks the establishment of 
the International Crimes Division of the High Court which shall be responsible for 
the trial of some of the cases referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions for 
investigations and prosecution. 
 The Commission recommends that the fast-tracking of the enactment of human 
rights related laws as envisaged by the Constitution of Kenya, including on: 
freedom of the media; fair hearing; and rights of persons held in custody or 
detained.  
 The Commission recommends that the government makes a declaration in terms of 
article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
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on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights thus 
allowing individual victims of human rights violations who have exhausted local 
remedies to directly access the African Court. 
 The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Justice fast-tracks the 
expansion of the national legal aid scheme to cover the entire country. 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 4, p.9.) 
The commission collected 42, 465 testimonials and an additional 1529 memoranda from 9 
regions, including the refugee camps in Uganda (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. I, pp.83-8). However, 
only a select number of witnesses were allowed to testify at the public hearing sessions (pp.89-
122).  
Table 5.5: Statements Distributions by Region and Gender 
Region Male Female Unknown Total 
Central 1778 1578 6 3358 
Coast 2455 1079 13 3547 
Eastern 3467 1775 7 5249 
Nairobi 832 947 2 1781 
North Eastern 2883 1307 2 4129 
Nyanza 2606 1828 7 4437 
Rift Valley 7211 4698 23 1932 
Western 3934 2890 8 6832 
Not Given 649 405 83 1137 
Gran Total 2581 16503 151 42465 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 1, p.87.) 
In summary, the TJRC faced three major problems, which suggests the disconnection of its 
proceedings from members of the public, especially the IDPs. First, the body faced an initial 
legitimacy crisis when a former diplomat from the era of President Moi, Bethuel Kiplagat, was 
appointed by the government to chair the commission (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. I, pp.124-43). 
Critics argued that, for his alleged responsibility for the impunity of previous governments, 
Kiplagat should be subject to a TJRC investigation of his own rather than being made 
chairman of the commission (Lynch, 2012/2013: p.131). Some raised concerns that he was 
appointed to the post by the government as part of its attempt to doctor the commission’s 
works, as was the case in the government’s endorsement of the 2005 constitutional draft 




Secondly, like many TRCs throughout the globe, the TJRC had to deal with serious financial 
shortages, which resulted in the pending of its critical proceedings (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. I, 
pp.144-47). In addition, the lack of external funding was also owing to the international 
donors’ and civil societies’ (CSO) concerns about the initial legitimacy crisis faced by the 
TJRC, and this inevitably diverted the primary focus onto convincing members of the public 
about its credibility, rather than conducting the investigation (p.148).  
 
Thirdly, the TJRC issued a nearly impossible mandate, which covered a wide range of 
violations over the 45 years prior to the 2008 crisis and the two years subsequent to it (Musila, 
2009a: p.460). The CSOs criticised the fact that the overly ambitious mandate for largely 
ignoring the recent atrocities that were committed by various senior members of the incumbent 
government (interview with NPI officer, Kenya, March 10, 2012). At the time of writing, the 
TJRC has successfully completed its six volumes of reports.  
 
The author’s observations of its proceedings, his analysis of its final reports and the 
conversations he conducted with many of the IDPs who observed the TJRC’s proceedings 
confirm that the commission has generally received a lack of positive responses from IDPs, as 
a result of the overly ambitious scope of its mandate in documenting systematic violations and 
impunity (see Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6: Summary of TJRC Final Reports, 2013 
 
Volumes Major Themes Comments 
I A general summary of the objectives 
and scope of the commission; its 
work and research methodology, the 
The commission’s adoption of particular 
mechanisms was informed by the 
adoption of various similar non-judicial 
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structure of the organizsation, its 
budget review, the major challenges 
that it faces and its limitations in 
dealing with these challenges; the 
legal/political definition of the terms 
used by the TJRC. 
mechanisms worldwide, especially by 
South Africa’s TRC. 
 
Terms like transitional justice, retributive 
justice, restoration, reparation and 
reconciliation were defined based on the 
customary and treaty-based sources of 
public international laws, as well as the 
works of various existing commissions 
across the globe. 
 
The commission is aware of the general 
key debates surrounding the literature of 
transitional justice, and therefore has not 
raised any substantive issues in relation 
to cultural peculiarity. It is to be assumed 
that the TJRC’s works will be accepted 
and implemented based on the 
government’s idea of bona fide policy. It 
is plausible that the government used the 
report as a justification for challenging 
the ICC’s proceedings in Kenya, which 
suggests that the government’s 
commitment to following the report’s 
recommendations constitutes a sufficient 
alternative to the limited scope of the 
ICC’s prosecution. This serves as a prime 
example of how the government has 
succeeded in manipulating the ICC’s 
proceedings, but has failed to address the 
immediate needs of the victims. 
II A A consideration of the historical 
(structural) and key recent (agency-
based) events that account for the 
political violence, extra-judicial 
killing, state-related torture and other 
violations that have been perpetrated 
since the colonial era, and which 
 While such a comprehensive analytical 
approach may seem interesting, the TJRC 
report is not tasked with writing a history 
book. Rather, it should be viewed as a 





continued up until the December 
2008 crisis. 
The TJRC report covers a very wide 
timeframe, but possesses limited 
political, legal and financial resources for 
addressing various instances of political, 
criminal and civil violations.   
 
Nothing is new; the report relies on 
repeating the findings of existing and 
previous parliamentary and judicial 
inquiry commissions on top-profile 
political assassinations, without 
providing any substantive evidence or 
supports from secondary literature. Can 
such findings be accepted as a valid form 
of evidence by the national court in its 
conducting of further investigations, and 
will the state be willing to comply with 
such a request? 
II B The discussion of themes of 
economic marginalisation and 
economic violations. 
This is the most ambitious component of 
the TJRC; nonetheless, it is a 
shortcoming similar to that of other 
TRCs, such as those of Timor Leste, 
Haiti and South Africa.  
 
These economic objectives also overlap 
with the tasks undertaken by the Land 
Reform Commission. Various previous 
anti-corruption and land inquiry 
commissions have failed to secure a 
minimum degree of implementation from 
previous governments. 
 
What is the likelihood of successful land 
policies and other economic solutions 
being implemented by such ad-hoc 
mandates of the TJRC if other more 
permanent commissions have failed to 
follow even the basic recommendation of 
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resolving disputes that have arisen from 
illegal land grabs made by national 
politicians? 
 
What is the actual, identifiable 
mechanism that can be identified from 
the findings of these volumes, and how 
can it be integrated into the existing 
mechanisms adopted as part of the 
various domestic polices undertaken by 
the government? What is the likelihood 
that the implementation of these 
recommendations will satisfy the popular 
demand for democratization at the 
expense of weakening democratic and 
judicial institutions?  
II C An analysis of gender-based 
violence, and the rights of women, 
children, disabled persons, ethnic 
minorities and indigenous peoples. 
While the new constitution has 
incorporated the bill of rights and other 
international human rights documents, it 
remains to be seen whether the 
translation of the language of these 
documents into an international and 
vague language of rights can be 
incorporated into a practical set of 
municipal regulations and government 
policies. 
 
Considering that the political and legal 
concerns that were raised by this 
volume’s findings are not the immediate 
priority of the reconciliation commission, 
when can victims realistically expect to 
receive compensation from the state? 
What actual mechanism will the state use 
to compensate such a huge number of 
material requests from such diverse 
sections of the population? 
III A consideration of the issues of Again, there is nothing new about the 
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ethnic conflict and its impact on 
national cohesion and reconciliation. 
findings; they merely confirm the 
assertions of various secondary literatures 
that negative ethnicity is persistently used 
as a political instrument for debating 
national identity in Kenyan politics. The 
findings only reinforce existing ethnic 
stereotypes in Africa, and may only be 
visible as a form of public education or 
historical reflection. 
 
What is the likelihood of these findings 
being able to prevent the cycle of 
violence impelled by negative ethnicity 
from recurring in the future? A few 
months after the release of the reports, 
the local politicians utilized the TJRC’s 
public hearing sessions to project a 
discourse of negative ethnicity. This lead 
to the renewal of violent conflict between 
pastoralist and agriculturalist groups in 
the Tana Delta. Did the public actually 
learn anything useful from this?  
IV The final volume invoked the legal 
obligation to act on all of its 
findings, as recommended by the 
TJRC statute enacted by parliament. 
 
The drafting of specific legal bills to 
be considered by the national 
assembly (parliament) in its attempt 
to endorse all its findings and 
recommendations. 
Will the government uphold its 
commitment to implementing the overall 
findings?  
 
Will the specific six month timeframe for 
fully implementing its findings be 
enough? 
 
What is the government’s response to 
various politicians’ legal suits filed in an 
attempt to freeze the implementation 
processes? What will be its response to 
the MPs’ private  motions to make the 
implementation of the TJRC statute 




Interviews conducted by the author 
revealed a general sense of 
disappointment among various 
individuals involved in testifying at the 
TJRC hearing sessions about the realistic 
implementation of the crucial 
recommendations. 
 
What is the likelihood of the more 
unrealistic recommendations being met, 
such as the requesting of more material 
compensation from the UK government 
for historical violence perpetrated by 
former colonials in the wake of the recent 
Mau Mau case, and the huge amount of 
financial compensation that must be 
dispensed by the government? 
Source: Compiled by Author 
 
The crime of impunity has been acknowledged, and the TJRC has taken the bold step of 
specifically naming various top profile government individuals who will be subject to further 
legal investigation.  
 
However, many have expressed their anxieties about the country’s unprecedented records of 
commission inquiries that have scarcely been implemented, or not implemented at all 
(interview with IDP no. 79, Rift Valley, March 14, 2013). Further comparisons of the reports 
with previous inquiry reports prior to the 2008 crisis have confirmed that the commission only 
‘narrates’ similar issues of human rights and recommendations that were raised by previous 




The TJRC 2008 statute empowered the commission to authorise future investigations, to force 
the government to comply with its recommendations, and to allow any Kenyans to seek 
judicial review and demand explanations from the Minister of Justice if the TJRC did not meet 
the recommendations of the statute within the minimum deadline of between 6 and 12 months 
(T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. IV, pp.72-96).   
Table 5.7: Excerpts from the TJRC Act  
Recommendation Scope  Legal Source 
The Commission shall submit a report of its 
work to the President at the end of its 
operations. The Report shall:  
a. summarise the findings of the 
Commission and make 
recommendations concerning the 
reforms and other measures, whether 
legal, political, or administrative as 
may be needed to achieve the object 
of the Commission; 
b. make recommendations for 
prosecution; 
c. recommend reparation for the 
victims; 
d. recommend specific actions to be 
taken in furtherance of the 
Commission’s findings; 
e. recommend legal and administrative 
measures to address specific 





Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, 
Section 48(1) & (2) 
All recommendations (of the Commission) 
shall be implemented, and where the 
implementation of any recommendation has 
not been complied with, the National 
Assembly shall require the Minister to 
furnish it with reasons for non-
implementation. 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, 
Section 50(2) 
Source: TJRC Act 2008 
However, six months after the release of the final the report, the TJRC has not only failed to 
meet any of the substantive recommendations, but various legal suits and injunctions have 
been filed against the TJRC by various politicians and retired civil servants (Shiundu, 2013). 
The legal injunctions as stipulated by the 2008 Act were abused by many (especially those 
who were specifically named in the report) in an attempt to stop the TJRC from meeting the 
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compulsory recommendations of criminal investigation and reparation fulfillment (Freedom 
House., 2013).  
 
In this regard, the TJRC’s proceedings suffered from a similar level of popular discontent 
faced by the TRCs of other nations in relation to the crucial recognition of ‘nuts and bolts’ 
considerations, including continuous and generous funding, coherent administrative 
management and workloads, the active support of CSOs, the reasonable scope of the mandate 
and the timeframe in which to fulfil it (see Hayner, 2011). What remains to be seen is whether 
the TJRC will successfully fulfil its mandate (see Table 5.1). It also remains unclear as to 
whether the needs of such public hearing mechanisms have been legally defined rather than 
politically pursued, and whether the commissions final works can be perceived as a ‘ritual 
cleansing’ that signified the government of the day’s acknowledgement of past atrocities and 
its commitment to addressing them; or whether it has simply employed a ‘popular buy-in’ 
strategy to deflect the acknowledged call for punitive justice and criminal accountability 
(interview with IDP no. 80, Rift Valley, March 14, 2013). 
 
E – Preaching Peace to Defy Criminal Justice 
‘Political violence not only terrorizes through actual injury or fear but also traumatizes by 
inscribing the memory of violence on the bodies of the victims’ (Humphrey, 2000: p.7). 
Building upon such a belief, the law as implemented through post-conflict tribunals addresses 
the unspeakable evil of mass atrocities and becomes what Martti Koskenniemi has identified 




This liberal narrative signifies the legal authority to distinguish what is lawful from what is 
unlawful, and to separate the perpetrator from the victim. However, such liberal narratives of 
justice not only become a constitutive moment in which ‘moral entrepreneurs’ conduct a show 
trial, but also run through TRC projects (Nagy, 2008: p.277). As a result, both types of ‘show’ 
tribunals and truth commissions function not only as justice mechanisms, but also serve as 
pedagogical instruments (Osiel, 1997: p. 17). ‘Unaspiringly, law is concerned not only with 
the determination of guilt or innocence in traumatised societies, but also functions as an 
attempt to romanticise the TJRC’s pedagogic function of restoring public faith in the state 
(interview with ICTJ officer no. 1, Nairobi, February 26, 2012). Hence, narratives about 
violence are ‘morality stories that contain reference to weapons, wounds and community, 
thereby identifying the source of violence…’ (Humphrey, 2000: p.14)  
 
As a result, this narrative structures the relational position between the victim’s testimony and 
the perpetrator’s confession within a particular social reality, and delineates these 
asymmetrical relations when the violence is being described. This makes testimonies and 
confessions both readily ‘available for political appropriation in the future’, particularly in 
relation to nation building (p.13). Such ‘symbolic and pedagogic functions’ appear within the 
broadly defined ambitions of the TJRC mandate in Kenya (see Table 5.2).  
 
In this respect, the method of highlighting individual testimonies and confessions at public 
hearing sessions confirms the ‘expressivist’ roles of restorative justice in interpellating 
victims’ collective solidarity against mass atrocities. In examining the role of expressivism in 
legal proceedings in Cambodia, Maria Elander has identified four ways in which transitional 
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justice interpellates members of the public (2012: pp.100-1). Key among these is the way in 
which transitional justice functions as an educational mechanism, emphasising community 
values and conveying the moral message that justice is being done, ‘in order to ensure that 
lessons are not forgotten’ (p.101). As such, the performative function of the TJRC’s public 
hearings has confirmed its role ‘as a theatre of renewal, through which collectivity is 
reconstituted and order is restored’ (p.100). What remains problematic is the question of 
whether the predominant expressions of selected victims’ testimonies incorporated into the 
TJRC’s six volumes report meet the IDP community’s expectations of justice and 
reconciliation.  
 
During the 2012 public hearing sessions, the TJRC conducted 14 thematic hearing sessions on 
a range of various issues (2013: Vol. I, p.115). While these were conducted with the purpose 
of raising awareness among members of the public about the TJRC’s task of national healing 
and reconciliation, the thematic sessions were described by the IDPs as ‘a waste of the 
taxpayer’s money’ (interview with IDP no. 81, Rift Valley, March 15, 2013).  
Table 5.8: The Locations of the Public Thematic Hearings 
 Region Hearing Locations 
1 Central Nyeri, Muranga, Kiambu and Nyandarua 
2 Coast Lamu, Hola, Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale and Wundanyi 
3 Eastern Meru, Embu, Machakos, Makindu,, Kitui, Marsabit 
and Isiolo 
4 Nairobi Nairobi 
5 North Eastern Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and Moyale 
6 Nyanza Kisumu, Kisii and Kuria 
7 Rift Valley Kericho, Nakuru, Naivasha, Narok,, Kajiado, 
Rumuruti, Eldoret, Lodwar, Kapenguria, Kitale and 
Baringo 
8 Western Mt. Elgon, Kakamega, Busia and Bungoma 
9 Uganda (Refugee Camps) Kiryandongo 






Table 5.9: Schedule of the Thematic Hearings 
 Thematic Hearings Date(s) 
1 Children December 13 & 14, 2011 
2 Ethnic tensions and violence February 2, 2012 
3 Internally Displace Persons February 3, 2012 
4 Women February 8, 2012 
5 Economic marginalisation and minorities February 13, 2012 
6 Persons with Disabilities February 16, 2012 
7 Torture February 28, & March 7, 2012 
8 Prisons and detention centres February 29, 2012 
9 Access to justice March 1 & 2, 2012 
10 Political assassinations March 5 & 6, 2012 
11 Security agencies, extra-judicial Killings and 
massacres 
March 9, 2012 
12 Armed militia groups March 12, 2012 
13 1982 Attempted Coup March 21, 2012 
14 Land: Historical injustices and illegal/irregular 
allocation of public land 
March 22, 2012 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 1, p.115.) 
Indeed, from the author’s observations of the TJRC’s proceedings between February and 
March 2012, it can be suggested that the public hearings generated less public excitement and 
support; there was a marked lack of attendance at the majority of its hearing sessions, as was 
evidenced by the abundance of empty chairs (fieldwork notes no. 2, Rift, Valley, March 25, 
2012).  
 
The focus on the wide range of violations that were perpetrated before the 2008 crisis suggests 
that the proceedings mainly attracted the victims and survivors of previous regimes, rather 
than IDPs who were displaced as a result of the post-election violence (interview with IDP no. 
82, Rift Valley, March 15, 2013). However, public hearings that focused on the specific 
themes of ‘IDPs’, ‘ethnic conflict’, ‘land’, ‘massacres’ and ‘political assassinations’ have not 





It can be suggested here that, while the realistic understanding of justice and issues pertaining 
to the definition of ‘violation’ may vary among Kenyans, nearly all of the individual 
testimonies suggest that violations occurred because of the failure of state officials to prevent 
them from occurring (see Table 5.10).  
Table 5.10: Factors that Encouraged Perpetuation of Gross Violations of Human Rights 
The Commission finds that the following factors encouraged the perpetuation of gross 
violations of human rights during the mandate period:  
 The failure of the first government in independent Kenya (led by President 
Jomo Kenyatta) to dismantle the repressive state structures established by the 
colonial government.  
 The use of and subsequent enhancement of repressive laws, policies and 
practices initially employed by the colonial government by the first two post-
independence governments (President Jomo Kenyatta’s and President Daniel 
Arap Moi’s administrations).  
 The creation of a de jure one party state by President Moi’s government, 
resulting in severe repression of political dissent and intimidation and control 
of the media. Repression of political speech and the media allowed many 
violations to occur with little public scrutiny, much less accountability.  
 Consolidation of immense powers in the person of the President, coupled with 
the deliberate erosion of the independence of both the Judiciary and the 
Legislature.  
 The failure of the state to investigate and punish gross violations of human 
rights. The Commission finds that in most cases, the state has covered-up or 
downplayed violations committed against its own citizens, especially those 
committed by state security agencies. During the entire mandate period (1963-
2008), the state demonstrated no genuine commitment to investigate and 
punish atrocities and violations committed by its agents against innocent 
citizens. 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 4, p.9.) 
The testimonies also suggest that the state officials are responsible for these violations by 
virtue of having employed various obstructive methods associated with impunity or the 
pervasion of justice at various governmental levels, ranging from the civil service to the 
military (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. IV, pp.1-63). The primary focus on the testimonies of 
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individuals may challenge the state’s official narrative concerning past authoritarian practices 
(see Hayner, 2011).  
 
In this respect, the TJRC as a form of state apparatus sits very well with Nussbaum’s assertion 
that ‘public culture needs something religion-like…something passionate and idealistic if 
human emotions are to sustain projects aimed at lofty goals’ (Nussbaum, 2013: p.14). This 
need of ‘something passionate’ refers to the administration of justice with ‘political emotion’ 
rather than the dry facts of law; the full disclosure of individual stories becomes an enunciative 
space to rupture impunity, and to define justice and reconciliation.  
 
In reality, however, the predominant focus on public emotions, morals and faith-based 
narratives ‘have large-scale consequences’ for the future direction of rebuilding societies that 
are emerging from authoritarian rule. ‘They can give the pursuit of those goals new vigor and 
depth, but can also derail that pursuit, introducing or reinforcing divisions, hierarchies, and 
forms of neglect or obtuseness’ (p.3). ‘We thought by attending the session it would lessen our 
distrust in the state, but we were wrong’ (interview with IDP no. 84, Rift Valley, March 15, 
2013). ‘After telling my stories, I remained hunted by the past [atrocities], and naively 
believed that my testimony would function as a ritual cleansing’ (interview with IDP no. 85, 
Rift Valley, March 16, 2013). ‘What moral and goodness is left for me if those [leaders] 
preached forgiveness and peace, but denied justice?’(interview with IDP no. 86, Rift Valley, 




Through these testimonies, some of the IDPs who participated as an audience acknowledged 
that what was perceived as the natural language of morality and the dramatic preaching of 
national healing, unity and reconciliation only confirmed the political intention of the ruling 
class to continue their practice of impunity by manipulating the TJRC’s proceedings. 
Coincidentally, a local politician who attended one of the sessions whispered to the author 
that, ‘the testimonial proved that we are ready to forgive and are not seeking vengeance or 
criminal justice. If only the ICC understood our language’ (interview with local MP no. 2, Rift 
Valley, March 14, 2012).  
 
Interestingly, the idea of ‘forgiving and not seeking vengeance’ against those in power 
confirms the placement of the TJRC’s public hearings within an illiberal environment,  ‘the 
manner in which a text is written, a speech is uttered, a though is thought is integral to its 
content. There is no neutral form of representing the world, in which the speaker or writer is 
embedded’ (Bleiker, 2000: p.280.). As such, what appears to be a faith-based institution like 
the TJRC, with its visualisation of reconciliation based on ‘forgiveness’ and ‘truth-telling’, 
only confirms what Althusser describes as ISA: 
 
Given the Marxist tradition’s considerable work (and especially Lenin’s) on how the “state 
apparatus” reproduces the legal and political conditions for capitalist exploitation, Althusser 
took the term but refocused instead on how ideological conditions were reproduced… In 
Althusser’s view, however, a different set of apparatuses–much less well examined or 
understood in the Marxist tradition–played a parallel role in sustaining capitalist class 
structures. He named that set the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) to ascertain parallels with 




In this respect, Wolf argues, what is identified as ideology by Althusser also functions through 
the projection of ideologies or internalised norms and values upon the subjects through ISA, 
such as educational and religious institutions (p.226).  
 
Indeed, the adoption of ISA as a method of uncovering partial justice has been advanced by 
Claire Moon’s study on TRCs in South Africa and Elander’s study of the relation of victims to 
the Extraordinary Chamber in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC). In this context, the adoption of 
South Africa’s TRC template by Kenya’s TJRC signified the ruling class’ predominant focus 
on the faith-based features of TJRC, in order to cultivate selective ideas or notions of partial 
justice, such as ‘forgive and forget’ (interview with IDP no. 87, Rift Valley, March 17, 2013).  
 
Given that the primary focus of the post-election crisis is on both retributive and restorative 
justice, the political game of defying the ICC’s proceedings was reinforced by the ruling class’ 
appearance of co-operating with the TJRC at the national level, hijacking the victims’ 
emotions about justice and engineering their sympathies towards partial justice (see Brown 
and Sriram, 2012). The situation of partial justice in Kenya confirms what other commentators 
have described as ‘compromised justice’ in Serbia and Croatia, in which the post-conflict elite 
focus mainly on the acknowledgment of ‘past atrocities’ in order to confirm their desire to 
enact a transition and ‘move forward’. This further exaggerates the need for ‘forgiveness’ and 
a ‘narrative of peace’, but abandons the components of retributive justice and reparation in 
transitional justice (see Grodsky, 2009a). The same politician interviewed by the author also 
agreed that the TJRC’s legal modus operandi is more suitable than the constrained style of the 
ICC’s prosecutions (interview with local MP no. 2, Rift Valley, March 14, 2012). Their 
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exaggerations of the difference between justice and peace were echoed by a town councilor, 
‘by virtue of the fact that we are becoming more peaceful, it is obvious that KNDR’s aim of 
national reconciliation is best reached through forgiveness [TJRC] rather than punishment 
[ICC]’ (interview with City Council officer, Nairobi, February 20, 2012).  
 
Such political tones of peace narratives, and the misleading intentions of the TJRC’s mandate, 
‘reinvigorated an old debate regarding whether peace or justice is more important’ during the 
2013 election (Cheeseman et al., 2014: p.10), which served to perpetuate the IDPs’ 
perceptions about partial or compromised justice when peace and forgiveness were preached 
as the “official” language of reconciliation. ‘In other words, for all of the good work done as 
part of the peace narrative, it is also clear that a peace-at-all-costs message ... suppressed frank 
discussion of critical reform issues that historically contributed to violent elections’ (p.10). 
Unsurprisingly, ‘…stability was prioritized over a competitive and fair election leading to a 
‘negative peace’ characterized by the cessation of hostilities, rather than a ‘positive peace’ built 
on trusting and harmonious inter-ethnic relations’ (p.11).  
 
As such, some concluded that the TJRC is a measure for ‘transitional forgiveness but not 
transitional justice’, and allows those who ‘have blood on their hands’ to suppress the 
conducting of further criminal investigations (interview with IDP no. 88, Rift Valley, March 
18, 2013). Throughout the author’s observations of the TJRC’s public hearing sessions in 
2012, it was apparent that its concurrent operations with the ICC proceedings not only created 
confusion among the wider population (due to the limited amount of civic education they had 
received), but also created the widespread perception among the IDPs that its actual operations 
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were navigated by the ruling class’ attempt to defy prosecution or criminal justice (fieldwork 
note no. 4, Rift Valley, April 7, 2013).  
 
Hence, peace and reconciliation narratives (regardless of what these terms mean to the ruling 
class) were preached as an ideological call to justice, despite standing in contradiction to the 
IDPs’ demands for retributive and restorative justice (see Robinson, 2011). ISA functions, in 
Althusser’s view, by “interpellation” [in which the state apparatus] “call” individuals in 
particular ways that prescribe and enforce’ a specific thinking ‘about their identities, their 
relationship with other individuals, and their connection to social institutions’ (Wolff, 2005: 
p.225).  
 
It is no secret that the ruling class’ preference for the TJRC over the ICC is part of their 
attempt to defy criminal accountability. ‘I am not happy with the way the TJRC has been 
politicised by the politicians, but I nave no other options, except attending the [TJRC] public 
hearing sessions (interview with IDP no. 89, Rift Valley, March 17, 2013). ‘Waiting for the 
ICC’s verdict is like waiting for a dying [form of] justice’ (interview with IDP no. 90, Rift 
Valley, March 17, 2013). However, these IDPs have no other options, as their needs for justice 
and reconciliation have to be pursued through some form of legal or non-legal mechanism. In 
this case, some of them attempted to do so by participating in the TJRC’s sessions: 
I have lost hope in the ICC but I have no other options, except attending the TJRC sessions. 
Yet I am more frustrated with the way the politicians responded to the comission (interview 
with IDP no. 91, Rift Valley, March 18, 2013). 
 
At first, I was hoping that justice would be done through the ICC. Yet after four years of 
waiting for justice, I decided to forgive, and forced myself to accept the fact that the best thing 
is to move forward, and to hope that there will be some compensation for our losses (interview 




After four years of battling justice, I have decided to forgive and forget. There is no point in 
prosecuting those in power. Let justice take its course through forgiveness, since we don’t 
receive compensation if we continue to prosecute those that try to help us (interview with IDP 
no. 93, Rift Valley, March 19, 2013). 
 
Such testimonials reveal that many members of the IDP community recognise the near 
impossibility of seeing retributive justice delivered by the ICC. As such, some have expressed 
their preference for the realistic expectation of justice in the form of reparation or material 
compensation that can be delivered by the TJRC (see Table 5.11). This means that the IDPs’ 
focus on justice has been compromised; the majority of them are now concerned solely with 
the TJRC’s recommendations of reparations, as the ICC has abandoned its focus on retributive 
justice.  
Table 5.11: Excerpt of the TJRC Report, Volume 4 on Reparation and Criminal 
Prosecution 
 The Commission has made findings of responsibility against individuals where such 
persons had an adequate opportunity to respond to allegations in interviews, hearings 
or in writing. However, a significant number of adversely mentioned persons did not 
respond to the Commission’s invitation to respond to allegations levelled against 
them. In the absence of a response from such AMPs, the Commission presumed the 
allegations as levelled against them to be truthful. This is in accordance with the 
jurisprudence of quasi-judicial human rights bodies. In the practice of the African 
Commission on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) the facts alleged in a complainant’s petition 
is presumed to be true if the respondent state has not provided responsive information 
during the maximum period set by the respective commissions. Similarly, the Human 
Rights Committee has established the practice of drawing its decision on the basis of 
information provided by the complainant when the respondent state fails to 
participate in the communications procedure. 
 
 In making findings of responsibility against individuals and groups, the Commission 
employed the balance of probabilities standard of proof. This standard is akin to the 
preponderance of evidence normally used in civil cases. It is the same standard used 
by similar truth commissions internationally. The Commission was not a court of law 
and therefore the finding it has made in reference to an adversely mentioned person is 
not a finding of guilt. 
 
 It is noteworthy that some compared this Commission’s work with that of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) or asked about the relationship between the 
Commission and the ICC. As noted, the Commission was not a court of law, and 
while some of the purposes of the Commission were similar to that of the ICC, they 
were very different institutions. First, the Commission was a more victim-centered 
institution. The ICC, while more victim-centered than many courts, still has as the 
subject of its primary focus the suspect, and determining by a high standard of proof 
whether the suspect is guilty of the charges alleged. Second, the Commission was 
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focused on historical narratives, context, and perspectives of victims, perpetrators, 
and witnesses. The ICC, like all courts, is much more narrowly focused. As a result 
of these and other differences, the Commission was able to interact with, and provide 
participation for, far more victims and other Kenyans than the ICC. Third, the ICC’s 
temporal mandate is relatively narrow – from the time of the ratification of the Rome 
Statute by Kenya on June 1, 2005 to November 26, 2009 (the date of the ICC 
Prosecutor’s filling of a request for the initiation of an investigation into the Kenya 
situation). The Commission’s temporal mandate is far broader, from December 12, 
1963 to February 28, 2008, and in fact extends before and after that period.  
 
 Some also asked about the role of the Commission with respect to the 2007 post-
election violence. As noted earlier, it was the 2007 post-election violence that 
provided the immediate impetus for the creation of the Commission, and that period 
of Kenya’s history is clearly within the temporal mandate of the Commission. 
Consequently the Commission heard a good deal of testimony concerning the post-
election violence. The Commission, however, limited the amount of resources that it 
devoted to that period for three reasons. First, the period of post-election violence 
was a very small part of the time period in which the Commission was to examine 
historical injustices and gross violations of human rights. Second, a previous 
commission of inquiry – the Commission of Inquiry on the Post-Election Violence, 
also known as the Waki Commission – had focused specifically and narrowly on 
violations during this period. Third, through its focus on initially six, and now three, 
individuals, the ICC was and is investigating this period of Kenya’s history. In other 
words, it was the view of the Commission that a good deal of time and resources had 
already been, and were continuing to be, focused on this period within the mandate. 
Without commenting on the quality of either of these separate investigative 
institutions, it was the considered view of the Commission that its limited time and 
resources would be better served focusing on those broad areas of the mandate that 
were not the subject of any other investigative process.  
 
 The TJR Act also required the Commission to make recommendations concerning the 
reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, or administrative as may be 
needed to achieve the objects of the Commission.5 In this regard, the objects of the 
Commission were to promote peace, justice, national unity, healing, and 
reconciliation. In particular the Commission was enjoined to make recommendations 
regarding: 
 
1. Prosecution;  
2. Specific actions to be taken in furtherance of the Commission’s findings;  
3. Legal and administrative measures to address specific concerns identified by the 
Commission;  
4. Measures to prevent the future occurrence of human rights violations. 
 
 The Commission was authorised to make recommendations concerning any other 
matter with a view to promoting or achieving justice, national unity and 
reconciliation within the context of the Act. 
 
 The Commission was also mandated to recommend the grant of amnesty in respect of 
certain offences. However, as explained in the mandate chapter of this Report, the 
Commission did not process any amnesty applications and as such no 
recommendations pertaining to amnesty have been made. The Commission was also 
mandated to recommend a reparation framework that would serve as the basis for 
repairing the harm suffered by victims and survivors of gross violations of human 
rights and historical injustices. Chapter Three of this Volume sets out the 
Commission’s recommendations in relation to reparations. Finally, the Commission 
was required to make recommendations on the mechanism and framework for the 
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implementation of its recommendations. Chapter Two of this Volume makes 
recommendations relating to such a mechanism.  
 
 In essence, the legal framework provided by the TJR Act facilitated the making of 
comprehensive recommendations on a range of topics. As such, and to facilitate 
implementation and monitoring, the Commission has tried to make recommendations 
which are specific, feasible and which have measurable short, medium or long-term 
goals. Recommendations which strike a resonance with the Kenyan people are likely 
to be the subject of mobilization and lobbying. Such recommendations are more 
likely to be implemented by the Government. Each recommendation has been 
directed to a specific entity or office holder.  
 
 The recommendations made by the Commission are a synthesis of views expressed to 
the Commission and the Commission’s own reflection on the findings reached with 
respect to various violations and issues. The recommendations reflect views 
expressed to the commission by victims, witnesses, civil society organisations, 
experts and government officials who interacted with the Commission. With respect 
to victims, the Commission solicited their views on recommendations through the 
statement taking process. Additional recommendations were proposed to the 
Commission by those who testified during the individual, thematic and institutional 
hearings held around the country. 
 
Source: (T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 4, pp.2-4.) 
 
While the TJRC’s mandates prompted the commission to recommend further criminal 
investigations of past atrocities (TJRC, 2013: Vol. IV, p.72), the elite’s ongoing attempts to 
defy the ICC suggest that any future criminal investigation recommended by the TJRC is 
unlikely to be undertaken by the new government.  
 
This leaves the reparation part of the recommendations. When the IDPs described their 
adoption of a ‘forgive and forget’ mentality, they specified that the adoption of this mentality 
was not borne out of their agreement with the ruling class’ narratives of justice and 
reconciliation, but out of the realisation that they were far more likely to receive reparation 
and financial compensation from the TJRC than they were from the ICC.  There are two main 
types of reparation suggested by the TJRC’s report: individual reparations and group 




However, even after these reparations were chartered in the TJRC’s report, the reparations 
have still not been awarded more than six months after the release date of the report. This 
explains why some of the above testimonials reveal the belief that ‘justice takes its course 
through forgiveness’ which suggests the belief in partial justice. Furthermore, given the 
realistic expectation of the IDPs who participated in the public hearing sessions to receive 
reparation, especially in the form of land resettlement, psychological support and 
remembrance in the form of public monuments (TJRC, 2013: Vol. IV, pp.100-27), it is 
obvious that the lack of government attention to their reparation needs has encouraged some 
IDPs to reject the TJRC’s report (fieldwork note no. 4, Rift Valley, April 7, 2013). These IDPs 
believe that the TJRC report has betrayed their trust, and now expect to receive immediate 
financial rewards from the electoral candidates during the election campaign. This belief was 
echoed by Olivia:  
the [TJRC] report described our responsibility to the government very well, but some of us fear 
that if we show our inclinations towards meeting the ICC and TJRC’s wider demands, we 
might not receive our reparation demands. The best thing is to “respect” those politicians 
(interview with IDP no. 94, Rift Valley, March 19, 2013).  
 
Olivia later confirmed that she had been informed by the local MP for whom she voted in the 
2013 election that he would quickly process her demand for funding to buy land. In this 
respect, the TJRC (and the ruling class’ preference for its restorative justice over the 
retributive justice of the ICC) has interpelled or ‘called’ Olivia to subordinate and alter her 
needs for criminal justice. She has been ‘psychologically forced’ to expect restorative justice 
by accepting her position as a victim, and that she is a political subject of the ruling class. 
When other IDPs described their ‘forgive and forget’ mentality, Olivia recognised that she was 
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being presented with a more realistic chance of being “normalised” into society by supporting 
the existing patronage networks, rather than by expressing her support for the ICC’s crusade to 
administer criminal justice. While it remains to be seen whether the TJRC will provide 
reparations for other IDPs, Olivia has decided to cease her pursuit of criminal justice and to no 
longer consider the retributive desires of other IDPs, despite the fact that she lost her entire 
family owing to the negligence of local policemen during the 2008 crisis. Olivia’s testimonials 
were recorded in 2012 and 2013, before the TJRC concluded its final reports.  
 
However, the official release of the final reports of the TJRC has transformed it into a 
pedagogical apparatus that “formalises” the ruling class’ ideological preference for restorative 
justice as a means of continuing their practice of impunity. Olivia was ‘officially’ interpellated 
when she declared her support for President Kenyatta during the 2013 elections. As a result, 
she received her financial compensation, which she used to buy land a few weeks after 
Kenyatta won the March 2013 elections. Other IDPs who participated in the TJRC’s sessions 
and who followed a similar path to that of Olivia received instant financial rewards during the 
election campaigns of Kenyatta and his ally, William Ruto (interview with IDP no. 95, Rift 
Valley, March 19, 2013).  
 
In this respect, TJRC as ISA does more than simply create new socio-economic positions for 
the displaced victims as permanent subjects of vulnerability; it also creates disenfranchised 
and dependent citizens, particularly when the TJRC’s primary focus on the performative 
dimension of victimhood, violation and a sense of loss ignores their position as subjects of 
political manipulation. ‘I remain a victim and nothing can be done to undo it’ (interview with 
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IDP no. 96, Rift Valley, March 23, 2013). ‘I always thought that I could challenge those 
politicians when the TJRC suggested criminal investigations, yet I am “relieved” to know that 
no matter what path I take [in seeking justice], I remain displaced, haunted, and forced to be 
“grateful” if I am compensated’ (interview with IDP no. 97, Rift Valley, March 20, 2013).  
 
F – Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to identify the ideological structures that cause IDPs to want 
instant material rewards that are not related to their needs for retributive and restorative 
justice. It has also attempted to define the ideology of reconciliation and national unity that has 
successfully convinced them that the TJRC advances their needs for retribution, restoration 
and reparation, while showing that in reality it does quite the opposite. As such, this confirms 
the studies on TRC in South Africa by Humphrey (2000) and Moon (2008), which assert that 
attempts to unearth past injustices do not necessarily correspond to the victim’s perspective, 
but are contingent to societal structure and the ruling class. 
 
Secondly, viewing TJRC as ISA reveals the irony of the TJRC being used as a mechanism for 
delivering justice and reconciliation, which undermines the supposedly ‘natural’ and 
‘uncontested’ ideology of justice through its focus on reparation. Indeed, the TJRC has 
actually performed an oppressive function, since the final report has not acted on its 
recommendations, and has been ‘replaced’ by the IDPS’ expectation of immediate patronage 
rewards during and after the 2013 election, and before and after the release of the TJRC report. 
Hence, money to has been awarded to IDPs based of their readiness to persuasively defy the 
ICC and TJRC’s proceedings. Such an ideological pursuit of partial justice has reinforced the 
IDP’s belief in ‘business as usual’. The ruling class has successfully utilised the TJRC to 
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promote partial justice and reconciliation, as well as to defy criminal accountability. The 
anomaly of adopting TJRC in the highly contested nature of regime change in Kenya not only 
confirms Quinn’s (2009c) study of the failure of TRCs in Haiti, but reveals the shortcomings 
of transitional justice literature in explaining and assessing the increasing adoptions of 
transitional justice mechanisms within an unclear paradigm shift. 
 
Thirdly, it is crucial to recognise the hard work of the TJRC staff members in documenting 
past atrocities. However, the reality is that the TJRC is far from allocating any of the 
reconciliation dividends that were envisioned by the KNDR agenda, especially agenda items 
three and four. Similar to Hayner’s (2011) findings, the dangers of expecting TJRC to address 
‘everything’ have revealed its limitations. Interestingly, Kenyan policymakers and CSOs 
decided to add the word ‘justice’ to the title of their truth commission, making it TJRC instead 
of TRC as a reminder of the country’s infamous record of impunity. Yet the TJRC’s primary 
focus on dramatising human emotions may increase public expectations of its performance in 
the short term, but its legacy is likely to vanish from public memory when no concrete 
outcomes are produced in the long term. Simultaneously, the TJRC has revealed the attempt of 
the post-conflict elite to romanticise their needs in order to socially heal the legacy left by the 
post-election violence, and has revealed the highly unlikely probability of the government 
remaining committed to meeting broader reparative demands that have arisen from 45 years of 
state-related violations of human rights.  
 
Finally, the TJRC reports rely heavily on the victims’ testimonials, but many IDPs do not find 
its revelations to be cathartic. For these individuals, the TJRC’s benevolent task of pressuring 
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the government to comply with its findings has confirmed the broader concerns of scholars of 
post-conflict studies about the danger of establishing a binary dichotomy between victim and 
perpetrator. The TJRC report cannot be utilised as a basis for altering collective perceptions 
about victims and violations when the IDPs were “forced” to accept that justice is limited to 
‘forgiving and forgetting’ (see Clark, 2012a; Sandberg, 2013; Tenove, 2013; Wallis, 2013).  
 
The attempts to simplify victimhood do not address the complex issues of justice and 
reconciliation. The lessons to be learned from Kenya challenge Miller (2008), Nagy (2012) 
and Winter’s (2013) radical proposals of ‘unified theory’ about the ‘usefulness’ of TRC. What 
was perceived as the usefulness of TRC, or sustaining transitional justice mechanisms in 
highly authoritarian environments, can be articulated within the recent development of 
transitional justice scholarship and practice, in that its interaction with peacebuilding focuses 
on structural violence, greater democratic reforms, economic disparity and uneven 
development 
 
However, such a radical proposal for broadening the scope of transitional justice (including by 
addressing land tenure reform as part of the IDPs’ reparation scheme in Kenya) ignores the 
victim’s relational positions and their patronage ties to the ruling class. Instead of providing a 
constitutive moment for the IDPs to come to terms with their past, the cathartic revelation of 
state impunity has reinforced their subaltern positions and their status as subjects of political 
manipulation. The findings of this chapter illuminate the deficiencies of the ‘unified theory’ 
regarding the usefulness of TRC in addressing non-transitional justice issues, and serve as a 
clear indication of the future direction of transitional justice literature in addressing the 
 
 421
complexity of exploring transitional justice mechanisms in unclear political transitions, and 















































Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
 
‘You think that just because it's already happened, the past is finished and unchangeable? Oh no, the past 
is cloaked in multicolored taffeta and every time we look at it we see a different hue.’ (Kundera, 2000: 
p.15). 
  
To bring the analysis of justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in Kenya to a 
comprehensive conclusion is challenging. The aim of this final chapter is to bring together the 
central ideas around which this thesis has been constructed.  
 
A – Researching Transitional Justice in Kenya 
Much of this section will be dedicated to identifying the lessons that can be learned from 
Kenya, and to suggesting future research directions for the field of transitional Justice itself. 
Despite the complexity of the numerous legal and political initiatives activated by the Kenyan 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) policy (including the implementation of the 
new constitution, devolution and electoral reforms) this analysis conducted in this thesis has 
focused primarily on the two major transitional justice mechanisms active in Kenya, namely 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the national Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC). Connecting both mechanisms to the larger themes of democratisation, 
justice and peacebuilding efforts in Kenya provides two instructive lessons, which will be 







I) Transitional Justice in the Absence of Political Transition 
The most challenging task is to position the Kenyan case into a broader transitional justice 
literature, in particular when transitional justice mechanisms have been applied or considered 
within the context of unclear of illiberal political transition. In this respect, I have largely 
agreed with a pragmatic yet controversial position by one of the most actively engaged 
transitional justice scholars in debating the situations in Kenya, Thomas Obel Hansen. 
Drawing form his previous publications on the legal analysis of the ICC’s proceedings in 
Kenya (2010a; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b; 2011d; 2012b; 2012a; 2013a; 2013b), Hansen recently 
contributed to a new perspective in theorising transitional justice (2014). In that latest works, 
Hansen argues on how the application of transitional justice within unclear regime change 
with less direct concerns to the legalistic debate within the field itself signifies what he coined 
as’ ‘normalising’ transitional justice in which the field is no longer associated with 
extraordinary features of war crimes as understood through the legacy of Nuremberg and other 
international tribunals (p.105).  
 
As such, transitional justice have been politically connected to the pursue of accountability, 
national unity or nation building project, and the systematic violations of human rights, 
especially when the accused of the individually criminal suspects remained in the positions of 
influencing the dynamic of transitional justice in their society. Yet Hansen warned that while 
these new features contributed to the popular depiction that transitional justice now are more 
normalised and feeds very well with the critical call to expands transitional justice discreet 
features into broader domains of peacebuilding, development and democratisation, we need to 
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carefully assess whether such relations are nexus or nemesis (pp.105-106). The consequence is 
very obvious here when such expansive mandate or broader conceptualisation of transitional 
justice has become increasingly difficult to operate with one common framework of 
understanding and evaluating its tools or institutions.  
 
For that, Hansen suggested that in order to rescue such contested and delicate fields, instead of 
expanding transitional justice case studies, including Kenya into one single framework of 
universal evaluation, different paradigms or standard settings needs to be created where all 
cases can be divided into three major paradigms (p.140). Firstly, transitional justice case 
studies in a clear political or liberal transition like many situations of Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. Secondly, transitional justice situations with a clear but illiberal regime 
change like the current situation in Rwanda and finally, transitional justice with the absence of 
transition of what likely occurred in Kenya.  
 
Understanding different paradigm of measurements not only recued the field of transitional 
justice from extreme criticisms, but also allows each case study within these three different 
paradigms to suggest a new avenue of research that contributes to the case study, as well as a 
new perspective on transitional justice research. In line with Hansen’s suggestions, while the 
evaluation of transitional justice institutions undertaken by this thesis have not invalidate the 
legitimacy of the field, it urges the policymakers to give a special attention on the particularity 




This thesis has demonstrated that Kenya’s attempts to deal with post-election violence 
emerged out of a confluence of international and national dynamics that contributed to the 
substantive difficulty of defining transitional justice policy. While violence reversed the 
progress that the country had made in democratisation since the 1990s, it is generally accepted 
that the crisis was predictable yet unpreventable. However, Kenya’s attempts to deal with 
post-election violence and the recurring pattern of impunity has provided local opportunities 
for invoking the use of legal measures that have been acknowledged in transitional justice 
literature, and adopted by various countries that faced more substantive regime changes.  
 
However, in a hybrid case such as Kenya’s, which is neither fully democratic nor deeply 
authoritarian, achieving liberal peace by means of power-sharing leaves a limited amount of 
space for transitional justice to operate in. The practical danger that arises is whether or not the 
ambiguity that is produced by the power-sharing deal has reinforced the Kenyan victims’ 
perception that the process of formulating transitional justice has become entangled with the 
elite’s struggle to retain impunity and defy accountability (interview with IDP no. 96, Rift 
Valley, March 20, 2013).  
 
In short, the deficiencies of existing transitional justice literatures concerning the debate of 
universal framework of evaluation of the success story have not grasped the fact that, while 
the installment of a power-sharing government prevents a clear regime change (Hansen, 
2013b: p.320), the language of transitional justice has been widely connected to the continued 
effort to advance democratisation and reforms in Kenya (Chapter 3). In reality, many African 
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countries that share similar features to those of Kenya have undergone many transitions; from 
colonial to immediate post-colonial government, and from single to multiparty systems.  
 
However, the pursuit of justice (including the addressing of social inequalities and the 
structural violence that caused the democratic crisis) has not been successful in Africa. This is 
likely to trigger a precarious and turbulent judicial transition, or a pursuit of ‘justice’ without 
the substantive element of transition, as has occurred in Kenya. The current situations in 
Zimbabwe, Libya and the Ivory Coast confirm are prime examples of such case studies. 
 
For over two decades, research on building a robust system for establishing accountability in 
Kenya has been connected to efforts to advance the process of democratisation, thereby 
allowing political scientists to deploy multidisciplinary forms of analysis in an effort to 
understand the logic of the politics of accountability in Kenya through the language of 
transitional justice, creating a symbiotic relationship between transitional justice and 
peacebuilding (Hansen, 2011c: p.34). As such, the simultaneous efforts of criminal 
prosecution and truth commissions were connected from one election period (2008) to another 
(2013), allowing an extensive analysis of specific transitional justice mechanisms and its 
interaction with national political dynamics, as well as its connection to plausible future trends 
in resolving political crises in Africa through modes of liberal peace, and the understanding of 
transitional justice and power sharing.  
 
If the situation in Kenya demonstrates the fact that continued efforts to consolidate democracy 
in Africa have provided a language for transitional justice policy, the only component that is 
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missing is that of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (see also Sriram et 
al., 2013). As such, future research under the similar predicaments in Kenya needs to 
investigate on what common frameworks of evaluation can be utilised to identify: 
 under what likely and unlikely factors that allows transitional justice ideas is to be 
used as part of the democratic reforms instruments? 
  how does the local agencies correspond to these processes, in particular the 
complexity or the excessive politicking or brinkmanship games among the national 
elites? 
 how do we measures various perspectives, instead of one single narratives of ‘local’, 
and, do we need more flexible and mixed methods?  
 
As I leave these questions for future research, I would also like to remind the reader on how 
my experiences of meeting various stakeholders in Kenya have shaped some of my 
understandings on political liberalism and international justice, which will be discussed next. 
 
II) Transitional Justice and Political Liberalism Tautology 
Throughout my observation on how the ideas of transitional justice have been conceived 
within the secondary literature as well as from the empirical evidence of Kenya, I realised that 
that the actual condition for theory of transitional justice is lies in its ability to provide 
comprehensive package of justice, including retribution, restoration and redistribution to 
restore or reconcile the shattered living conditions of the victims back into the society, as well 




Within the Western liberal theoretical traditions, there are rich discussions107 on how such 
ideas of political rights, civil liberties and social justice is underpinned by a robust social 
contract, with particular citations from John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971). What remained 
to be seen is a scant theoretical discussion within the literatures of liberal peacebuilding and 
transitional justice on how the liberal pursuits and commitments of building liberal democratic 
values in post-conflict societies are intentionally expressed through the international 
commitments in preaching Rawlsian conception of justice when building democracy in 
dangerous place. While John Rawls remained contested within the great traditions of liberal 
political tautology, especially with a latest publication of his former student, Amartya Sen’s 
The Idea of Justice (2009), there is a wider discussion within the transitional justice literature 
on how its institutions impacted on greater democratisation and liberal environments, as 
envisioned by Rawls (Andrieu, 2014: 85-104). Therefore it is essential for this section to 
revealed what lessons of justice that can be learned from Kenya.  
 
In this regards, during the negotiation of the power sharing government that lead to the 
transitional justice institutions, the Deputy Prime Minister of Kenya, Musalia Mudavadi cited 
Paul Collier’s War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (2010). In Musalia 
opening speech (2010), he urged the international community to use the situation of mediating 
crisis in Kenya in order to reflect their commitments to international security and peace 
through intervention. Interestingly, Musalia highlights Collier’s arguments how Sub-Saharan 
Africas are neither nations nor states, due to the amalgam of various competing ethnic 
identities and the only public goods available are bad governance served with ethno-centered 
                                                        




politics. Build from this particular Collier arguments, he eventually agreed on how the 
political elites in Kenya have not internalised democratic and accountability values resulting 
violence based of democratic competitions within the already weak institutions. Whether 
Collier or Musalia is right or wrong in sensationalising Kenya’s 2008 crisis, if we would like 
to apply the thrust of both Collier’s and Musalia’s cynicism to the crisis, there is a greater 
needs introspection on whether liberal intervention in such ‘dangerous places’ through 
transitional justice institutions and liberal peacebuilding domains have successfully cultivates 
political liberalism as envisioned by Rawls. As a result, I have discovered three features of 
transitional justice negated the liberal political imaginations as envisioned by Rawls as 
follows: 
 
i) Retributive Justice and the Irony of Liberalism, Morality and Law 
To justify the condemnation of human rights violators and war criminals, there is a normative 
perception that tribunals have curative powers; they educates the public about the past, they 
promotes the shared truths and upholds the universal values of laws and sanctions the moral 
norms. Similar to the legacy of the Nuremberg, ICTY (former Yugoslavia) and ICTR 
(Rwanda), the ICC’s proceedings in Kenya were also used for larger more ambitious purposes, 
yet remained ironies from the great moral values of liberalism with its form of legalism that 
emphasise the separation between law and politics (Chapter 4). The latest failure in 
prosecuting Uhuru Kenyatta revealed the contradictory and difficulty to accomplish and 
almost impossible of such retributive tasks (Mungai and Kiranda, 2014). 
 
In response to the Kenyan situation, I believe that there is a reasonable ground to largely agree 
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with Jenifer Balint (1996) claims that the international lawyers have failed to develop a 
systematic explanation, using what she terms ‘international criminology’. Perhaps this is 
because previous legal literature had simply assumed that, once the indictments had been 
made and trials were underway, the atrocities and the instances of impunity would be erased 
and justice would prevail. Between 2012 and 2013, there is widespread fear among the victims 
and the prosecutor’s witnesses under the protection of the ICC that the bringing to justice of 
the ICC’s suspects will turn the IDPs and witnesses into  ‘traitors’, since their actions will 
have been deemed to undermine collective moral values by placing the burden of the crime 
upon a particular ethnic community in Kenya (interview with IDP no. 99, Rift Valley, March 
21, 2013).  
 
While the ICC may attempt to highlight the criminal responsibility of the individual, the ruling 
class and the ICC’s suspects have ensured that justice is administered on the basis of collective 
guilt. For instance, prosecuting Kenyatta and Ruto has been erroneously understood as 
punishing the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities respectively. As such, when the GNU 
proudly claimed that KNDR policy was being successfully implemented by the TJRC, it was 
not speaking on behalf of the political community it was supposed to represent. This created a 
fictional narrative of justice that did not represent all of Kenyan society (interview with IDP 
no. 98, Rift Valley, March 21, 2013). 
 
In such instances, the lessons from Kenya reminds us on how retributive justice is thus 
considered a means towards an end, and trials, containing as they do an expressive and 
educative function are used for the sake of democratic transition and subject to political 
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brinkmanship games. Of course, this idea is certainly not new. The French sociologist Emile 
Durkheim saw justice and punishment as an essential means of reactivating national unity by 
offering society the occasion to gather in common rejection of crimes (Gane, 2005: p.235). 
Meanwhile Bruce Ackerman calls trials affirmed ‘constitutional moments’ for moral 
judgments (Ackeman, 1991: p.84), and Hannah Arendt was aware that such a show trial is a 
political drama when she internally debated whether or not she assisted in Adolf Eichmann’s 
trial in Jerusalem after realising the ultra motive of Israeli Prime minister of Ben Gourion’s 
intentions to unify Israeli society (Arendt, 1977: p.15). In this regards, I would like to 
highlight not only how retributive elements of transitional justice can be instrumentalised by 
the most powerful actors to moralise law, but also how attempts to police society is negating 
the Ralwsian notion of the individual liberty. In order to avoid collective guilt that hunted the 
entire society, the focused on dramatising the individual crimes, the pure neutral conception of 
law as unimpeded by moral or biased judgments subjected itself to various political 
predilections and have been compromised.  
 
ii) Restorative Justice and the Irony in Narrating Forgiveness, Peace and Reconciliation 
As transitional justice evolved, so did its critics that realised the limited focus on trials is 
insufficient within the context of mass violence and huge number of the victims, and to 
compliment the existing retributive nature of transitional justice, social legal mechanism of 
truth commissions was developed (Arthur, 2009: p.362). Yet while the Kenyan TJRC do not 
abandoned future criminal investigations, its mainly focused on restorative justice, it creates 
large impunity gaps when some of the retributive and restorative recommendations have not 
been fully implemented (Chapter 5). The aimed of restorative justice is initially based on the 
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idea of greater democratic participations of the war torn society in delivering justice and social 
control in punishment that focused on healing and restoring the broken relationship (Daly and 
Sarkin, 2007: p.27). Yet it relied on participatory understanding of truth, justice and 
forgiveness with less power of criminal sanctions. The TJRC reports recognised this 
shortcoming when some of the identified big names and accused for committing systematic 
violation of human rights from the President Moi’s and Kenyatta’s regimes have decided not 
to responds or to reply back to the victim’s allegations (see T.J.R.C., 2013: Vol. 4). In some 
cases, the victims were persuasively asked to renounce their rights to criminal justice for the 
sake of national reconciliation (interview with IDP no. 83, Rift Valley, March 15, 2013). 
 
As such the restorative justice underpinned by the TJRC revealed the problematic ideas of 
individual rights to access criminal justice have been compromised when the individuals are 
perceived as subordinated to the society, which is obviously contradicted to the liberalism. 
Nevertheless the highly performantive nature of the TJRC operations stand in opposition of 
the strictly procedural and criminal justice that envisioned by political liberalism in respecting 
individual rights to justice and upholding the rules of law (Andrieu, 2014: p.90). Forgiveness 
is deeply an interpersonal exercise that cannot be dictated by the state-sponsored institutions. 
As such the seemingly benign, TJRC’s concerted efforts to remedy vengeance with 
forgiveness has render the victim legal rights and his/her moral power, in particular when such 






iii) Redistributive Justice, Socioeconomic Agendas and Land Restitutions 
Form the situation in Kenya, I have demonstrated on how reparations have now become a 
prominent aspects of transitional justice codified in the final TJRC report. Accordingly, 
reparations defined as ‘those policies and initiatives that attempts to restore to victims their 
sense of dignity and moral worth and eliminate the social disparagement and economic 
marginalization that accompanied their targeting, with goal of returning their status as citizens’ 
(Verdeja, 2008: p.1). As such, various types of reparations, including financial compensation 
and money to buy lands as for the case of the IDP resettlement schemes understood here as a 
form of monetary equivalence for compensation and to restore the balance or normalising 
them back in the society.  
 
However, the discussions of the Chapter 5 have also revealed that some of the IDPs have not 
received their reparation claims yet, and some opted for immediate financial rewards through 
patronage networks during the 2013 election, rather than waiting for the compensation money 
that have not arrive yet. If this is vaguely ‘defined’ as reparations, then the situations of the 
Kenyan TJRC have demonstrates its fundamental flaws, which replicates the Morocco’s Truth 
Commission. In this respect, while reparation was given to victims of repression, but 
perpetrators remained free and not subjected to fair trial or criminal prosecution (see Hayner, 
2011). As such, reparative justice that attempts to reconfigure or to redistribute social 
inequality and economic disparity without any attempts to reforms institutions or punish 




From a liberal perspective, such reparations are problematic. For example, the instant material 
awards based on patronage relation rather than a just financial compensation as chattered by 
the TJRC imply that individuals are tied to the actions of their political predecessors and they 
are part of the systematic burden or responsibility for the unspeakable crimes that committed 
by the state actors. While economic factors in political violence constituted the bedrock of 
Galtung’s understanding of positive peace and the enduring of the social inequalities found in 
many war-torn societies, financial payments are limited to the state and non-state resources 
and therefore, insufficient to restore the balance of relationship in post-conflict society 
(Hayner, 2013). Additionally, the TJRC like many other truth commissions have opted for 
collective reparations, resulting a redefinition of victims to include not only individuals who 
experienced direct physical violence, but also those whose lives were mutilated in the day-to-
day web regulations in which the atrocity took place (A. and Thompson, 2001: p.15). Such 
redefinition have indicate a radical breaks from strictly liberal paradigms on the preeminence 
of political rights and civil liberties into an immediate priority of economic and social cultural 
rights (Krog, 1998: p.8). There is a clear danger of prioritising the later into the actual positive 
rights might dangerously extend the power of the state. Liberal political traditions have long 
separate the administration of justice from cultural considerations or the ‘politics of 
difference’ (Young, 1990: p.36). The consequence of this is obvious when we imply a claim to 
certain rights and reparations triggers the construction of existentialist ideas of justice instead 
of the supposed voluntarily formation of the individual rights (Shklar, 1963: p.12). In this 
regards, a collective ideas of victim identifications based on certain narratives of time and 
space as witnessed among the self-help and integrated IDPs nurtured existentialist pursuits of 
justice and altered the existing social relations, ‘becoming indigenous in pursuit of justice’. It 
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challenge our conventional understanding of on the victim rights to justice not based on 
continued primordial ideas that inherited fro the ancient past, but an invented tradition that 
easily corrupted or manipulated by the political agency to trigger new wave of violence.  
 
As such, while how good is the intention of the transitional justice institutions in Kenya to 
address broader scope of historical injustices including land displacements, it has replicated 
the existing deficiencies in the way the international society engaged Africa. Through, the 
complex task of resolving the political crisis confirms the increasing necessity of an 
interesting interaction between transitional justice and liberal peacebuiding; the interaction 
between both fields has generated more of an international engagement with Africa’s 
heterogeneous societies in the long-term, but in the short-term it has duplicated the existing 
deficiencies of the technocratic and institutional focus on good governance, democratic 
reforms, human rights struggles and judicial administration. As such, this thesis agrees with 
Leslie Vinjamuri’s criticism of the proponents of the justice cascade108 in international politics 
(2012). In her critical reflection on Kathryn Sikkink’s famous thesis concerning the justice 
cascade (2001), she described the moribund nature of justice processes in Kenya and Libya, 
characterising them as a ‘justice casket’ rather than a justice cascade. This provides a clear 
                                                        
108  Many ‘realists’ of course, both academic and otherwise, continue to believe that talk of human rights 
and international law is merely a plaything of the powerful interests. The Justice Cascade confronts such readers 
with powerful argument to the contrary. In the early 1970s, it points out, neither authoritarian leaders in Latin 
America nor their most determined domestic opponents ever even contemplated the possibility that state officials, 
including heads of state, might one day be tried for crimes committed in office (pp.2-3). Yet thirty years later 
such trials have become a commonplace, even integral feature of the global political landscape (ch.4). The 
International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, was created to do this (amongst other things), despite 
determined opposition to it at one stage from every permanent member of the UN Security Council (p.199). 
Please see (Sikkink, 2011). 
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indication of the dilemma of striking a balance between moral utopia and realpolitik in human 
rights agendas.  
 
Nevertheless, the ironies between the current patterns of transitional justice interactions with 
the Kenyan IDPs have clearly shown that while most transitional justice commentators have 
long duree of arguing their cases of how transitional justice promotes greater democratisation 
and liberal values, my observation on the administration of its mechanism in Kenya have 
illuminated its clear contradicted with procedural understanding of teleological liberalism 
since the publication of Rawlsian justice, and not every transitional justice experiments 
triggers a robust liberal values since the means used by the transitional justice ideas and policy 
have undermined the fundamental traditions of political liberalism, producing an illiberal 
democratic path to many hybrid situations like Kenya (Yordan, 2009: pp.87-88). Transitional 
justice relied heavily on a thick conception that bind the state-society relations with heavy cost 
of constructing the device of moral and religion for national unity, producing unintended 
consequences of endorsing a social holism, a sentimentalisation of public sphere, a 
communitarian complexion and in keeping with Aristotelian perfections that negates the 
liberal preference of individual political rights and civil liberties (Sandel, 1998: p.12). For that, 
lessons from Kenya should warned the danger of to naively argued for the causal relations 
between transitional justice and liberal democratic values. This brings my next appraisal to the 
political rhetoric in transitional justice debates. 
 
B - Political Rhetoric: Peace, Justice and Reconciliation: How Do we know? 
Regardless of whether the country is actually in the midst of a ‘transition’, the practical 
challenge lies in mitigating the increasing hostility between those who called for recognition 
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between those who argue that transitional justice helps to establish accountability (Alai and 
Mue, 2010), and those who argue that it impedes the task of establishing national 
reconciliation (Paisley, 2012).  
 
However, by looking at a broader challenge within transitional justice literature itself, Kenyan 
situation is not novel. One of the major dilemmas in the field of transitional is that of how to 
strike a balance between the need to prosecute perpetrators and to promote negative peace. 
This has reinvigorated the old debate between the ‘logic of appropriateness’, based on liberal 
cosmopolitan and constructivist convictions that justice should precede negative peace 
(Orentlicher, 1991; Sikkink and Walling, 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), and the ‘logic 
of consequence’. The latter argues that, in the sequence of peace, justice should only be 
executed when it has been proven that it can realistically be achieved (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 
2004; Mendeloff, 2004; Graubart, 2010).  
 
However, the Kenyan case has demonstrated that the complex pursuit of justice and 
reconciliation entails more than simply delineating the asymmetrical relation between peace 
and justice. In reality, the administration of justice (either by the ICC or the TJRC) is not 
willfully opposed to satisfying the IDPs’ needs or meeting the broader reconciliation goals of 
the KNDR policy, and this is wisely illustrated in Kofi Anan words that, 
‘when you are riding in a train, and the train gets derailed, you are well advised to look 
backwards at the twisted rails to find out how you got to where you are, and then look ahead to 
find out how you now get to where you want to go. For Kenyans today, it is a question of 
doing just that: looking at the past to determine when and where the country got derailed. Once 
that is determined, you must fix and adjust the rails towards the direction of peace, justice and 




As such, throughout this thesis, I have continuously argued on how various agencies among 
the ruling class invokes the fictional clashed between peace and justice as a pretext to various 
political vendettas in its attempt to divert the judicial focus away from criminal accountability, 
restoration, restitution and reparation, which eventually hinders the overall performance of the 
ICC and TJRC in Kenya.  
 
Many conflict resolutionist scholars have noted, an important process in building peace after 
civil conflict is enhancing communication between various conflicting parties (Adegoju, 2009; 
Blake, 1998). The rhetorical language (or the kind of argumentation employed) used has a 
significant impact in revealing whether politics are fraught with conflict or accommodation.  
 
For that, a political psychological analysis of the language of peace, justice or reconciliation 
can provide important insights into the reasoning and characteristics of the speakers (Ishiyama 
and Backstrom, 2011: p.368). In such instances, while in the second part of the chapter 2 I 
have clarified the key vocabularies of ‘justice’, ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’, I have eventually 
illuminated how the debate on various transitional justice options among the Kenyan MPs 
(Chapter 3) and the vocabulary expressions of the aforementioned terms by the ICC’s suspects 
(Chapter 4) shows the level of conceptual complexity or ‘rhetorical decompressions’, in which 
the speakers are willing to use language that is less stark and confrontational and they 
recognises areas of compromise and shades of gray when engaging their political opponents 
(interview with IDP no. 71, Rift Valley, March 12, 2013). Such rhetorical languages are 
excessively evidence when these politicians engaged with Kenyan publics and international 
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actors who widely used the same vocabularies in more general understating that I have 
clarified in the Chapter 2.  
 
In short, such rhetorical decompressions itself is firstly sufficient in order to distinguish 
between a ‘superficial reconciliation’ and a genuine one when we considers their languages 
with their political actions in defying justice-seeking mechanisms. And finally, highlight the 
challenge of an effective communication in crisis mediation that triggers wider misperceptions 
of the terms in the public circle and establishes the baseline predispositions over time whether 
this rhetoric evolved and whether it really led to reconciliation process similar to more 
relatively to those found in places like South Africa and Argentina. 
 
C – Power and Ideology in Transitional Justice: Justice without Punishment? 
Throughout my observation in Kenya, I have discovered that there has been little discussion 
about power and ideology in the legal literature that examines to what extent the pursuit of 
transitional justice is capable of achieving reconciliation for victims without actual punishing 
the perpetrators. Can there be justice without there being a perpetrator or any form of 
punishment? If Foucault emphasised the difference in the functions of punishment during the 
period of the absolute monarch and after the introduction of the prison system, then Kenya’s 
judicial processes demonstrate the former functions rather than the latter, since the pursuit of 
justice is simply endorsed by the ruling class in order to publicly exercise their power but not 
to reconcile the victims with the perpetrators (1977). In this regards, I have shown that after 6 
year of the operations of the ICC and TJRC in Kenya, indicated two interesting features on 





I) Debating Accountability and Impunity in the Constellation of power Relations and 
Ideological Apparatus  
Attempts to mitigate the complexity of the political crisis in Kenya through the adoption of a 
one-size-fits-all model of conflict resolution may help to accelerate the process of flawed 
democratisation in the long term; for the time being, however it only empowers the ruling 
class and heightens IDPs’ collective sense of being excluded from judicial processes 
(interview with IDP no. 63, Rift Valley, March 10, 2013). The transitional justice mechanisms 
were mediated or came into force through the relational positions between the ICC’s suspects 
and the IDPs, particularly as a result of the patronage relations between the ruling class and 
various subaltern agents.  
 
In this aspect, viewing transitional justice as power allows us to understand how judicial 
processes emanated from discursive forms of accountability, yet the ruling class’ ability to 
replace these with discursive forms of impunity illuminate the relational position between the 
ruling class and the IDPs. Furthermore, contextualising such power relations within specific 
ideological apparatus (ICC and TJRC) helps to unravel the rhetorical agenda of partial justice, 
in which IDPs were forced to accept that their demands for justice were most likely to be met 
through the pursuit of restorative rather than retributive justice. However, the failure to 
provide the IDPs with reparation and restitution confirms that the actual inception of the TJRC 
was carried out with the aim of replacing the precondition for retributive justice specified in 




II) Transitional Justice as Politics: The Fascinating Intricacy between Law and Politics  
While the epistemic understanding of the liberal cosmopolitan approach to human rights and 
humanitarian projects in post-Cold War Kenya has confirmed the shared affinities of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding with rescuing the victims from conflict zones; the 
pursuit of transitional justice through liberal peacebuilding practices reveals the complexity of 
restoring order, and that the rule of law is heavily conditioned by politics. Navigating law and 
politics in both fields confirms Hazel Cameron’s identification of the ‘fascinating intricacy’ of 
the interaction between institutions of international law and international politics. In her study, 
Britain’s Hidden Roles in the Rwandan Genocide (2012: p.71), she demonstrates that an 
understandings of politics as the act of manipulation by the international elite is not 
immediately obvious to the casual observer. Such a tacit understanding of power and politics 
results in the creation of circumstances in which the western countries’ ability to perform the 
immediate tasks of upholding human rights and preventing genocide is highly influenced by 
their geostrategic and economic interests in Africa.  
 
For that, in Kenya, the moribund state of the ICC’s judicial administration, and the 
inconsistent stances of the western partners in relation to its proceedings, reveal the 
‘fascinating intricacy’ between law and politics (Brown and Raddatz, 2014). Equally 
important is the fact that, while the ICC’s quest to deliver justice is largely conditioned by 
external politics, the ruling class played a significant role in obstructing the justice cascade 
(interview with IDP no. 15, Rift Valley, February 12, 2012). Retrospectively, the situations 
that arose from the ICC’s indictments against its suspects and the TJRC’s primary aim of 
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national healing have reinvigorated an all–too–familiar debate about the misleading trade-off 
between accountability and impunity, or between justice and peace (Chapter 3).  
 
By adopting Ranciere’s assertion that politics begins when victims who cannot usually do 
anything to assert their rights through mass mobilisation and the inciting of civil strife. In 
these circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine the depoliticisation of the KNDR policy as a 
process in which those same victims become ‘convinced’ that they are incapable of doing 
anything significant. As a result, the elite conclude that the victims must be ‘guided’ by the 
state’s intelligentsia (2003: p.202). These assumptions that are continually exhibited by 
Kenyan politicians reveal the fundamental contradiction between human rights and the rule of 
the law by the victim on the one hand, and state nationalism and elite consciousness on the 
other. This leads to the ‘filtering’ of a set of human rights and justice that does not strengthen 
the post-conflict elite’s positions. This brings my next evaluations to the entire ICC’s 
operation in general. 
 
D – Lessons that ICC Should Learn from Kenya 
The final month of 2014 finally came an unceremonious conclusion when the ICC’s Chief 
Prosecutor announced its case against Kenyatta was too weak to proceed. Since the collapse of 
the most politically-sexy case of the Kenyan President of Kenyatta, some commentators 
highlights how the Chief Prosecutor’s anticipated move revealed the obstructive investigations 
launched by the ICC and reinforced the supranational court’s subjugation to the world politics, 
and how the success story of Kenyatta won the 2013 elections and defied the ICC served an 
example quashed an ICC’s first attempt to try a head of the state (Lynch, 2014a; 2014c). In 
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recent to this progress only confirmed the author’s interactions with the IDPs (Chapter 4) and 
two lessons could be indicated here: 
 
Firstly, ICC has in the past played safe by targeting only one side (mostly non-state actors), 
the ICC should wonder whether they need to stop targeting the both sides (the state and non-
state actors) of a conflict. There is a little evidence to deny the selectivity of the ICC’s justice. 
While most debates focused on the selectivity based on regions (Africa versus other regions), 
the reality of selectivity is mostly based on the situation preferred or reinforced the status quo 
of the sate actor, rather than prosecuting the state itself. To this date, the active five of the 
ICC’s interventions are either invited by the state or prosecuting mainly on the warlords; 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast and 
Mali. Besides issuing the warrant of arrest on Sudanese President of Bashir (2005) and Libyan 
late President Gadhafi (2011), Kenyan President of Kenyatta is the only case against the state 
ever attempted by the ICC.  
 
Secondly, the ICC had been under immense pressures to counter the popular depicted 
perceptions that it was a court that mete out selective justice and always sided with the 
government or the UN Security Council. As a result, the ICC’s Prosecutor decided to target 
the state leaders in Kenya in the name of justice against impunity. Additionally to that, the 
recent development of the Kenyatta’s case, have shown that it may triggers future chaos in the 
nation, especially when Kenyatta’s political allied during the 2013 election and his vice-
President, William Ruto remained secured in full trial, unless the unlikely event of weak 
evidence of the prosecutorial team against him as well. The heavy interactions between law 
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and politics exhibited in the ICC’s curious interactions with Kenya, when both opposing 
politicians during the 2007 elections joined political coalition that secured the 2013 election’s 
trophy, resulting a remarkable twist of fate, Kenya now had both president and vice-president 
charged by the ICC (Bosco, 2014).  
 
Many remained wonders how both infamous local Kenyan politicians have successfully 
crafted a narrative that pitted the ICC and its supporters among many of the Africa and 
international civil societies and victims as neocolonial tools being wielded by the powerful 
West against a vulnerable developing countries. As such future research is needed: 
 What is the likely factor that motivates ICC’s preference to investigate the non-state 
rather than the state actor? 
 Could the heavily focused on the non-state actor defined the success story of the 
international justice per see? 
 To what extend, the ICC intervention on the local peace process or on-going conflict 
triggers difficulties in prosecuting the head of the states? 
 What are the likely chances of improving the court to meet its positive feedbacks from 
the victims? 
 Should and would the ICC’s focused on the state actors improved the court’ positive 
feedback among the global human rights activists? 
 And finally, compared to other criminal indictees, why some of the ICC’s indictees 





Nevertheless, the ICC has been left battered and bruised. The open secret is that many within 
the court were quietly relieved that the case had collapsed and they could finally move on. But 
there is a danger in drawing the wrong lesson from the court’s intervention in Kenya. There is 
a risk that the prosecutorial team will look at itself and its record and say: ‘We tried to target 
both sides and we got burned. Let’s not do that again.’ It may be understandable that, for 
reasons of ensuring cooperation and enforcing arrest warrants, the ICC must be selective in 
who it targets for prosecution. But such pragmatism does not make it excusable. For 
international justice to be– and be perceived to be–legitimate, it must be impartial. When both 
sides of a given war have committed atrocities (which, of course, is the case in virtually all 
conflicts), that means targeting both sides for prosecution.  
 
Yes, the move to open an investigation proprio motu was audacious. Yes, the way the 
investigations were built deserves severe criticism and require introspection. Yes, the ICC got 
burned – politically and legally. But, no, the court should not revert back to the easy approach 
of siding with powerful actors and selectively targeting the enemies of governments and 
UNSC member-states. For that, it is important for us to higglights on the shortcomings of the 
system of criminality conditioned by the ICC’s operation next. 
 
E – System of Criminality, The Victim’s Rights and Transversal Dissent 
My reading within the secondary literature have confirmed my understanding upon the way 
the ICC operated have confirmed the normative ideas that the punishment of a perpetrator of 
crimes against humanity is a precondition for delivering justice to victims, and is a critical 
component of the transformation of war-torn societies into democracies (Teitel, 2000: p.25). 
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This transformation is affected so that a similar pattern of systematic abuse of human rights 
can be prevented from displaying itself in the future.  
 
There have been extensive discussions about the system of criminality in the ICC’s current 
proceedings; there is an ongoing debate surrounding the legality and viability of the focus on 
crimes committed by an individual, instead of collective accountability (for a uselful 
discussion, see Nollkaemper and Wilt, 2009b). The predominant focus on the big fish marks a 
clear development that has occurred in various ad-hoc tribunals since the 1990s, in their 
attempts to redefine and expand the prosecution of international war crimes to include 
atrocities committed during internal armed conflict (Haye, 2008: p.380). Before the trials at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY), it was nearly 
impossible to apply the principle of individual accountability, and eventually the legacy of the 
ICTY crystallised the focus on individual accountability. Additionally, the increase in this 
focus on individual accountability was catalysed by the establishment of the Rome Statute 
(p.381).  
 
However, some have raised concerns that the focus on the big fish may obscure the distinction 
between international and national crimes (White, 2009: p.318). Indeed, when Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi voiced his reservations about the ICC, he unintentionally 
acknowledged that prosecution of an individual leader like Slobodan Milosevic is substantially 
different from an individual being tried for an ordinary crime by a municipal court (Stacy, 
2010: p.86). As such, the atrocities committed in international crimes required a distinct 
understanding of legality, and a system of criminality that differs from that applied to 
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domestic or ordinary crime. This is owing to the systematic and political nature of 
international crime (p.87).  
 
In criticising the ICC’s focus on individual accountability, Nigel White has pointed out the 
reluctance of legal positivism to use the term of ‘state crime’, since the state (sovereignty) is a 
legal entity, and crime cannot be associated with the legal operation of the state by virtue of 
being unlawful (2009: p.328). However, international concerns about the unspeakable crimes 
addressed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have challenged the idea that the state apparatus 
is incapable of addressing war crimes (p.329). In theory, the danger of the ICC’s recent focus 
on the big fish in Kenya is that the state’s alleged crimes do not meet the threshold 
requirement for crimes against humanity; the prosecutor has not identified a specific policy 
that was systematically undertaken by the state (on behalf of the state actors) during the 
specified period of violence that can be connected to the crimes for which Kenyatta and Ruto 
are accused (see International Criminal Court., 2011). The challenge appears even more 
gigantic when one compares the ICC’s proceedings in Kenya with the Nuremberg trials or the 
proceedings of the ICTY. The ‘system criminality’ of the ICC (based on individual 
accountability) may challenge our understanding that it was possible for the unspeakable 
crimes to have been committed by the suspects without them having utilised state apparatus to 
orchestrate post-election violence.  
 
Realising such legal limitations (in indicting Kenyatta), the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) has added new forms of evidence to establish that Kenyatta (as a central part of the 
state system) has committed the crime of deliberately failing to prevent state security forces 
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from committing violence against unarmed civilians. By 2013, the OTP has also used 
evidence that he held secret meetings in order to mobilise the Mungiki criminal sect to displace 
supporters of the opposition (see Chapter 4: Table 4.2).  
 
The most legally daunting aspect of the OTP’s attempt to convince the judges is its sole focus 
on individual accountability, and the fact that it has not identified a specific policy that was 
systematically implemented by the state. Consequently, it is nearly impossible to draw 
parallels with the crimes of genocide addressed by the Nuremberg trials, and to establish a 
case for crimes against humanity if the prosecution of crimes committed during post-election 
violence focuses solely on individual accountability. It is this focus which makes it even 
harder to identify the systematic planning of such crimes by the state (collective entity). As 
such, other commentators have suggested the prosecution of international crimes should focus 
on both individual and collective accountabilities (Nollkaemper and Wilt, 2009a: p.395). 
Indeed, Tony Lang’s analysis of international justice suggests that a third court be established 
(in addition to the existing ICJ and ICC) to try crimes committed by non-state actors and 
terrorist groups (2008: p.138).  
 
Yet this reasoning does not take into account that in Kenya, politicians nor the ICC itself (or 
any suggested court) display any substantive willingness to address the victims’ collective 
rights to justice (fieldwork note no. 4, Rift Valley, April 7, 2013).  
 
The interaction between liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice (Chapter 2) emphasises 
the objectification of the victim through human rights, humanitarian laws and criminal laws 
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(Garcia-Godos and Sriram, 2013: p.5). While studies of public international law have 
identified the legal obligation of the victim to testify, the current legal focus on individual 
responsibility has limited the scope of the victim, and generally only concerns victims who 
choose to testify at the ICC’s proceedings (Pena and Carayon, 2013: p.534). As I have 
discussed in the Chapter 4, the IDPs have continued to be victimised, and are treated as objects 
of evidence by the ICC. They are also subject to political manipulation at the hands of the 
national elite, which affects their livelihood at the camps. As such, they expressed their 
rejection of the ICC by voting for the ICC’s suspects in the 2013 election.  
 
Indeed, the shift from optimism to cynicism was quantitatively documented by one of the 
polls: Ipsos-Synovate (2013a). In November 2011 and February 2012, Ipsos-Synovate 
concluded that the majority of Kenyans would not vote for the ICC suspects in the 2013 
election, and that they firmly believed that justice could only be delivered by the ICC (Ipsos-
Synovate, 2011; 2012). However, after the 2013 election, the number of Kenyans who were 
optimistic about the ICC had dropped from 50% in November 2012 to 35% by July 2013 
(Ipsos-Synovate, 2013b). The respondents mostly cited Kenyatta’s official position as 
president as the main reason for why they believed that his ICC trial would be continuously 
delayed and eventually dropped. 15% of the respondents also believed that Kenyatta would 
win his case at the ICC.  
 
While the limited size of the sample collected by this quantitative survey prevents us from 
establishing a precise trend in IDPs’ attitudes towards the ICC, the shifting preferences of the 
Kenyan population reveal the most important aspect of the ICC’s proceedings. The extensive 
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documentation of the ICC’s proceedings has only confirmed the dominant perspective that 
justice, as it is understood by the ICC and the Kenyan political class, does not accord with the 
IDPs’ understanding of it. In such instances, the IDPs’ everyday narratives and acts of 
resistance represent a crucial bottom-up perspective on justice- and reconciliation-seeking 
policy.  
 
Indeed, Roland Beiker has argued the necessity of making ‘conceptual breaks with the existing 
understanding of global politics [in order] to recognize trans-territorial dissident practices and 
to comprehend the processes through which they exert human agency’ (2000: p.273). The top-
down approach, or the ‘long tradition of conceptualizing global politics in state centric ways’, 
have reinforced the binary distinction between international and national domains in a region 
where such a distinction is highly contested (p.273). As a result, various agencies have 
become ‘unrecognized, or at least untheorized’ (p.273). Only the shifting of the analysis of 
global politics from a top-down to a bottom-up perspective makes it possible to identify the 
‘transversal site of contestation’ in which ‘one’s investigative gaze must be channeled…more 
on various forms of connections, resistances, identity formations and other political flows that 
transgress the spatial giveness of global politics’ (p.274).  
 
Given that the nature of the African state (Chapter 3) has proven itself to be unreachable to 
marginalised IDPs (see also Thomson, 2013b), it is suggested here that their everyday 
narratives and acts of resistance should be read as an alternative political trajectory for the 
state. These narratives and acts of resistance can help us to determine how the state came into 
being, as a result of the power relations and ideological apparatus of the policies implemented 
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by the international and national elite (Chapter 3). In the context of Kenya’s state-society 
relations, the IDPs’ various responses display a language of resistance and rejection, which is 
not only counter-productive to the justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy, but also to the 
ICC’s proceedings. It also weakens the ruling class’ power position, in that the victims’ acts of 
resistance revealed the ruling class’s hidden agenda of politicisation in its national debate 
(Mueller, 2014: p.13). These acts of resistance also challenged the ICC’s vague narrative of 
justice and peace for the victims (Brown and Raddatz, 2014: p.8), which taught the wananchi 
to be wiser in their dealings with the Kenyan ruling class and individual members of the ICC. 
 
F- The Important of the IDP on ICC Proceedings: The Everyday Resistance  
Throughout this thesis analysis, I have also discovers the idea of justice became essentially 
obsolete. The predominant narratives were about Kenya or the entire African Union 
establishments versus the ICC. Yet few asked the fundamental question: how will justice be 
served for the dead and displaced victims from the 2008 crisis? 
 
Throughout my analysis within this thesis, I have hinted the answer by phrasing the title of my 
thesis in the form of question: justice without punishment? Six years after the violence and left 
1200 dead and 300, 000 IDPs, only one murder has been investigated and there is no 
indication of other international crimes committed by the small and medium level of the 
thousands were committed will ever be investigated, or the perpetrators will be brought to 
justice. In this partial justice sequence, justice and reconciliation was not a goal for those who 
perished or remained displaced, rather justice could only be served if the politically targeted of 
the big fish–Kenyatta and Ruto–were left alone (interview with IDP no. 53, Rift Valley, 
March 7, 2013). It won’t be surprised to many displaced victims that the collapse of 
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Kenyatta’s case is the pretext of the Kenyan ruling class that justice has been delivered. Two 
instructive lessons can be drawn from the focused on the IDPs upon transitional justice: 
 
I) Different Levels of Understanding of Justice Validates the Unsuccessful Political 
Reconciliation  
Firstly, the IDPs’ narratives confirm the reality that, while power-sharing puts an end to direct 
violence, the actual process of social repair and restituting and reintegrating the victims and 
survivors into society has not yet been completed. Sanctioning transitional justice mechanisms 
within such negative peace conditions–or normalising criminal offences in the everyday life of 
Kenyans–may increase the difficulty of identifying specific evidence for successful 
reconciliation. Furthermore, it creates difficulties in determining the ability of transitional 
justice mechanisms to establish sustainable peace. While the 2008 post-election violence was 
not repeated in the aftermath of the 2013 election, the transitional justice mechanisms did not 
succeed in establishing political reconciliation, peaceful democratic consolidation or in putting 
an end to ethnic chauvinism. Consequently, this has renewed the prospect of future unrest, 
especially if such unrest is connected to the same factor of impunity that the ICC and TJRC 
are currently attempting to combat (Cheeseman et al., 2014).  
 
Given the ICC’s ongoing proceedings and the TJRC’s ineffectual attempts to award 
reparations, it is impossible to assert that both transitional justice mechanisms have fulfilled 
their specific mandates, and the mid- and long-term objectives specified by the KNDR 
agreement. Certainly, it is true that violence has been prevented, the electoral body has been 
reformed, the new constitution and tougher laws for unethical media reports have been 
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promulgated and devolution (instead of the centralization of power in the hands of one single, 
imperial president) has been effected.  
 
However, those who cite such institutional examples as evidence that justice and reconciliation 
has taken its course ignore the complex roles of neo-patrimonialism, informal norms and 
political collusion that have governed the political dynamics of modern Kenya. The 2013 
elections were far from being free and fair, but they were definitely peaceful. However, such 
peacefulness was not owing to the ICC’s interventions, but to Kenyatta and Ruto’s strategic 
calculations of mobilising their ethnic powerhouse against Rahila Odinga’s blatant support for 
the ICC. Exposing the nature of transitional justice mechanisms through the power relations 
and ideological apparatus on which they are based uncovers the continuing pervasion of neo-
patrimonial logic.  
 
Even after five years since the establishment of these mechanisms, there is still more room for 
the issuing of recognisable mandates for justice and reconciliation. It can be concluded that, 
while the interaction between transitional justice and peacebuilding is provided with a nexus 
by epistemological assumptions about victimhood, transitional justice and peacebuilding can 
also become nemeses when their hybrid practices are not connected to the victim. 
 
II) Between International and Local: The ‘Distance’ between Transitional Justice and 
Victims 
The overwhelming politicisation of justice in Kenya has ensured that, while there has been an 
abundance of sophisticated scholarly publications on transitional justice over the past two 
decades, these publications have suffered from a tendency to follow a univariate direction; this 
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has led to the disconnection of the discussion of transitional justice options from the local 
contingency of the case study (Ramirez-Barat, 2014). The IDPs’ perspectives on which this 
thesis primarily focuses indicate two main assumptions concerning the administration of 
justice: the idea that justice delayed is justice denied, and the idea that justice hurried is justice 
buried. The first assumption is displayed in the ruling class’ shifting of preference between the 
ICC and the TJRC; the second relates to the immediate period following the release of the 
TJRC’s report, in which no substantive targets for administering justice in the form of 
retribution, restoration, restitution and reparation have been reached  (interview with IDP no. 
55, Rift Valley, March 8, 2013). 
 
While this thesis agrees with Godfrey Musila in his assertion that the ICC needs to develop a 
comprehensive template for restorative justice that is derived from Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute, this process would be open to the more practical danger of putting forward an 
institutional design for global restorative justice without substantive methods implementation. 
In Kenya, the ruling class dominated the proceedings of both the ICC and the TJRC in their 
focus on the ICC’s suspects, but not on the reconciliation needs of the entire political 
community. These transitional justice mechanisms were seen as responsible for creating a 
‘political boundary’ between the state and its citizens, as well as a boundary between those in 
power and those who were systematically victimised by the state (interview with IDP no. 46, 
Rift Valley, March 6, 2013).  
 
Those who were directly affected by the violence did not feel that they were being ‘treated’ by 
the measures, because the measures were ethnically and politically structured. It is equally 
 
 455
important to recognise the danger of establishing a binary dichotomy between victim and 
perpetrator in focusing exclusively on the victims’ perspectives. Additionally, the TJRC’s 
extensive coverage of victims’ testimonials has been criticised by many IDPs for not actually 
being accurate (interview with IDP no. 36, Rift Valley, April 4, 2013). 
 
However, the process of identifying what ‘truth’ means to the IDPs is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, and requires more relevant methods (such as those of ethnography) and a longer 
research period. The IDPs’ narratives also informed us about the limitations of the ICC in 
delivering broader forms of justice. This confirms Godfrey Musila’s thesis regarding the 
inability of the ICC to protect victims in Africa (2009b). This inability is partly owing to the 
TJRC’s difficulty in complying with the Kenyan government’s demands for restitution and 
reparation, especially in relation to the land resettlement scheme, which discuss next. 
 
G- Lessons from TJRC to Future Truth Commissions 
Throughout my observation of the TJRC, and the way its interacted with the displaced victims 
have revealed that while the transitional justice at the national level bridged the gap between 
the humanitarian concerns that guided the thrust of the Kenya’s truth commission and the 
IDPs, yet the IDPs do not received enough concrete benefits from the commission’s final 
report, and transitional justice institutions could sometime hinders their actual reparations 
when its operations undermined the national authority. Interestingly while Kenya facing the 
complexity of TJRC’s operations, the UN Human Rights Council established the mandate of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of 




In short this latest global human rights developments signified the judicial and non-judicial 
concepts of transitional justice institution, namely the truth commission and the ICC as the 
practical strategy for confronting with the past violations of human rights. Furthermore, 
through the Special Rapporteur periodical reports for the 2012 and 2013 in accordance o the 
above resolution submitted to the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council, the term 
‘transitional justice’ is used to describe the comprehensive package of addressing the past 
violations of human rights (Hansen, 2013b: p.320). In this regards, the overall transitional 
justice options debated in Kenya resonates very well with the UN aspirations of confronting 
the past violations of human rights (Asaala and Dicker, 2013b: p.134). In producing its 
periodic report, the Special Rapporteur have visited many war-torn societies, including 
Uruguay, Guatemala, Guinea, Nepal, Tunisia and Spain with pending visits for Brazil, Ivory 
Coast, Democratic republic of Congo Indonesia, Rwanda and Kenya. Given the misleading 
trade off between peace and justice in Kenya, a visit to Kenya are highly welcome by most 
civil societies (Asaala and Dicker, 2013a: p.324). This is mainly because the Special 
Rapporteur’s mandate that stresses that transitional justice are ‘neither meant to be “soft form 
of justice” nor a means of pursuing the aim of political reconciliation by passing the 
implementation of the four scopes its mandate, namely ‘truth’, ‘justice’, ‘reparation’ and 
‘guarantees of non-recurrence of human rights violation’ (The U.N, 2012). 
 
However, lessons for future truth commissions should consider the situations from Kenya. In 
this respect, despite the concerted efforts of the TJRC in producing the final report, it lacks 
three major factors that spanned the overall timeframes of its operations; firstly, the legitimacy 
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and local ownership factors at the initial stage of its formation, the political wills of the 
government in mediating or conflicting its jurisdiction during its operation, and finally, the 
civil society’s active and constructive engagements in its overall evaluations (Asaala and 
Dicker, 2013a:  p.330). For that future research is required to investigate: 
 whether the aforementioned three factors could be the likely variables in 
measuring the effectiveness of the truth commission; 
 under what likely and unlikely environments, the politically conditions of 
certain truth commissions are successful from other commissions; 
  what is the likely chances of success story for combining the TJRC works with 
the ICC operations within politically constrained environments; 
 does the participation various local agencies and non-state actors produces for 
greater results of the final report’s implementation; 
 how to measure the agents/actors interactions with the truth commissions and 
finally; 
 under what likely and unlikely environments fosters the civil society’s greater, 
critical and constructive engagements with the truth commission.  
 
Nevertheless, the above has more or less hinted the future navigation for research in relations 
to the IDPs. However, more investigations required for understanding the relationship between 
the IDP and truth commission, which discussed next. 
 
H – The Displacement Agendas within Transitional Justice Research 
The IDPs’ perspectives challenge the narratives of justice and reconciliation as they are 
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understood by the state. The IDPs’ non-state perspectives provide rare new insights into the 
disproportionate focus on the domains of state security in African politics. As Surren Pillay 
(2013: p.75.) has noted, the predominant approach of studying African politics from the 
perspective of state security domains has increased the difficulty of gauging the public’s 
political imagination of the concept of community. As a result, there is a dearth of studies that 
examine the lives of African heterogeneous societies within displaced camps.  
 
I) Legal Framework for ‘Durable Solutions’: Bridging the Gaps between Transitional 
Justice and Displacement Issues 
In discussing the significant of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, 
Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence by the pursuant to Resolution 18/7, the above 
sections have also illustrated how the idea of protecting individuals has come to play a central 
role in both liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice concerned with ameliorating human 
sufferings and bettering the human condition. For that, the long standing concept of protection 
as the obligation of the state with regards to their citizens have been progressively expanded 
by post-Cold War developments. The right-based approaches have structured the humanitarian 
conditions of displaced individuals which specified that states are not merely expected but 
obligated to protect the lives, integrity, property, welfare and dignity of citizens within their 
jurisdictions, namely the sovereign responsibility (Williams, 2012: pp.85-86). Coupled 
together with the notion of human security as adopted by the UN General Assembly’s 2005 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the codification of the ICC’s Rome Statute in 
2003 and the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence by the pursuant to Resolution 18/7 represents the extent to 
which the assertion of human rights confirmed the central ideas of reparations and restitutions 
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for the displaced victims. As a result, the 2001 UN Guidelines for the IDPs’ convictions of 
rights to restitution of housing, land and property or in the form of physical and legal 
restoration of wrongfully taken assets in the wake civilian displacements was largely 
understood by state parties as a practical necessity for reversing the atrocity effects of ethnic 
cleansing, genocide and mass violence (Bradley, 2012: p.197). 
 
Given the sophisticated legalisation of the aforementioned various international documents, 
there is a reasonably substantive grounds for the future truth commissions to follow the similar 
footsteps of the Kenya’s TJRC. In the final 2013 report, TJRC recommended the government 
to respect its legal obligation as a rectifier of the 2001 UN Guiding Principles for IDPs, as 
well as calling the government to take necessary steps to domesticating the regional and sub-
regional legal frameworks that governed the protection of the displaced victims (see T.J.R.C., 
2013: Vol. 4.). The Kenya’s new constitutions have enshrined the specific bill of rights and the 
2012’s IDP Act, but I believe that there is still a gap between such grand legal frameworks 
with the actual short- and long- terms plans for providing the reparations and restitutions of 
the IDPs (interview with IDP no. 11, Rift Valley, February 11, 2012). As such, I would 
suggest that the TJRC’s recognition of the ‘durable solutions’ identified in the UN Guiding 
Principles for the IDPs should be accompanied with the pending adoptions of the sub-regional 
legal frameworks of the IDP, as well simultaneously implemented through the adoption of the 
2005 Pinheiro Principles109 that posited a general guideline for the actual operation of the 
                                                        
109  The Pinheiro Principles containts full text of an important new international standard which outlines the 
rights of refugees and displaced persons to return not only to their countries when they see fit to do so, but to 
their original homes and lands as well. The Pinheiro Principles are the culmination of more than a decade of 
international and local activities in support of the emerging right to housing and property restitution as a core 
remedy to displacement, see (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions. , 2010) 
 
 460
restitutions of land, housing and property for the IDPs. This not only directly touched on the 
land needs of the Kenyan IDPs, but also pushed for speedy momentum for building more 
robust framework. Yet I have observed, neither sets of recommendations have been acted 
upon. 
 
In contrast, the IDPs’ needs for restitution and reparation have been replaced with immediate 
patronage rewards during the 2013 election (Chapter 5). Since May 2008, the government has 
launched various operations in order to pressure the IDPs to resettle, including cutting off their 
food and water and applying political pressure instead of providing socio-economic support 
(Klopp and Sheekh, 2011). This obviously violated the country’s legal ratification of the 
regional pact on Security, Stability and Development, which is supposed to guide the 
government’s policy in relation to displaced victims, upholding a protocol of protection that 
ensures that IDPs are successfully reintegrated and rehabilitated back into society (Klopp and 
Sheekh., 2008: p.19).  
 
While this thesis explicitly focused on the IDPs from the 2008 crisis, there are urgent 
attentions for mitigating the increasing displacements issues in the long-term (interview with 
IDP no. 37, Rift Valley, April 7, 2012). It was unfortunate that, while the country had 
endorsed such a regional treaty and promulgated the 2012 Act of IDP, the 2008 crisis did not 
elicit a heightened degree of transnational pressure on the government to fulfil its 




The current living conditions of the post-election violence IDPs illustrated in this thesis 
suggest the Kenyan government’s violation of Section 5, Principle 28 (1) of the above Act, 
since the government’s politicisation of the ICC and TJRC’s proceedings indicate that it has 
violated its primary duty to establish conditions that allow the IDPs to resettle with ‘safety’ 
and ‘dignity’ (Republic of Kenya, 2012: p.2245). In addition, the government’s attempt to 
politicise both the ICC and the TJRC has ‘arbitrarily deprived’ the IDPs of their collective 
rights to reparation, restitution, rehabilitation and resettlement, which violates section 2, 
Principles 10 (2) and (3) respectively (p.2255).  
 
In the second half of 2012, about 116,000 people were newly displaced due to violence 
resulting from a combination of ethnic, political and economic factors (United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014). Following a 2010 constitutional reform, 
in 2013 power was devolved from the central to the local level. Election-related violence is 
also being decentralised. Devolution offers opportunities but it also carries risks, as 
communities compete against each other for representation (particularly for the post of 
governor). In northern Kenya, the days prior to the March 2013 general election saw a 
significant movement of population from Ethiopia into Kenya, which inflamed clan tensions 
in Mandera, resulting in the temporary displacement of 7,000 people (The United Nations 
Children's Funds., 2013). Before the 2013 elections, cattle’s rustling was often used as a cover 
for political violence. Pastoralists in various locations confirmed both an increase in raids and 
the political nature of the violence (interview with local pastoralist, Rift Valley, March 1, 
2013).  However, with the exception of some serious localised incidents, the elections turned 




There have been new displacements since UNHCR released its January 2013 estimate. In 
2013, 55,000 were reported to be newly displaced as a result of political, inter-communal and 
resource-based violence particularly in the counties of Marsabit and Mandera (United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013). Over 2,800 people were reported 
to be newly displaced due to inter-ethnic violence along the border separating the counties of 
Kericho and Kisumu in March 2014 (Kenya Red Cross., 2014). Tens of thousands more have 
been displaced by disasters. In 2013, floods destroyed homes, property and livelihoods 
throughout the country and displaced nearly 180,300 people, though most of them returned 
after a short time (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013). 
This number of people newly displaced by floods is an increase over the 2012 figure of 97,600 
people (Editor., 2014). 
 
For that, improving the availability of comprehensive data on IDPs disaggregated by age, 
gender and location (including those in urban settings) is paramount. In 2012, Chaloka Beyani, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs urged the government to develop 
accurate, comprehensive and disaggregated data-collection and database/registration systems 
inclusive of all categories of IDPs, and to undertake at the earliest opportunity a 
comprehensive data-collection exercise with a view to considering how best to identify, assess 
and respond to IDPs’ assistance, protection and durable-solution needs, with particular 
attention to vulnerable groups (Beyani, 2012). The great majority of IDPs in Kenya does not 
live in camps (interview with IDP no. 20, Rift Valley, February 17, 2012). For example, only 
about 4,700 of the more than 34,000 displaced by violence in Tana River County in 2012/13 
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gathered in camps (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). The vast majority fled to 
various villages and towns within Tana River and the neighbouring counties of Kilifi, 
Mombasa and Lamu. 
 
II) The IDP, Citizenship and Human Rights 
By observing the livelihoods of the IDPs, it was evidence that the mechanisms for promoting 
national unity and for healing ethnic tensions in the wake of the electoral crisis have proven to 
be vague and vastly disconnected from those who remain vulnerable and displaced (interview 
with IDP no. 33, Rift Valley, March 16, 2012). The current living conditions of the IDPs, and 
the default necessity of their moving to the slums after the camps had been closed by the 
government, fit very well with Hannah Arendt’s descriptions of displaced citizens or subjects 
who live ‘beyond the legal existence of the state or the state’s authority’, in that violent 
conflict becomes an enduring force that shapes the placement of an individual human being in 
relation to his or her state of security (Oman, 2010).  
 
In this regards, the scholarly literature on citizenship and the nation-state in Africa has little to 
say about IDPs, as its tend to be perceived as either citizens who have been officially 
disenfranchised or economic migrants. Undoubtedly forced IDP’s flows, largely reflect the 
failure of the nation-building project wherein the pursuit of national identity is subordinated 
by elite competition and social group exclusion. Although technically citizens, thanks to 





As such the focused on the IDPs here revealed the diversity politics in relations to the question 
of citizenship and subjectivity in the twenty first century of Africa (see also Daley, 2013). The 
diversity of Kenya’s plural societies speak tremendously to the state power, resulting the 
construction of modern state based on the ideas of inclusivity and exclusivity of certain groups 
while inherited the repressive functions of the colonial state system (Chapter 3). Having 
inherited the various competing social groups in the early period of post-independence Kenya, 
nation building were seen as a precondition for sovereignty and the promotion of differences, 
whether on the basis of class, race, ethnicity or gender, what termed by Foucault as 
‘biopoliticcs’ (see Foucault, 1997a). Such diversity often maintained through violence, 
economic disparity and political segregations resulting unequal treatments of individual rights 
and claims to humanity (Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014: p.545). This brings the whole ideas 
of unequal political and economic treatments of various ethnic groups in Kenya before major 
crises to different projections of citizenship and shaped the current treatment of the IDPs. 
 
In this matter, Mahmood Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996) could be cited to drawn our attention to the bifurcated 
colonial state with its different legal system. In settler societies only whites settlers and 
urbanised Africans were recognised as citizens under modern Roman law; the rest of the 
population were subjects and governed by customary law. Independent African states used 
nation building as a means of defining their modernity and exerting sovereignty over their 
citizens. According to Herbst, citizenship laws in Africa became salient only after 
independence, with the ‘creation of the concept of the foreigner’ (see 2000b). Independent 
states were relatively successful in promoting distinctive nationalist traits, which, however, 
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started to lose meaning during the economic crisis of the 1980s and the imposition of 
structural adjustment. 
 
More recently scholars have noted the turn away from nation building in African states and the 
fiercely contested nature of local territorial identity, often with appeals to colonial history for 
definition. This trend has been attributed to two tendencies: the neoliberal retreat of the state 
from the economy and public service delivery, and the emergence of competitive politics 
resulting from democratisation (Daley, 2013: pp.900-901). Neoliberalism helped to undermine 
citizenship rights, despite claims that citizens can be empowered through new governance 
mechanisms and to certain extends constraining the transitional justice institutions in Kenya to 
empower the IDPs through restitutions and reparations. 
 
Nevertheless, the precarity faced by IDPs cannot be separated from ongoing debates about 
citizenship in Kenya and Africa generally (interview with IDP no. 32, Rift Valley, March 16, 
2012). Under neo-liberalism states no longer subscribe to public service obligations to 
citizens, much less to non-citizens. Despite peace agreements, successive elections, power 
sharing, transitional justice and donor-funded programmes of reconstruction and stabilisation, 
those people forcedly displaced from their homes tend to lose their rights of belonging—social 
and political citizenship—especially as their ‘otherness’ prevents them from articulating their 
entitlements, at a time when access is being linked to existential claims of indigeneity or 
whatever criteria are deemed appropriate by the powerful national elites (see also Lynch, 
2011a). Displacement has, therefore, placed ordinary people in seemingly insurmountable 
situations of social and economic marginality that are not resolved by repatriation and 
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integration into host societies (interview with IDP no. 26, Rift Valley, March 8, 2012). 
 
Considering such an understanding, this thesis illuminates the divergent critical 
understandings of Kenyan state and its complex relation to external actors, as well as the 
subjective and plural understanding of socio-legal terms like ‘justice’, ‘peace’ and 
‘reconciliation’ in the everyday life of wananchi. Simultaneously however, the relationship 
between Kenyan government and its displaced citizens is complicated by the existence of 
international humanitarian regimes and human rights documents that rectified through the 
domestication of these documents in Kenya’s municipal laws (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, 2012). While these documents priorities the respect of the state 
sovereignty and its legitimacy in assisting their own IDPs and consolidating the control over 
their hinterland borders, the state’s unequal treatments of every citizens have not evidently 
fixed the social conviction among the IDPs that they belongs to the state national territory (see 
Lonsdale, 2008). Humanitarian convictions of transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding, 
though of critical importance at times of emergency, has unexpected and adverse outcomes in 
the long term, some of which may be counter to effective integration or reintegration. 
Transitional justice processes should be viewed as being complicit in the reconfiguration of 
citizenship and identity that is taking place in the country after the 2008 crisis. 
 
For that, the establishment of forms of peace, justice and reconciliation that are satisfactory to 
the IDPs remains a formidable task, since the government is rapidly closing the IDP camps 
without addressing the IDPs needs for rehabilitation and restitution (interview with HRW 
officer no. 2, Nairobi, February 28, 2012). The existence of the IDP camps has become a 
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‘permanent feature’ of Kenya’s recent history (Waki, 2009; p.271). These violations challenge 
the prevailing political perception among the Kenyan ruling class that the IDPs are the 
responsibility of institutions that provide international humanitarian relief, rather than the 
state. This situation has also increased the conviction among ordinary Kenyans that the 
proliferation in the number of displaced populations and illegal settlements over the last five 
years has created a scenario in which the outbreak of political violence seems probable, as a 
means of silencing any voices of dissent that continue to demand that leaders be brought to 
justice for their atrocities (interview with IDP no. 25, Rift Valley, March 8, 2012). 
 
Thus far, the timeframe required has been vaguely specified using the simple premise that 
where there is a beginning there must also be an end or ‘closure’ to this process, so that 
lessons can be inferred and applied as conflict resolution models in future attempts to prevent 
the outbreak of political violence. As Harvey Weinstein (2011: p.1) argues, the word ‘closure’ 
has become ‘ubiquitous’ in any discussion of legal mechanisms being sanctioned after violent 
conflict has ceased. Weinstein also cites the proliferation of land disputes following the TRC’s 
report in post-apartheid South Africa, as evidence of the danger of romanticising justice and 
reconciliation efforts and measuring them in terms of closure.  
 
If there is a primary theme in concluding the analysis of justice and reconciliation in Kenya, it 
is crucial to recognise the ‘myth of closure’ initiated by the KNDR policy. The proliferation of 
studies on international intervention in countries that have undergone democratisations has 
increased the pressure on policymakers and academics to measure the specific timeframe 
required to implement the net effect of transitional justice as part of liberal peacebuilding. This 
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pressure has been heightened by the astronomical cost of establishing tribunals and truth 
commissions, which are either fully sponsored by the taxpayer’s money or by international 
donors and humanitarian funds. 
 
On the basis of narratives of residents of the IDP camps, it can be deduced here that, while 
large-scale post-election violence has not been repeated during the 2013 election, the current 
situation of ‘stabilised hostility’ or ‘negative peace’ has contributed to the relative dearth of 
conclusive evidence as to what defines a ‘successful transitional justice prescription’. There is 
more disagreement rather than agreement regarding whether to opt for quantitative or 
qualitative methods in studying transitional justice. The empirical evidence obtained from 
quantitative method of examining the positive and negative causal effects of transitional 
justice mechanisms is still insufficient (Olsen et al., 2010a: p.15).  
 
However, the single case approach and qualitative methods adopted by this thesis in analysing 
transitional justice in Kenya cannot be easily applied to other countries (Thoms et al., 2010: 
p.352). While the installation of the TJRC was inspired by South Africa’s TRC, it has proven 
to be tricky to apply in the context of Kenya. As a result of such methodological limitations, 
any ambitious attempts to implement successful justice- and reconciliation-seeking policy in 
Kenya have remained politically unsuccessful. If the current administration under the 
stewardship of Kenyatta can put an end to the recurring cycle of violence and displacement, 
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10 Lecturer (no.1), University 
of Nairobi 
Nairobi, Kenya March 18, 
2009 
6 
11 Lecturer (no. 2) University 
of Nairobi 
Nairobi, Kenya March 18, 
2009 
261 
12 Lecturer (no. 3) US 
International University 
Nairobi, Kenya March 23, 
2009 
6 










15 ECCC observer (no. 1) Paris, France November 27, 
2010 
172-3 
16 ECCC observer (no.2) Paris, France November 28, 
2010 
172 
15 ECCC observer (no.3) Paris, France November 29, 
2010 
172 
16 IJR officer Cape Town, 
South Africa 
July 15, 2011 8, 185, 
258, 276, 
17 Local lawyer Cairo, Egypt July 22, 2011 173 
18 Lecturer (no. 4) The 
American University 
Cairo, Egypt July 23, 2011 34 




20 TJRC officer (no.2) Nairobi, Kenya February 6, 
2012 
279 




22 TJRC officer (no. 4) Nairobi, Kenya February 7, 
2012 
186, 367 
23 CIC officer (no.1) Nairobi, Kenya February 7, 
2012 
8 
24 CIC officer (no. 2) Nairobi, Kenya February 7, 
2012 
77 
25 Lecturer (no. 5), University 
of Nairobi 
Nairobi, Kenya February 7, 
2012 
38 








































34 USAID officer Nairobi, Kenya February 15, 
2012 
71, 393 



























40 City Council Nairobi, Kenya February 20, 
2012 
411 





42 Smallholding farmer (no.1) Nairobi, Kenya February 24, 
2012 
321, 332 














46 HRW officer (no.1) Nairobi, Kenya February 27, 
2012 
95, 336 
47 HRW officer (no. 2) Nairobi, Kenya February 28, 
2012 
466 
48 KNHRC officer (no.1) Nairobi, Kenya February 28, 
2012 
269 
49 IDP (no. 22) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 2, 2012 271 
50 KNHRC officer (no.2) Nairobi, Kenya March 2, 2012 117, 271 
51 Former Mungiki member Nairobi, Kenya March 2, 2012 231 
52 IDP (no. 23) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 2, 2012 336 
53 US Embassy officer Nairobi, Kenya March 4, 2012 189-90, 
231, 274, 
280 
54 Canadian High Commission 
officer 
Nairobi, Kenya March 6, 2012 274, 322 
55 IDP (no. 24) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 7, 2012 201-2, 
267, 334 
56 IDP (no. 25) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2012 466 
57 IDP (no. 26) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2012 465 
58 IDP (no. 27) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2012 341 
59 IDP (no. 28) Nairobi, Kenya March 8, 2012 155, 336 
60 IDP (no 29) Nairobi, Kenya March 8, 2012 164 
61 Street Musician, (IDP no. 
30) 
Nairobi Kenya March 9, 2012 193 
62 NPI officer Nairobi, Kenya March 10, 
2012 
272, 396 






























69 Kenyan Government officer 
(no.1) 
Nairobi, Kenya March 17, 
2012 
123, 155 
70 UNDP officer Nairobi, Kenya March 17, 
2012 
193 





72 Kenyan Government officer 
(no.2) 
Nairobi, Kenya March 18, 
2012 
274, 350 
73 Ministry of Finance, Kenya Nairobi, Kenya March 24, 
2012 
272 
74 Local squatter (no. 35) Nairobi, Kenya April 3, 2012 273 
75 IDP (no. 36) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
April 4, 2012 455 
76 IDP (no. 37) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
April 7, 2012 460 
77 IDP (no. 38) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
April 10, 2012 332 
78 AU officer (no. 1) Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
April 14, 2012 120, 159, 
173, 185, 
262 
79 AU officer (no.2) Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
April 15, 2012 122, 275, 
277 







81 Local pastoralist Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 1, 2013 461 
82 KNHRC officer (no. 3) Nairobi, Kenya March 1, 2013 320, 335, 
340, 342, 
351 
83 IDP (no. 39) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 2, 2013 201, 346 
84 IDP (no. 40) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 2, 2013 301 
85 IDP (no. 41) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 2, 2013 304, 305, 
346 
86 IDP (no. 42) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 2, 2013 305 
87 IDP (no. 43) Nairobi, Kenya March 3, 2013 305, 346 
88 IDP (no. 44) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 6, 2013 327 
89 IDP (no. 45) Nairobi, Kenya March 6, 2013 331 
100 IDP (no. 46) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 6, 2013 454 
101 IDP (no. 47) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 6, 2013 344 
102 IDP (no. 48) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 6, 2013 347 
103 IDP (no. 49) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 7, 2013 349 
104 IDP (no. 50) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 7, 2013 349 
105 IDP (no. 51) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 7, 2013 330 




107 IDP (no. 53) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 7, 2013 451 
108 IDP (no. 54) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2013 329 
109 IDP (no. 55) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2013 454 
110 IDP (no. 56) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2013 337-338 
111 IDP (no. 57) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 8, 2013 337 
112 IDP (no. 58) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 9, 2013 338 
113 IDP (no. 59) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 9, 2013 338 
114 IDP (no. 60) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 9, 2013 342, 343 
115 IDP (no. 61) Rift Valley, 
Kenya 
March 9, 2013 331 
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